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PREFACE 
 
The research reported here was originally commissioned by the Legal Services 
Commission in 2000 and completed in 2006.  It has been co-ordinated throughout by 
a team of senior researchers consisting of Professors Lee Bridges of the University of 
Warwick, Ed Cape of the University of the West of England, Richard Moorhead of 
the University of Cardiff, and Avrom Sherr of the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, University of London, all of whom were also involved in various aspects of 
data collection.  Anona Mitchell was employed as a Research Fellow on the project 
from 2001 to 2005 and in particular took overall responsibility for co-ordinating the 
extensive fieldwork across the six areas studied (Birmingham, Cheltenham, 
Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Pontypridd and Swansea) and organisation of the resulting 
data.  Ed Cape undertook the peer review of investigation stage cases, and he and 
Avrom Sherr were responsible for the recruitment and training of the peer reviewers 
during the proceedings stage of the research.  Richard Moorhead and Clair Wilkins 
conducted the bulk of the statistical analysis of the results of the research, other than 
the multivariate analysis, which was carried out by Professor Paul Fenn of the 
University of Nottingham.    
 
Paul Fenn also provided general statistical advice, while Professor Alan Paterson of 
the University of Strathclyde advised on our findings and their relation to studies of 
public defenders in other jurisdictions.   Peta Sweet conducted the postal surveys of 
Public Defender Service (PDS) staff (reported in Chapter 7); Simon Thomson assisted 
in the analysis and writing up of the proceedings stage peer reviews (reported in 
Chapter 4), and Margaret Robinson analysed and assisted in writing up the results of 
the surveys of criminal justice professionals and PDS staff. (reported  in Chapters 6 
and 7).  
 
The final report was compiled and written by the four lead members of the research 
team, who together are solely responsible for its contents.  Lee Bridges was primarily 
responsible for Chapters 1, 5 and the Conclusions; Richard Moorhead and Ed Cape 
for Chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7; and Avrom Sherr and Ed Cape for Chapter 4.  Paul Fenn 
wrote up the results of the multivariate ang regression analyses reported in Chapters 3 
and 5 and in Appendices 3.1, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.  Lee Bridges was responsible for the 
final compilation and editing of the whole of the report.    
 
The research would not have been possible without the co-operation and assistance of 
numerous people working within the Legal Services Commission and the Public 
Defender Service.  We would wish in particular to thank Richard Collins, Jill Saville 
and other members of the central Criminal Defence Service team based within the 
London headquarters of the Legal Services Commission; Tony Edwards, the 
Professional Head of Service of the PDS; the Heads and members of staff of the 
Public Defender Offices in Birmingham, Cheltenham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, 
Pontypridd and Swansea; Gaynor Ogden, latterly Head of Service of the PDS, and 
Jane Cosgrove of the PDS Central Business Team in Birmingham; and Gary Charlton 
who provided invaluable assistance in extracting relevant data from the PDS Case 
Management System.   Thanks also go to the many private practice criminal defence 
solicitors in the six areas on whom we made many demands, not least for access to 
their case files at various stages of the research.  
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Lee Bridges 
Ed Cape 
Richard Moorhead 
Avrom Sherr 
 
December 2006 
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Outline of Content of Report 
 
 
This report presents the findings of the independent evaluation of the Public Defender 
Service (PDS) in England and Wales.  It is based on an extensive analysis of the work 
of six Public Defender Offices in Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Swansea, 
Pontypridd and Cheltenham, and of comparative samples of cases drawn from private 
criminal defence solicitors’ firms in the same areas, primarily over the first three years 
of operation of the PDS, from 2001 to 2004.   
 
Chapter 1 sets out the policy background and context to the establishment of the PDS 
and analyses the key decisions made during its implementation relating to the 
service’s objectives, scope of service, access to clients, location and staffing of 
offices, management, and measures to ensure independence and quality of provision.  
This chapter also describes the development of the research and its methodology. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the findings of the research relating to the source, social 
background, criminal histories, offence characteristics and profiles of clients, and the 
seriousness and complexity of cases, of the PDS and private criminal defence firms.     
 
Chapter 3 compares the ways in which these two forms of providers process cases 
through the different stages of the criminal justice process and the outcomes they 
achieve.  
 
Chapter 4 reports the findings of the research relating to the quality standards of the 
PDS and private criminal defence firms.  This is based on two separate peer review 
evaluations of their case files drawn from the investigation and court proceedings 
stages of the criminal justice process.   The findings are reported in respect of overall 
performance and standards of files, communication and timeliness, fact gathering, 
advice and assistance, efficiency and ethical conduct of cases.     
 
Chapter 5 analyses the recording of time spent on cases by the PDS, the staffing of 
its offices and utilisation of staff time, the costs incurred in establishing and running 
the service over the period of the research, and how these costs compared with those 
relating to similar criminal cases conducted by private criminal defence firms 
operating under contracts with the Legal Services Commission. 
 
Chapter 6 reports the findings of a survey of a number of groups of criminal justice 
professionals relating to the effectiveness, quality, and independence of the PDS, in 
comparison with private criminal defence providers, and to the impact of the PDS in 
each of the areas studied.  It also presents the findings of a survey of clients of both 
types of service. 
 
Chapter 7 reports the findings of survey of PDS office heads and other legal 
professional staff as to their experiences of working within the service and their 
perceptions of its work. 
 
A summary of the findings of the research is presented in the Conclusions section at 
the end of each of the above chapters.  Chapter 8 sets out the overall conclusions of 
 xx
 1
Chapter 1 
 
The Context of the Public Defender Service in England and Wales 
and Research Methodology 
 
 
The Public Defender Service (PDS) in England and Wales was launched in May 
2001, with the opening of public defender offices (PDOs) in Liverpool, 
Middlesbrough and Swansea, with further offices opened in Birmingham in July 
2001, in Cheltenham in April 2002 and in Pontypridd in September 2002.1  This was 
the first salaried criminal defence service in England and Wales.   A separate Scottish 
Public Defender Solicitors' Office (PDSO) had previously been established in 1998 in 
Edinburgh.2 
 
The Policy Context of the PDS 
 
The plan to establish such a service was first announced in 1998 in the Labour 
Government's White Paper, Modernising Justice: 
 
Evidence from other countries suggests that properly funded salaried 
defenders can be more cost-effective and provide a better service than lawyers 
in private practice.… 
The Government believes that, in the longer term, the best approach will prove 
to be a mixed system, combining both private and staff lawyers. This will 
produce better value for money for the taxpayer; because the two systems will, 
in effect, both complement and compete against one another. The cost of the 
salaried service will provide a benchmark, which … can [be] use[d] to assess 
whether the prices charged by private lawyers are reasonable. Staff lawyers 
will also give … flexibility to fill gaps in the system, for example where too 
few local solicitors' firms and barristers' chambers participate.3  
 
Modernising Justice was the precursor of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which 
provided for a comprehensive reform of public legal services in England and Wales, 
including the creation of the Legal Services Commission (LSC).4  This body was to 
be responsible for the provision of both civil and criminal legal aid (now renamed as 
the Community Legal Service (CLS) and Criminal Defence Service (CDS)) under a 
new system of contracts with service providers, which in the case of criminal legal aid 
were exclusively solicitors and barristers in private practice.  The contract system was 
                                                 
1 These six offices were included in the research reported here.  Subsequently, two further offices were 
opened in February 2003 in Chester in North Wales and in Darlington in northeast England.                 . 
2 Established under Scottish legislation, this service was also separately evaluated in T. Goriely, et al, 
The Public Defence Solicitors’ Office in Edinburgh: An Independent Evaluation, Edinburgh, Scottish 
Executive Central Research Unit, 2001. 
3Cm 4155, Modernising Justice, London, HMSO, 1998, paras. 6.18-6.19.  
4 This body replaced the Legal Aid Board, which had originally been created in 1988 to take over the 
administration of civil and criminal legal aid from the professional body of the solicitors' branch of the 
legal profession, the Law Society.   
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to replace the previous provision of these services under a 'judicare' model, in which 
solicitors and barristers were remunerated primarily on the basis of their inputs into 
individual cases.  At the same time, the Access to Justice Act for the first time 
allowed for the direct employment of solicitors and barristers, through the LSC or 
other bodies maintained by it, to provide legal aid services to the public. 
 
The implementation of the PDS was not the only change in the provision of criminal 
defence services that flowed from the Access to Justice Act.  The LSC officially came 
into operation in April 2000 and was given the target of implementing the new 
contract system within a year.5   As regards criminal legal aid, this would mean 
devising a contract and administrative systems to deliver what had developed, over 
the previous half century, as the most extensive system of publicly-funded criminal 
defence services in the world.6  In particular, the contract would cover the provision 
of legal representation to around half a million defendants in magistrates' courts each 
year, at an annual cost of £280m.7  Perhaps more important, the criminal legal aid 
system in England and Wales encompassed a right of all suspects to receive legal 
advice whilst in police custody prior to being formally charged with a criminal 
offence and for this to be paid for by the state.  By 2001, over three-quarters of a 
million suspects each year were availing themselves of this service, at an annual cost 
of £116m.8 As will be seen, the fact that police station legal advice had become such 
an integral and significant part of public criminal defence provision was to have 
important implications for the PDS, especially in terms of the staffing of its offices.  
Prior to the introduction of criminal contracts, in excess of 6,000 solicitors' offices 
throughout the country were engaged in the provision of these services, although this 
was subsequently reduced by half under contracting.9  It is also notable that the same 
administrative team within the new Criminal Defence Service was responsible during 
this period for the implementation of both criminal contracts and the PDS, and it was 
not until after the PDS was set up that a specifically-designated central support team 
was created to administer it.  
 
The then head of the Criminal Defence Service described his role at the time as one of 
starting: 
 
                                                 
5 It is significant that the Labour Government, having originally been elected in May 1997, was widely 
anticipated as likely to face a further General Election during 2001. 
6 For a description of development and scope of the criminal legal system in England and Wales, see L. 
Bridges, ‘The Right to Representation and Legal Aid’ in M. McConville and G. Wilson (eds), The 
Handbook of The Criminal Justice Process, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 137-148. 
7 Based on expenditure on magistrate’s court representation and court duty solicitors in 2000-01.  A 
further £26m was spent on advice and assistance under the ‘Green Form’ scheme in criminal matters 
and £27m on the criminal contracting pilot, some of which would have involved defendants in 
magistrates’ courts.  See Legal Services Commission Annual Report 2000/01, p. 37.  The contracts did 
not cover legal aid in the Crown Court, where a further 100,000 of the most serious criminal cases are 
tried each year, almost all involving publicly-funded representation at an annual cost of an additional 
£422m.  The system of Crown Court legal aid, again involving case-by-case payments to solicitors and 
barristers, was at the time administered separately from the LSC by the Lord Chancellor's Department 
(now the Department of Constitutional Affairs).  Although Crown Court legal aid has now been 
brought within the remit of the LSC, it has not yet been made subject generally to contracting.     
8 Legal Services Commission Annual Report 2000-01, p. 37. 
9 The evidence suggests that this was primarily as a result of the consolidation of solicitors into a 
smaller number of firms, rather than of an overall reduction in the number of individual solicitors 
providing criminal legal aid services.    
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 from scratch, devising how we might introduce the system, what the focus of it 
would be, how we might do it, how you can test it, so the whole package 
really.10 
 
He also pointed to the LSC lack of experience in establishing or running a service of 
this type: 
 
This was an organisation that had no direct experience of any form of directly 
employed legal aid provision, and no experience of running a criminal legal aid 
practice.11    
 
In June 2000 the LSC produced, on behalf of the Government, a consultation paper on 
Establishing a Salaried Defence Service and Draft Code of Conduct for Salaried 
Defenders Employed by the Legal Services Commission.12  Whereas the Government 
in Modernising Justice had seen salaried defence services primarily in terms of 
potential cost savings and as a 'benchmark' for private suppliers operating under 
contracts, the likely benefits of such a service were now defined more widely to 
include:  
 
• providing good or better quality services than private practice at equal or 
lower costs; 
• because salaried defenders would not be motivated by profit to maximise the 
price paid for their services, there would be a better alignment in objectives 
between the LSC and the PDS than would be possible with private 
practitioners; 
• to provide the LSC with access to management information on the supply of 
criminal defence services that would not otherwise be available to it through 
contracting; 
• to provide a test or benchmark for the cost and quality of the criminal defence 
services provided by private practitioners under contracts; 
• to give the LSC greater flexibility in managing the CDS as a whole, including 
having a means to fill geographical gaps in provision under contracting and to 
test out new methods of delivery.13 
 
Subsequently, in the second annual report on the PDS, the objectives of the service 
were further refined as: 
 
• To provide independent, high quality and value-for-money criminal defence 
services to the public. 
• Nationally and locally, to provide examples of excellence in the provision of 
criminal defence services. 
• To provide us with benchmarking information to be used to improve the 
performance of the contracting regime with private practice suppliers. 
                                                 
10 Interview with Richard Collins, then Head of the Criminal Defence Service.   
11 Ibid. 
12 Criminal Defence Services: Establishing a Salaried Defence Service and Draft Code of Conduct for 
Salaried Defenders employed by the Legal Services Commission, London, Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, June 2000.  
13 Ibid, paras. 55-67. 
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• To raise the level of understanding within Government and the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department (LCD), (now the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs), and all levels and areas of the Legal Services Commission (the 
Commission), of the issues facing criminal defence lawyers in providing high 
quality services to the public. 
• To provide us with an additional option for ensuring the provision of quality 
criminal defence services where existing provision is low or of a poor 
standard. 
• To recruit, train and develop people to provide high quality criminal defence 
services – in accordance with the PDS’s own business needs – which will add 
to the body of such people available to provide criminal defence services 
generally. 
• To share with private practice suppliers the best practice, in terms of forms, 
systems, etc., developed within the PDS to assist in the overall improvement 
of Criminal Defence Service (CDS) provision.14 
 
It will be seen that the objectives of the PDS had thus moved considerably beyond the 
original Government emphasis on cost comparisons with, and benchmarking for, 
private practice provision of criminal defence services.   
 
The Setting Up of the PDS 
 
(i)  Scope of service and establishing a client base 
  
The consultation paper for the first time set out details of how a salaried defence 
service in England and Wales might be established and operate for a pilot period.  In a 
number of respects it is interesting to contrast this with the earlier Scottish experiment 
with such a service.  It was decided that the pilot would be based on offices in six 
locations (rather than only one as in Scotland), primarily in large conurbations in 
order to access a relatively large supply of work, but with at least one office in a 
smaller town.  There would also be the option of expanding the service out from the 
initial offices to serve suburban or rural areas and also of opening offices in further 
locations.  Unlike in Scotland, where the PDSO was limited to handling summary (i.e. 
less serious) cases only (and where police station advice generally does not form such 
a significant part of defence work generally), the PDOs in England and Wales were to 
provide a comprehensive service able to represent clients from the police station 
through to both the magistrates' courts and the Crown Court.15  This would include 
advocacy in the magistrates' courts and possibly, through the employment of barristers 
or solicitors with higher court rights of audience, in the Crown Court as well. 
 
A key issue at this stage was how the PDS would relate to contracted defence services 
in terms of client recruitment.  In Scotland, there was an attempt to guarantee the 
PDSO a client base from the outset by directing a group of clients to it, with those 
who sought assistance through criminal legal aid who were born in certain months 
                                                 
14Public Defender Service: review of the second year of operation, London, Legal Services 
Commission, 2003, para. 2.1. 
15 The one exception to this was that the PDS was initially restricted from handling very high cost cases 
and serious fraud. 
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being required to use the PDSO rather than another solicitor of their own choice.16  
This option of directing criminal legal aid clients to the PDS in England and Wales 
had been rejected by the Government, in favour of continuing to allow a choice of 
representative, during the Parliamentary debates on the Access to Justice Bill.17  
However, the consultation paper stated that salaried defenders would be allocated 
'slots' on both police station and magistrates' court duty solicitor schemes,18 so long as 
they individually met the requirements for joining such schemes.  This may have led 
to a suspicion among some private practitioners that the PDOs would still be given 
preference in terms of the number of duty solicitor 'slots' they would be allocated in 
order to assist in their build up of a client base.  Although it appears that it was never 
the intention of the LSC that this should happen, it was not until the Government’s 
conclusions following responses to the consultation paper were published in April 
2001 that this was made explicit: 
 
The individual [public defender] offices will operate and run crime files as they 
would if they were in the private sector.  They will have to take their turn on the 
duty solicitor rotas and compete on a "level playing field" with private suppliers 
in that area. … Each public defender office will be allocated slots on the duty 
solicitor rota in the same way as any other supplier.19   
 
This decision, not to artificially stimulate the potential for the PDS to recruit clients, 
when combined with the large number of competitor private practice suppliers that 
existed in most urban areas and the other risks associated with the establishment of 
the PDS, was to have a number of important implications for the way the service 
operated during the pilot.  As the then head of the CDS explained: 
 
We were forced … to open criminal practices in a way which no commercial 
organisation would have done, which was just go completely cold into an area 
and try to create something from scratch.  Any other criminal practice usually 
forms on the basis of, often, splits from existing firms, with a following body of 
work.  …  We didn't have that sort of luxury.  Also, we made some policy 
decisions that, because we couldn't be seen to fail, we had to open in a way 
which would enable us to provide 24 hour a day coverage, seven days a week.  
                                                 
16 This policy was subsequently abandoned as it proved unpopular both with clients and private practice 
solicitors in Scotland.  However, it was replaced by an agreement that the PDSO would be given 
priority in the provision of duty solicitor services in the lower courts, thus giving them greater access to 
clients who appeared unrepresented at their initial court appearance.   
17 Section 15(4) of the Act prohibited the Government from requiring that "only a person employed by 
the Commission, or by a body established and maintained by the Commission" could be selected as a 
legal representative by a person receiving criminal legal aid.   
18 Duty solicitor schemes for both police stations and magistrates' courts are run by the LSC.  Police 
station duty  schemes involve solicitors within an area who normally provide criminal defence services 
taking it in turn to be on call to attend local police stations when a suspect requires legal advice and 
either does not know of another solicitor or his or her ‘own’ solicitor is unable to attend.  Court duty 
schemes similarly involve local criminal defence solicitors attending or being on call at magistrates' 
courts in order to advise and represents defendants who are otherwise unrepresented.  In both types of 
schemes, duty solicitors receive payment from the LSC for acting in this capacity, but participation in 
such schemes is also seen as a means of obtaining additional clients.     
19 Lord Chancellor's Department, Criminal Defence Service: Establishing a Salaried Defence Service: 
The Government's conclusions, London, April 2001. 
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So we employed more people than we obviously would have work to fill their 
time.20 
 
The same point was made in the initial consultation paper on setting up the PDS: 
 
The structure and number of staff in each office will be developed with the 
researchers and the pilot site heads.  Given that the offices will be starting from 
scratch with no clients, these plans will be based on the need to phase the growth 
of the offices in line with the growth of the business until they reach planned 
capacity.  However, we will wish the offices to be able to offer a 
comprehensive, 24 hour service from day one of their operation, and therefore, 
each office will have some over-capacity in its early days. … 
 
This approach will mean that the number of defendants being represented by 
salaried defenders should grow relatively slowly.  This will impact on the length 
of the start-up phase in order to produce sufficient research data.  It will also 
mean that the offices will be relatively expensive to establish in terms of average 
costs per case, and this will need to be taken account of when comparing such 
information with cost per case data from private practice lawyers.21 
 
For this reason, it was decided that the pilot and associated research should run for 
four years, which was seen as "a sufficient period of time to effectively compare the 
salaried and private systems and evaluate any benefits of a mixed system of 
provision."22  However, the then head of the Criminal Defence Service, when asked in 
2005 what he may have done differently when setting up the PDS, said that  
 
I wouldn't have introduced [the] research into it until we had been up and 
running for a few years.  …  I would have had a much longer review time.23 
 
(ii)  The location of the PDOs 
 
In fact, the initial consultation paper on the setting up of the PDS committed the LSC 
to opening at least three of the six pilot offices within less than a year, by April 2001. 
As noted, the intention was that most of these would be in major urban areas in order 
to assist in the process of client recruitment.  The consultation paper also stated that 
the LSC would work with the researchers in order to "identify the cities and towns in 
which to establish the first salaried defence service offices" and, further, that once 
having recruited professional lawyers to head each of the offices, the researchers 
would also be involved in decisions on "the identification and acquisition of offices 
and the recruitment of staff."24  In the event, the Government's timetable for opening 
the initial offices meant that the selection of their locations was determined largely 
without consultation with or analytical input from the researchers.  Instead, the CDS 
team within the LSC, in consultation with their regional offices, drew up a list of nine 
                                                 
20 Interview with Richard Collins, op. cit. 
21 Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit.  In fact, the research team was not 
appointed until late 2000 and was not involved in the decisions on the staffing of the initial PDOs. 
22 The Government's conclusions, op. cit.   
23 Interview with Richard Collins, op. cit. 
24 Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit. 
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potential locations,25 including both larger cities and smaller towns, where it was 
considered there might be potential problems with the supplier-base of private 
criminal defence firms operating under contracts.  Such problems included possible 
shortages of criminal defence firms in relation to the local market; the concentration 
of the market on a small number of such firms; doubts over the quality of local 
criminal defence services; and a perceived history of difficult relations with the local 
profession over earlier policy initiatives to reform criminal legal aid.   
 
The next step was to advertise nationally for professional lawyers to head offices in 
these locations, and as explained by the then head of the CDS, eventually the decision 
on which would be chosen as the sites of the initial PDOs was determined by the 
ability to recruit suitably experienced, senior criminal defence practitioners to take on 
this role: 
 
The offices would be opened on the basis of where we could find people who 
we thought would make good heads.  We saw the head of each office as being 
key to the success of the project.26 
 
In the event, the first round of recruitment held in December 2000 succeeded in 
identifying office heads for Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough and Swansea.27  
These four areas certainly presented different local contexts in which the PDOs would 
operate.  Birmingham is the largest centre of population outside of London, with well 
in excess of 100 private criminal defence firms represented on the local duty solicitor 
rota with whom the PDO would be competing.  Liverpool is another large city but one 
that had experienced a significant loss of population over recent time, again with a 
considerable number of competing local criminal defence firms.  It is also an area 
long noted for having a distinct local criminal defence culture.  Middlesbrough in 
north-east England is a smaller city, where it appeared that the local ‘market’ for 
defence services was becoming concentrated in a relatively small number of firms.  
Finally, Swansea in South Wales is an even smaller city, where again there were a 
limited number of competing firms, although no specific indications of an overall 
shortage of supply of criminal defence services.       
 
On the other hand, in none of these areas could it be said that there was a gap in the 
market for criminal defence services that the PDOs might exploit in order to build 
their client base.  As the then head of the CDS stated: 
 
The issue we struggled with, and continue to struggle with, is just the volume of 
work….  [It] has been tough because you have very well established local 
professions…[and] an incredibly competitive market for clients.28 
 
His views were echoed by a number of the original office heads who questioned the 
“business reasons” for opening PDOs in their areas in terms of whether “there was 
actually any demand there [and] what private practice was doing in the area.”.  
 
                                                 
25 These were Birmingham, Carlisle, Dover, Oxford, Gloucester/Cheltenham, Liverpool, 
Middlesbrough, Sheffield and Swansea. 
26 Interview with Richard Collins, op. cit 
27 Two of these four original PDO heads, from Swansea and Middlesbrough, eventually left the service.   
28 Interview with Richard Collins, op. cit. 
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At this stage, the possibility of targeting a PDO on a specific group of potential 
clients, such as ethnic minorities or youth cases, had not been considered, although 
the Government response to the initial consultation paper stated that  
 
individual offices may develop specialisms in such areas as Youth work.  This 
will be a natural development based on the location of the particular office and, 
at least initially, the skills of the people recruited.29 
 
Further consideration was subsequently given to developing a PDO with a youth 
specialism, but analysis appeared to show that there was a linkage between youth and 
adult criminal representation, in particular in police stations, and that such an office 
would have to operate across a very wide geographical area to obtain sufficient work. 
 
It is notable that London, which accounts for approximately a quarter of all criminal 
defence work in the country, was not included on the shortlist of potential locations 
for the initial PDOs.  This was largely because there was perceived to be an over-
supply of criminal defence firms in London,30 so that any PDO would face even 
greater competition for clients than in other areas of the country.   In its response to 
the initial consultation, the Government stated that London would be considered as a 
possible location for a further PDO, but eventually in consultation with the 
researchers this was rejected on grounds that there was sufficient contracted supply in 
London; that as criminal defence work in London is spread across a large number of 
courts, one office would not be able to reflect the market as a whole; and that the 
office established in Birmingham would provide a test for the PDS operating in a 
highly competitive local market.31    
 
One option that may have been relevant in the context of London was for the LSC to 
negotiate with an existing private supplier to take their practice into the PDS, bringing 
with it an established client base.  This possibility was raised by respondents to the 
initial consultation but did not elicit a response from the Government.  The then head 
of the CDS was asked why this option was not pursued: 
 
Partially time, partially couldn't work out how to do it.  Also, I think we felt we 
could successfully build a PDS culture, and bringing in someone else would 
have made life more difficult.32 
 
Apart from London, the possibility of opening further PDOs was investigated in rural 
areas, including East Anglia and mid-Wales; in 'county' towns with rural hinterlands; 
and in towns in close proximity to the original four PDOs.  The rural option was not 
pursued primarily because of concerns over recruitment of a sufficient client base, the 
risk of undermining the viability of existing suppliers, and the restrictions associated 
with duty solicitor schemes which require members to have offices within a certain 
                                                 
29 Government's conclusions, op. cit. 
30 So much so that the LSC has subsequently considered introducing competitive tendering for duty 
solicitor work in London, with the aim of reducing the number of suppliers.  See Legal Services 
Commission, Improving Value for Money for Public Funded Criminal Defense Services in London, 
January 2005. 
31Legal Services Commission, Public Defender Service: Review of the first year of operation 2001/02, 
London, August 2002, para. 4.3. 
32 Interview with Richard Collins, op.cit. 
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travelling time of the police stations and courts served.  However, it was eventually 
decided to open a further PDO in Cheltenham, a large town in Gloucestershire with a 
substantial rural hinterland.  This was the one location chosen for a PDO where there 
was a clear 'gap' in the local market, which arose from the fact that one of the major 
private practice criminal defence firms in the area had shut down following the 
conviction of its founding partner (and several of its staff) for defrauding legal aid.  
Three further PDOs were eventually opened as branches of the initial offices.  The 
first of these was in Pontypridd in South Wales as an offshoot of the Swansea PDO, 
followed by offices in Chester in North Wales which was associated with the 
Liverpool PDO, and Darlington as a branch of the Middlesbrough PDO. 
 
Another issue to be resolved was where the PDOs would be located in each of these 
areas and what sort of office accommodation they would have.  Each of the original 
four PDOs was located within the relevant city centre in fairly close proximity of the 
local magistrates' court.  This decision was explained by the then head of the CDS as 
follows: 
 
We went for a pretty standard approach, which was city centre, near the 
magistrates' court, and because we are a public sector organisation, we provided 
accommodation that was consistent with the rest of this organisation.  ….  On 
reflection, I think we probably should have tested going out to an estate or 
something, moving out to where the punters are really, although a large number 
of firms don't do that, they do currently locate near a magistrates' court or police 
stations. …  Also, we opened them in a way which pretty much replicated 
private practice.  Again, I am not sure that we had the experience or were in a 
position where we could take a risk of trying different models.  Also, I think we 
were very much focussed on delivering something which was very easily 
comparable with private practice for research and benchmarking purposes.33 
 
However, there were at least two important respects in which the accommodation of 
the initial PDOs differed significantly from most private firms in this field.  First, they 
were provided with prominent, shopfront locations as part of a strategy of giving them 
a public presence in the areas, for purposes of enhancing both client recruitment and 
general public perceptions of the new service.  Secondly, the standard of the PDOs 
accommodation was undoubtedly higher than most private criminal defence firms.  Of 
course, both of these factors could be said to have added to the costs of the PDOs, a 
matter on which several of the PDO office heads commented adversely to us: 
 
It was an incredibly expensive way of doing it, but if they had settled for more 
traditional type of office to open with, I feel we would have been criticised on 
quality …. I am not content that we needed a ground floor frontage …   The 
offices are not swish, they are simply modern offices.34   
 
The accommodation of the Cheltenham PDO followed the same pattern, but the 
Pontypridd PDO went without a groundfloor, shopfront location. 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview with PDO office head, 2005. 
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Commenting on the type of office accommodation provided to the PDOs, the then 
head of the CDS stated: 
 
In the early days … we were more focussed on making this work ….  It would 
have been wrong to cut things to the extent where we would increase the risk of 
failing in some areas.  …  We now have, with varied degrees of success, 
established businesses.  As with any other business, as well as trying to improve 
your volumes of work and do individual cases more effectively, we need to 
really now attack the cost base.  I think there is a lot more we could do to attack 
our cost base.  And certainly the starting point would be to take a different 
approach to premises, which are … costly….  I would like to explore moving to 
different parts of town … but also look to whether we should even be so office 
based … looking at other models of delivery.  Because going back to the start, 
we've modelled it on private practice and have gone for a particular kind of 
office, but can we actually deliver it in a completely different way which attacks 
very significantly our cost base.35  
 
More generally, he admitted that in retrospect he would have 
 
put a lot more analysis and research into where we should have placed the 
offices, a lot more research into where in those towns we should have placed 
them, what sort of offices we should have gone for.36   
 
(iii)  Staffing of the PDOs 
 
As noted, a policy decision was taken early on that each PDO should be staffed in 
such a way as to enable it to provide a 24-hour a day, seven day a week service both 
to local courts and to police stations from within its own resources, without for 
example relying on the local duty solicitor scheme to provide out-of-hours coverage 
for its clients.  It was recognised both by the Government and the LSC that this would 
add considerably to the initial costs of the PDS and in particularly greatly inflate the 
average cost per case of the new service.  There were a number of reasons behind this 
decision, including the need to avoid the risk of a service failure, hostility from 
private practice suppliers in the areas in which the PDOs were being established 
which might prevent them cooperating with the PDOs in servicing clients, and the 
need to be seen to provide a comprehensive service to assist in recruiting and 
retaining clients.  The staffing model adopted as the basis for initial recruitment for 
most of the offices was to have for each PDO an office head, two or three additional 
solicitors, and three accredited police station representatives. 
 
All the office heads recruited for the PDOs have been experienced solicitors drawn 
from private criminal defence practices.  Two of the heads of the initial four offices, 
in Liverpool and Swansea, were recruited from the same general geographical areas in 
the which the offices were located and therefore were able to draw to some extent on 
local knowledge and personal reputations to assist in initial client recruitment.  The 
office head in Birmingham was recruited from another town in the West Midlands, 
while the office heads in Middlesbrough and eventually Cheltenham were drawn from 
                                                 
35 Interview with Richard Collins, op.cit. 
36 Ibid. 
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well outside these locations.  The final office to be included in the research, in 
Pontypridd, was initially staffed out of the Swansea PDO, although staff originally at 
Swansea had strong ties with the Pontypridd area.   
 
Not all the office were able immediately to recruit a full complement of staff 
according to the above model.  In particular, there were initial difficulties in recruiting 
solicitor staff in Birmingham and Cheltenham, which were attributed to hostility and 
uncertainty among the local legal professions and to the fact that the salaries offered 
by the PDS were not seen as so competitive in these areas as in the other locations. In 
Liverpool, on the other hand, the office head decided to focus initially on recruiting 
non-solicitor police station representatives, although additional solicitors were also 
recruited within the first year of operation.37  Several of the initial office heads 
complained that the staff recruitment process, which was handled through the LSC's 
central human resources team, was time-consuming and did not allow them to use 
local knowledge and contacts to obtain staff in a similar way as would private practice 
solicitors’ firms.   
 
As noted, initially the setting up of the service was handled through the same 
administrative team in LSC national headquarters as was responsible for the 
implementation of the CDS and criminal contracting as a whole, drawing on other 
sections of the central LSC administration, particularly in respect of office 
procurement and staff recruitment.  However, once the service became operational, a 
central PDS Business Manager was appointed, reporting directly to the Head of the 
CDS.  Each PDO was also staffed from the outset with a Practice Manager (later 
retitled as the Quality Manager) and two administrators.  
 
(iv)  Management of the PDS 
 
A key decision to be made at the start of the PDS was whether its members would be 
directly employed and administered by the LSC or through an 'arms length' body 
created and funded by LSC for this purpose.  The initial consultation paper gave a 
number of reasons why the LSC considered the 'directly employed' model to be most 
appropriate for the pilot: 
 
• we believe this "directly employed" approach will simplify the establishment 
of the service, in that the Commission will not also have to establish arms 
length bodies as a part of the process; 
• we believe the "directly employed" model will be more flexible to develop in 
the early stages of the service, as the Commission will almost certainly need to 
make detailed changes within the arrangements as its knowledge and 
experience, and that of the salaried defenders and researchers, grows; 
• we believe that the "directly employed" model will provide easier information 
flows for the Commission and the research programme during the start-up 
phase of the service; 
• at the same that the service is being established, the Commission will be 
learning in detail about the implications and issues arising from the provision 
of criminal defence services through contracts with private practice lawyers.  
                                                 
37 Data on the staffing of the PDOs is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Many of these lessons will be of direct relevance to the establishment and 
maintenance of wholly funded arms' length bodies.38 
 
Given this decision, further questions were raised as to how the service would be 
managed within the LSC and, in particular, how the independence of the PDOs would 
be guaranteed.  A distinction was drawn in the initial consultation paper between the 
professional and administrative lines of responsibility of the PDOs.  The paper stated: 
 
The individual salaried service office heads will be personally and 
professionally responsible for the services they, and their offices, provide to 
clients, and for managing and supervising the work of the staff within their 
offices.  In this professional role the office heads will report to a professional 
head of the service ….  Within this management structure no individual other 
than the office heads and the staff employed in their offices (and, where 
necessary, the professional head of the service) will make decisions or have a 
role in the conduct of individual cases.39 
 
In addition, the office heads would be responsible for the day-to-day running of each 
PDO "in terms of management, supervision, budgetary control, training, assessment 
and appraisals"40 and, specifically for: 
 
Managing their own budgets from which they will cover direct costs (staff, 
accommodation, etc.) and purchase services from others (advocates, experts and 
disbursements).  Budgets will be reviewed regularly during the start-up phase.  
In particular, it will be important for the Commission to ensure that the nature 
and scope of services is not unnecessarily constrained during the pilot period 
because of budgetary estimates which prove to be inaccurate in operation.41 
 
On the other hand, for general management purposes it was decided, as previously 
noted, that "responsibility for … the salaried service project within the Legal Services 
Commission will lie initially with the Commission's Head of Criminal Defence 
Services" and in particular that: 
 
the individual office heads will report, for administrative purposes and for the 
purposes of their participation in the research programme, to the Commission's 
Head of Criminal Defence Services.  During the start-up phase of this new 
undertaking, it will be important for all the management strands of the project to 
develop and implement the new service to report to one individual.  However, it 
is probable that the Commission will, thereafter, appoint a dedicated salaried 
service operations manager (to whom the office heads will report) who will 
report directly to the Commission's Chief Executive.42 
 
Further, the PDOs would have no direct line management relationship with the LSC's 
network of regional offices.   
                                                 
38 Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit., para. 46. 
39 Ibid., paras. 49 and 53. 
40 Ibid., para. 19. 
41 Ibid., para. 42. 
42 Ibid., para. 52.  Although a PDS Business Manager was subsequently appointed, this person 
continued to report to the head of the CDS and not to the LSC Chief Executive. 
 13
 
The role of the professional head of service was to become closely linked with the 
Code of Conduct for Salaried Defenders Employed by the Legal Services 
Commission, which the LSC was required under s. 16 of the Access to Justice Act to 
prepare and to submit to Parliament for approval.  A draft of this code was also issued 
for consultation in June 2000 at the same time as the paper on establishing the PDS, 
although interestingly the draft code itself made no reference to the professional head 
of service.  However, by the time the Government responded to the consultation on 
the code in March 2001, it had been amended to provide that: 
 
The Commission shall appoint a professional head of the salaried service ("the 
professional head of service") who shall be responsible for the interpretation of 
this Code in practice and providing advice and guidance upon it.43   
 
The code also required heads of the PDOs to report to the professional head of service 
on any complaints received and on staff refusals to accept instructions under the 
Code's provisions relating to avoidance of excessive workloads.44   
   
The intention from the outset was that the role of professional head of the PDS would 
be performed on a part-time basis by a member of Legal Services Commission who 
would be "an experienced criminal practitioner of high professional standing",45 
rather than appointing a full time person to this position. The then head of the CDS 
saw this decision as having "been a huge advantage, especially in the early days, in 
terms of both internal and external credibility" of the PDS,46 a view echoed by a 
number of the PDO heads. In addition to his various roles under the Code of Conduct, 
the professional head of service was able to provide office heads and their staff with 
advice on the handling of specific cases, to assist in interviewing for and training of 
staff, to undertake some quality checks on the casework of the PDOs, and to act as a 
spokesperson for the LSC (perhaps especially to the legal profession) on issues 
relating to the PDS.  The professional head of service also chaired the PDS 
Management Committee, which was intended to provide the link between local and 
central management of the service.  All the office heads of the PDOs sat on this 
committee, along with the head of the CDS, representatives of the research team, and 
eventually the PDS Business Manager.47   
 
As set up originally, therefore, there was a dual division of responsibility built into the 
management structure of the PDS, on the one hand between the PDO heads and the 
professional head of service for professional matters, and on the other between the 
PDO heads and the head of the CDS for budgetary and administrative matters.  It 
would be true to say that this management structure created some tensions between 
the individual office heads, with their responsibility for managing each PDO, and the 
                                                 
43 Criminal Defence Service: Code of Conduct for Salaried Defenders employed by the Legal Services 
Commission: Responses to the Consultation Paper, London, Lord Chancellor's Department, March 
2001, Annex A. 
44 The general provisions of the Code are discussed further below. 
45 Ibid., para. 49.  This person was subsequently identified as Mr. Tony Edwards, the senior partner of a 
large private practice firm of solicitors in East London with an extensive criminal practice.   
46 Interview with Richard Collins, op. cit. 
47 The initial consultation paper had indicated that the Chief Executive and the Policy and Legal 
Director of the LSC would be members of the PDS Management Committee, but in practice they did 
not play a role in it. See Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit., para. 51.  
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central CDS/LSC administration.  For example, the then head of the CDS commented 
that the office heads 
 
all had their own ways of doing things….  I was managing them, but because I 
am not a criminal legal aid lawyer, it did give the heads quite a lot of [latitude] 
… to run things ….  We spent a lot of time trying to achieve consensus.  And in 
some ways that goes right back to the initial policy decision, when ministers 
asked us to set it up, I think they reacted to some of the professional pressures 
from external organisations to sort of play up the role that the office heads 
would have in the running of the organisation and its development - you know, 
the way we set up the management committee, with [the Professional Head of 
Service] as chair and the heads as members, we spend a lot of time working 
around that trying to achieve a degree of consensus.48  
 
In 2004, a major change in the management structure of the PDS took place, with the 
appointment of one of the PDO office heads (from the Cheltenham PDO) as the 
overall head of the PDS, with direct line management responsibility for the PDS 
central business team.49  Responsibility for the management of the service was also 
subsequently transferred, as part of a more general re-organisation of the LSC, to a 
newly created Director of Service Delivery,50 and the membership of the PDS 
Management Committee was changed so that, while all the office heads were 
represented by one of their number, not all were members of the Management 
Committee.   However, while some of the roles performed by the professional head of 
service have also now been assumed by the head of the PDS, such as providing advice 
to staff and undertaking quality monitoring of the PDOs, the professional head of 
service remains responsible for the interpretation of and reporting on the operation of 
the Code of Conduct.   
 
The original head of the CDS explained these management changes as follows: 
 
I think the direct line management by someone who is both a very good lawyer 
and a very good manager has been the most important change that we have 
made in the structure.  I think it was the right thing [for the office heads] to have 
been line managed by me at the outset because we were in such a difficult 
political environment, and I felt maybe they would want protection from me ….  
But in terms of a real ability to performance manage the offices, performance 
management in this environment is strictly linked with the understanding that 
the line manager has of undertaking criminal case work.51   
 
He went on to express the view that: 
 
on reflection, we maybe should have recruited [a full-time professional head of 
the PDS] from the outset.  Again, it comes down to time, because we had to 
have it set up for April 2001.  I think what we would have done [otherwise] was 
appointed someone like that, given them some staff, and worked closely 
                                                 
48 Interview with Richard Collins. 
49 Consisting of five members of central administrative staff.  The PDS central business team operates 
out of the Birmingham PDO office and not the LSC central office in London.   
50 The previous Head of the CDS became Executive Director, Policy and Planning of the LSC. 
51 Interview with Richard Collins. 
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between them and my policy team, to actually build and establish the PDS.  So 
that we would have got better some of the things which we didn't get right at the 
outset ….  52      
 
 (v)  Independence of the PDS 
 
The original Government consultation paper on the setting of the PDS identified 
independence as a key point of potential criticism of a salaried defence service and 
noted that there were three elements to this issue.53  These were "system pressure by 
the funder", "lack of independence of mind", and "individual case interference”.  The 
paper itself argued that "system pressure" could be applied through restrictions on 
funding to either a salaried service or to contracted private practice providers, and also 
cited research evidence that in the past private criminal defence lawyers in Britain 
provided a service that was "segmented and made routine, with many solicitors and 
their staff tending to assume their clients were guilty."  As regards the question of 
interference with the conduct of individual cases, the paper cited the management 
measures outlined above (professional control of casework residing solely with PDO 
heads, access of staff to the professional head of service) as providing the necessary 
safeguards, along with a commitment that: 
 
No individual case information passes outside the salaried service into the 
operational units of the Commission other than that strictly necessary for the 
proper performance of the Commission's functions (in particular quality 
assurance) and equivalent to that provided by contracted private practice 
lawyers.54 
 
In response to various concerns raised in respect of independence during the 
consultation process, the Government placed greater emphasis on the role of the 
professional head of service and the Code of Conduct outlined above.  As well as 
requiring such a Code to be prepared, the Access to Justice Act had identified a 
number of issues to be covered by it, including duties to avoid discrimination, to 
protect the interests of clients, to the courts, to avoid conflicts of interest, and of 
confidentiality.  In addition, the draft Code issued for consultation in June 2000 
included provisions on duties to act with integrity and independence, not to offer or 
accept payments, and relating to relationships with other members of the legal 
profession; and on change or withdrawal of legal representation, public interest 
disclosure, excessive caseload, general standards of conduct, and complaints.   
 
In contrast with the general consultation on setting up the PDS, the Government 
accepted many of the criticisms made of the draft Code and introduced several 
amendments to strengthen it.55  In addition to making provision for the professional 
head of service to interpret and monitor the Code (and to do so as far as possible "in a 
way that is compatible with other professional codes"56), the other changes made 
included: 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit., paras. 72-83. 
54  Ibid., para. 81. 
55 See Code of Conduct, Responses to the Consultation Paper, op. cit. 
56 Code of Conduct for Employees of the Legal Services Commission who provide services as part of 
the Criminal Defence Service, London, Legal Services Commission, para. 1.3. 
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• strengthening the duty to protect the client and "to provide … fearless, 
vigorous and effective defence and … use all proper and lawful means to 
secure the best outcome for the client", specifically by adding a requirement 
that a professional employee "shall not put a client under pressure to plead 
guilty, and in particular, shall not advise a client that it is in his or her interests 
to plead guilty unless satisfied that the prosecution is able to discharge the 
burden of proof"57; 
• adding a duty to maintain professional independence from "the Commission" 
as well as from the prosecuting authorities, the courts, clients and any other 
sources58; 
• removing a mandatory requirement to accept instructions from clients who are 
otherwise unrepresented and adding a proviso that instructions should be 
accepted only where the professional employee "can discharge those 
instructions effectively having regard to other professional obligations" (i.e. to 
avoid case overload)59; 
• making a duty "to ensure that in the public interest they discharge their duties 
in a way which is consistent with the proper and efficient administration of 
justice" specifically subject to the proviso that this must be consistent with 
other provisions of the Code and "any other rules of professional conduct"60 
• widening the definition of conflicts of interest where the professional 
employee must cease to act to include not only those between clients but also 
with the any employee of the salaried service or any third party,61 and 
requiring the professional employee to refer a client for whom representation 
is withdrawn to another representative as appropriate62; 
• amending a prohibition on professional employees not to offer or accept "any 
fee, commission, inducement, gratuity, gift, benefit or other form of 
compensation" to allow the provision of "refreshments or cigarettes for the 
client's immediate consumption in the employee's presence"63; 
• amending a provision to make it clear that where a professional employee is 
required to act "by the Commission" (not a client) in a way which is "illegal, 
improper or unethical"; "in breach of professional rules"; "may involve 
maladministration, fraud or misuse of public funds"; "or otherwise 
inconsistent with this Code or the Commission's Staff Code of Conduct", the 
matter must be brought to the attention of the PDO head and notified to the 
Professional Head of Service to investigate and report to the Commission64; 
• adding a positive duty on professional employees to decline instructions if 
they consider "that acceptance of any further instructions is reasonably likely 
to lead to inadequate representation of existing clients”, as well as bringing 
this to the attention of the professional head of office "who shall notify the 
professional head of service"65; 
                                                 
57 Ibid., paras. 2.1 and 2.2. 
58 Ibid., para. 3.2. 
59 Ibid., para. 4.2. 
60 Ibid., para. 6.2. 
61 Ibid., para. 7.2. 
62 Ibid., para. 7.5. 
63 Ibid., para. 8. 
64 Ibid., para. 12.1. 
65 Ibid., para. 13. 
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• while retaining a provision that a professional employee "shall not do 
anything to bring the salaried service into disrepute", removing similar 
references to "diminishing public confidence in the criminal justice system", 
and making this requirement subject to other provision of the Code and 
professional rules of conduct66; 
• removing a provision regarding adherence to professional rules or guidance 
"approved by the Commission" relating to the treatment of victims or 
witnesses, and to the Commission's Personnel Manual; 
• removing reference to the Commission's complaints procedure and placing 
the responsibility to investigate complaints relating the PDS on the 
professional head of office in conjunction with the professional head of 
service.67 
 
In the first year the professional head of service issued further guidance on the 
position of salaried defenders in advising a client to plead guilty and their obligations 
to act on instructions from clients to seek adjournments, given the Code's requirement 
to discharge their duties in a way consistent with the "proper and efficient 
administration of justice".68  As the professional head of service explained: 
 
There was great uncertainty in the profession about what proper pressure [on the 
client to plead guilty] was or was not.  And that I think was a helpful exercise.  It 
concentrated minds elsewhere than here, about how barristers go about to get on 
to the next case.  And, because I could see that it was a danger area, I included 
applications for adjournments.  I wanted to make it very clear that … whether 
you are employed by the government or not, you do what your client advises 
within the law and within the professional rules.  If the client asks for an 
adjournment, you apply for an adjournment.  You can't mislead the court …, 
you can't put before the court a reason for an adjournment you know to be 
wrong, but [otherwise] you follow your client's instructions.  There has never 
been any resistance [in the LSC to that advice].  That in a sense has become 
more relevant as government initiatives have gone on.69 
 
Two subsequent notes of guidance have been prepared by the professional head of 
service.  One relates to the objectives set for the CDS70, which are to 
 
• provide legal advice and representation to individuals under investigation or 
charged with criminal offences; 
• facilitate the fair, efficient and effective operation of the Criminal Justice 
System and influence positive improvements in it; 
• help individuals address the causes of their offending behaviour and reduce re-
offending through effective links with other Criminal Justice System 
initiatives and the Community Legal Service.71 
                                                 
66 Ibid., para. 14.1. 
67 Ibid., para. 15. 
68 This guidance was published as an annex to the Public Defender Service: Review of the first year of 
operation 2001/02, London, Legal Services Commission, August 2002 and is also available under the 
title ‘Guidance on Code of Conduct' at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/pds/doc_library.asp. 
69 Interview with Tony Edwards, 2005. 
70 ‘Guidance on CDS Objectives’ at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/pds/doc_library.asp 
71 Legal Services Commission Annual Report 2004-5, London, 2005, p. 39. 
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The professional head of the PDS appears to have been requested by members of the 
CDS legal team to advise on the priorities between these objectives: 
 
I took the view that I could get a handle on it because if anyone was going to be 
required to apply the CDS objectives it was going to be lawyers employed 
directly by the Commission.  And there was very real concern that there had 
been no prioritisation between the three objectives and in particular encouraging 
people not to commit further crime ….  I was very clear in my own mind … that 
objective one is the absolutely overriding and primary objective.  .  …  We're 
not here to make the criminal justice system work efficiently if our clients tell us 
to make the criminal justice system work inefficiently.  …  I was very 
determined that the prime objective was the client's instructions, and the Bar 
said in response to the consultation, you should stop there.  I don't think that's 
right.  If a client is … provably and indisputably guilty and admits it, it seems to 
me perfectly proper to say to a client, "wouldn't it be a good idea to go on this 
programme" or "are you aware of this" or "are you actually claiming all your 
benefits so you don't need to go stealing".  And I think it is good advice in the 
client's interest.  It's for the client to decide whether to follow it, but it seems 
perfectly proper, and I think a solicitor who has a client provably guilty who 
does not follow that action does not do everything the CDS pays a lot of public 
money to achieve, as long as the client makes the final decision.  And similarly 
… some suppliers … drag it out or its taken to Crown Court when it needn't 
have been and the client is put at greater risk as a result, that doesn't seem to be 
good work or proper use of public funds.72 
 
 
The third guidance note relates to the position of legal advisers in police stations 
where it is known that a client is providing a false name and seeking to pass 
information to another suspect.73  
 
(vi) Quality monitoring within the PDS  
 
A key objective of the PDS from the outset was to "provide good or better quality of 
service" as private practice, and to this end the consultation paper on the setting up of 
the service made the commitment that as "a minimum requirement, salaried defence 
offices would have to meet the quality and performance standards set for private 
practice contracted firms operating under the general CDS contract."74  However, the 
consultation paper went on to state that 
 
We would wish to see salaried offices move further than this minimum 
requirement and seek to improve quality standards and assurance mechanisms 
which can feed back into the development of the standards set for contracted 
private firms.  This will be an important objective for the salaried service and for 
the individual office heads.75 
                                                 
72 Interview with Tony Edwards, 2005.  
73 ‘Guidance on Police Station Advice’ at http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/pds/ doc_ library. 
asp  
74 Establishing a Salaried Defence Service, June 2000, op. cit., para. 33. 
75 Ibid., para. 34. 
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In line with private practice firms operating under the General Criminal Contract, 
PDOs have been subject to two types of quality audit.  The first of these is a one-off76 
audit of a sample of casework files evaluated against Transaction Criteria, to which 
each of the PDOs was subject during its first year of operation.  The audit results in a 
score out of 100, with 70 being the pass mark, and the PDOs achieved scores ranging 
between 76 for the Birmingham PDO to 93 for the Cheltenham PDO.77   
 
The second form of audit is the Cost Compliance Audit, in which a sample of cases is 
assessed for the costs incurred against criteria set out in the General Criminal 
Contract.  Of course, the PDOs are not funded on a case-by-case basis but rather 
receive a block grant from the LSC.  Nevertheless, for both audit and research 
purposes, they have been required during the pilot to complete cost claim report forms 
on their police station and magistrates' court cases in the same way as private practice 
suppliers operating under contracts.78  In fact, what has been scrutinised under the 
Cost Compliance Audits is the inputs, in terms of time and other factors, that the 
PDOs have made into cases.  This form of audit results in suppliers being placed in 
one of three categories based on the level of variation between their reported costs in a 
sample of files and the auditors’ assessments of costs, with 1 representing less than 
10% variance; 2 between 10% and 20% variance; and 3 more than 20% variance.  In 
the first year of the PDS, three of the four offices (Liverpool, Middlesbrough and 
Swansea) achieved category 1 status, while the Birmingham PDO was category 2.  
However, there was a decline in the second year, when the Liverpool PDO achieved 
only a category 2 and the Swansea PDO a category 3 (with 43% of cases at variance), 
and the Pontypridd PDO in its first year only a category 2.  In the third year, all the 
PDOs achieved category 1 in the standard LSC audit, although the Liverpool office 
achieved only category 2 in a specifically developed internal audit that was being 
piloted there that year.79 
 
The PDOs have been subject to two further forms of quality monitoring.  As noted, 
first the professional head of service and latterly the head of the PDS have been 
responsible for carrying out spot-check file reviews of the PDOs at various points.  
These reviews confirmed some variations between offices, as explained by the head of 
the PDS: 
 
I think people were doing their best to ensure that there were systems and that 
they had checks on quality, but they weren't necessarily doing it in the same 
way.  I think the role … of the quality manager was absolutely key.  …  Where 
the relationship between the quality manager and the head of office … wasn't 
good … for whatever reason, it showed in terms of the quality of the office and 
what was reflected in audit results.  Now that may have been for a whole variety 
                                                 
76 The audit may be repeated where there are grounds of concern over the quality of service of a 
particular provider. 
77 Public Defender Service Third Annual Report 2003-4, London, Legal Services Commission, 2004, p. 
14.  
78 For reasons explained in Chapter 5, the cost claimed are notional, based on the payments that would 
have been due to the PDOs had they been working under the General Criminal Contract.   
79 Public Defender Service Second Annual Report 2002-3, p. 19 and Third Annual Report, 2003-4, p. 
15.   
 20
of reasons, but I saw vast differences in quality of files at least, and in some 
cases there was a lack of systems [being implemented].80 
 
Secondly, as part of the research evaluation of the PDS, a process of independent peer 
review has been carried out on a sample of files drawn from each of the PDOs and 
from private practice suppliers in their areas relating to three stages: police station 
advice cases, magistrates' court cases and Crown Court cases.  The results of this peer 
review are reported in Chapter 4.  
 
More recently, the PDS has been moving to strengthen its internal audit systems, in 
conjunction with the establishment of the post of head of service and the central 
business team and the placing of the service under the new LSC Director of Service 
Delivery.  Thus, the Third Annual Report of the PDS stated that: 
 
In our fourth year, we are moving towards a balanced scorecard approach in line 
with the rest of the LSC.81 
 
Reference was also made by the professional head of service to the PDS developing a 
'safe audit' system: 
 
Because the PDS has had time to develop it … they have their own auditor now 
who is routinely just working around the offices doing SAFE audits, that's a 
wonderful facility.82  
 
(vii) Case management systems in the PDS 
 
One of the most important tasks for the PDS at the outset was to develop its case 
management systems, including both standards forms and guidance and computerised 
information on the handling of cases.  The latter involved the development of both 
hardware and software.  Initially a decision was taken that each PDO should have its 
own separate computer system and not be integrated into the LSC's systems, in order 
to avoid any risk of other parts of the LSC having access to information about 
individual clients and cases.  This decision was subsequently changed83 so that the 
PDOs would be integrated into the LSC wider systems for the provision of such 
services as word processing, financial management and e mail, but with the PDS case 
management system operating in each PDO on a separate, non-networked basis.   
 
A commercial software company with experience of providing systems for solicitors 
was engaged to develop the PDS computerised case management system (CMS).  
This was important both for the day-to-day operation of the PDOs and for the 
research, as the latter would draw heavily on data recorded on CMS relating to cases 
for its analysis.  Both the original PDO heads and members of the research team were 
involved in drawing up the initial specification and eventual testing of the system.  As 
a result of this and EU requirements relating to procurement in the public sector, there 
was a delay in the installation of the system well beyond the opening of the initial 
                                                 
80 Interview with Gaynor Ogden, 2005. 
81 PDS Third Annual Report, op. cit., p. 14.  
82 Interview with Tony Edwards. 
83 This did result in some ‘wasted costs’ in terms of initial expenditure on IT, as is discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
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offices, and even then considerable further development work was required in order 
further to adapt the system to the specific requirements of the PDS and the research.   
 
CMS therefore did not become fully operational until the second year of the pilot, and 
during the first year much of the recording of time and other inputs into cases was 
done by hand on paper records.  As noted previously, a decision was made that the 
PDOs, even though they were directly funded by the LCS and not on the basis of 
case-by-case payments, should complete the standard contract report forms for each 
police station and magistrates' court case84, including the notional costs they might 
have been entitled to had they been operating under the General Criminal Contract.  
However, under contracting these report forms do not include a record of the time and 
other inputs into cases, but only a record of costs, so the research was dependent on 
the paper records and eventually CMS for these additional data.   
 
An issue throughout the pilot has also been the accuracy of time recording by the 
PDOs, since unlike private practice this does not directly influence the amount of 
funding they receive from the LSC.  As the professional head of service explained: 
 
A criminal lawyer is a lawyer - it doesn't matter actually how you employ them.  
They are much of a muchness, trying to get them to do time recording is like 
hitting your head against a brick wall.  …  And actually, I think [the PDS] has 
achieved extraordinary outcomes in terms of getting them onto a paperless time 
recording system, and ______ is achieving remarkable results in terms of seeing 
recording standards go up.85    
 
There was a similar iterative process, involving both the PDO heads and the 
researchers86, in designing the various forms used to record information on cases, and 
many of these forms went through a number of versions before they were finalised.  
The forms were eventually all published on the LSC website87 so that private practice 
firms could also access and make use of them if they wished.    
 
Development of the Research 
 
An important factor in the general context in which the PDS has developed and 
operated is the fact that it has been subject to an independent research evaluation from 
the outset.  The research began in December 2000, shortly before the first four PDO 
heads were appointed, but data collection did not start until the second year of the 
PDS, in April 2002.  There were two reasons for this delay.  First, it was necessary to 
allow the initial PDOs a period of time to start their operations and to build up an 
initial client base and body of casework that could be evaluated.  Secondly, there was 
considerable development work to be done in respect of the research itself, as well as 
                                                 
84 Costs in Crown Court cases are claimed separately from the General Criminal Contract and often 
with private practice firms involve the use of cost draftsmen to draw up the bill.  Discussions were held 
as to whether the PDOs should draw up Crown Court bills, but it was eventually decided that this 
would not be done. 
85 Interview with Tony Edwards. 
86 The researchers took the view that they might be involved in advising on the initial design of forms, 
but that once the actual evaluation of the service in comparison to private practice suppliers had begun, 
they should withdraw from this.   
87 At http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/pds/ doc_ library. asp.  
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with the LSC in designing recording and case management systems that would be 
utilised for data collection purposes.  
 
A consultation paper on the methods to be employed in the research evaluation of the 
PDS was published in February 2002 and circulated to academics, legal professional 
bodies, legal interest groups, and all private practice firms with criminal defence 
contracts within the regions where PDOs had by then been established.  A further 
version of this paper, taking account of the comments received, was also published in 
August 2002.  Both versions were also made available on the LSC website.88   
 
(i) Research objectives 
 
The following objectives for the research were identified: 
 
• A full analysis of cost effectiveness, compared with contracted provision, for 
different work types. Changes over time, percentage utilisation of office capacity, 
and additional costs of the development process will be considered. 
 
• A full analysis of quality in absolute terms and relative to contracted provision. 
 
• A comparative analysis of patterns of case conduct. 
 
• Information on how PDOs attract clients, why clients choose the public 
defender and client satisfaction and retention.   
 
• Qualitative and quantitative information on the vital requirement of independence 
of thought and behaviour, including information on actual advice, case 
outcomes, the operation of the Code of Conduct, attitudes and experience of PDS 
staff to their work, and the perception of PDOs amongst clients and others within 
the criminal defence system.   
 
• An examination of the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of 
management structures for the service. 
 
• Information on the PDO’s impact on local patterns of supply. 
 
• Recommendations on future models for PDOs of appropriate quality, cost and 
independence both during the course of the pilot and, beyond this, an assessment 
of the future potential of the PDS and the balance between it and the private sector 
in different types of area. 
  
As the paper explained: 
 
                                                 
88 L. Bridges, et. al., Methods for Researching and Evaluating the Public Defender Service, Legal 
Research Institute (University of Warwick) and Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (London), 
February and August 2002 (http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/pds/methodology_paper.pdf.  
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a key aspect of the evaluation of the PDS will be a comparison between its 
services and those provided by private criminal defence solicitors operating 
under contracts.89 
 
This applied not only to the issue of cost effectiveness but also those of quality of 
service and patterns of case conduct and outcomes.  Much of the consultation paper 
was devoted to considering ways in which these comparisons might be carried out.   
 
(ii)  Sampling and data sources 
 
In this respect, an important consideration was whether comparisons would be made 
on the basis of national or local case samples.  Given that the research was to be based 
on just six PDOs operating within fairly limited localities likely each to handle only 
several hundred cases each year, compared to in excess of 3,000 private practice firms 
with criminal contracts spread throughout the country handling in total several 
hundreds of thousands of cases annually, it was decided that a comparison based 
solely on national data would be unrealistic.  There was also the fact that previous 
research had tended to show considerable local variations across the country in the 
pattern of delivery and costs of criminal defence services.90   For these reasons it was 
decided to base the research on a comparison between each PDO and a sample of 
cases drawn from firms holding criminal contracts within their localities.  There was a 
further possibility of comparing the PDOs only with a selected group of private 
practice firms in each area, but this option was rejected for two reasons.  First, it was 
not clear on what basis such a selective sample of local firms should be drawn and 
whether, for example, it should include only firms of a similar size to the PDOs or a 
random group.91  In the end, it was decided to draw the sample of private practice 
cases from all contracted firms within the local areas of the PDOs.  The cases were 
drawn from all contracted firms in each area that reported cases under the General 
Criminal Contract as having been completed in the relevant periods in the main police 
stations or magistrates' courts which the PDO also served, while the sample of Crown 
Court cases was drawn from those reported as being completed by the main Crown 
Court centres served by each PDO.  The findings throughout this report are therefore 
reported on the basis of a PDO/private practice comparison in each of five or six  
areas92 and additionally on these six areas combined (all offices or areas), but not on a 
national basis.  As has been the case in this chapter, we refer throughout the report to 
the Public Defender Service as a collective entity as the PDS, to each of its offices as 
a PDO, and to the six offices taken together as the PDOs. 
 
As the above discussion implies, another decision made at an early stage was to divide 
the data collection into stages, covering work done in respect of police station advice 
cases (criminal investigations), magistrates' court cases, and Crown Court cases, 
rather than attempt to draw a single sample of cases from each PDO and their private 
                                                 
89 Ibid., p. 2. 
90 Lee Bridges and Asif Abubaker, Work Pattern and Costs under Criminal Contracting, London, 
Legal Services Commission, August 2000. 
91 Another possibility considered was to compare PDOs with other new 'start up' firms in their areas.  
However, it did not prove possible to identify a sufficient number of such firms in any one area. 
92 Although the original intention was to base the research on six areas, two of those included were 
Swansea PDO and its branch office in Pontypridd, and some data, especially relating to costs, on these 
two offices was combined on the LSC systems throughout the period of much of this research.  It has 
therefore been necessary to report on the Swansea/Pontypridd offices as a single unit in these instances.    
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practice comparators covering all stages of the criminal justice process.  Two factors 
lay behind this decision.  First, it was likely that a single sample of cases would, 
unless it was so large as to be unmanageable, result in too few Crown Court cases on 
which to draw meaningful conclusions.  Secondly, there were the limitations placed 
on the research by the need for the PDOs to build up their client bases.  In doing so, it 
would be expected that each PDO would have completed the police station or criminal 
investigation stage of sufficient cases far sooner than would be the case for either 
magistrates' court or Crown Court proceedings.  The original intention was therefore 
to begin data collection in respect of police station cases in the second year of 
operation of the PDS and to follow this by separate data collection exercises in later 
years on magistrates' court and Crown Court cases.  In the event, it was subsequently 
decided to combine the data collection, but not the samples, for the latter two stages.   
 
Therefore, in addition to reporting results for each of five or six areas, the analysis is 
divided between the three stages or samples of police stations, magistrates' courts and 
the Crown Court cases.  It is important to note the size of the samples drawn at each 
of these stages was related to the number of cases required in order to draw 
meaningful conclusions and were not representative of the proportion of the overall 
caseloads of either the PDOs or private practice firms completed in police stations, 
magistrates' courts or Crown Courts.  For this reason, the findings relating to each of 
these stages or samples cannot be combined to produce an overall finding, for 
example, on average case costs or quality of performance as between the PDOs and 
their private practice comparators.    
 
In fact, a number of samples were drawn at different stages of the research based on 
the various data sources.  These included:   
 
• The LSC's contract reporting system known as SPOCC covering all police 
station and magistrates' court cases completed by private practice contractors 
and the PDOs during the relevant periods.  Although this source therefore 
covered a large number of cases, it contains only limited information on such 
factors as client and case characteristics, outcomes, costs (but not time or other 
inputs into cases), and the police station or court where the cases was 
conducted.93  These data were therefore used to draw broad comparisons of 
types of clients served and cases undertaken (Chapter 2) and case processes 
and outcomes (Chapter 3); as a source of data on private practice case costs 
(Chapter 5); and a basis for drawing smaller samples of case files for more 
detailed analysis.  We refer to this sample throughout the report as the SPOCC 
dataset. 
• The PDS Case Management System.  This has been a the primary source of 
data on time spent by PDOs on cases, which has formed the basis of an 
analysis of case costs (Chapter 5), and for some more detailed information on 
case types and outcomes in this sector. 
• Data on completed cases drawn from Crown Courts.  This information formed 
the basis for an analysis of Crown Court costs for private sector providers 
(Chapter 5) and a basis for sampling private practice Crown Court cases for 
more detailed analysis.   
                                                 
93 For a full list of the information included on SPOCC, see Bridges, et. al., op. cit., p. 16. 
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• Case files drawn from both the PDOs and private practice.  Using SPOCC data 
as a basis for sampling, a sample of 50 case files was drawn from each PDO 
and group of private practice comparators in each stage of the research, 
covering police station investigations and magistrates' court representation.  
SPOCC does not cover cases completed in the Crown Court, and therefore 
similar samples of 50 Crown Court case files for each PDO and private 
practice comparators in each area were drawn from either the PDS Case 
Management System or from lists of cases concluded by private practice firms 
in the same Crown Courts.  Therefore, in total 600 files were sampled at each 
of the three stages across the six PDOs.  These files provided more detailed 
comparative information on client and case types (Chapter 2) and case 
processes and outcomes (Chapter 3).  We refer to these cases as the case file 
sample.  Half of these files at each stage were also subject to peer review to 
evaluate the quality of service provided by each sector (Chapter 4), and this is 
referred to as the peer review data.  The case file sample also provided a basis 
for surveying clients (Chapter 6).  
• Samples of various criminal justice professionals (private practice solicitors, 
barristers, District Judges (Magistrates' Courts), Crown Prosecution Service 
lawyers, and police) were drawn as a basis for surveying their opinions on the 
standards of service provided by both PDOs and private practice defence 
solicitors (Chapter 6).  In addition, all PDS legal staff and senior figures 
involved in the PDS administration were surveyed (Chapter 7). 
    
 (iii)  Comparison of costs  
 
On the issue of costs, the initial consultation paper canvassed two methods of 
comparison.  The first was referred to as the 'cost to the public purse', which would 
compare the cost paid by the Legal Services Commission to private practice firms for 
criminal cases completed under the General Criminal Contract with the cost of 
completing similar cases undertaken by the PDS.  The cost paid to private practice 
could be derived directly from data recorded on the LSC computer and taken from the 
report forms which these firms were required to lodge with the LSC in respect of each 
completed case under the contract.  On the other hand, as discussed above, although 
the PDOs were required also to complete these forms, the costs claimed were notional 
ones, and in order to calculate the actual costs of PDS cases it was necessary to take 
account of the full costs paid directly by the LSC to maintain the service and to divide 
this among the cases completed according to time spent on each case.  The full 
method by which this was done is set out in Chapter 5.   
 
A second possible basis of cost comparison that was canvassed in the consultation 
paper was that of 'cost to the provider'.  Under this method, the comparison would be 
between the actual costs of the PDS as calculated above and how much it costs private 
practice firms to carry out cases under contract taking account of such factors as staff 
salaries, office accommodation and overheads, etc.  Such a comparison might have 
been considered essential to meet on the stated objectives for the PDS, to serve as a 
'benchmark' for the amount that should be paid to private practice firms for criminal 
cases under contracts.  However, as the consultation paper noted: 
 
despite considerable research on criminal defence services over recent years, 
there is still much that we simply do not know about the working of private 
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practitioners operating in this field.  This lack of knowledge is perhaps most 
acute in respect of the economics of private criminal defence firms and financial 
aspects of their decision-making in relation to such matters as capital costs, 
deployment and utilisation of staff, and the opening of new offices…. 
 
Very little objective information is available on the cost base of private criminal 
defence services, and this is likely to vary widely from one area of the country to 
another and even between individual firms.  Private practitioners may be 
reluctant to reveal information on the cost of offices, equipment, salaries, etc., or 
on the amounts of non-chargeable work that they undertake, nor have the 
researchers been commissioned to carry out a detailed evaluation of the 
economics of private criminal defence firms operating under contracts.94 
 
During the course of the research an attempt was made to pilot a questionnaire to 
private criminal defence firms to obtain more information on their background costs, 
but this did not prove successful.  As a result, it was eventually decided to focus the 
cost comparison in this research (as was done in the earlier evaluation of the Scottish 
PDSO95) on a comparison of the 'cost to the public purse' of the two different forms of 
service. 
 
(iv)  Comparison of quality 
 
The main basis of the comparison of quality between PDOs and private practice have 
been two separate exercises involving peer review of case files.  As noted above, this 
covered a sample of 25 files drawn from each PDO and group of private practice 
comparators at the three different stages of the research, i.e. a total of 900 files across 
the two sectors.  The peer review for police station cases was carried out by a solicitor 
member of the research team, Professor Ed Cape, who is a nationally-recognised 
expert in the provision of custodial legal advice.96  Peer review of magistrates' court 
and Crown Court cases was conducted by a team of specially-recruited and trained 
experienced criminal defence solicitors, drawn from both private practice and the 
PDS.  Further details of the peer review methodology and its results are reported in 
Chapter 4.   
 
During the initial consultation the possibility of including observations of legal 
advisers from both the PDS and private practice in police stations or magistrates' 
courts was considered.  Observation in police stations was eventually rejected 
primarily on cost grounds, as experienced showed this to be extremely resource-
intensive.  Following the consultation, further pilot work on possible observation of 
advocacy in magistrates' courts was undertaken, but this tended to demonstrate that to 
implement such observation on a wider scale would be impracticable.  Further details 
are provided in Chapter 4.   
 
Surveys of client opinion and those of various criminal justice professionals were also 
                                                 
94 Ibid., pp. 2 and 10 
95 See Goriely, op. cit. 
96 Consideration was originally given to using experienced non-solicitor police station representatives 
as peer reviewers of police station cases, but following the consultation on methods this was rejected 
on the grounds that such an exercise would carry less credibility with the legal profession than one 
utilising experienced defence solicitors only. 
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relevant to the issue of quality, although none of these proved highly fruitful in this 
regard (see Chapter 6), either because of poor response rates and/or the limited 
experience of respondent with the work of defence solicitors.   
 
(v) A note on use of statistics and significance testing 
 
Throughout this report we have used statistical tests to determine the significance of 
differences found between the PDOs and private practice.  Two statistical tests have 
been utilised: the Mann Whitney test and Chi Square. The Mann Whitney test is 
appropriate where the data have been obtained from two independent samples – here 
the PDO and PP – and where the data can be considered non-parametric. In both 
studies the data are ordinal and take the form of ratings, which satisfies these 
requirements. The Mann Whitney test can tell if the two samples are significantly 
different by analysing the difference in their mean ranks.  
 
Chi Square is used only where the Mann Whitney test is inappropriate for the data. 
Chi Square can be used if the data are nominal (i.e. names rather than numbers) as it 
utilises the frequency of a particular response to measure the strength of association 
between variables. It is used to test associations by comparing the distribution of 
actual numbers in each group (e.g. the number of times a response of ‘no’ appeared) 
with those that would be expected according to theory or simply by chance.  
 
Throughout the report, we use the symbols ‘*’ and ‘**’ to denote different degrees of 
statistical significance.  A p of ≤0.05 indicates a probability of 5 in 100 that the 
difference shown occurred by chance, which is the normal threshold for significance 
in the social sciences.  Where relevant, this denoted by a * in the tables and referred to 
in the text as a ‘significant’ finding.97  Where p≤0.01, the probability of the difference 
occurring by chance drops to less than 1 in 100. These are characteristically referred 
to as “highly significant differences” and are denoted by ** in the tables. 
 
It should be remembered in interpreting the findings that a difference which is small 
in numerical terms (e.g. 2%) can still be highly significant in statistical terms. It is 
thus important to bear in mind not only whether differences are ‘significant’ but also 
whether the size of the difference is objectively important (e.g. a difference of 20% 
which is also statistically significant is probably more important than a difference of 
2% that is also statistically significant). Furthermore, statistical differences might be 
attributed to differences in the work or performance of PDOs and PP, when in fact 
they are explained by another factor (such as the type of case, for example).  Where it 
has been feasible to do so, we have also used multivariate analysis in order to attempt 
to control for such additional factors (known as ‘independent variables’) that may 
have influenced the particular difference being examined, although it must be 
remembered that it is only possible to control for those independent variables for 
which data are available.   
 
                                                 
97 Significance here refers to statistical significance only. 
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(vi) Impact of research on PDOs 
 
One issue that has arisen from interviews with PDS personnel is the extent to which 
the fact of the research evaluation, and in particular the comparison between the PDS 
and private practice which has been central to it, may itself have influenced the 
development of the service.  While the sampling methods employed in respect of 
private practice were intended to minimise the demands of the research on individual 
firms,98 it is undoubtedly the case that a much heavier burden from the research fell 
on the PDOs and that their staff often felt to be under particular scrutiny, and this may 
have influenced their behaviour in certain respects.  Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the fact of the research may have led staff of the PDS to be more cautious in their 
approach to casework than might otherwise have been the case and the service as a 
whole to be less innovative than it might have been, both in its inception and 
operation.  As previously noted, the head of the CDS cited the need to deliver 
"something which was easily comparable to private practice" for research and 
benchmarking purposes, as one of a number of factors influencing the risk adverse 
approach taken to developing the service at the beginning, and he went on to comment 
that: 
 
We have felt … the need to produce data for research.  I think now we are 
moving out of the research phase, I would expect us to be more innovative.99 
 
Apart from these general effects, the main demand made by the research on the PDS 
was in the requirement to complete General Criminal Contract reports on cases.  
Some of the PDO heads also saw other data collection demands made on them, for 
example in terms of time recording, as research led, although as more recent 
developments in the management of the service demonstrate, such demands are likely 
to continue and even to intensify in future.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the context to the establishment and development of the 
Public Defender Service in England and Wales.  The original impetus for establishing 
the PDS, and in particular the tight timetable for its implementation (coinciding with 
the introduction of the General Criminal Contract) undoubtedly came from the 
Government of the day.  However, this was not accompanied with by clear directions 
as to the objectives or purposes of the new service, beyond a general view that it could 
provide a basis for cost savings and exert pressure, through 'benchmarking', on private 
practice providers to reduce costs and possibly to improve the quality of their 
services.   
 
The lack of clarity about the policy objectives the PDS was designed to meet, the 
hostility of many private practice lawyers (both solicitors and barristers) to the idea of 
such a service, and the LSC's complete lack of experience in directly employing 
lawyers to provide legal services to the public, all contributed to a highly risk adverse 
approach to the setting up of the PDS.  It is also significant that, unlike the 
                                                 
98 The demands on private practice firms were heavier in those areas with fewer contracted suppliers, 
but in only one instance did a s (small) firm complain about the number of files they were asked to 
provide for research purposes.   
99 Interview with Richard Collins. 
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introduction of public defender services in most other jurisdictions, there already 
existed in England and Wales both a fully comprehensive system of criminal legal aid 
provision, encompassing mass representation of both suspects under investigation in 
police stations and defendants in magistrates' courts and the Crown Court, and a 
highly developed network of private practice lawyers delivering these services in all 
parts of the country.  There were therefore virtually no 'gaps' in provision, either in 
terms of new types of service that might be offered or areas of the country to be 
served, on which the PDS could be focussed, not least in attempting to build a client 
base.100  The decision first of the Government in Parliament to provide a statutory 
guarantee of client choice of representative, and subsequently by the LSC not to give 
the PDS any preference in the allocation of duty solicitor 'slots', further served to 
marginalise the PDS in terms of client recruitment from the outset.   
 
A number of other key decisions were made in the process of setting up the service 
which were to have very significant implications for the way the PDS operated, 
particularly in respect of its costs.  These included the decisions that the PDOs should 
be fully staffed at the outset in order to provide a full, comprehensive service covering 
police stations and courts on a 24-hour a day basis; and those relating to the types of 
offices in which the PDOs would be accommodated.  As the professional head of 
service commented: 
 
I was a party to those decisions, and I am entirely satisfied that the management 
that now runs [the LSC] would not have made those decisions.  …  I am entirely 
satisfied that the present management group would not have staffed them as they 
were staffed, guaranteeing 24-hour cover of good quality….  Obviously, that 
was hugely costly in terms of what one was getting by way of return.  In terms 
of quality of layout of offices, God I would like to work in that sort of place, and 
again the positioning of the offices ….101 
 
As this comment indicates, there have been further developments in the PDS, 
including the setting up of additional offices on a somewhat different model to that 
followed initially and particularly in the management structure of the service.  
However, many of the innovations which might, with further consideration and time 
for investigation and implementation, have been considered at the outset are only now 
being discussed and set in motion.  The service as it develops in the future (if allowed 
to do so) may be very different from the one that has been subject to the research 
evaluation presented in this report.     
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
100 The one exception, in terms of the PDOs included in the research, was Cheltenham, as discussed 
above.   
101 Interview with Tony Edwards. 
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Chapter 2 
The Nature of Clients and Caseloads 
 
A matter of considerable interest in itself, but also an important element in 
interpreting the other findings in the study, is an investigation of the nature of 
caseloads in private practice and the Public Defender Service (PDS).  There are a 
number of reasons for thinking that Public Defender Offices (PDOs) might have 
different caseloads from private practice.  Principal amongst these is the fact that the 
PDOs were ‘cold starts’, offices created from scratch, often (though not always) 
without office heads or other solicitors who had strong local followings.   As a result, 
PDOs began without an established client base. Furthermore, the PDOs were required 
to recruit clients in the same way as private firms.  They did not have the benefit of 
formal direction of clients to them, as was the case in Scotland for the early part of the 
Edinburgh PDSO experiment.102  Nor did they receive preferential treatment on duty 
schemes, the most obvious way in which client recruitment could have been boosted, 
as continues to happen in Scotland. 
 
There may be other factors which would influence caseloads.  The absence of an 
established client base might lead to a less serious caseload, at least initially.  More 
regular offenders may be more likely to have established relationships with particular 
firms (or solicitors within them), and existing firms might have stronger reputations 
amongst regular criminal defendants, which would lead them to have more of those 
types of client.  Similarly, if there were perceived differences in approaches to 
criminal defence work by the two sectors, this might be picked up by prospective 
clients and reflected in the nature of clients choosing the PDS rather than private 
practice. 
 
More importantly for our purposes, the nature of caseloads are likely to affect the 
ways in which cases are handled, the outcomes that could be achieved and the costs 
that would be incurred.  If, as we hypothesised, PDOs had caseloads which were less 
serious or had clients with fewer previous convictions, then all things being equal it 
would be expected that the PDS would spend less time on cases and for their clients to 
receive lighter sentences. 
 
Thus in this chapter we first look at the characteristics of the client base of the two 
sectors, including demographic data and the criminal histories of clients. We then go 
on to examine the characteristics and profiles of the offences of which clients were 
suspected or charged, before looking at the seriousness and complexity of the cases 
dealt with by the PDS and private practice. 
 
We have a number of data sets relevant to understanding the nature of criminal 
defence caseloads.  Principal amongst these are the SPOCC data and case file 
samples.  There is also relevant information from the peer review data set concerning 
complexity and seriousness of cases.103 
 
                                                 
102 As discussed in Chapter 1. 
103 For details of the respective data sets see Chapter 1. 
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Social Characteristics of Clients 
 
In this section we look at comparative demographic and socio-economic data on the 
clients of private practice and the PDS, and then examine in some detail their previous 
criminal histories. 
 
(i)  Gender 
 
Our data on gender were derived from the case file samples. The gender pattern in the 
investigation stage sample can be seen in Table 2.1a, and those for the magistrates’ 
court and Crown Court samples in Tables 2.1b and 2.1c.  At the all areas level, there 
were no significant differences between the PDS and private practice with regard to 
the gender of clients, either in the investigation stage sample or in the court stage 
samples. At the local level, the gender pattern of clients often differed as between 
PDOs and private practice, but such differences were normally not consistent as 
between the different stages (i.e. investigation, magistrates’ court and Crown Court). 
Thus, for example, Birmingham PDO clients in the investigation stage sample were 
more frequently female (31% female compared with 11% for private practice).  
Whereas, in the magistrates’ court sample only 7.7% of their clients were female 
(compared with 12.2% for private practice).  In the Crown Court sample 13% were 
female (compared with 6% for private practice). The only PDO with a consistent 
pattern was Liverpool, with proportionately more female clients than their private 
practice counterparts in all three samples, although overall the differences were not 
significant.  
 
Table 2.1a: Gender of Client Base (Investigation Stage file data) 
  Female 
% 
Male 
% 
N 
Birmingham* PDO 31.3 68.8 48 
 PP 10.6 89.4 47 
Cheltenham PDO 13.7 86.3 51 
 PP 22.2 77.8 45 
Liverpool PDO 18.0 82.0 50 
 PP 14.6 85.4 48 
Middlesbrough PDO 26.0 74.0 50 
 PP 16.0 84.0 50 
Pontypridd PDO 24.5 75.5 49 
 PP 16.7 83.3 48 
Swansea PDO 12.0 88.0 50 
 PP 11.1 88.9 45 
All areas PDOs 20.8 79.2 298 
 PP 15.2 84.8 283 
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Table 2.1b: Gender of Client Base (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
 
  Female 
% 
Male 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 7.7 92.3 52 
 PP 12.2 87.8 49 
Cheltenham PDO 10.4 89.6 48 
 PP 22.0 78.0 48 
Liverpool PDO 27.5 72.5 51 
 PP 14.0 86.0 50 
Middlesbrough PDO 7.7 92.3 52 
 PP 17.6 82.4 51 
Pontypridd PDO 22.4 77.6 49 
 PP 14.0 86.0 50 
Swansea PDO 20.0 80.0 50 
 PP 14.0 86.0 50 
All areas PDOs 15.9 84.1 302 
 PP 15.3 84.7 300 
 
 
 Table 2.1c: Gender of Client Base (Crown Court file data) 
  Female 
% 
Male 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDS 13.0 87.0 46 
 PP 6.0 94.0 50 
Cheltenham PDS 10.9 89.1 46 
 PP 3.4 96.6 29 
Liverpool PDS 20.0 80.0 50 
 PP 15.4 84.6 52 
Middlesbrough PDS 12.8 87.2 47 
 PP 4.1 95.9 49 
Pontypridd PDS 15.0 85.0 40 
 PP 20.0 80.0 50 
Swansea PDS 2.9 97.1 35 
 PP 12.0 88.0 50 
All areas PDS 12.9 87.1 264 
 PP 10.7 89.3 280 
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(ii)  Ethnicity 
 
We collected data on the ethnicity of clients from case files.  The categories used in 
our data collection mirrored those categories used by the Criminal Defence Service. 
Under-recording on files of ethnicity of clients has hampered our findings. Private 
practitioners were much less likely to record this information on their files than the 
PDS. In the investigation stage sample, data on ethnicity was missing in 60% of 
private practice files, compared with 12% of PDS files. Recording of ethnicity was 
higher in court stage files, although relevant data was still missing in about one third 
of private practice files, compared to less than 5% in PDS files.  The statistics below 
are based only on cases where ethnicity was identified.  
  
At the investigation stage, the only areas showing notable ethnic minority 
representation among the clients of either sector were Birmingham and Liverpool. In 
Birmingham, 4% of the PDO clients were black, 10% Asian or Chinese, and 6% 
recorded as ‘other’. However, the indications were that private practice in 
Birmingham had higher proportions of their clients drawn from ethnic minorities, 
with 15% recorded as black, 15% Asian or Chinese, and 2% as ‘other’. Put another 
way, in 29% of PDO cases but 50% of private practice cases in Birmingham where 
ethnicity was recorded the client was from one of these minority groupings. In 
Liverpool, by contrast, 12% of the PDO clients but only 2% of private practice clients 
were recorded as being black, Asian, Chinese or ‘other’, and a further 6% of PDO 
clients and 2% of private practice clients were noted as being Irish. 
 
Looking at the two court stage samples (see Tables 2.2a and 2.2b), there were no 
significant differences in client ethnicity between the PDS and private practice in 
magistrates’ court cases, either at the all areas level or at the local level. This was also 
true in respect of Crown Court cases except that in Birmingham private practice had 
significantly more ethnic minority clients than the PDO in the same area. 
 
Table 2.2a: Ethnicity of Clients (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Ethnic 
Minority 
% 
White 
 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 44.3 53.8 1.9 52 
 PP 38.6 57.1 14.3 49 
Cheltenham PDO 6.2 83.8 0 48 
 PP 4.0 60.0 36.0 50 
Liverpool PDO 11.8 84.3 3.9 51 
 PP 4.0 46.0 50.0 50 
Middlesbrough PDO 7.7 84.6 7.7 52 
 PP 0.0 47.1 52.9 51 
Pontypridd PDO 2.1 95.9 2.0 49 
 PP 4.0 68.0 28.0 50 
Swansea PDO 0.0 100.0 0.0 50 
 PP 6.0 78.0 16.0 50 
All areas PDO 12.3 85.1 2.6 302 
 PP 7.7 59.3 33.0 300 
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Table 2.2b: Ethnicity of Clients (Crown Court file data) 
  Ethnic 
Minority
% 
White
 
% 
Don’t 
know 
% 
N 
Birmingham* PDO 34.8 65.2 0.0 46 
 PP 56.0 34.0 10.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 2.2 97.8 0 46 
 PP 3.4 75.9 20.7 29 
Liverpool PDO 14.0 80.0 6.0 50 
 PP 9.6 32.7 57.7 52 
Middlesbrough PDO 8.5 74.5 17.0 47 
 PP 4.0 32.7 63.3 49 
Pontypridd PDO 5.0 95.0 0 40 
 PP 2.0 72.0 26.0 50 
Swansea PDO 14.5 85.6 2.9 35 
 PP 6.0 84.0 10.0 50 
All areas* PDOs 12.9 82.6 4.5 264 
 PP 14.3 53.6 32.1 280 
 
(iii)  Vulnerability 
 
There were three main indicators of client vulnerability potentially available from 
case files: mental disorder/vulnerability; physical disability; and 
drug/alcohol/substance abuse or addiction. It is worthy of note that at the all areas 
level between a fifth and a quarter of clients in the court samples were vulnerable in 
one of the ways specified above, a finding that is likely to be an under-estimate given 
that we had to rely on relevant information being recorded in the case files.104 As a 
result, these data only provide a tentative indication of clients’ vulnerability. 
 
Approximately 90% of investigation stage files contained no indication that the client 
suffered from particular disabilities or vulnerabilities, although Liverpool and 
Middlesbrough PDO files recorded notably high rates of vulnerability amongst their 
clients (20% in Liverpool, including 18% involved in substance abuse, and 18% in 
Middlesbrough). 
 
In relation to both the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples (see Tables 2.3a 
and 2.3b), four PDOs appeared to have a smaller proportion of clients with drugs, 
alcohol and similar problems than private practice (Birmingham, Middlesbrough, 
Pontypridd and Swansea), but the difference is only significant in the case of 
Middlesbrough (for both court samples). In Pontypridd, in Crown Court cases the 
PDO had significantly more clients evidencing mental disorder than private practice 
Otherwise the profiles of clients for the PDS and private practice were broadly 
similar.   
                                                 
104 In some cases such factors were noted on case pro-forma, and in others we extracted the information 
from client instructions, pre-sentence reports, etc.   
 36
 
Table 2.3a: Client Vulnerability (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Any 
indication 
of Mental 
Disorder? 
 
% 
N Any 
indication 
of 
Physical 
Disability?
 
% 
N Any 
Indication 
of 
drug/alcohol 
etc 
addiction? 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 1.9 52 0.0 48 15.4 52 
 PP 4.1 49 0.0 49 18.4 49 
Cheltenham PDO 8.3 48 0.0 48 16.7 48 
 PP 8.0 50 2.0 50 14.0 50 
Liverpool PDO 2.0 51 3.9 51 13.7 51 
 PP 4.0 50 2.0 50 8.0 50 
Middlesbrough PDO 3.8 52 0.0 52 3.8 52 
 PP 2.0 51 0.0 51 25.5 51 
Pontypridd PDO 2.0 49 4.1 49 22.4 49 
 PP 0 50 2.0 50 30.0 50 
Swansea PDO 4.0 50 0 50 12.0 50 
 PP 4.0 50 2.0 49 20.0 50 
All areas PDOs 3.6 302 1.3 302 13.9 302
 PP 3.7 300 1.3 300 19.3 300
 
Table 2.3b: Client Vulnerability (Crown Court file data) 
  Any 
indication 
of Mental 
Disorder? 
 
% 
N Any 
indication 
of 
Physical 
Disability?
 
% 
N Any 
Indication 
of 
drug/alcohol 
etc 
addiction? 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 2.2 46 0.0 46 13.0 46 
 PP 6.0 50 0.0 50 24.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 4.3 46 0.0 46 26.1 46 
 PP 10.3 29 0.0 29 20.7 29 
Liverpool PDO 10.0 50 2.0 50 16.0 50 
 PP 5.8 52 1.9 52 15.4 52 
Middlesbrough PDO 4.3 47 2.1 47 4.3 47 
 PP 10.2 49 2.0 49 20.4 49 
Pontypridd PDO 12.5 40 0.0 40 25.0 40 
 PP 0.0 50 4.0 50 32.0 50 
Swansea PDO 5.7 35 0.0 35 17.1 35 
 PP 6.0 50 0.0 50 22.0 50 
All areas PDOs 6.4 264 0.8 264 16.7 264
 PP 6.1 280 1.4 280 22.5 280
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(iv)  Age 
  
SPOCC data do not record the date of birth or age of clients, but do include a field for 
‘Youth court’. On the other hand, we were able to record date of birth in our case file 
samples and to compute clients’ ages at the date of their arrest or charge.  Comparing 
the two sets of data, it appears that SPOCC under-records the numbers of clients who 
are under 18 years. This is significant because defendants under the age of 18 years 
are normally dealt with in a youth court, although there are exceptions, where, for 
example, a youth is jointly charged with an adult. Furthermore, youth clients are 
generally regarded as more vulnerable than adult clients, and in some ways the law 
and procedure applicable to youths is more complex than that relating to adults. 
 
Tabale 2.4a shows SPOCC data on the proportion of youth work in the investigation 
stage sample in the six areas. Excluding Swansea and Pontypridd, PDOs appeared to 
do very little youth work in the police station.  Middlesbrough, Cheltenham, 
Liverpool and Birmingham all did significantly less than their private practice 
counterparts. Swansea PDO was the sole office to do significantly more youth work 
than private practice in the same area.  
Table 2.4a: Youth Work in Investigation Cases (SPOCC) 
  % N 
    Birmingham* PDO 0.3 770 
 PP 5.8 81893 
Cheltenham* PDO 1.5 871 
 PP 4.9 21429 
Liverpool* PDO 1.2 842 
 PP 8.0 34096 
Middlesbrough* PDO 0.5 883 
 PP 12.4 17047 
Pontypridd PDO 10.2 381 
 PP 10.9 4412 
Swansea* PDO 3.6 752 
 PP 0.8 11099 
All areas* PDOs 2.1 4499 
 PP 6.6 169976 
 
However, these data may be unreliable, especially in respect of investigation stage 
cases, and particularly in PDS cases. The CDS 6 and its guidance may reinforce 
this.105 The likelihood that youth cases are under-recorded in investigation stage 
SPOCC data is demonstrated by a comparison between the SPOCC data and the age 
profile of clients drawn from our investigation stage case file analysis.  While SPOCC 
                                                 
105 SPOCC data is derived from CDS 6 claim forms, which contains a box entitled ‘Youth court’ but 
which do not include a prompt for age of the client. The contract guidance on the completion of Form 
CDS 6 states that the box must be completed with a ‘Y’ where the client ‘was a youth’. It is possible, 
however, that given the title of the box, that some solicitors only indicate a ‘Y’ where the case involved 
work in the youth court, which will not normally be the case at the investigation stage. This approach 
may be reinforced by the guidance which states that where a youth is jointly charged with an adult and 
the case is not remitted to a youth court, that this box should not be completed. This may lead some 
solicitors to only complete the box if the case, at the stage when a claim is made, has actually involved 
an appearance in a youth court. 
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data indicate that only 5% of PDS and 6% of those private practice clients that were 
included in our file data analysis were youths, the calculation of clients’ ages using 
their date of birth showed around 18% of PDS and 14% of private practice clients in 
these cases were 17 years old or under at the date of their arrest (Table 2.4b).  The 
latter data also indicate that four of the six PDOs (Cheltenham, Liverpool, 
Middlesbrough, and Swansea) actually dealt with higher proportions of clients aged 
17 or under than private practice in their areas, and Pontypridd PDO handled a similar 
proportion of such clients.  There were notably high proportions of youth clients in 
Pontypridd (for both the PDO and private practice) and in Swansea (for the PDO).  
Table 2.4b: Client’s Age at Arrest in Investigation Cases (file data) 
  17 or 
under 
18-35 36 or 
over 
Not 
ascer-
tained 
N 
Birmingham* PDO 16.7 31.3 45.8 6.3 48 
 PP 19.1 46.8 31.9 2.1 47 
Cheltenham PDO 15.7 68.6 13.7 2.0 51 
 PP 11.1 55.6 28.9 4.4 45 
Liverpool PDO 14.0 50.0 26.0 10.0 50 
 PP 6.3      64.6 25.0 4.2 48 
Middlesbrough PDO 18.0 46.0 28.0 8.0 50 
 PP 12.0 78.0 10.0 0 50 
Pontypridd PDO 22.4 67.3 10.2 0 49 
 PP 22.9 58.3 8.3 10.4 48 
Swansea PDO 24.0 46.0 28.0 2.0 50 
 PP 15.6 62.2 22.2 0 45 
All areas PDOs 18.5 51.7 25.2 4.7 298 
 PP 14.5 61.1 20.8 3.5 283 
 
The information is shown graphically in Figure 2A. 
Figure 2A: Client’s Age at Arrest in Investigation Cases (file data) 
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In our file data set relating to the two court samples, we recorded clients’ dates of 
birth. These data show no significant differences in the age profiles of private practice 
and PDS clients, although private practice Crown Court clients were an average 18 
months younger than PDS Crown Court clients. 
 
The SPOCC data for the magistrates’ court proceedings stage show a higher level of 
youth court work compared to the investigation stage sample, and again indicate that 
private practice has a greater proportion of youth court work compared to the PDS 
(Table 2.4c), in all offices except Middlesbrough (although this difference was not 
significant). The differences reached statistical significance in Birmingham and 
Liverpool and at the all areas level. 
Table 2.4c: Youth Court Work in Magistrates’ Court  (SPOCC) 
  Proportion of 
Youth Court 
Work 
% 
Total 
 
 Birmingham* PDO 
 
7.3 
 
548 
 PP 12.4 91531 
Cheltenham PDO 8.6 454 
 PP 10.0 14550 
Liverpool* PDO 7.6 1057 
 PP 10.9 37610 
Middlesbrough PDO 13.8 509 
 PP 12.2 15358 
Pontypridd PDO 11.4 307 
 PP 13.7 5152 
Swansea PDO 11.9 413 
 PP 14.2 6086 
All areas* PDOs 9.5 3288 
 PP 12.0 170287 
 
However, our file data show that the proportion of clients under 18 years in 
magistrates’ courts was identical for the PDS and private practice.  Figure 2B shows 
the age distribution of the magistrates’ court sample, and Figure 2C for the Crown 
Court sample. The distributions were not significantly different. As would be 
expected, the proportion of clients under 18 years was higher in the magistrates’ court 
sample (19% for both the PDS and private practice) than in the Crown Court sample 
(7% for the PDS and 6% for private practice). 
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Figure 2B: Age Distribution (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
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Figure 2C: Age Distribution (Crown Court file data) 
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Source of Clients 
 
One factor likely to have to have influenced the types of clients and cases attracted to 
the PDS during its initial stages of operations was that it was more heavily dependent 
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on duty solicitor schemes as a source of clients.  SPOCC data relating to investigation 
cases indicate that 38% of the PDS investigation cases over the course of our research 
began as duty solicitor cases.  This compares with 25% of private practice cases in the 
same areas, a difference that is highly significant at the all areas level as well as five 
out of six of the areas looked at. 
 
Table 2.5: Proportion of Investigation Cases that are Duty Solicitor Cases (SPOCC)  
  Mean N 
Birmingham** PDS  69% 800 
 PP 27% 84860 
Middlesbrough** PDS  52% 922 
 PP 19% 17386 
Cheltenham** PDS  19% 886 
 PP 34% 21579 
Liverpool** PDS  30% 860 
 PP 21% 35519 
Pontypridd PDS  26% 393 
 PP 25% 4619 
Swansea** PDS  27% 923 
 PP 11% 12954 
All areas** PDS  38% 4784 
 PP 25% 176917 
 
However, there was considerable variation between the PDOs in the extent to which 
they depended on duty solicitor work, with the greatest reliance being in Birmingham 
where seven out of ten investigation stage clients where recruited through duty 
solicitor schemes over the three years of our research, more than twice the proportion 
as for private practice in the area.  Similarly, in Middlesbrough the PDO drew just 
over half of its investigation stage clients from duty solicitor work, compared with 
only a fifth for private practice.  The Liverpool and Swansea PDOs both drew around 
three in ten of their investigation stage clients from duty solicitor work, compared 
with 21% and 11% respectively for private practice in each of these areas.  The 
Pontypridd PDO, which opened later as a branch of the Swansea PDO, had a very 
similar proportion of its investigation stage cases originate in duty solicitor work as 
local private practice (26% and 25% respectively), a finding that no doubt reflects the 
fact that when it was opened it drew its staff and some established clients from the 
Swansea PDO.  Finally, the Cheltenham PDO was the only one in the research that 
was less dependent on duty solicitor work as a source of clients than local private 
practice firms, a finding that may be explained by the earlier closure of a major local 
provider and the fact that a number of new private practice firms had also recently 
been established in the area.     
 
In addition to these geographical variations, the dependence of the PDS on duty 
solicitor work as a source of clients declined over time, as shown in Figure 2D, 
although it clearly remained high in some areas.     
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Figure 2D: The Proportion of Investigation Cases that are Duty Solicitor Cases over 
time (SPOCC) 
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Criminal Histories of Clients 
 
The antecedent profile of the client base of the two sectors is important in its own 
right, but is also relevant both to assessment of caseload seriousness and complexity, 
and to processes and outcomes. Most obviously, clients with previous convictions 
will, other things being equal, tend to receive higher sentences, particularly if the 
previous convictions are recent and/or similar to the offence(s) of which they are now 
accused. Antecedents may also affect processes, for example, whether an accused 
elects trial in the Crown Court in either-way cases. Here we examine the profiles of 
clients in terms of whether they have previous convictions or cautions (or reprimands 
or warnings). In respect of those that do have previous convictions or cautions, we 
look at the number of previous convictions, how recent were the convictions, whether 
they have previous convictions for offences that are similar to the current lead 
offence, and the history of custodial sentences. 
 
(i)  Previous convictions 
 
Given that the PDOs started from scratch, were not in a privileged position compared 
to private practice in terms of client recruitment, and were more dependent on client 
recruitment through duty solicitor schemes, we hypothesised that their clients would 
have fewer and, perhaps, less serious previous convictions than private practice 
clients.  Our information on previous convictions was usually derived from Police 
National Computer (PNC) printouts contained in the files we examined.  This enabled 
us to collect detailed information on previous convictions, cautions and sentences. 
Where the file did not include a PNC printout we relied on instructions and other 
documents indicating the client’s antecedent history, although usually these were less 
detailed. 
   
The investigation stage files that we examined frequently did not have PNC printouts 
in them.  PNC printouts were more likely to be found in files relating to court 
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proceedings, as is shown in Tables 2.6a and 2.6b. In relation to magistrates’ court 
files, although private practice files had the PNC printout on it more often than the 
PDOs, there were no significant differences (Table 2.6a). At the Crown Court level, 
however, as can be seen in Table 2.6b, in Liverpool and Middlesbrough private 
practice had significantly more clients with PNC records on file than the PDOs. This 
was also the case at an all areas level. 
Table 2.6a:  PNC Printout on File? (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Missing 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 59.6 38.5 1.9 52 
 PP 71.4 28.6 0.0 49 
Cheltenham PDO 64.6 33.3 2.1 48 
 PP 76.0 24.0 0.0 50 
Liverpool PDO 72.5 27.5 0.0 51 
 PP 60.0 40.0 0.0 50 
Middlesbrough PDO 51.9 48.1 0.0 52 
 PP 68.6 31.4 0.0 51 
Pontypridd PDO 61.2 38.8 0.0 49 
 PP 70.0 30.0 0.0 50 
Swansea PDO 62.0 38.0 0.0 50 
 PP 64.0 34.0 2.0 50 
All areas PDOs 61.9 37.4 0.7 302 
 PP 68.3 31.3 0.3 300 
 
Table 2.6b: PNC Printout on File? (Crown Court file data) 
  Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Missing 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 60.9 39.1 0.0 46 
 PP 74.0 26.0 0.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 50.0 39.1 10.9 46 
 PP 65.5 34.5 0.0 29 
Liverpool* PDO 40.0 60.0 0.0 50 
 PP 63.5 34.6 1.9 52 
Middlesbrough** PDO 48.9 48.9 2.1 47 
 PP 79.6 20.4 0.0 49 
Pontypridd PDO 67.5 32.5 0.0 40 
 PP 66.0 34.0 0.0 50 
Swansea PDO 74.3 22.9 2.9 35 
 PP 84.0 16.0 0.0 50 
All areas** PDOs 55.7 41.7 2.7 264 
 PP 72.5 27.1 0.4 280 
 
In investigation stage cases, the frequent absence of the PNC printout meant that it 
was not always clear from the file whether or not the client had previous convictions, 
especially where the case did not proceed to charge. As a result, there were large 
proportions of cases for both the PDS (31%) and private practice (48%) where 
 44
information on antecedents was not obtained in the investigation stage sample (see 
Table 2.7). 
  
Table 2.7a: Clients with Previous Convictions (Investigation Stage file data) 
Previous 
Convictions    
% 
Previous 
conviction 
(excluding files 
with no 
information) % 
 Missing    
% 
Yes No  
No 
Birmingham PDO 33.3 33.3 33.3 50 48 
 PP 42.6 40.4 17 70 47 
Cheltenham PDO 39.2 47.1 13.7 77 51 
 PP 82.2 13.3 4.4 75 45 
Liverpool* PDO 32 50 18 74 50 
 PP 39.6 56.3 4.2 93 48 
Middlesbrough PDO 34 42 24 64 50 
 PP 42 48 10 83 50 
Pontypridd* PDO 14.3 63.5 12.2 84 49 
 PP 45.8 35.4 18.8 65 48 
Swansea PDO 30 44 26 63 50 
 PP 35.6 53.3 11.1 83 45 
All areas* PDOs 30.5 48.3 21.1 70 298 
 PP 47.7 41.3 11 79 283 
  
More of the PDS files contained evidence regarding clients’ previous convictions, and 
at the all areas level it was clear from the file that the client had no previous 
convictions in 21% of PDS and 11% of private practice files.  This pattern was 
consistent across five of the six areas, the exception being Pontypridd.  Both 
differences may have been due to the higher number of private practice files lacking 
information on previous convictions rather than real differences in previous 
convictions.  However, excluding the files which did not contain relevant data, it 
appears that a greater proportion of private practice clients in the sample had previous 
convictions compared with the PDS. 
In the court samples, files were more likely to contain information about previous 
convictions. As Tables 2.7b and 2.7c show, data on previous convictions was missing 
from 14.9% of PDS and 9% of private practice magistrates’ court files, and from 8.7% 
of PDS and 10.7% of private practice Crown Court files.  In the magistrates’ court 
sample, in all areas except Swansea, and at the all areas level, private practice clients 
were more likely to have previous convictions than PDO clients.  However, only in 
Liverpool, and at the all areas level, were the differences significant (Table 2.7b). In 
the Crown Court sample, in all offices except Pontypridd, and at the all areas level, 
private practice clients were also more likely to have previous convictions than PDO 
clients (Table 2.7c). The differences were significant in Birmingham, Liverpool and 
Middlesbrough and at the all areas level. 
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Table 2.7b: Previous Convictions (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
Client had 
previous 
convictions 
  
Yes No 
Missing N 
Birmingham PDO 61.5 17.3 21.2 52 
 PP 79.6 14.3 6.1 49 
Cheltenham PDO 70.8 12.5 16.7 48 
 PP 82.0 12.0 6.0 50 
Liverpool* PDO 58.8 29.4 11.8 51 
 PP 74.0 12.0 14.0 50 
Middlesbrough PDO 61.5 17.3 21.2 52 
 PP 76.0 12.0 12.0 50 
Pontypridd PDO 69.4 18.4 12.2 49 
 PP 84.0 12.0 4.0 50 
Swansea PDO 68.0 28.0 4.0 50 
 PP 64.0 24.0 12.0 50 
All areas* PDOs 64.9 20.5 14.6 302 
 PP 76.6 14.4 9.0 299 
 
Table 2.7c: Previous Convictions (Crown Court file data) 
Client had 
previous 
convictions 
  
Y N 
Missing N 
Birmingham** PDO 47.8 43.5 8.7 46 
 PP 70.0 18.0 12.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 67.4 30.4 2.2 46 
 PP 69.0 20.7 10.3 29 
Liverpool* PDO 56.0 26.0 18.0 50 
 PP 76.9 9.6 13.5 52 
Middlesbrough** PDO 57.4 38.3 4.3 47 
 PP 80.0 8.0 12.0 50 
Pontypridd PDO 70.0 17.5 12.5 40 
 PP 68.0 20.0 12.0 50 
Swansea PDO 62.9 28.6 8.6 35 
 PP 76.0 20.0 4.0 50 
All areas** PDOs 59.8 31.1 9.1 264 
 PP 73.7 15.7 10.7 281 
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Thus the data collected would tend to indicate that, at the all areas level, clients of 
private practice were more likely to have previous convictions than PDO clients. This 
was also true for most individual PDOs. Although some PDOs did have a greater 
proportion of clients with previous convictions than private practice in one of the 
stages, none of them did so over all three stages. 
 
(ii)  Number of cautions, reprimands or warnings 
 
Whether clients have previous convictions provides some indication of the respective 
seriousness of caseloads, but in order to obtain a more in-depth picture we collected 
data on whether clients had received cautions, reprimands or warnings in the past 
(and, if so, the number), and on the number and nature of previous convictions. 
 
In the investigation stage sample, only a minority of files from either sector recorded 
that the client had received a previous caution (17% for PDOs and 10% for private 
practice).  There were particularly high levels of previous cautions recorded for PDO 
clients in Cheltenham (24%), Pontypridd (27%) and Swansea (20%) and among 
private practice clients in Swansea (20%) and Middlesbrough (18%).  
The position regarding magistrates’ court clients is shown in Table 2.8a.  There were 
no significant differences between clients of the PDS or private practice in terms of 
previous cautions etc., either at the all areas level or for individual offices, although in 
Cheltenham more PDO clients appear to have at least one caution compared to private 
practice clients in that area. Overall, about 50% of those clients in respect of which 
there were relevant data had one or more cautions, reprimands or warnings.  
 
Table 2.8a: Number of Previous Cautions, Reprimands or Warnings (Magistrates’ 
Court file data) 
  0 
 
% 
1 
 
% 
2 
 
% 
3 
 
% 
4 or 
more 
% 
N Missing 
N 
Birmingham PDO 65.6 18.8 12.5 0.0 3.1 32 20 
 PP 62.9 25.7 8.6 2.9 0.0 35 14 
Cheltenham PDO 37.5 37.5 18.8 6.3 0.0 32 16 
 PP 55.3 26.3 13.2 2.6 2.6 38 12 
Liverpool PDO 51.4 24.3 18.9 5.4 0.0 37 14 
 PP 53.3 33.3 13.3 0.0 0.0 30 20 
Middlesbrough PDO 44.8 37.9 17.2 0.0 0.0 29 23 
 PP 40.5 37.8 18.9 0.0 2.7 37 14 
Pontypridd PDO 43.3 30.0 20.0 3.3 3.3 30 19 
 PP 57.1 25.7 11.4 2.9 2.9 35 15 
Swansea PDO 43.8 28.1 18.8 9.4 0.0 32 18 
 PP 48.6 28.6 17.1 2.9 2.9 35 15 
All areas PDOs 47.9 29.2 17.7 4.2 1.0 192 110 
 PP 52.9 29.5 13.8 1.9 1.9 210 90 
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Table 2.8b: Number of Previous Cautions (Crown Court file data) 
  0 
% 
1 
% 
2 
% 
3 
% 
4 or 
more 
% 
N Missing
N 
Birmingham PDO 82.8 10.3 3.4 3.4 0.0 29 17 
 PP 75.7 18.9 2.7 0.0 2.7 37 13 
Cheltenham PDO 50.0 30.8 15.4 3.8 0.0 26 20 
 PP 30.0 45.0 15.0 5.0 5.0 20 9 
Liverpool PDO 61.9 23.8 14.3 0.0 0.0 21 29 
 PP 64.7 8.8 20.6 5.9 0.0 34 18 
Middlesbrough PDO 40.0 32.0 24.0 0.0 4.0 25 22 
 PP 48.7 33.3 15.4 2.6 0.0 39 10 
Pontypridd PDO 70.4 14.8 14.8 0.0 0.0 27 13 
 PP 70.6 17.6 8.8 0.0 2.9 34 16 
Swansea PDO 52.0 28.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 25 10 
 PP 47.7 36.4 9.1 2.3 4.5 44 6 
All areas PDOs 60.1 22.9 15.0 1.3 0.7 153 111 
 PP 57.7 26.0 11.5 2.4 2.4 208 72 
 
Table 2.8b shows that there were also no significant differences relating to cautioning 
history between the PDS and private practice in the Crown Court sample. 
Interestingly, at the all areas level, compared with the magistrates’ court sample, a 
larger proportion of both PDS and private practice clients had no previous cautions. 
(iii)  Number and sets of previous convictions 
Where there was an indication of previous convictions on the file, we recorded the 
numbers (by individual convictions and by sets of convictions), the date of the most 
recent conviction prior to the offence(s) forming the subject matter of the file, and 
also the length of any previous custodial sentences received by the client. A person 
may be sentenced on one occasion for more than one offence, and thus ‘sets of 
convictions’ refers to the number of times that a person has appeared in court to be 
sentenced, and ‘number of convictions’ refers to the actual number of offences for 
which the person has been sentenced.  For the sake of convenience, we first present 
figures for investigation stage files, and then the figures for the two court stages.  
 
Table 2.9a shows the numbers of PDS and private practice clients in the investigation 
stage sample with previous convictions, divided between those with five or less 
convictions/sets of convictions and those with six or more.106   
                                                 
106 See above regarding the number of files where data on previous convictions was missing. 
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Table 2.9a: Clients with Previous Convictions by Number of Actual and Sets of 
Convictions (Investigation Stage file data) 
 Convictions Sets of Convictions 
No. of clients with No. of clients with  
1-5(%) 6+ 
(%) 
N 1-5(%) 6+ (%) N 
PDO 50.0 50.0 8 57.1 42.9 7 Birmingham 
PP 16.7 83.3 12 33.3 66.7 12 
PDO 25.0 75.0 20 35.0 65.0 20 Cheltenham 
PP 0 100.0 4 0 100.0 5 
PDO** 55.6 44.4 18 66.7 33.3 18 Liverpool 
PP 0 100.0 16 20.0 80.0 15 
PDO 53.8 46.2 13 45.5 54.5 11 Middlesbrough
PP 23.1 76.9 13 35.7 64.3 14 
PDO 44.4 55.6 27 48.1 51.9 27 Pontypridd 
PP 50.0 50.0 10 50.0 50.0 10 
PDO 63.2 36.8 19 73.7 26.3 19 Swansea 
PP 31.6 68.4 19 47.4 52.6 19 
PDOs** 47.6 52.4 105 53.9 46.1 102 All areas 
PP 21.6 78.4 74 34.7 65.3 75 
 
A clear pattern emerges distinguishing three of the areas (Middlesbrough, Liverpool 
and Swansea) from the others.  In these three areas, although the overall number of 
investigation stage clients of PDOs and private practice with previous convictions did 
not vary a great deal, a greater proportion of those from private practice tended to 
have six or more sets of convictions and actual convictions than clients of PDOs.  In 
other words, in these areas, although it was only a minority of investigation stage 
clients from either sector who were recorded as having previous convictions, private 
practice appears to have dealt with more clients with extensive criminal records than 
PDOs.  In Cheltenham and Pontypridd the PDOs recorded more of their investigation 
stage clients as having previous convictions than their private practice counterparts. 
However, in Cheltenham a greater proportion of private practice clients with previous 
convictions had six or more sets of and actual convictions compared to PDO clients, 
although in Pontypridd the proportions were similar. Birmingham PDO had a smaller 
number of investigation stage clients with previous convictions than private practice 
in the area, and a smaller proportion of those with previous convictions had six or 
more sets of and actual convictions.  
Table 2.9b shows, in respect of clients at the investigation stage who had previous 
custodial sentences, the proportions by reference to the length of those sentences. 
These data tend to indicate that, overall, clients of the PDOs had more shorter 
sentences and those of private practice more longer sentences, although none of the 
differences were significant.   
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Table 2.9b: Clients’ Previous Sentences by Length of Sentence (Investigation Stage 
file data) 
 Less than 
three months   
% 
3+ - 12 
months 
% 
12+ 
months 
% 
Total No of 
Sentences 
PDO 63 25 13 40 Birmingham 
PP  29 48 22 63 
PDO 31 42 27 59 Cheltenham 
PP  13 33 53 15 
PDO 36 29 14 42 Liverpool 
PP  34 45 21 56 
PDO 33 33 33 9 Middlesbrough
PP  47 33 21 43 
PDO 33 39 27 51 Pontypridd 
PP  17 67 17 17 
PDO 53 35 13 40 Swansea 
PP  18 58 24 33 
PDOs  43 36 21 227 All areas 
PP  30 46 24 231 
 
As noted earlier, the data on previous convictions at the court stage are more robust. 
The following tables record information only from those in the two court samples who 
we ascertained as having previous convictions. As a result, the sample size differs 
from the overall sample size. Table 2.9c shows the position with regard to the 
magistrates’ court sample, and Table 2.9d for the Crown Court sample. 
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Table 2.9c: Previous Convictions by Actual and Sets of Convictions (Magistrates’ 
Court file data) 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
Birmingham PDO 19.2 23.7 24 
 PP 22.0 29.3 29 
Cheltenham* PDO 32.9 39.9 27 
 PP 14.9 20.3 36 
Liverpool PDO 35.4 42.7 25 
 PP 23.9 32.3 29 
Middlesbrough** PDO 7.9 6.3 26 
 PP 35.7 33.9 32 
Pontypridd PDO 18.3 21.2 29 
 PP 27.7 25.6 32 
Swansea PDO 16.5 21.8 26 
 PP 21.3 30.5 28 
All areas PDOs 21.7 29.7 157
 
 
 
 
Actual Previous Convictions 
 
 PP 24.1 29.1 186
Birmingham PDO 8.0 9.5 25 
 PP 10.1 11.2 30 
Cheltenham* PDO 16.3 17.1 27 
 PP 8.2 10.3 36 
Liverpool PDO 17.4 19.5 26 
 PP 11.0 13.5 29 
Middlesbrough** PDO 4.6 3.1 26 
 PP 14.1 12.5 32 
Pontypridd PDO 9.8 9.9 29 
 PP 12.6 10.0 32 
Swansea PDO 8.9 11.2 26 
 PP 9.6 10.1 28 
All areas PDOs 10.9 13.5 159
 
 
 
 
Sets of Previous Convictions 
 PP 10.9 11.3 187
 
At the all areas level, there was little difference between the PDS and private practice, 
but this was not the case at the local level. In the case of four PDOs (Birmingham, 
Middlesbrough, Pontypridd and Swansea) their magistrates’ court clients appeared to 
have fewer actual and fewer sets of previous convictions than clients of private 
practice in their areas. However, only in the case of Middlesbrough was this 
difference significant. In Liverpool and Cheltenham the opposite was the case, with 
PDO magistrates’ court clients appearing to have more actual and sets of convictions 
than private practice in the area, although this difference was only significant in the 
case of Cheltenham. 
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Table 2.9d: Previous Convictions by Actual and Sets of Convictions (Crown Court 
file data) 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
Birmingham PDO 8.5 13.6 19 
 PP 15.6 20.7 32 
Cheltenham PDO 29.4 30.7 26 
 PP 30.0 37.6 17 
Liverpool PDO 13.3 16.2 18 
 PP 21.2 27.3 34 
Middlesbrough PDO 17.6 15.2 21 
 PP 27.0 29.3 38 
Pontypridd PDO 33.1 27.3 27 
 PP 23.7 34.4 31 
Swansea PDO 24.7 26.5 21 
 PP 24.2 23.6 37 
All areas PDOs 22.3 24.7 132
 
 
 
 
Actual Previous Convictions 
 
 PP 23.2 28.3 189
Birmingham PDO 4.3 5.5 19 
 PP 8.2 8.9 32 
Cheltenham PDO 12.4 10.3 26 
 PP 10.8 10.9 17 
Liverpool PDO 6.7 7.8 18 
 PP 10.1 11.0 34 
Middlesbrough PDO 9.0 7.4 21 
 PP 11.5 10.3 38 
Pontypridd PDO 15.0 10.5 27 
 PP 10.9 10.7 32 
Swansea PDO 10.9 9.7 21 
 PP 11.8 10.3 37 
All areas PDOs 10.2 9.5 132
 
 
 
 
Sets of Previous Convictions 
 PP 10.6 10.3 190
 
Although for most PDOs it was true to say that their Crown Court clients with 
previous convictions had fewer such convictions, when both sets and actual numbers 
of previous convictions were analysed, there were no significant differences between 
the PDS and private practice. Pontypridd PDO provided an exception to the general 
picture, with both more actual and more sets of convictions amongst their Crown 
Court clients compared to private practice in their area, but the differences were not 
significant. At the all areas level, there was little to distinguish between the PDS and 
private practice. 
 
Whilst the numbers of previous convictions and sets of convictions give some 
indication of both the nature of the client base and caseload seriousness, other relevant 
factors include how recent a client’s convictions are, whether they have convictions 
for offences that are similar to those of which the client is now accused, and whether 
clients have previously been given custodial sentences and, if so, the length of those 
custodial sentences. We now deal with those factors in the same order, starting with 
recent convictions. 
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(iv) Recent convictions 
 
Tables 2.10a and 2.10b show information only for those clients who were recorded as 
having previous convictions, and refer to the number of sets of convictions within the 
two years up to the date on which instructions were first given in the current case. 
Thus they demonstrate the proportion of those clients who have previous convictions 
who have appeared in court for sentence during that period by reference to the number 
of occasions on which they have appeared in court for sentence. 
 
In magistrates’ courts sample, at the all areas level there is no significant difference 
between the PDS and private practice. In other words, their clients’ recent criminal 
records were broadly the same. The only statistically significant differences are in 
Liverpool and Middlesbrough. Liverpool PDO had a greater proportion of 
magistrates’ court clients who had previous convictions in the previous two years 
compared to private practice, and in particular more who had three or more sets of 
convictions during that period. In Middlesbrough, the position was reversed.  With 
regard to Crown Court cases, although there was some evidence of a tendency for 
private practice clients to have a more serious recent conviction profile than PDS 
clients, both at the local level (with Pontypridd a notable exception) and at the all 
areas level, the differences were not significant. 
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Table 2.10a: Number of Sets of Convictions in Past Two Years for Clients with 
Previous Convictions (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  0 
% 
1 
% 
2 
% 
3+ 
% 
Missing 
% 
 
N 
Birmingham PDO 3.1 28.1 9.4 18.8 40.6 32 
 PP 5.1 33.3 5.1 20.5 35.9 39 
Cheltenham PDO 14.7 26.5 2.9 32.4 23.5 34 
 PP 26.8 26.8 4.9 31.7 9.8 41 
Liverpool* PDO 0.0 13.3 6.7 50.0 30.0 30 
 PP 0.0 24.3 10.8 21.6 43.2 37 
Middlesbrough** PDO 0.0 32.3 6.5 16.1 45.2 31 
 PP 0.0 10.3 15.4 43.6 30.8 39 
Pontypridd PDO 8.8 26.5 11.8 38.2 14.7 34 
 PP 19.0 19.0 7.1 31.0 23.8 42 
Swansea PDO 8.8 11.8 14.7 32.4 32.4 34 
 PP 21.9 21.9 6.3 37.5 12.5 32 
All areas PDOs 6.2 23.1 8.7 31.3 30.8 195 
 PP 12.2 22.6 8.3 30.9 26.1 230 
 
Table 2.10b: Number of Sets of Convictions in Past Two Years for Clients with 
Previous Convictions (Crown Court file data) 
  0 
% 
1 
% 
2 
% 
3+ 
% 
Missing 
% 
 
N 
Birmingham PDO 0.0 26.1 4.3 4.3 65.2 23 
 PP 5.7 25.7 11.4 20.0 37.1 35 
Cheltenham PDO 6.5 32.3 16.1 19.4 25.8 31 
 PP 30.0 25.0 20.0 10.0 15.0 20 
Liverpool PDO 0.0 17.9 17.9 7.1 57.1 28 
 PP 0.0 22.5 20.0 15.0 42.5 40 
Middlesbrough PDO 0.0 22.2 14.8 7.4 55.6 27 
 PP 0.0 23.1 20.5 30.8 25.6 39 
Pontypridd PDO 14.3 17.9 14.3 50.0 3.6 28 
 PP 26.5 14.7 17.6 35.3 5.9 34 
Swansea PDO 27.3 22.7 4.5 36.4 9.1 22 
 PP 18.4 18.4 15.8 42.1 5.3 38 
All areas PDOs 7.5 23.3 12.6 20.8 35.8 159 
 PP 11.7 21.4 17.5 26.7 22.8 206 
 
 
(v) Similar previous convictions 
 
In addition to the issue of recent convictions, another factor that may, in particular, 
affect sentence is whether clients have previous convictions for offences that are 
similar to those for which they are currently being prosecuted. For this purpose, the 
most common offences were divided into categories (see Appendix 2.1) and a 
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conviction was treated as similar to the current offence if it came within the same 
category. No account is taken in these data of the period of time between the current 
offence and the most recent similar offence. 
 
With regard to the magistrates’ court sample, the position as between the PDS and 
private practice is very similar, with no statistically significant differences between 
them. In both cases, just over half of clients who had previous convictions had 
convictions that were similar to the offence(s) for which they were now being 
prosecuted (Table 2.11a). There is some evidence that private practice clients in 
Birmingham, Middlesbrough and Pontypridd were more likely to have similar 
previous convictions than their PDS counterparts, but the reverse was the case in 
Liverpool and Cheltenham. 
 
In the Crown Court sample, the position at the all areas level again was similar, 
although interestingly it appears that clients were less likely to have similar previous 
convictions compared to the magistrates’ court sample (Table 2.11b). The data tend to 
show that in four areas (Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough and Swansea) private 
practice had a greater proportion of clients with similar previous convictions than the 
PDOs. However, the picture was reversed in the case of Cheltenham and Pontypridd 
PDOs, although only in the case of the latter was the difference significant.  
 
Table 2.11a: Do clients with previous convictions have similar previous convictions? 
(Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  No 
% 
Yes 
% 
Missing
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 37.5 46.9 15.6 32 
 PP 25.6 56.4 17.9 39 
Cheltenham PDO 14.7 64.7 20.6 34 
 PP 31.7 58.5 9.8 41 
Liverpool PDO 23.3 63.3 13.3 30 
 PP 29.7 56.8 13.5 37 
Middlesbrough PDO 35.5 51.6 12.9 31 
 PP 23.1 61.5 15.4 39 
Pontypridd PDO 35.3 50.0 14.7 34 
 PP 21.4 57.1 21.4 42 
Swansea PDO 26.5 50.0 23.5 34 
 PP 40.6 50.0 9.4 32 
All areas PDOs 28.7 54.4 16.9 195 
 PP 28.3 57.0 14.8 230 
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Table 2.11b:   Do clients with previous convictions have a similar previous 
conviction? (Crown Court file data) 
  No 
% 
Yes 
% 
Missing
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 52.2 34.8 13.0 23 
 PP 45.7 45.7 8.6 35 
Cheltenham PDO 25.8 61.3 12.9 31 
 PP 45.0 45.0 10.0 20 
Liverpool PDO 53.6 14.3 32.1 28 
 PP 52.5 37.5 10.0 40 
Middlesbrough PDO 44.4 40.7 14.8 27 
 PP 46.2 51.3 2.6 39 
Pontypridd* PDO 21.4 78.6 0.0 28 
 PP 47.1 47.1 5.9 34 
Swansea PDO 50.0 45.5 4.5 22 
 PP 31.6 65.8 2.6 38 
All areas PDOs 40.3 46.5 13.2 159 
 PP 44.7 49.0 6.3 206 
 
(vi) Previous custodial sentences 
A further element of clients’ previous criminal histories which is relevant to 
seriousness and complexity of caseloads is the extent to which clients have been 
sentenced to prison (or other forms of custody) before, and the length of such 
sentences. Relevant data on investigation stage clients has already been discussed 
above (see Table 2.9a).  Here, in respect of the two court samples, we first look at the 
proportion of those clients having previous convictions who have previous custodial 
sentences (Tables 2.12a and 2.12b). 
 
It was shown earlier that private practice clients were significantly more likely than 
PDS clients to have one or more previous convictions at the all areas level (see Tables 
2.6a and 2.6b), although there were exceptions in the case of Swansea (magistrates’ 
court) and Pontypridd (Crown Court). Looking only at those clients who had previous 
convictions, at the all areas level a greater proportion of private practice magistrates’ 
court clients had at least one previous custodial sentence compared with the PDS, 
although in Birmingham and Cheltenham the position was reversed. In the case of 
Crown Court clients, at the all areas level private practice clients with previous 
convictions were again more likely to have one or more previous custodial sentences, 
although in Cheltenham and Pontypridd the position was reversed. However, none of 
the differences were significant. 
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Table 2.12a: Proportion of Clients with Previous Convictions with one or more 
Previous Custodial Sentences (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
 
 
 Proportion with one or more  
previous custodial sentences (%) 
N 
Birmingham PDO 40.6 32 
 PP 28.2 39 
Cheltenham PDO 32.4 34 
 PP 26.8 41 
Liverpool PDO 40.0 30 
 PP 43.2 37 
Middlesbrough PDO 21.9 32 
 PP 42.1 38 
Pontypridd PDO 35.3 34 
 PP 47.6 42 
Swansea PDO 29.4 34 
 PP 31.3 32 
All areas PDOs 33.2 196 
 PP 36.7 229 
 
Table 2.12b: Proportion of Clients with Previous Convictions with one or more 
Previous Custodial Sentences (Crown Court file data) 
  Proportion with one or more  
previous custodial sentences (%) 
N 
Birmingham PDO 27.3 22 
 PP 34.3 35 
Cheltenham PDO 45.2 31 
 PP 40.0 20 
Liverpool* PDO 21.4 28 
 PP 45.0 40 
Middlesbrough PDO 40.7 27 
 PP 50.0 40 
Pontypridd PDO 67.9 28 
 PP 50.0 34 
Swansea PDO 36.4 22 
 PP 50.0 38 
All areas PDOs 40.5 158 
 PP 45.4 207 
 
Taking this analysis a stage further, we show in Tables 2.12c and 2.12d the mean 
(average) number of custodial sentences for clients who had at least one custodial 
sentence on their records. With regard to the magistrates’ court sample, at the all areas 
level, the mean number of previous custodial sentences for such clients was identical 
for PDS and private practice. However, in four areas (Birmingham, Middlesbrough, 
Pontypridd and Swansea), private practice clients who had served previous custodial 
sentences had a higher mean number of such sentences than PDS clients, with the 
position reversed in the other two areas. However, only in the case of Middlesbrough 
was the difference significant. 
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In the Crown Court sample, at the all areas level the mean number of previous 
custodial sentences was again almost the same between the two sectors, and 
interestingly the mean number was less than for magistrates’ court clients. In three 
regions (Birmingham, Liverpool and Middlesbrough) private practice clients who had 
served previous custodial sentences had a higher mean number of such sentences than 
PDS clients, with the position reversed in the other three areas. Again, only in 
Middlesbrough was the difference significant. 
Table 2.12c: Mean Number of Custodial Sentences for Clients with Previous 
Sentences (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
Birmingham PDO 3.4 3.0 14 
 PP 5.5 3.4 11 
Cheltenham PDO 6.9 8.0 11 
 PP 2.4 2.1 12 
Liverpool PDO 6.4 4.7 12 
 PP 4.3 4.7 16 
Middlesbrough* PDO 1.6 0.8 7 
 PP 4.6 4.2 16 
Pontypridd PDO 3.7 2.7 13 
 PP 4.4 3.9 20 
Swansea PDO 2.4 3.2 10 
 PP 3.9 3.8 11 
All areas PDOs 4.2 4.6 67 
 PP 4.2 3.8 86 
 
Table 2.12d: Mean Number of Custodial Sentences for Clients with Previous 
Sentences (Crown Court file data) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
Birmingham PDO 2.6 2.4 7 
 PP 3.2 3.6 12 
Cheltenham PDO 4.4 3.5 14 
 PP 3.4 2.6 8 
Liverpool PDO 4.0 3.3 6 
 PP 4.3 7.5 18 
Middlesbrough* PDO 1.5 0.5 11 
 PP 4.0 3.2 20 
Pontypridd PDO 3.6 2.6 19 
 PP 3.3 3.1 17 
Swansea PDO 4.0 2.7 8 
 PP 3.5 2.4 19 
All areas PDOs 3.4 2.7 65 
 PP 3.6 4.2 94 
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We also examined, for clients who had previous custodial sentences and for whom a 
PNC printout was available, the frequency with which they had received sentences of  
particular length. When looking at the average number of previous custodial sentences 
per client, by reference to the length of such sentences, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the two sectors. At the local level, the only area where 
there was a significant difference between the PDS and private practice in respect of 
the magistrates’ court sample was Birmingham, where private practice clients had on 
average significantly more 6-12 month prior sentences than PDS clients.  In the 
Crown Court sample, the only significant difference was in Swansea where, on 
average, PDS clients had served more sentences of up to 3 months and of 12-24 
months in length. At the all areas level the profile of the PDS and private practice 
were broadly similar (Tables 2.12e and 2.12f). 
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Table 2.12e: Average Number of Custodial Sentences by Length of Sentence for 
Clients with Previous Sentences (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
 Birmingham 
Up to 3 months PDO 4.4 3.2 8 
 PP 2.5 1.9 8 
3-6 months* PDO 2.0 1.4 9 
 PP 4.8 2.7 8 
6-12 months PDO 2.0 1.2 7 
 PP 2.0 1.2 4 
12-24 months PDO 1.1 0.4 7 
 PP 1.0 0.0 6 
24 months+ PDO 1.4 0.5 5 
 PP 1.8 1.1 5 
Cheltenham 
Up to 3 months PDO 7.9 9.3 13 
 PP 3.3 3.7 7 
3-6 months PDO 4.4 6.1 10 
 PP 2.6 2.5 7 
6-12 months PDO 3.0 2.1 6 
 PP 1.5 0.7 2 
12-24 months PDO 1.5 0.7 2 
 PP 1.0 0.0 5 
24 months+ PDO 2.2 1.6 5 
 PP 1.0 0.0 3 
 Liverpool  
Up to 3 months PDO 3.5 4.7 12 
 PP 3.5 4.6 6 
3-6 months PDO 4.0 2.4 10 
 PP 2.5 2.2 13 
6-12 months PDO 1.4 0.7 9 
 PP 2.7 2.9 7 
12-24 months PDO 1.7 1.1 9 
 PP 1.8 2.0 6 
24 months+ PDO 1.1 0.3 8 
 PP 1.4 0.9 5 
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  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
 
 Middlesbrough 
 PP 4.1 2.9 18 
3-6 months PDO 1.2 0.4 6 
 PP 3.2 2.6 13 
6-12 months PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 1.5 0.7 10 
12-24 months PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 2.3 1.2 6 
24 months+ PDO 1.0 0.0 2 
 PP 2.0 1.4 2 
 Pontypridd 
Up to 3 months PDO 2.0 1.6 10 
 PP 1.7 2.3 14 
3-6 months PDO 2.8 1.9 12 
 PP 2.9 2.4 18 
6-12 months PDO 1.8 1.1 5 
 PP 1.1 1.0 14 
12-24 months PDO 1.5 0.7 2 
 PP 1.4 2.0 12 
24 months+ PDO 1.0 0.0 3 
 PP 0.3 0.5 6 
 Swansea 
Up to 3 months PDO 1.8 0.5 4 
 PP 3.3 4.3 9 
3-6 months PDO 3.5 3.8 4 
 PP 3.8 3.1 5 
6-12 months PDO 1.0 0.0 8 
 PP 1.6 1.6 7 
12-24 months PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 1.8 1.5 4 
24 months+ PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 1.2 0.4 5 
                                                                All areas 
Up to 3 months PDO 4.1 5.7 52 
 PP 3.3 3.2 62 
3-6 months PDO 3.0 3.3 51 
 PP 3.1 2.5 64 
6-12 months PDO 1.8 1.3 36 
 PP 1.6 1.5 44 
12-24 months PDO 1.4 0.8 22 
 PP 1.5 1.5 39 
24 months+ PDO 1.4 0.9 24 
 PP 1.2 0.9 26 
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Table 2.12f: Average Number of Custodial Sentences by Length of Sentence for 
Clients with Previous Convictions (Crown Court file data) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
Birmingham 
Up to 3 months PDO 2.5 0.7 2 
 PP 2.6 2.1 11 
3-6 months PDO 3.0 2.7 3 
 PP 2.6 2.7 10 
6-12 months PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 1.3 0.6 3 
12-24 months PDO 1.5 0.7 2 
 PP 1.7 1.2 3 
24 months+ PDO 1.3 0.5 4 
 PP 1.5 0.7 2 
Cheltenham 
Up to 3 months PDO 1.9 1.2 8 
 PP 1.7 1.5 6 
3-6 months PDO 2.8 1.4 10 
 PP 2.4 1.5 5 
6-12 months PDO 2.9 2.4 7 
 PP 1.5 1.0 4 
12-24 months PDO 1.0 0.0 5 
 PP 1.2 0.4 5 
24 months+ PDO 1.1 0.4 7 
 PP 1.5 0.7 2 
Liverpool 
Up to 3 months PDO 4.5 2.6 4 
 PP 5.6 8.9 13 
3-6 months PDO 2.3 0.6 3 
 PP 3.8 7.8 11 
6-12 months PDO 2.3 1.9 4 
 PP 1.9 1.5 8 
12-24 months PDO 2.0 0.0 2 
 PP 1.6 1.1 7 
24 months+ PDO 1.3 0.6 3 
 PP 1.3 1.0 7 
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  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
 
Middlesbrough 
Up to 3 months PDO 2.7 1.5 7 
 PP 3.1 2.5 11 
3-6 months PDO 1.3 0.5 7 
 PP 3.0 2.3 13 
6-12 months PDO 1.0 0.0 2 
 PP 1.8 1.3 10 
12-24 months PDO 1.0 N/A 1 
 PP 1.3 0.5 8 
24 months+ PDO 1.0 0.0 5 
 PP 1.5 0.8 8 
Pontypridd 
Up to 3 months PDO 3.2 2.8 13 
 PP 1.6 1.1 12 
3-6 months PDO 2.1 1.3 12 
 PP 1.9 1.9 14 
6-12 months PDO 1.6 1.1 16 
 PP 1.4 1.2 9 
12-24 months PDO 1.3 0.5 7 
 PP 0.9 0.6 10 
24 months+ PDO 1.8 1.3 5 
 PP 0.9 0.8 9 
Swansea 
Up to 3 months* PDO 4.8 4.1 5 
 PP 1.7 1.3 11 
3-6 months PDO 3.5 2.2 6 
 PP 2.4 1.5 15 
6-12 months PDO 1.5 1.0 4 
 PP 1.1 0.9 9 
12-24 months* PDO 1.7 0.6 3 
 PP 1.0 0.0 10 
24 months+ PDO N/A N/A 0 
 PP 1.4 1.0 7 
All areas 
Up to 3 months PDO 3.1 2.5 39 
 PP 2.9 4.5 64 
3-6 months PDO 2.4 1.5 41 
 PP 2.7 3.6 68 
6-12 months PDO 1.9 1.5 34 
 PP 1.5 1.2 43 
12-24 months PDO 1.4 0.5 20 
 PP 1.2 0.7 43 
24 months+ PDO 1.3 0.7 24 
 PP 1.3 0.8 35 
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Offence Characteristics and Profiles 
 
In addition to client characteristics, a second major dimension of caseloads is the 
nature of the offences faced by clients, and the seriousness and complexity of those 
offences. We examine this in a number of ways. First, we look at how cases 
commenced in terms of whether this was by way of charge, summons or warrant, and 
in the case of the former, whether the client was produced in court in custody or 
appeared on bail. Generally, although not always, cases commenced by way of 
summons are, in the view of the police at least, less serious than those commenced by 
way of charge. In any event, only a minority of cases (other than traffic offences) are 
commenced by summons. Where a person is charged with a criminal offence, the 
police must decide whether to grant bail or keep the person in custody pending their 
first court appearance. Although offence seriousness is not, per se, a ground for 
refusing bail, it is relevant to a number of the conditions for withholding bail set out in 
the relevant legislation.107  In practice, the decision whether to grant bail is likely to 
be based on a combination of offence and (suspected) offender characteristics. 
 
Second, we look at the proportion of advice and assistance only claims, which gives 
some indication of relative caseload seriousness in that free-standing advice and 
assistance claims are likely to relate to less serious offences where either a client has 
not been charged with a criminal offence, or the charge or the circumstances would 
not warrant the grant of a representation order. 
 
Third, we look at the number of clients included on a claim, first in respect of 
investigation claims and then in relation to magistrates’ court proceedings claims. As 
explained later, this may give some indication of relative case seriousness and 
complexity, although there are some difficulties in interpreting the data given possible 
differences in claiming behaviour between the PDS and private practice. 
 
Fourth, in respect of cases in our Crown Court sample, we examine the way in which 
they reached the Crown Court. Broadly, cases can reach the Crown Court in one of 
three ways: the offence is indictable-only, a magistrates’ court decides that an either-
way offence is not suitable for summary trial, or (where the magistrates’ court decides 
that an either-way offence is suitable for summary trial) a defendant elects trial on 
indictment. Where a defendant faces an either-way offence, direction or election is 
only possible where, under the plea before venue procedure, the accused either 
indicates that they intend to plead not guilty, or refuse or fail to indicate their plea. 
Where an accused indicates, in respect of an either-way offence, that they intend to 
plead guilty, they are treated as having pleaded guilty. In this case, the magistrates’ 
court can commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentence if they conclude that 
their powers of sentencing are insufficient. Cases committed for sentence are not 
included in our Crown Court sample. 
 
Finally in this section, we examine the nature of the offences of which clients are 
suspected (investigation stage) or with which they have been charged or summoned 
(proceedings cases). As explained further below, since many clients are suspected of, 
or charged with, more than one offence, our analysis is based upon the most serious, 
or lead, offence. However, a perennial problem of classifying offences by reference to 
                                                 
107 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s38. 
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seriousness is that the offence suspected or charged does not necessarily give an 
accurate indication of offence seriousness. For example, whilst murder is self-
evidently serious, an offence such as theft may cover a wide range of seriousness.  
Furthermore, the fact that an offence is serious does not mean that it is complex. 
Conversely, complexity may arise from a combination of charges which are not, taken 
alone, particularly serious, or from the fact that a number of people are suspected of or 
charged with the same offence or combination of offences. For these reasons, the 
fourth part of our analysis of offence characteristics involves analysis of the number 
of defendants per claim and, as a separate exercise, assigning measures of seriousness 
and complexity to cases. 
 
(i)  How the case started 
 
As noted above, one indicator of seriousness is how the case started. Data were 
available on this from the sample of proceedings files. More serious cases would be 
more likely to start with the client produced in court from police custody following 
charge (rather than being bailed, or summoned), either because the offence itself is 
more serious or because the offender is believed by the police to be more likely to 
abscond or repeat offend (or interfere with the administration of justice). Persons 
arrested on warrant can be discounted for these purposes since the fact that a person is 
arrested on warrant bears no relationship to seriousness of the offence. The results for 
the magistrates’ court sample are shown in Table 2.13a, and those for the Crown 
Court sample are shown in Table 2.13b. 
 
Table 2.13a: How the Case Started (Magistrates’ Court file data) 
  Charge: 
Custody
% 
Charge:
Bail 
% 
Summons
 
% 
Warrant
 
% 
Not Clear 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 17.3 59.6 9.6 3.8 9.6 52 
 PP 24.5 65.3 4.1 6.1 0 49 
Cheltenham PDO 6.3 72.9 10.4 2.1 8.3 48 
 PP 24.5 65.3 4.1 6.1 0 49 
Liverpool PDO 25.5 64.7 2.0 2.0 5.9 51 
 PP 22.0 52.0 18.0 2.0 6.0 50 
Middlesbrough* PDO 3.8 80.8 5.8 3.8 5.8 52 
 PP 23.5 54.9 5.9 2.0 13.7 51 
Pontypridd PDO 6.1 79.6 12.2 2.0 0 49 
 PP 8.0 68.0 16.0 2.0 6.0 50 
Swansea PDO 10.0 72.0 10.0 2.0 6.0 50 
 PP 20.0 66.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 50 
All areas* PDOs 11.6 71.5 8.3 2.6 6.0 302
 PP 20.0 61.3 9.7 2.3 6.7 300
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Table 2.13b: How the Case Started (Crown Court file data) 
  Charge: 
Custody 
 
% 
Charge:Bail
 
% 
Not 
Clear 
 
% 
Other: 
Breach 
of DTTO 
% 
Summons 
 
 
% 
Warrant
 
 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 32.6 58.7 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 46 
 PP 32.0 60.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 43.5 43.5 6.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 46 
 PP 34.5 58.6 3.4 0.0 3.4 0.0 29 
Liverpool PDO 34.0 48.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 2.0 50 
 PP 28.8 53.8 11.5 0.0 3.8 1.9 52 
Middlesbrough PDO 25.5 63.8 8.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 47 
 PP 24.5 63.3 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 49 
Pontypridd PDO 40.0 52.5 5.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 40 
 PP 36.0 50.0 4.0 0.0 6.0 4.0 50 
Swansea* PDO 25.7 42.9 25.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 35 
 PP 44.0 48.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 50 
All areas PDOs 33.7 51.9 9.8 0.8 3.0 0.8 264
 PP 33.2 55.4 7.5 0.0 2.9 1.1 280
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, other than in Liverpool, private practice had more 
clients who were produced from custody at the first court appearance than the PDS.  
The differences were statistically significant at an all areas level and in 
Middlesbrough.  However, in the Crown Court sample the position was reversed at 
the all areas level and in five of the six areas, but the differences were smaller and not 
significant. The only significant difference was in Swansea where the PDO had 
significantly fewer clients who were produced from custody at their first court 
appearance. Unsurprisingly, a greater proportion of clients whose cases were 
ultimately dealt with in the Crown Court were denied bail by the police following 
charge compared to those whose cases were dealt with in magistrates’ courts. 
 
(ii)  Advice and assistance cases 
 
One indication of the nature of caseloads is the extent to which claims are in respect 
of free-standing legal advice and assistance (i.e. without the solicitor providing 
representation in court). Prior to 17 May 2004, the General Criminal Contract 
provided that where legal advice and assistance was provided to a client in respect of 
whom a representation order was also granted, only one claim could be made for 
payment. Thus a claim in respect of legal advice and assistance would normally only 
be made where a client was not charged or summoned for a criminal offence, or 
where they were charged or summoned but a representation order was not applied for 
or granted. The latter would most frequently occur where the offence charged was 
such that the criteria for the grant of a representation order were not met, broadly 
because it was not sufficiently serious.  Thus a high rate of free-standing advice and 
assistance claims could indicate a high number of  relatively minor cases. 
 
Table 2.14, which is based on SPOCC data, demonstrates that PDOs tended to have a 
higher proportion of free-standing advice and assistance claims as a proportion of all 
their proceedings work than private practice in their comparator regions.  In some 
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areas the difference, although statistically significant, were fairly minor (Cheltenham, 
Middlesbrough and Birmingham PDOs had 1-3% more free standing advice and 
assistance cases as a proportion of their proceedings cases).  The differences, 
however, are larger in Liverpool (7%), Pontypridd (9%) and Swansea (16%). 
 
Table 2.14: Proportion of Free-standing Advice and Assistance within Proceedings 
Claims (SPOCC) 
  Other 
Claim 
 
% 
Advice 
and Assist 
Only 
% 
Total 
N 
Birmingham* PDO 92.3 7.7 594 
 PP 95.7 4.3 95623 
Cheltenham* PDO 94.0 6.0 483 
 PP 95.5 4.5 15228 
Liverpool* PDO 86.8 13.2 1218 
 PP 93.3 6.7 40308 
Middlesbrough* PDO 89.1 10.9 571 
 PP 91.0 9.0 16880 
Pontypridd* PDO 84.3 15.7 364 
 PP 93.3 6.7 5523 
Swansea* PDO 67.3 32.7 614 
 PP 83.4 16.6 7298 
All areas* PDOs 85.5 14.5 3844 
 PP 94.2 5.8 180860 
 
There are a number of potential interpretations of the relatively high levels of free-
standing advice and assistance claims. The PDOs may have taken on more free-
standing advice and assistance work in response to having insufficient work and/or as 
a method of recruiting clients who may return to the PDO in the future. It may also 
reflect a difficulty in recruiting clients facing more serious or complex allegations. On 
the other hand, it could indicate that PDOs were providing a fuller service to a wider 
range of clients than private practice, for example, by carrying out free-standing 
advice work where private practice firms would have regarded it as uneconomic. 
 
(iii) The number of defendants indicated on the claim 
 
Although a claim in respect of an investigations case or a proceedings case normally 
relates to only one client, in some circumstances solicitors are required to submit one 
claim in respect of more than one client. The General Criminal Contract defines a case 
as one that relates to all clients represented in respect of one offence, or more than one 
offence, where one or more charges are preferred at the same time, or where the 
offences are allegedly founded on the same facts or form part of a series of offences. 
Generally each claim will equate with one case, so that one claim may relate to a 
number of clients. Thus here we examine the number of clients per claim, based on 
SPOCC data. It is important to note, when interpreting these data, that it may be 
affected by the fact that the PDS were filing claims (which form the basis of the 
SPOCC data) primarily for the purposes of this research, whereas private practice may 
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have a financial interest in splitting cases, where this is possible, in order to maximise 
income.108 
 
Table 2.15a compares the number of defendants included on PDS and private practice 
investigation claims. Birmingham, Pontypridd and Swansea PDOs have significantly 
greater proportions of claims in which they acted for more than one client than their 
private practice counterparts. This is also the case at the all areas level. 
Middlesbrough private practice acted for a single client in significantly fewer 
investigation cases. In Liverpool, the picture is similar but the difference does not 
reach statistical significance. Across all regions the PDS had just over 1% more 
claims with multiple clients, a difference that is significant. 
 
Table 2.15a: Number of Clients on Investigation Claims (SPOCC) 
  1 
% 
2 
% 
3 
% 
4 + 
% 
N 
Birmingham** PDO 90.8 5.8 1.7 0.7 770 
 PP 95.5 2.9 0.8 0.5 81893 
Cheltenham PDO 93.9 4.5 1.3 0.2 871 
 PP 95.0 3.1 1.2 0.5 21429 
Liverpool PDO 96.9 1.7 0.5 0.5 842 
 PP 95.8 3.1 0.5 0.4 34096 
Middlesbrough** PDO 97.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 883 
 PP 91.0 6.9 0.9 1.0 17047 
Pontypridd** PDO 85.3 8.7 4.2 1.4 381 
 PP 95.9 2.9 0.7 0.4 4412 
Swansea** PDO 93.0 4.4 1.5 1.1 752 
 PP 97.6 1.7 0.4 0.2 11099 
All areas** PDOs 93.8 4.0 1.2 0.5 4499 
 PP 95.2 3.3 0.8 0.3 169976 
 
 
Table 2.15b records the number of clients recorded in proceedings claims (ie. claims 
relating to magistrates’ court proceedings). Birmingham, Pontypridd and Cheltenham 
PDOs had significantly more cases with multiple clients than their private practice 
counterparts. Middlesbrough PDO had fewer, but the difference was not significant. 
As at the investigation stage, across all areas the PDS had just over 1% more claims 
with multiple defendants, a difference that is significant. 
 
 
                                                 
108 This is more likely to happen in proceedings claims than in investigation claims. 
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Table 2.15b: Number of Clients on Proceedings Claims (SPOCC) 
 
  1 
% 
2 
% 
3 
% 
4 + 
% 
N 
Birmingham** PDO 90.9 5.7 2.4 0.9 548 
 PP 96.5 2.7 0.4 0.2 91531 
Middlesbrough PDO 98 1.6 0.2 0.2 509 
 PP 97.1 2.4 0.3 0.1 15358 
Cheltenham** PDO 95.6 3.3 0.2 0.6 454 
 PP 98 1.6 0.2 0.1 14550 
Liverpool PDO 98 1.3 0.4 0 1057 
 PP 97.1 2.3 0.3 0.2 38667 
Pontypridd* PDO 93.2 4.2 1.6 1.0 307 
 PP 95.7 3.2 0.7 0.2 5152 
Swansea PDO 95.2 3.9 0.2 0.2 413 
 PP 96.7 2.5 0.4 0.3 6086 
All areas** PDOs 95.7 3.0 0.8 0.3 3288 
 PP 96.8 2.5 0.4 0.2 170287 
 
(iv)  How cases reached the Crown Court 
 
Our Crown Court file sample was drawn by sampling a proportion of cases from 
SPOCC where the cases had been committed for trial to the Crown Court and, in 
addition, sampling a smaller number of indictable-only cases that had been dealt with 
in the main courts in our pilot areas. The nature of the sample by reference to mode of 
trial status and, in the case of either-way offences, whether the case reached the 
Crown Court as a result of court direction or defendant election, is shown in Table 
2.16a.  As a result of the sampling method, which is a consequence of the fact that 
indictable-only cases do not form part of the SPOCC database, the data in Table 2.16a 
cannot be interpreted as representative of the respective Crown Court case loads of the 
PDS and private practice.  
 
However, Table 2.16b, which concerns only either-way cases in our sample, does give 
some indication of whether such cases reached the Crown Court as a result of court 
direction or defendant election. It has been suggested that private practice defence 
lawyers might be more inclined to advise clients to elect trial in the Crown Court on 
the basis that, all things being equal, they would be likely to receive a higher fee as a 
result.   
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Table 2.16a: Crown Court Sample by How Case reached the Crown Court 
 
Either Way    
 Not known
 
% 
Directed
 
% 
Elected
 
% 
 
IndictableOnly 
 
 
 
 
 
% 
Other 
 
 
 
 
 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 2.2 47.8 0.0 50.0 0.0 46 
 PP 4.0 56.0 4.0 36.0 0.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 10.9 23.9 6.5 56.5 2.2 46 
 PP 3.4 31.0 13.8 51.7 0.0 29 
Liverpool PDO 8.0 38.0 12.0 38.0 4.0 50 
 PP 13.5 40.4 21.2 25.0 0.0 52 
M/brough PDO 10.6 57.4 4.3 25.5 2.1 47 
 PP 18.4 55.1 6.1 20.4 0.0 49 
Pontypridd PDO 5.0 30.0 7.5 55.0 2.5 40 
 PP 10.0 38.0 12.0 40.0 0.0 50 
Swansea* PDO 5.7 42.9 0.0 51.4 0.0 35 
 PP 2.0 68.0 6.0 22.0 2.0 50 
All areas** PDOs 7.2 40.2 5.3 45.5 1.9 264
 PP 8.9 49.3 10.4 31.1 0.4 280
 
Table 2.16b: Either way Cases - Direction or election (Crown Court file data)? 
  Directed 
% 
Elected 
% 
N 
Birmingham PDO 100.0 0.0 22 
 PP 93.3 6.7 30 
Cheltenham PDO 78.6 21.4 14 
 PP 69.2 30.8 13 
Liverpool PDO 76.0 24.0 25 
 PP 65.6 34.4 32 
Middlesbrough PDO 93.1 6.9 29 
 PP 90.0 10.0 30 
Pontypridd PDO 80.0 20.0 15 
 PP 76.0 24.0 25 
Swansea PDO 100.0 0.0 15 
 PP 91.9 8.1 37 
All areas PDOs 88.3 11.7 120 
 PP 82.6 17.4 167 
 
The first thing to note is that the proportion of cases where the court directs trial on 
indictment is high for both the PDS and private practice. At the all areas level, 
between eighty and ninety percent of either-way cases dealt with in the Crown Court 
resulted from a decision by magistrates that the case was not suitable for summary 
trial, suggesting that it is the courts, and not defence lawyers, who are largely 
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responsible for either-way cases going to the Crown Court.109  There is, however, 
some regional variation. In Birmingham, Middlesbrough and Swansea more than 
ninety per cent of PDS and private practice either-way cases dealt with in the Crown 
Court had been directed there by magistrates, whereas in Cheltenham, Liverpool and 
Pontypridd it was eighty per cent or less.  
 
The second thing to note is that in each area private practice had a greater proportion 
of clients who elected Crown Court trial than the PDS.  Whilst it is tempting to infer 
that private practice are thus more likely to encourage clients to elect Crown Court 
trial, the differences were not statistically significant at individual office nor at the all 
area level. Furthermore, the dynamics of the decision-making process are such that it 
is not possible from these data to determine the relative influence of the various 
factors, including representations from defence lawyers (either to the court or their 
clients) or the nature and seriousness of the alleged offences, on magistrates’ 
decisions to direct trial on indictment or clients’ decisions to elect Crown Court trial. 
 
(v)  Offence profiles 
 
(a) SPOCC data 
 
In this section we look at the offence profiles of PDS and private practice clients in a 
number of different ways. First, we look at SPOCC data for investigation stage and 
magistrates’ court cases. This gives a broad indication of the respective caseloads of 
the PDS and private practice by reference to the offence categories reported by 
solicitors to the LSC. 
 
Table 2.17a shows the offence profiles as indicated by SPOCC for investigation 
claims. Approximately four out of ten cases dealt with by both the PDS and private 
practice were offences against the person or theft. Although for four of the six areas 
under consideration (excepting Cheltenham and Pontypridd) the difference in the 
distribution of offence type as between the PDS and private practice is statistically 
significant, there are few trends which point to an obvious difference between PDS 
and private practice caseloads. Proportions of burglary and theft appeared generally 
lower in PDS caseloads by several percentage points (with the exception of 
Pontypridd) and likewise for robbery (other than in Pontypridd and Cheltenham). All 
PDOs had a slightly higher proportion of criminal damage cases and most had a 
slightly higher proportion of sex offences and fraud in their caseloads. Private practice 
was also more inclined than the PDS (other than in Birmingham, where the proportion 
was equal) to code their cases as ‘other’. 
                                                 
109 It should be noted that the magistrates’ decision on direction may, of course, be affected by 
representations made by defence lawyers as well as by prosecutors. 
 
  
Table 2.17a: Most Serious Offence (Investigation Cases, SPOCC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
A
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
t
h
e
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
 
H
o
m
i
c
i
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
g
r
a
v
e
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
S
e
x
u
a
l
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
 R
o
b
b
e
r
y
 
 B
u
r
g
l
a
r
y
 
 C
r
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
D
a
m
a
g
e
 
 T
h
e
f
t
 
F
r
a
u
d
,
 
f
o
r
g
e
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
O
r
d
e
r
 
 
a
n
d
 
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
j
u
s
t
i
c
e
 
 D
r
u
g
s
 
D
r
i
v
i
n
g
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
o
f
f
e
n
c
e
s
 
 N
u
m
b
e
r
 
   
  % % % % % % % % % % % %  
B/ham**  PDO 21.6 0.9 4.2 4.4 7.4 10.3 19.6 4.3 9.5 4.4 6.6 6.9 770 
 PP 23.3 1.0 3.6 6.7 8.4 5.6 21.1 3.5 7.8 5.5 6.6 6.9 81893 
Cheltenham PDO 20.2 1.4 2.3 2.6 10.7 8.5 23.9 2.2 7.0 5.6 7.8 7.8 871 
 PP 17.5 0.9 3.1 2.7 8.8 7.8 25.7 3.1 7.0 6.0 7.6 9.8 21429 
Liverpool** PDO 17.1 1.0 3.6 3.9 5.8 5.5 22.7 6.5 8.2 7.8 9.9 8.1 842 
 PP 16.6 1.3 2.5 4.3 8.8 4.9 23.3 3.4 8.3 7.8 9.7 9.1 34096 
Middlesbrough** PDO 16.9 0.6 6.9 1.9 9.2 8.6 19.7 2.6 14.6 7.0 5.1 6.9 883 
 PP 10.8 0.4 2.0 3.5 13.4 5.5 25.6 1.6 9.3 6.7 5.5 15.9 17047 
Pontypridd** PDO 20.5 0.5 5.5 2.1 11.5 11.0 21.0 1.6 6.8 8.9 6.3 4.2 381 
 PP 23.8 0.8 5.5 1.3 9.1 9.1 17.8 3.0 6.6 9.2 8.5 5.3 4412 
Swansea PDO 22.6 1.1 4.0 1.2 5.2 10.4 26.7 3.5 8.4 8.5 8.5 0.0 752 
 PP 17.6 0.6 2.6 1.8 8.6 7.4 29.5 2.3 12.6 8.1 7.0 2.1 11099 
All areas** PDOs 19.6 0.9 4.3 2.8 8.1 8.8 22.3 3.6 9.4 6.9 7.4 5.9 4499 
 PP 19.6 1.0 3.1 5.0 9.1 5.9 23.0 3.2 8.2 6.4 7.3 8.2 169976 
  
Table 2.17b: Most Serious Charge (Magistrates’ Court Cases, SPOCC) 
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  % % % % % % % % % % % %  
B/ham*  PDO 26.1 0.2 2.0 1.1 5.5 5.8 18.1 4.7 11.1 4.4 12.8 8.2 548 
 PP 21.8 0.2 1.5 2.1 6.6 5.2 20.6 4.1 8.8 5.2 15.1 8.9 91531 
Cheltenham** PDO 14.8 0.2 0.9 0.7 5.3 6.6 24.7 3.1 11.5 3.7 18.1 10.6 454 
 PP 19.5 0.2 1.3 0.6 6.4 5.2 24.9 4.2 6.7 4.1 15.3 11.6 14550 
Liverpool** PDO 11.7 0.2 1.6 1.2 4.2 4.5 26.2 3.7 11.9 6.5 17.8 10.4 1057 
 PP 15.4 0.2 0.9 0.7 5.8 4.5 26.1 4.6 9.8 6.0 15.3 10.7 37610 
Middlesbrough** PDO 15.3 0 2.6 0.6 6.1 6.3 21.4 3.3 15.5 4.9 17.3 6.7 509 
 PP 10.0 0.1 1.0 0.7 8.9 6.0 29.2 2.5 8.1 6.6 15.6 11.3 15358 
Pontypridd* PDO 16.9 0 2.0 0.7 6.8 5.9 16.9 4.6 9.8 6.2 16.6 13.7 307 
 PP 21.4 0.1 1.7 0.1 6.6 7.5 13.6 3.6 9.9 6.7 19.9 8.8 5152 
Swansea** PDO 15.3 0 1.9 1.5 3.6 6.3 19.4 3.9 12.8 4.1 20.6 10.7 413 
 PP 12.5 0.2 1.2 0.3 5.4 5.4 21.1 4.0 15.1 8.1 19.9 6.9 6086 
All areas** PDOs 16.0 0.1 1.8 1.0 5.0 5.7 22.2 3.8 12.2 5.2 17.2 9.8 3288 
 PP 18.8 0.2 1.3 1.4 6.5 5.2 22.8 4.1 9.0 5.5 15.5 9.7 170287 
 
 
  
Table 2.17b shows the SPOCC data offence profiles for magistrates’ court 
proceedings cases. As with investigation cases, offences against the person and theft 
constituted approximately forty per cent of the caseloads of both the PDS and private 
practice, but unlike investigation stage cases at least one in eight cases for both the 
PDS and private practice concerned a driving offence. Both also had proportionately 
more public order offences in their caseloads than at the investigation stage.  
 
Each PDO had a significantly different distribution of cases compared with private 
practice within its comparator region. The SPOCC data show that, compared to 
private practice in their areas, PDOs dealt with relatively more sexual offences and 
offences against children (except Cheltenham) and more public order offences (except 
Pontypridd and Swansea). On the other hand, PDOs had relatively fewer cases 
involving burglary (except Pontypridd), theft (except Liverpool and Pontypridd), and 
drugs (except Liverpool), and had fewer in the ‘other’ category (other than in 
Pontypridd and Swansea). However, at the all areas level the differences between the 
caseloads of the PDS and private practice, although statistically significant, were 
relatively small. 
 
(b)  File data 
 
In view of the limitations of the SPOCC data, including the fact that it does not 
include cases dealt with in the Crown Court, we collected our own data on the lead 
charge from the files that we examined. ‘Lead charge’ equates to ‘the most serious 
offence’. In our file sample the lead charge was determined by the researchers rather 
than the solicitor making the claim. Further, whereas the most serious offence on 
SPOCC data is the most serious offence finally faced by the client, our file data shows 
the lead charge at the time that the solicitor first dealt with the case. The offence 
categories that we used were similar to those used for the purposes of SPOCC except 
that our ‘theft’ category included fraud and other offences of dishonesty, and we used 
two additional categories, ‘breach proceedings’ and ‘administration of justice 
offences’. 
 
In the investigation stage sample, the PDS and private practice handled similar 
proportions of arrests for violence (although a slightly higher proportion of arrests of 
PDS clients were for more serious violence than for private practice clients), offences 
of dishonesty other than theft (although private practice had a slightly higher 
proportion of clients arrested for robbery or aggravated burglary), and public order 
offences.  Private practice dealt with higher proportions of sexual offences, (mostly 
minor) drugs offences and driving offences, while the PDS had a higher proportion of 
clients arrested for criminal damage. 
In the magistrates’ court sample, there were no significant differences between the 
PDS and private practice in respect of the lead charge, either for individual offices or 
at the all areas level (Table 2.17c). At the all areas level there is an indication that 
private practice had more cases where the lead charge was theft, but dealt with fewer 
cases where the lead charge was a driving offence. Private practice was also more 
likely to indicate that the lead charge fell into the ‘other’ category. At the individual 
office level there are few apparent trends, although four PDOs dealt with 
proportionately more drugs offences, and a different combination of PDOs dealt with 
more driving offences than their private practice counterparts. On the other hand, in 
four areas private practice had proportionately more cases where the lead charge was 
theft. 
  
Table 2.17c: Magistrates’ Court, Lead Charge (file data) 
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  % % % % % % % % % % % %  
PDO 23.1 0.0 1.9 3.8 3.8 30.8 7.7 5.8 11.5 9.6 0.0 1.9 52 Birmingham 
PP 20.4 0.0 0.0 6.1 8.2 26.5 12.2 4.1 14.3 4.1 0.0 4.1 49 
PDO 10.9 0.0 0.0 8.7 6.5 17.4 6.5 6.5 28.3 8.7 0.0 6.5 46 Cheltenham 
PP 14.3 0.0 4.1 2.0 10.2 30.6 8.2 0.0 16.3 10.2 0.0 4.1 49 
PDO 16.0 0.0 4.0 6.0 2.0 20.0 4.0 0.0 32.0 4.0 0.0 12.0 50 Liverpool 
PP 16.3 2.0 2.0 6.1 2.0 22.4 16.3 4.1 10.2 12.2 0.0 6.1 49 
PDO 15.7 0.0 0.0 5.9 9.8 23.5 19.6 3.9 15.7 2.0 0.0 3.9 51 Middlesbrough
PP 7.8 0.0 2.0 7.8 5.9 37.3 11.8 2.0 13.7 2.0 2.0 7.8 51 
PDO 16.3 0.0 0.0 6.1 4.1 20.4 10.2 8.2 20.4 8.2 2.0 4.1 49 Pontypridd 
PP 20.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 14.3 4.1 4.1 30.6 8.2 0.0 14.3 49 
PDO 12.5 0.0 2.1 4.2 4.2 12.5 18.8 4.2 25.0 8.3 2.1 6.3 48 Swansea 
PP 6.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 8.0 18.0 18.0 8.0 20.0 6.0 2.0 10.0 50 
PDOs 15.9 0.0 1.4 5.7 5.1 20.9 11.1 4.7 22.0 6.8 0.7 5.7 296 All areas 
PP 14.1 0.3 1.3 4.4 6.4 24.9 11.8 3.7 17.5 7.1 0.7 7.7 297 
 
  
Table 2.17d: Crown Court, Lead Charge (file data) 
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  % % % % % % % % % % % % %  
Birmingham PDO 20.0 4.4 4.4 17.8 15.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 8.9 45 
 PP 22.9 0.0 6.3 22.9 6.3 0.0 6.3 2.1 27.1 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.2 48 
Cheltenham PDO 23.9 6.5 4.3 13.0 19.6 0.0 4.3 6.5 2.2 6.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 46 
 PP 28.6 0.0 17.9 3.6 17.9 10.7 0.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0.0 3.6 7.1 28 
Liverpool PDO 28.0 2.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 18.0 4.0 8.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 50 
 PP 29.4 0.0 2.0 2.0 11.8 3.9 13.7 5.9 17.6 3.9 0.0 2.0 7.8 51 
Middlesbrough PDO 16.7 2.4 14.3 4.8 11.9 2.4 11.9 11.9 7.1 4.8 0.0 2.4 9.5 42 
 PP 12.2 0.0 10.2 14.3 18.4 4.1 10.2 8.2 10.2 4.1 0.0 4.1 4.1 49 
Pontypridd PDO 32.5 2.5 15.0 7.5 7.5 0.0 7.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 2.5 7.5 5.0 40 
 PP 29.8 0.0 6.4 6.4 21.3 2.1 6.4 6.4 10.6 2.1 0.0 4.3 4.3 47 
Swansea PDO 45.7 2.9 8.6 5.7 5.7 2.9 8.6 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.9 8.6 5.7 35 
 PP 44.0 0.0 4.0 6.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 6.0 20.0 8.0 2.0 6.0 0.0 50 
All areas** PDOs 27.1 3.5 8.9 9.3 10.9 2.3 9.7 5.0 6.6 2.7 2.7 4.7 6.6 258 
 PP 27.8 0.0 7.0 9.5 12.5 2.9 7.0 5.5 15.8 3.7 0.4 3.7 4.4 273 
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In the Crown Court sample, at the all areas level the lead charges for PDS and private 
practice cases did differ significantly (Table 2.17d). This is due, in particular, to the 
fact that a drugs offence was the lead offence in double the proportion of private 
practice cases compared to PDS cases. Apart from this, the offence profiles at the all 
areas level were fairly similar, although it is notable that whereas all PDOs had at 
least one homicide or similar, private practice had none. At the individual office level, 
the majority of PDOs had proportionately more cases in the sexual offences, theft and 
administration of justice categories, whereas the reverse was the case in respect of 
criminal damage and drugs, although none of these differences was significant. 
 
(vi)  Details of lead charge 
 
As noted earlier, the offence categories used in the analysis so far are broad, and are 
not necessarily discriminating in terms of seriousness.  Thus, in our proceedings stage 
file data sample we collected more detailed information about the lead charge in order 
to see if there were more nuanced differences between the PDS and private practice 
caseloads. It is only possible to conduct a meaningful analysis where there are 
sufficient cases within offence categories, and thus the following excludes homicides, 
robbery and administration of justice cases. We also exclude the ‘other’ category 
because the numbers in respect of any particular category of offence are extremely 
small. The data on the theft category, which includes other offences of dishonesty 
such as deception, handling and TWOC, does not allow for any meaningful 
comparison to be made because, given the number of sub-categories, the numbers 
within sub-categories are relatively low, and seriousness often depends upon the value 
of the stolen property and on factors such as whether the offence was committed in 
breach of trust. There are similar reasons for excluding public order offences and 
sexual offences from the analysis. 
  
(a)  Offences against the person 
 
The case profiles for offences against the person are fairly mixed (Table 2.18a). In the 
magistrates’ court sample, over 70% of PDS cases involving offences against the 
person were common assault or actual bodily harm, compared with just less than 60% 
for private practice. However, whilst private practice had a greater proportion of 
serious assault cases (GBH/wounding) in the magistrates’ courts sample, the reverse 
was true for such cases in the Crown Court sample. 
 
Table 2.18a: Detailed Lead Charges: Offences Against the person 
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 % % % % % % % %  
Magistrates’ court 
PDOs 25.5 46.8 6.4 0.0 14.9 4.3 2.1 0.0 47 
PP 19.0 40.5 9.5 2.4 11.9 11.9 2.4 2.4 42 
Crown Court 
PDOs 0.0 27.1 14.3 47.1 8.6 0.0 2.9 0.0 70 
PP 0.0 28.9 14.5 36.8 11.8 0.0 1.3 6.6 76 
 
 
(b)  Burglary 
 
Generally, dwelling house burglary is treated as more serious than non-dwelling 
house burglary, and aggravated burglary more serious than either (Table 2.18b). In the 
magistrates’ court sample, there was little difference between the PDS and private 
practice as regards dwelling and non-dwelling house burglary. In the Crown Court 
sample, however, whilst the PDS dealt with a greater proportion of non-dwelling 
house burglary cases, they also dealt with a greater proportion of aggravated burglary. 
Taking dwelling house and aggravated burglary cases together, they made up a greater 
proportion of private practice burglary cases than for the PDS, although the numbers 
are relatively small. 
 
Table 2.18b: Detailed Lead Charges: Burglary 
 Aggravated 
burglary 
% 
Dwelling House 
 
% 
Non-dwelling 
House  
% 
N 
Magistrates’ court 
PDOs 0.0 47.1 52.9 17 
PP 0.0 46.2 53.8 13 
Crown Court 
PDOs 23.1 53.8 23.1 26 
PP 7.1 85.7 7.1 28 
 
(c)  Criminal damage 
 
The numbers for criminal damage are relatively low (Table 2.18c). In relation to the 
magistrates’ court sample there is some, limited evidence that the criminal damage 
cases dealt with by private practice were more serious than those dealt with by the 
PDS. In the Crown Court sample, where the number of cases is particularly low, the 
evidence is more equivocal.  
 
Table 2.18c: Detailed Lead Charges: Criminal Damage 
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 Criminal 
Damage 
under £5000 
% 
Criminal 
Damage 
over £5000 
% 
Arson 
 
 
% 
With intent/  
aggravated 
 
% 
Threats 
 
 
% 
N 
Magistrates’ court 
PDOs 93.3 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 15 
PP 84.2 0.0 10.5 0.0 5.3 19 
Crown Court 
PDOs 16.7 0.0 50.0 33.3 0.0 6 
PP 12.5 12.5 37.5 37.5 0.0 8 
 
(d)  Drugs offences 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, Table 2.18d shows that the PDS had a slightly more 
serious drugs caseload than private practice, but the numbers are low. In the Crown 
Court sample, however, the picture is more mixed. Private practice dealt with more 
than double the number of drugs cases in the Crown Court, but the PDS dealt with 
proportionately more Class A drugs cases than private practice. 
 
Table 2.18d: Detailed lead charges: Drugs offences 
 Class A Class B Class C  
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 % % % % % % % %  
Magistrates’ court 
PDO
s 
0.0 21.4 35.7 0.0 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 14 
PP 0.0 18.2 36.4 0.0 36.4 0.0 0.0 9.1 11 
Crown Court 
PDO
s 
0.0 94.1 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17 
PP 2.3 76.8 0.0 13.9 0.0 2.3 4.6 0.0 43 
 
(e)  Driving offences 
 
Driving offences are, for the most part, dealt with in magistrates’ courts rather than 
the Crown Court, so Table 2.18e only deals with the lead charge in the magistrates’ 
court sample. Of the offences within this category, dangerous driving is the most 
serious, followed by driving whilst disqualified, whilst alcohol offences generally 
carry a mandatory driving ban. The PDS dealt with proportionately more dangerous 
driving and alcohol offences, but private practice dealt with more cases of driving 
whilst disqualified.  
 
Table 2.18e: Detailed Lead Charges (magistrates’ Court file data): Driving Offences 
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 Alcohol 
offence
s 
 
 
% 
Driving 
without 
insurance/ 
Tax 
% 
Failure 
to stop/ 
Report 
 
% 
Carele
ss 
Drivin
g 
 
 
% 
Other, 
Incl. 
speeding 
 
% 
Driving 
whilst 
disqualifie
d 
 
% 
Dangerous 
driving 
 
 
% 
N 
PDS 38.5 6.2 4.6 4.6 1.5 33.8 10.8 65 
PP 30.8 7.7 5.8 3.8 1.9 42.3 7.7 52 
 
(vii)  Seriousness and complexity – Peer review assessments  
Having looked at the nature and seriousness of lead charges, we now examine the 
seriousness and complexity of cases. We saw earlier that a case, as defined in the 
General Criminal Contract (but also as perceived by defence lawyers), may involve 
more than one charge, and more than one client. As a result, a case may be more 
serious and/or more complex than the lead offence, considered on its own, would 
indicate. Thus we decided to examine the seriousness and complexity of cases by 
asking the peer reviewers who reviewed proceedings files to make an assessment of 
the seriousness and complexity of each case file that they examined.9 
  
Peer reviewers were given the following guidance about seriousness and complexity: 
 
Seriousness concerns both the nature of the alleged offence(s) and the 
circumstances of the alleged offender (eg. they have relevant previous 
convictions which are likely to make the penalty greater). 
Complexity/difficulty relates to the circumstances of the alleged offence(s) 
(eg. complex facts and/or evidence) and the circumstances of the alleged 
offender (eg. mental disorder). 
 
The scales were developed in consultation with the peer reviewers. Seriousness was 
assessed according to a three point scale: most serious, moderately serious, and least 
serious. Complexity was assessed according to a four point scale: exceptional, 
demanding, routine and minor. In view of the fact that cases dealt with in the Crown 
Court are generally more serious than those dealt with in magistrates’ courts, 
reviewers were told that seriousness and complexity should be judged by reference to 
the standards relevant to the trial court in which the case was finally dealt with. The 
peer reviewer assessment of case seriousness for both court samples is shown in Table 
2.19a. 
 
Table 2.19a: Peer Reviewer Assessment of Case Seriousness (Magistrates’ Court and 
Crown Court) 
 
                                                 
9 It will be recalled that peer reviews were carried out on one-in-two of the cases included in each of 
the case file samples for the investigation stage and for each court proceedings stage (magistrates’ court 
and Crown Court).  Assessment of seriousness and complexity was included in the peer review of the 
court samples only. 
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  Least 
serious 
% 
Moderately 
serious 
% 
Most 
serious 
% 
N 
Birmingham** PDO 41.7 50.0 8.3 48 
 PP 22.9 60.4 16.7 48 
Cheltenham** PDO 30.6 69.4 0 49 
 PP 24.5 55.1 20.4 49 
Liverpool PDO 32.0 52.0 16.0 50 
 PP 24.5 57.1 18.4 49 
Middlesbrough PDO 21.3 68.1 10.6 47 
 PP 25.0 62.5 12.5 48 
Pontypridd PDO 36.2 48.9 14.9 47 
 PP 29.2 58.3 12.5 48 
Swansea PDO 22.0 60.0 18.0 50 
 PP 27.1 62.5 10.4 48 
All areas PDOs 30.6 58.1 11.3 291 
 PP 25.5 59.3 15.2 290 
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At the all areas level, according to the peer reviewers, the PDS had a less serious case 
load than private practice, although it is not a difference that is significant. This is also 
reflected in the results of Birmingham, Cheltenham, Liverpool and Pontypridd PDOs, 
although for the latter two offices the difference with private practice was not 
significant. Middlesbrough and Swansea PDOs, on the other hand, appear to have a 
marginally more serious caseload than private practice in their areas although, again, 
the difference is not significant. When magistrates’ court and Crown Court cases were 
isolated and analysed separately, there were no significant differences between the 
PDS and private practice.  
 
The other dimension assessed by the peer reviewers was case complexity, using a four 
point scale, and the results are shown in Table 2.19b. 
 
Table 2.19b: Peer Reviewer Assessment of Case Complexity (Magistrates’ Court and 
Crown Court) 
 
  Minor 
% 
Routine 
% 
Demanding
% 
Exceptional 
% 
N 
Birmingham* PDO 8.3 79.2 12.5 0 48 
 PP 8.2 55.1 36.7 0 49 
Cheltenham** PDO 28.6 57.1 14.3 0 49 
 PP 14.3 46.9 38.8 0 49 
Liverpool PDO 18.0 56.0 22.0 4.0 50 
 PP 18.4 57.1 22.4 2.0 49 
Middlesbrough PDO 16.7 56.3 25.0 2.1 48 
 PP 22.9 52.1 22.9 2.1 48 
Pontypridd PDO 17.0 70.2 10.6 2.1 47 
 PP 14.9 61.7 23.4 0 47 
Swansea PDO 14.0 48.0 38.0 0 50 
 PP 12.5 68.8 18.8 0 48 
All areas PDOs 17.1 61.0 20.5 1.4 292 
 PP 15.2 59.6 27.2 0.7 290 
 
As for case seriousness, both Birmingham and Cheltenham PDOs caseloads were 
assessed as significantly less complex than those of their private practice counterparts, 
as was Pontypridd PDO, although in this instance the difference is not significant. 
However, Liverpool PDO cases were assessed as broadly similar in terms of 
complexity to those for private practice. Again, as for case seriousness, there were 
indications that Middlesbrough and Swansea caseloads were more complex than 
private practice, but the results are not significant. At the all areas level, private 
practice is assessed as having a marginally more complex caseload than the PDS, but 
it does not reach significance. When magistrates’ court and Crown Court cases are 
isolated and analysed separately, at the magistrates’ court level, Cheltenham PDO’s 
caseload alone remains significantly less complex than its private practice 
counterparts. At the Crown Court level there are no significant differences between 
the PDOs and private practice.  
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(viii)  Summary 
As far as we are aware, peer assessment of seriousness and/or complexity of criminal 
cases has not been attempted before. Broadly, the results show the PDS as having a 
less serious and less complex caseload than private practice, but the differences are 
relatively modest. Not all PDOs, however, followed this pattern. Whilst Birmingham, 
Cheltenham, Liverpool and Pontypridd PDOs have a less serious caseload, and 
Birmingham, Cheltenham and Pontypridd have a less complex caseload, than private 
practice in those areas, there is some evidence that Middlesbrough and Swansea have 
a more serious and complex caseload  than their private practice counterparts. 
 
Assessing seriousness and complexity of criminal cases is notoriously problematic, 
particularly because it involves a large number of variables and because determining 
seriousness by reference to offence categories is not sufficiently discriminating to 
provide an accurate assessment. As noted earlier there were few, if any, meaningful 
contrasts between the caseloads of the PDS and private practice by reference to 
offence category. In our file data samples we collected more detailed information 
about the lead offences, but lack of numbers in the sub-categories makes comparison 
between the PDS and private practice difficult. 
 
Some of the information that we collected as to client characteristics, particularly the 
various aspects of clients’ previous criminal history, together with factors such as 
whether clients were initially produced in court in custody, and stand-alone advice 
and assistance claims may provide, to a greater or lesser extent, proxies for 
seriousness and complexity. For example, a client with previous convictions, 
particularly where they are recent and similar to the offence charged, is likely to face 
a higher sentence than a client without those characteristics. However, the evidence of 
any relationship between these proxies and peer reviewers’ assessments is equivocal. 
 
We saw that at the all areas level the peer reviewers assessed PDS cases as being less 
serious and less complex than those of private practice. PDS clients were also less 
likely to have previous convictions, less likely to have previous convictions that were 
similar to the offence charged, less likely to have a previous custodial sentence and a 
lower average number of previous custodial sentences (Crown Court), less likely to be 
produced in custody at their first court appearance, and more likely to receive stand-
alone advice and assistance. 
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to Birmingham PDO, whose clients also had 
fewer actual and sets of convictions compared to their private practice counterparts, 
and to a lesser extent Liverpool. However, in relation to Cheltenham and Pontypridd, 
in respect of which the peer reviewers assessed the PDOs as having a less serious and 
less complex caseload than private practice, many of the proxies indicated the 
opposite. Conversely, Middlesbrough and Swansea PDOs were assessed as having a 
more serious and more complex caseload than private practice, but the proxies 
indicated the reverse. We have not, in this analysis, included offence category for the 
reasons set out above, but it seems clear that there are factors that are relevant to case 
seriousness and complexity that are not easily identified and isolated. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the peer reviewers’ assessments are the most reliable indicator of 
seriousness and complexity of the respective caseloads of the PDS and private 
practice that are available. 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has compared the client and case profiles of the PDS and private 
practice, both at the all areas level, and in respect of individual PDOs and their private 
practice counterparts. This information and analysis is important in its own right, 
giving a detailed picture of the respective client base and caseloads of the two sectors. 
It is also important because it provide a context for understanding the processes and 
outcomes considered in Chapter 3, and for understanding the differences in the cost of 
providing criminal defence services by the PDS and private practice respectively 
(Chapter 5). In many respects the differences between the various PDOs are as great 
as those between the PDS and private practice, reflecting both the significance of 
local criminal justice practices and cultures and, it would appear, the fact that these 
factors may be more important than the fact that the PDS is a national organisation 
with, to a certain extent, common policies and procedures. 
 
In terms of the demographic and socio-economic profiles of clients of the two sectors, 
there are few significant differences. The gender and ethnicity profiles of the PDS and 
private practice are broadly similar as are, it would seem, the ages of clients. Both 
sectors have nearly a fifth of clients who are aged under 18 years. There are some 
differences in relation to various forms of vulnerability of clients, with a greater 
proportion of private practice clients at the all areas level having some form of drug or 
alcohol problem, which was also the case in Birmingham, Middlesbrough, Pontypridd 
and Swansea. On the other hand, in Pontypridd a significantly greater proportion of 
PDS clients in the Crown Court sample had mental health problems compared with 
private practice clients in the area. It is worthy of note that between one fifth and one 
quarter of all clients, in both sectors, evidenced at least one form of vulnerability. 
 
There were, however, important differences in the antecedent profiles of PDS and 
private practice clients. A smaller proportion of PDS clients had previous convictions 
compared to private practice clients, fewer had previous convictions that were similar 
to the lead offence faced by clients, and fewer had previous custodial sentences, 
indicating a client caseload for the PDS nationally that is less experienced in terms of 
criminal histories. However, there was wide variation in terms of individual PDOs. 
There is evidence that the antecedent histories of PDS clients in Birmingham, 
Liverpool, Middlesbrough and Swansea were generally less extensive and less serious 
than private practice clients in those areas. On the other hand, those of Cheltenham 
and Pontypridd PDO clients were marginally more serious than for private practice. 
 
The data on the nature and seriousness of the offences faced by clients are more 
difficult to interpret in terms of differences between the two sectors, and the SPOCC 
data showed different patterns as between the magistrates’ court and Crown Court 
samples. In the former there were no significant differences either at the individual 
office level or the all areas level. At the all areas level there is some indication that the 
PDS dealt with a smaller proportion of theft cases and more where the lead charge 
was a driving offence. The latter was also reflected in four of the areas, and a different 
combination of four PDOs dealt with proportionately more drugs offences than their 
private practice counterparts. However, in the Crown Court sample, at the all areas 
level drugs offences made up double the proportion of private practice cases 
compared with the PDS. Otherwise, the offence profile at the all areas level was 
broadly similar. However, at the individual office level the majority of PDOs dealt 
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with proportionately more sexual offences, theft and administration of justice cases 
than private practice, and fewer criminal damage and drugs cases. 
 
The peer reviewer assessments of seriousness and complexity of cases did reveal 
important differences between the PDS and private practice. The caseload of the PDS 
was assessed as less serious and less complex than that of private practice, although 
the difference is relatively small. In terms of the individual PDOs, Birmingham, 
Cheltenham and Pontypridd were assessed as having a less serious and less complex 
caseload than private practice in those areas, and Liverpool a less serious, but not a 
less complex, caseload. On the other hand, the assessment provided some evidence 
that Middlesbrough and Swansea PDOs had more serious and more complex 
caseloads than private practice. 
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Chapter 3 
Case Processing and Outcomes 
 
A key issue emerging from international research on public defenders is the different 
outcomes that public defenders achieve for their clients, and the different ways in 
which public defenders handle their cases.  This shows, for example, a fairly 
consistent pattern of public defenders having more clients plead guilty earlier in the 
life of a case, with the Canadian research suggesting that this leads to lower sentences 
(but not higher conviction rates)110 and the Scottish research suggesting that it leads to 
higher conviction rates but no difference in sentences (because of a different attitude 
to plea bargaining).111  The impact of salaried models on police station work is under-
explored.   
 
This chapter concentrates on quantitative data which indicates ways in which cases 
were handled and the results achieved for clients.  It derives from two sources.  
SPOCC data on all claims handled in the police station and magistrates’ court; and 
file data from the three file samples: police station; magistrates’ court, and Crown 
Court files.  Both process and outcome data give a sense of what happens to cases.  At 
a very general level, such data provide a set of indicators, or contexts, for judging the 
relative quality of the PDS and private practice, although there are significant dangers 
in adopting a simplistic approach to the interpretation of outcome measures.112  As a 
result it is important to bear in mind in reading this chapter that we do not regard these 
individual indicators as definitive of either the quality of work or approach to work 
being adopted.  They are suggestive of how matters are being dealt with in the 
different organisations, particularly where patterns are seen across a cohort of cases, 
but they must be considered only as part of the broader picture emerging from the 
research. 
 
Case Processing in Investigation Cases 
 
We first examine the nature of the service provided to suspects at police stations by 
public defenders and private practice solicitors’ firms.  A key indicator of police 
station advice services is whether or not the adviser attends the police station or 
simply advises the suspect over the telephone.  A second issue is the status of the legal 
adviser and in particular whether s/he is a qualified solicitor or an accredited police 
station representative.  It is also possible from our file analysis to compare the PDS 
and private practice in terms of the amount of time they spend at the police station.  
                                                 
110 T. Goriely, Legal aid delivery systems which offer the best value for  
money in mass casework? A summary of international experience, London, Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, 1997 and A. Fleming and A. Henry (1998) A Literature Review of Public Defender or 
Staff Lawyer Schemes, Edinburgh, Scottish Office, 1998. 
111 T. Goriely et al., The Public Defence Solicitors’ Office in Edinburgh: An Independent Evaluation, 
Edinburgh, Scottish Executive Central Research Unit, 2001. 
112 R. Moorhead, A. Sherr and A. Paterson (1994) Judging on Results: International Journal of the 
Legal Profession, Volume 2. 
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Finally, we obtained data from our file analysis on any representations recorded by 
the legal adviser relating to either charge or bail. 
(i)  Attendance and non-attendance at police stations 
Previous research has shown a consistent pattern in the provision of police station 
legal advice that advisers are less likely to attend at the police station in duty solicitor 
as distinct from own solicitor cases.  SPOCC data collected during this research 
supports this finding as Table 3.1 shows. 
Table 3.1:   PDS and Private Practice Investigation Stage Claims on SPOCC:  
Percentage of Police Station Cases involving Telephone Only Advice 
 
  Own Duty All cases 
  PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Birmingham % 4.1** 12.8 24.1 21.2 18.4* 15.1 
 N 219 57756 551 22954 770 80710 
Cheltenham % 1.8** 11.2 27.4* 20.9 6.7** 14.5 
 N 704 14042 164 7267 868 21309 
Liverpool % 17.2** 26.9 20.3* 25.9 18.1** 26.7 
 N 587 26272 251 7393 838 33665 
Middlesbrough % 6.9** 12.1 16.7** 25.1 12.3* 14.7 
 N 403 13609 478 3344 881 16953 
Pontypridd % 5.8** 10.1 5.9** 18.8 5.8** 12.4 
 N 276 3193 101 1164 377 4357 
Swansea % 2.5** 10.2 3.8** 19.3 2.9** 11.2 
 N 554 10796 239 1365 793 12161 
All areas % 6.6** 15.2 18.2** 22.1 11.2** 17.0 
 N 2743 125668 1784 43487 4527 169155 
 
It can be seen that both private practice and the PDOs were more likely to attend on 
own clients.  Such a differential in service provision is not necessarily related to 
variations in case type or seriousness as between duty and own solicitor referrals but 
may reflect instead solicitors wishing to meet their own clients’ expectations of a 
personal attendance.113  Nevertheless, such a difference may also be accounted for, in 
part at least, by the likelihood that duty cases more often involve clients arrested for 
lesser offences.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that, despite their need to recruit a client 
base from scratch, this service differential as between duty and own solicitor 
investigation stage clients was maintained by all of the PDOs, in that they all had a 
lower rate of attendances in person on duty than in own solicitor cases (although the 
differences in Pontypridd and Swansea were only marginal).  Indeed, the Cheltenham 
PDO reported a higher proportion of duty cases on SPOCC as involving telephone 
advice only (27%) than private practice in the area (21%), a difference that was 
statistically significant.  This was much higher than the Cheltenham PDO rate of 
telephone only advice to own clients (2%).  In Birmingham the position was similar, 
telephone advice was given by the PDO in 24% of duty cases and only 4% of cases 
involving own clients.  There was a strong difference for Middlesbrough PDO cases 
                                                 
113   The decision whether or not to attend a client in person at the police station can relate to a number 
of factors, including the stage the investigation has reached and in particular whether the client is due to 
be interviewed or, indeed, already has been interviewed at the time of the call.   
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(15% telephone only advice for duty cases to 7% for cases involving own clients) and 
a weak difference in Liverpool (20% to 17%). 
 
More importantly for our comparison of the relative performance of the PDOs and 
private practice, there was also a consistent pattern across all the areas of PDOs 
attending in person on the client in own solicitor cases more often than private 
practice.  The differences were statistically significant in all areas.  It can be estimated 
from these data that around one in ten own clients and one in twenty duty clients 
would be more likely to be visited in person by a legal adviser if they called out the 
PDS rather than a private practice lawyer (depending on area and whether they were 
an own or duty solicitor client).  Nor would differences in the nature of the offences 
for which PDS and private practice clients were arrested explain this difference in 
rates of attendance in person at police stations. 
 
Before leaving Table 3.1 it is worth noting that, as well as differences in attendance 
rates between the PDS and private practice in each area, there are variations in overall 
attendance rates at police stations across the different areas.  For example, in 
Liverpool both private practice and the PDO had relatively high rates of non-
attendance, compared to the other areas, certainly for own solicitor clients.  Indeed, 
Liverpool was the only area where there was a higher rate of attendance for duty than 
for own clients among private practice, and overall a quarter of private practice cases 
in Liverpool involved no attendance in person on the suspect at the police station.   
 
Our analysis of investigation stage file data supported the picture shown by the 
SPOCC data and so is not reported here. 
 
(ii)  Status of police station legal adviser 
Prior to the introduction of the accreditation scheme for police station legal advisers, 
there was concern about the proportion of police station advice cases that were dealt 
with by unqualified staff.  However, research conducted subsequent to the 
introduction of the accreditation scheme tends to show that the status of the legal 
adviser is not necessarily related to the quality of the advice.5 Rather, the proportion 
of advice undertaken by solicitors or accredited representatives may often reflect more 
the structure of particular providers, whether private practice firms or PDOs. 
Although we sought to collect information on the status of the legal adviser from the 
files, unfortunately, in a large proportion of files drawn from private practice it was 
not possible to determine the status of the legal adviser in police station cases (see 
Table 3.2).  This information was unavailable in 61% of private practice cases overall.  
For those cases in which the status of the adviser was recorded, solicitors 
predominated in private practice.  Data on advisers’ status was more frequently 
available for PDS cases, and this shows that, with the exception of Birmingham where 
there were no accredited representatives on staff at the relevant time, all the PDOs did 
rely to a considerable extent on accredited representatives to service clients at police 
stations.  This was the case in 70% of PDO investigation stage cases in Cheltenham 
                                                 
5  L.Bridges and S Choongh, Improving Police Station Legal Advice, London, Law Society and Legal 
Aid Board, 1998.   In the civil sphere, see Moorhead R, Sherr A and Paterson A (2003) ‘Contesting 
Professionalism: Legal Aid and Non lawyers in England and Wales’,  Law and Society Review, 37 (4) 
(2003) 765-808. 
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(where at the time there were relatively few solicitors on the staff, although this 
subsequently changed), two-thirds in Middlesbrough, just under half in Pontypridd 
and Liverpool, and two-fifths in Swansea. 
Table 3.2: PDS and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Analysis: Status of Legal 
Adviser in Case 
 Solicitor Accredited 
Rep 
Mixed Don’t 
Know 
No. 
PDO % 100 - - - 41 Birmingham 
PP % 38 10 - 52 42 
PDO % 26 70 - 4 46 Cheltenham 
PP % 10 - - 90 42 
PDO % 44 47 8 - 36 Liverpool 
PP % 30 17 - 53 30 
PDO % 34 66 - - 44 Middlesbrough 
PP % 32 17 - 51 37 
PDO % 49 45 - 6 49 Pontypridd 
PP % 38 18 - 45 40 
PDO % 51 40 2 6 47 Swansea 
PP % 23 5 - 73 40 
PDOs % 50 45 2 3 263 All areas 
PP % 28 10 - 61 231 
 
(iii)  Time on police station cases 
 
SPOCC does not contain data on the time spent on cases, although it does contain 
billing information which may be a proxy for time spent on investigation cases.  This 
suggests that after controlling for case type, etc., Birmingham and Liverpool PDOs 
spent less time on their investigation stage cases than private practice in their areas 
and Middlesbrough PDO spent significantly more time than private practice in their 
area.  In proceedings cases, where bills may be a less satisfactory proxy for time spent 
on cases (because of the effect of standard fees) all PDOs other than Cheltenham 
appeared to spend less time on proceedings cases than did private suppliers in their 
area (in Cheltenham there was no significant difference).   
 
Partly because of the proxy nature of the SPOCC data, we attempted to collect 
detailed data on time spent on cases in our file sample.  Here we saw that, if there was 
a tendency for both PDOs and private practice to attend the police station in person 
less often in duty solicitor cases, there was also evidence that both sectors tended to 
spend less time at the police station where the adviser did in fact attend on a duty 
client (see Table 3.3a).  Again, this may reflect, in whole or part, the nature of duty 
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cases.  These probably tend towards involving clients with fewer previous convictions 
and, perhaps, those who are less likely to be facing more serous charges.  
 
Table 3.3a:   Average Time Spent on Police Station Cases for Duty and Own Solicitor 
Clients (Attendance Cases Only, Investigation Stage File Analysis) 
 Travel Waiting Attendance 
on Client 
In 
Interview 
Total 
 Minutes 
Own client 52 16 122 21 195 PDOs 
Duty Client 48 11 94 17 155 
Own client 54 17 125 27 196 Private 
practice Duty client 62 7 113 29 182 
 
There was no clear pattern in terms of average time spent by PDOs and private 
practice in attending on clients at the police station (see Table 3.3b).  In this respect, it 
should be noted that our samples of files for analysis were drawn from the same 
police stations for both the PDOs and private practice, so the results should not be 
affected by differences in police practice between stations.  Three of the PDOs 
(Middlesbrough, Cheltenham and Pontypridd) appear to have spent more time on 
average in police station attendances than their private practice counterparts, although 
at least part of this variation is explained by differences in travelling time which may 
have more to do with the location of PDO solicitors’ homes than with issues of 
efficiency.  
In the other three areas (Birmingham, Liverpool and Swansea) PDO advisers spent 
considerably less time on police station attendance cases than their private practice 
counterparts.  By far the largest difference between the two sectors was in Swansea, 
where the PDO spent 99 minutes, or 35% less time, on police station attendances than 
private practice advisers.  This included nearly an hour less in attending on the suspect 
or others and over 40 minutes less in travel time.  In Birmingham PDO advisers spent 
on average 76 minutes, or 36% less time, on police station attendances than private 
practice in their area, including 50 minutes less on actual attendances on the client or 
others.  Finally, in Liverpool although the PDO spent on average 20 minutes less 
overall on police station attendances than private practice advisers, this was almost 
entirely attributable to variations in travel and waiting time, with the PDO and private 
practice spending virtually the same time in attendances on the suspect or others at the 
police station.  There are four possible explanations for the lower time spent on 
attendance: one is that the PDS are more efficient in their dealings with police and 
client; another is that they record less time because they are under less incentive to 
record time; the third is that private practice is incentivised to spend more time on 
police station cases because they get paid per hour; and the fourth is that the 
seriousness and complexity of PDO cases may be lower.  As we will see below in 
relation to proceedings cases, there is evidence to support the fourth proposition. 
There is one other feature of these data on time spent on police station attendances 
that is worth noting.  There are significant geographical variations, with the longest 
average time on attendances being in Swansea (226 minutes) and Pontypridd (214 
minutes) and the shortest in Liverpool (156 minutes).  Interestingly, these differences 
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seemed to be attributable to spending less time interviewing the suspect.  The time 
spent in police interviews did not vary greatly between these three areas, but there 
were considerable differences in time spent by advisers in attending on suspects or 
others (an hour greater in Swansea and half an hour greater in Pontypridd than in 
Liverpool).  This suggests a different culture and approach to advising clients in the 
police station which may also reflect differences in quality. 
Table 3.3b: Average Time Spent on Police Station Attendance Cases by Area (PDS 
and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Analysis) 
 Travel Waiting Attendance (In 
Interview) 
Total 
PDO 41 13 76 (19) 133 
PP 57 25 126 (30) 209 
Birmingham 
All cases 49 19 101 (25) 171 
PDO 71 16 112 (16) 201 
PP 40 4 98 (21) 144 
Cheltenham 
All cases 57 10 106 (18) 175 
PDO 39 11 97 (24) 147 
PP 54 14 99 (26) 167 
Liverpool 
All cases 46 12 98 (25) 156 
PDO 54 12 110 (24) 180 
PP 62 6 87 (23) 155 
Middlesbrough 
All cases 58 9 99 (23) 168 
PDO 64 25 137 (20) 227 
PP 49 25 124 (24) 198 
Pontypridd 
All cases 57 25 131 (22) 214 
PDO 31 7 136 (14) 181 
PP 73 10 194 (39) 280 
Swansea 
All cases 50 9 163 (25) 226 
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(iv) Silence in police interviews 
 
A crucial indicator of approach in the police station is which suspects advised by the 
PDS or private practice made no comment during the course of police interviews.  
There was an indication on the file that the suspect made comments during at least 
some interviews in the majority of cases handled by either the PDS or private practice 
in each of the areas (see Table 3.4).  On the other hand, in four of the six areas 
(Middlesbrough, Cheltenham, Pontypridd and Swansea) there was clear evidence that 
suspects advised by the PDOs made no comment in response to all police questions 
more often than those advised by private practice.  The difference was greatest in 
Pontypridd (36% no comment interviews for the PDO compared to 14% for private 
practice), followed by Middlesbrough (20% for the PDO; 12% private practice), 
Swansea (18% for the PDO; 13% private practice) and Cheltenham (13% for the 
PDO; 7% private practice).  There was very little difference in this respect between 
the PDO and private practice cases in Liverpool.  By contrast with the other areas, 
suspects advised by the PDO in Birmingham had a relatively low rate of ‘no comment 
interviews’ (5% compared with 11% for private practice), although a further 7% of 
PDO clients appear to have commented only in some interviews and not others and 
the figures are limited somewhat by the inability to tell from the file whether the client 
commented or not in 14% of Birmingham PDO cases. 
Table 3.4: PDS and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Analysis: Suspect 
Comments in Police Interview 
 All no 
comment 
Comment 
during some 
interviews 
Comment 
during all 
interviews 
Not clear 
from file 
N 
PDO % 5 7 74 14 43 Birmingham 
PP % 11 - 80 9 45 
PDO % 13 4 73 10 48 Cheltenham 
PP % 7 - 78 15 41 
PDO % 13 3 79 5 39 Liverpool 
PP % 11 3 78 8 36 
PDO % 20 - 80 - 40 Middlesbrough 
PP % 12 9 71 10 42 
PDO % 36 - 61 2 44 Pontypridd 
PP % 14 - 83 2 42 
PDO % 18 - 82 - 38 Swansea 
PP % 13 3 82 3 38 
PDOs % 17 2 75 6 252 All areas 
PP % 11 2 79 8 244 
 
In general, the level of no comment interviews suggests a more adversarial approach 
was taken to police station work by PDS.  This is contrary to the common perception 
of public defenders but is consistent with the dominant view of good defence 
practice.6  It is worth noting here that in our ‘peer review’ of files, we specifically 
                                                 
6 R. Ede and E. Shepherd, Active Defence, London, Law. Society, 2000. 
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considered the appropriateness of the advice offered by legal advisers to suspects on 
their exercise of the ‘right to silence’ in police interviews.  The results (see Chapter 4) 
indicate that where a PDO had a relatively high proportion of clients who exercised 
silence, the PDO also scored highly on the appropriateness of the advice offered as to 
strategy to adopt in the police interview. 
We also noted in our file analysis where the adviser recorded representations made at 
the police station with regard to either charge or bail.  In fact, there were only a 
handful of files where such representations were specifically noted.  Thus, only one 
private practice file but ten of those from the PDOs noted specific representations 
made by the legal adviser at the police station in respect of charge, while eight private 
practice and nine PDO files recorded representations relating to bail.  Finally, there 
were six PDO cases and two private practice cases where a written statement was 
prepared for the suspect to hand into the police at the police station.  This was also an 
issue considered in our ‘peer review’ of files (see Chapter 4). 
 
Outcomes of Investigation Stage 
 
In this section we will examine whether there were any significant differences in the 
outcomes achieved by public defenders and private practice solicitors at police 
stations.  There were no significant differences between PDOs and private practice in 
terms of the extent to which they retained clients through to the end of the 
investigation stage of cases.  So we turn to look at how those clients who were 
retained by both sectors fared in terms of whether they were charged or summoned for 
a criminal offence, received a reprimand or warning, or were released without charge 
from the police station. 
(i)  Incidence of ‘bail backs’ 
 
Of course, one ‘outcome’ that can occur during the investigation stage of a criminal 
case is that the suspect will be released from the police station on bail, pending further 
police enquiries, with a requirement to return to the police station at a later date.  In 
our file analysis, we examined the proportion of total arrests dealt with by both the 
PDOs and private practice that involved such a ‘bail back’ to the police station (see 
Table 3.5).  Overall, it appears that more arrests dealt with by private practice (25%) 
involved a ‘bail back’ than those for PDOs (20%).  Indeed, the only offence category 
in which the PDS appears to have had a higher use of ‘bail backs’ than private 
practice was offences against the person, where 30% of PDO arrests but only 19% of 
those handled by private practice involved a ‘bail back’.  PDOs had a notably low 
incidence of ‘bail backs’ in relation to arrests for criminal damage (9% compared to 
21% for private practice).  As would be expected, a high proportion of drugs arrests 
for both PDOs (53%) and private practice (62%) involved the use of ‘bail backs’.7 
 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that these figures pre-date the introduction of CPS involvement in the charging 
process which may have substantially increased the number of bailbacks. 
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Table 3.5: PDS and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Analysis Incidence of 
Bail from Police Station by Offence Type 
 
  No. of arrests Bailbacks % of all 
arrests 
PDOs 47 14 30 Offences against 
persons PP 53 11 19 
PDOs 6 3 50 Sexual offences 
PP 15 9 60 
PDOs 42 7 17 Robbery/burglary 
PP 45 10 22 
PDOs 97 22 23 Other dishonesty 
PP 97 30 31 
PDOs 43 4 9 Criminal damage 
PP 24 5 21 
PDOs 25 3 12 Public order 
PP 25 3 12 
PDOs 19 10 53 Drug offences 
PP 26 16 62 
PDOs 28 1 4 Driving offences 
PP 43 - - 
PDOs 3 - - Assault/obstruct 
police PP 3 - - 
PDOs 52 7 13 Other 
PP 36 7 19 
PDOs 362 71 20 All arrests 
PP 267 91 25 
 
(ii)  Charges, reprimands/warnings, and no further action 
Table 3.6a shows the outcome at the end of the investigation stage of cases reported 
on SPOCC for PDO and private practice retained clients, divided between duty 
solicitor and own solicitor cases.  As regards duty solicitor cases, there was a 
statistically significant difference overall, insofar as fewer duty solicitor retained 
clients of PDOs were charged or summoned for a criminal offence (56%) compared 
with those of private practice (60%).  The differences between individual PDOs and 
their private practice comparators in terms of duty solicitor clients who were charged 
were statistically significant in Middlesbrough, where 47% of PDO duty solicitor 
retained clients were charged or summoned for a criminal offence compared with 
52% for private practice, and in Cheltenham where 44% of PDS retained clients were 
charged or summoned compared to 49% for private practice firms in the area.  There 
were more statistically different outcomes between PDOs and private practice as 
regards own solicitor clients.  Across all areas, 58% of retained own clients of PDOs 
were charged or summoned for a criminal offence, whereas this was the case for 
nearly 67% of retained own clients of private practice.  There were also statistically 
significant differences in this respect between the PDS and private practice in four of 
the six areas (Middlesbrough, Birmingham, Cheltenham and Swansea), and in each 
case the PDO had a lower proportion of its retained own solicitor clients charged or 
summoned for a criminal offence than their local private practice counterparts.  In 
94 
Middlesbrough 50% of retained PDO own solicitor clients were charged or 
summoned compared with 65% for private practice.  In Cheltenham the comparable 
figures were 50% for the PDO and 64% for private practice; in Birmingham 57% for 
the PDO and 64% for private practice; and in Swansea 58% for the PDO and 67% for 
private practice. 
 
Table 3.6a  PDS and Private Practice Investigation Claims on SPOCC: Outcome at 
end of Investigation Stage for Retained Clients 
 
  Client not 
a suspect/ 
defendant 
No 
Further 
Action 
Reprimand/ 
Warning 
Charged/ 
Summonsed 
N 
Duty Solicitor Cases 
Birmingham PDO** 2.8% 25.1% 11.3% 60.8% 434 
 PP 0.6% 28.0% 10.5% 60.8% 18985 
Cheltenham PDO** 1.6% 33.9% 21.0% 43.5% 124 
 PP 1.4% 30.2% 19.2% 49.2% 6026 
Liverpool PDO 1.3% 21.0% 9.4% 68.2% 233 
 PP 1.0% 19.0% 8.9% 71.1% 6426 
Middlesbrough PDO** 0.2% 39.8% 12.6% 47.3% 427 
 PP 1.3% 38.3% 8.7% 51.7% 2828 
Pontypridd PDO 0.0% 37.9% 9.5% 52.6% 95 
 PP 1.7% 27.1% 10.8% 60.4% 1026 
Swansea PDO 0.5% 22.5% 20.7% 56.3% 222 
 PP 1.2% 23.9% 15.4% 59.4% 1228 
PDOs** 1.2% 29.7% 13.4% 55.6% 1535 All areas 
PP 0.9% 27.4% 11.7% 60.0% 36519 
Own Clients 
Birmingham PDO* 0.4% 35.7% 6.7% 57.1% 224 
 PP 1.5% 30.3% 4.0% 64.1% 56440 
Cheltenham PDO** 0.2% 43.9% 5.6% 50.4% 665 
 PP 1.0% 28.5% 6.2% 64.2% 13337 
Liverpool PDO 0.9% 23.7% 3.8% 71.7% 575 
 PP 1.2% 21.8% 2.9% 74.0% 24870 
Middlesbrough PDO** 2.9% 42.8% 4.6% 49.6% 409 
 PP 0.7% 31.8% 2.1% 65.4% 13151 
Pontypridd PDO 0.4% 31.0% 3.3% 65.3% 271 
 PP 0.6% 28.6% 5.1% 65.8% 3315 
Swansea PDO** 1.6% 32.8% 11.3% 54.3% 628 
 PP 1.2% 27.5% 3.8% 67.5% 10946 
PDOs** 1.1% 35.1% 6.2% 57.6% 2772 All areas 
PP 1.3% 28.3% 3.8% 66.6% 122059 
 
Our file analysis shows a similar area pattern of differences between PDS and private 
practice in the proportions of their retained investigation stage clients who are charged 
or summoned for a criminal offence (see Table 3.6b).  In this instance, Middlesbrough 
PDO had a significantly lower proportion on retained clients charged or summoned 
(48% as compared with 65% for private practice), but in Pontypridd (80% PDO and 
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66% private practice retained clients charged or summoned) and Cheltenham (62% of 
PDO and 40% of private practice retained clients charged or summoned) the reverse 
was the case.  In the other three areas (Birmingham Liverpool and Swansea) the data 
also show that PDO clients were charged or summoned less often than those of 
private practice, but the differences were not statistically significant. 
Table 3.6b  PDO and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Analysis: Outcome at 
end of Investigation Stage for Retained Clients by Area 
 
  Client not 
suspect/ 
defendant 
No 
further 
action 
Reprimand/ 
warning 
Charged/ 
summoned 
N 
Birmingham PDO % - 30 16 54 37 
 PP % - 23 7 70 43 
Cheltenham* PDO % - 32 6 62 50 
 PP % - 50 10 40 40 
Liverpool PDO % - 21 6 73 48 
 PP % - 14 5 81 42 
Middlesbrough* PDO % 2 40 10 48 48 
 PP % - 33 2 65 49 
Pontypridd* PDO % - 15 6 80 48 
 PP % - 16 18 66 44 
Swansea PDO % 2 24 15 59 46 
 PP % - 26 2 72 43 
All Areas* PDOs % 1 27 10 63 277 
 PP % - 27 7 66 261 
 
 
(iii) Multivariate analysis 
In order to make the comparison of outcomes between the PDS and private practice 
suppliers statistically robust, we need to compare outcomes for like claims. In 
particular, we should be comparing claims of equal complexity and for similar 
localities. However, it is possible that the types of case represented by PDOs are 
substantially different from the types of case represented by other suppliers in their 
area, and it is this, not the efficiency of the supplier, which is driving the results. To 
deal with this problem, it is necessary to undertake multivariate analysis. The data 
available to us from SPOCC allows us to control for various factors other than the 
type of supplier (PDO or private practice) that might have an influence on outcomes 
at the police station.  These factors include the number of defendants on the claim, 
whether it relates to a youth case or a duty solicitor case, supplier size (as measured 
by the number of SPOCC investigation stage claims made), type of offence, and the 
location of the police station where the suspect was held.  The results of this analysis 
are shown at Appendix 3.1, Tables 1 and 2.  As regard outcomes, this shows that: 
after controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a retained client 
being charged was significantly lower for the Liverpool, Middlesbrough and Swansea 
PDOs relative to private practice clients in these areas.  For the other PDOs there was 
no statistically significant difference between them and private practice in respect of 
the likelihood of retained clients being charged. 
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Case Processing in Court Proceedings 
 
This section discusses the data from the proceedings stage of the project.  It looks at 
issues such as the comparative number of hearings on PDO and private practice cases; 
the outcomes of those cases; timing of guilty pleas; and the benefits achieved from 
guilty pleas in cracked trials. 
 
(i) The number of hearings 
SPOCC data provides an indication of the number of hearings.8 
 
Figure 3A: Number of Hearings in Magistrates’ Court (SPOCC data) 
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Generally, although private practice appeared to have fewer hearings than the PDS 
offices on the above distribution, (although it did have more cases with 7 or more), in 
terms of the average number of hearings there was almost no difference (PDS mean 
2.99, private practice mean 3.03).  Within areas, however, there were some significant 
differences (see Table 3.7a) with the PDS generally having fewer hearings overall.  At 
least one of the PDS offices indicates that this is the result of  
 
our policy of giving robust and appropriate advice.  Dealing with obvious guilty 
pleas at the first available opportunity to maximise available credit, but also 
taking cases in which there is either a not guilty plea or further negotiation to be 
conducted for as many hearings as are appropriate.9 
 
                                                 
8 These data are based on the magistrates’ court claims other than advice and assistance only claims and 
second hearings for deferred sentence claims.  They also exclude outlier values: in particular, on some 
cases the number of hearings exceeds 40, and some were even in the thousands.  Most, possibly all of 
these, are likely to be errors and were excluded from the analysis. 
9 Communication from Office Head. 
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Table 3.7a   Mean Number of Hearings per Case in Magistrates’ Courts (SPOCC) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
N 
Birmingham PDO* 2.66 1.90 0.014 548 
 PP 2.89 2.13  85732 
Cheltenham PDO 2.80 2.00 0.306 454 
 PP 2.90 2.20  14031 
Liverpool PDO** 3.01 2.11 0.000 1055 
 PP 3.41 2.76  35662 
Middlesbrough PDO 3.46 2.40 0.052 508 
 PP 3.25 2.81  14721 
Pontypridd PDO 3.19 1.98 0.980 307 
 PP 3.20 2.09  5004 
Swansea PDO** 2.84 1.90 0.004 412 
 PP 3.12 2.38  5897 
All areas PDOs 2.99 2.09 0.062 3284 
 PP 3.06 2.38  161047 
 
 
Information on the number of hearings was also collected on the file data, but as this 
was on a much smaller sample and does not contradict the findings of the much larger 
SPOCC dataset, we have not reported it. 
  
In the Crown Court the only available data on the number of hearings is from our file 
sample.  In such cases hearings took place both in the magistrates’ court and the 
Crown Court.  The results are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 3.7b  Mean Number of Hearings in the Magistrates' Court  (Crown Court Files) 
  Mean N 
Birmingham PDO 2.31 42 
 PP 2.30 47 
Cheltenham PDO 2.28 40 
 PP 2.62 29 
Liverpool PDO 2.80 45 
 PP 3.50 42 
Middlesbrough** PDO 2.82 44 
 PP 4.17 48 
Pontypridd PDO 2.48 39 
 PP 3.13 49 
Swansea** PDO 2.34 32 
 PP 3.61 49 
All** PDO 2.52 243 
 PP 3.26 263 
 
Generally, with the exception of Birmingham, private practice had more hearings in 
the magistrates’ court before the cases were committed to the Crown Court.  The 
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differences were  statistically significant only at the all areas level and in 
Middlesbrough and Swansea. 
 
The picture in terms of actual Crown Court hearings was if anything reversed, as we 
can see in Table 3.7c.10 
 
Table 3.7c   Mean Number of Hearings in the Crown Court  (Crown Court Files) 
  Mean N 
Birmingham PDO 4.39 46 
 PP 4.00 48 
Cheltenham PDO 4.41 46 
 PP 3.32 28 
Liverpool PDO 3.66 50 
 PP 3.94 49 
Middlesbrough PDO 3.57 46 
 PP 3.52 48 
Pontypridd PDO 4.23 39 
 PP 3.57 49 
Swansea PDO 4.63 35 
 PP 3.59 49 
All areas* PDOs 4.12 262 
 PP 3.68 271 
 
Thus generally PDS Crown Court cases had more hearings on average, though not in 
Liverpool.  The difference is only significant at the all areas level, with a half a 
hearing per case difference.  This is somewhat counter intuitive, as all things being 
equal, one would expect private practice to have more hearings than the PDS, partly 
because their cases were, if anything, more serious than the PDS; and partly because 
the economic incentives would generally suggest that, where the amount of work on 
Crown Court cases takes them over the standard fee payment thresholds, they would 
have economic incentives to do more hearings, which the PDS would not have.   
 
                                                 
10 In the Crown Court a limited number of cases (47) had other solicitors instructed prior to the main 
solicitor being instructed. Where possible, we collected information on the number of hearings prior to 
the second solicitor being instructed and added these to the total number of hearings in the case to see if 
this affected our findings.  In terms of significant differences, this did not alter the picture at all. 
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(ii) Adjournments 
An interesting issue related to hearings is the reasons for adjournments.  Because our 
interest in this emerged during the course of our data collection, we only collected 
data on adjournments in three of the areas. Table 3.8a records the information on 
magistrates’ court files and later tables look at the position in the Crown Court. The 
most noticeable statistic is the fact that the majority of adjournments are procedural or 
administrative in nature. In other words they appear to be related to the ordinary 
progress of the case, rather than inadequacies of the prosecution or defence.  The 
second general point is that the number of adjournments caused by the prosecution not 
being ready is noticeably higher than the number caused by the defence not being 
ready.      
 
Table 3.8a  Adjournments in the Magistrates’ Court (Magistrates’ Court Files) 
 Cheltenham Pontypridd Swansea All 
 PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS 
Prosecution not ready 8% 7% 18% 8% 11% 22% 13% 12% 
Prosecution witnesses not 
attending 
2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Defence not ready 0% 1% 3% 0% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
Defendant did not appear 10%* 3% 13% 11% 20% 9% 14%* 8% 
Defendant not produced 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 5% 1% 1% 
Administrative/procedural 68% 85% 57% 76% 66% 59% 63% 74%*
Not clear from the file 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Other 10%* 3% 8% 4% 2% 2% 7% 3% 
Number of adjournments 
recorded 
106 98 119 112 91 88 316 298 
 
In the magistrates’ court, there were relatively few significant differences.11 The main 
difference of note is the slightly greater tendency for clients of private practice not to 
attend court.  This difference was significant in Cheltenham and for the three areas as 
a whole.   
 
The next two tables look at adjournments in Crown Court cases.  The first table 
considers the pattern of adjournments in the magistrates’ court stages of the case (pre-
transfer or committal).  The second table looks at the hearings on these cases which 
took place in the Crown Court. 
 
                                                 
11 We compared mean proportions of each type of adjournment as a proportion of all adjournments in 
the case. 
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Table 3.8b  Adjournments in the Magistrates’ Court (Crown Court Files)12  
 Cheltenham Pontypridd Swansea 
  PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS 
Prosecution not ready 13% 10% 28%* 17% 18% 19% 
Prosecution witnesses not 
attending 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Defence not ready 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 
Defendant did not appear 1% 2% 1% 2% 3% 0% 
Defendant not produced 0% 1% 0% 0% 3% 6% 
Administrative/procedural 80% 87% 68% 78% 76% 71% 
Not clear from the file 3% 0% 3% 2% 0% 0% 
Other 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Number of adjournments 71 89 136 86 160** 69 
 
 
In these cases, the number of magistrates’ court adjournments per case was 
significantly higher in private practice in Swansea: otherwise the only significant 
difference was that a higher proportion of adjournments in private practice cases in  
Pontypridd was due to the prosecution not being ready. 
 
Table 3.8c  Adjournments in the Crown Court  (Crown Court Files) 
 Cheltenham Pontypridd Swansea 
 PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS 
Prosecution not ready 6% 9% 12% 12% 7% 13% 
Prosecution witnesses not 
attending 
0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Defence not ready 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Defendant did not appear 0% 0% 2% 3% 6% 1% 
Defendant not produced 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Administrative/procedural 88% 85% 83% 77% 82% 84% 
Not clear from the file 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 3% 5% 1% 8%* 3% 1% 
N of adjournments 68 150 118 132* 124 134* 
 
Turning to adjournments in the Crown Court, the difference in the number of 
adjournments in Cheltenham is large but is largely accounted for by the fact that there 
are fewer private practice cases in this sample than there are PDO cases (although in 
Cheltenham the PDO averaged 3.3 adjournments per case in the Crown Court and 
private practice averaged 2.3 adjournments per case, the difference was not 
statistically significant).    There was only one significant difference in the type of 
adjournments and that was that the Pontypridd PDO had a higher proportion of 
adjournments classified as ‘other’. 
 
                                                 
12 In this and the following table, comparisons were performed on the average total number of 
adjournments in each area comparing private practice and the PDS and on the means of the ratio of 
different types of adjournment as a proportion of all adjournments on a case to test differences between 
proportions of different types of adjournment.  
101 
We also examined the number of court hearings it took to reach a range of different 
outcomes in both the magistrates’ court and Crown Court file samples.  On the whole 
there were few significant differences between the PDOs and private practice in this 
respect, and for this reason we do not show the full data here.  However, in the 
magistrates’ court sample Liverpool PDO cases went through significantly fewer 
hearings on average than private practice cases to reach both conviction (an average 
of three fewer hearings per case), a finding probably related to the higher rate of 
guilty pleas in PDO cases in this area.  On the other hand, in magistrates’ court cases 
where there was an acquittal in Middlesbrough, those handled by the PDO went 
through significantly more hearings on average than similar private practice cases (an 
average of three more hearings per case).  In Crown Court cases, Middlesbrough PDO 
cases went through fewer hearings on average to reach the mode of trial decision (an 
average of 1.5 fewer hearings per case), and at the all areas level PDO cases went 
through significantly fewer hearings on average to reach final sentence (an average of 
half a hearing per case fewer).  
 
(iii) Length of cases and trials 
An interesting contrast to the number of hearings on cases is the length of case.  These 
data are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 3.9a   Length of Case in Days (SPOCC) 
 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
Birmingham PDO 68.6 68.7 546 
 PP 67.7 73.3 84383 
Cheltenham PDO 65.8 60.3 449 
 PP 60.9 66.3 13952 
Liverpool PDO** 65.0 74.9 1041 
 PP 81.7 88.3 35368 
Middlesbrough PDO** 89.4 78.1 505 
 PP 70.3 84.4 14674 
Pontypridd PDO** 78.0 95.0 304 
 PP 65.9 62.2 4947 
Swansea PDO** 66.8 79.5 406 
 PP 56.1 66.7 5838 
All areas PDOs 71.0 75.7 3251 
 PP 70.0 77.2 159162 
 
It will be recalled that the PDOs generally had fewer hearings per case, so these data 
tend to suggest that their cases had more days between hearings than private practice 
cases.  This can be seen in Table 3.9b where in every area apart from Liverpool the 
PDO cases took longer per hearing than did private practice cases.  This suggests 
either that there were different listing practices for PDO cases, or that the PDO 
lawyers were sometimes suggesting longer adjournments than their private practice 
counterparts.  This would have slowed the cases down but possibly meant they were 
more efficient in their use of court time.  Another suggestion is that because the courts 
were aware that the PDOs did not have an economic interest in stringing cases out 
they might have been more likely to grant longer adjournments. 
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Table 3.9b: Days per Hearing in the Magistrates’ Court (SPOCC) 
 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation
N 
PDO** 18.6 18.7 546 Birmingham 
PP 16.3 18.4 84367 
PDO* 16.9 17.4 449 Cheltenham 
PP 14.9 17.7 13951 
PDO 14.3 17.0 1041 Liverpool 
PP** 19.2 26.9 35361 
PDO** 19.8 22.1 505 Middlesbrough 
PP 15.1 19.4 14672 
PDO* 17.6 21.3 304 Pontypridd 
PP 14.7 13.9 4947 
PDO** 16.4 18.8 406 Swansea 
PP 12.5 16.6 5837 
PDOs 16.8 18.9 3251 All areas 
PP 16.5 20.5 159135 
 
Of cases where there was a trial, there was no significant difference in length of trial 
in the magistrates’ court (most trials lasted a day or less).  The length of time for 
which trials were listed was also collected where this was available.  The difference in 
the distributions was not significant.  In the Crown Court, although the average 
(mean) length of the PDS trials was 3.7 days compared to private practice trials of 2.7 
days, the difference was not significant. 
 
(iv)  Bail 
One process issue on which we collected data was the extent to which clients were 
bailed or remanded in custody (RIC) at the first hearing and the extent to which their 
bail status changed during the case.  To a degree this adds to the information we have 
on case seriousness in Chapter 2, but also the extent to which the client’s status 
changed in a positive direction (from being remanded in custody to being bailed) may 
be an indication of the quality of a lawyer’s bail work (both the applications and the 
work that goes into sorting out appropriate bail conditions).  Similarly, movements in 
a negative direction may indicate poor quality bail work (failing to anticipate and/or 
prepare for bail objections from the prosecution or the bench at hearings).  The 
defendant’s own behaviour can also obviously impact on bail status, especially 
movements in a negative direction. Tables 3.10a and 3.10b show the results for the 
magistrates’ and Crown Court file data.    There are almost no significant differences 
and low numbers of case where the bail status of clients changed.  
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Table 3.10a  Bail Situation after First Hearing (Magistrates' Court Sample) 
 
  Bailed RIC RIC 
then 
Bailed 
later 
Bailed 
but 
RIC 
later 
N 
Birmingham PDO 75.5 10.2 8.2 6.1 49 
 PP 75.6 17.8 2.2 4.4 45 
Cheltenham PDO 90.7 9.3 0.0 0.0 43 
 PP 76.6 12.8 4.3 6.4 47 
Liverpool* PDO 72.9 22.9 0.0 4.2 48 
 PP 73.5 8.2 10.2 8.2 49 
Middlesbrough PDO 88.0 2.0 2.0 8.0 50 
 PP 78.6 4.8 9.5 7.1 42 
Pontypridd PDO 85.1 8.5 0.0 6.4 47 
 PP 87.8 4.1 4.1 4.1 49 
Swansea PDO 88.1 4.8 2.4 4.8 42 
 PP 72.3 10.6 6.4 10.6 47 
All areas PDO 83.2 9.7 2.2 5.0 279 
 PP 77.4 9.7 6.1 6.8 279 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10b  Bail Situation after First Hearing (Crown Court Sample) 
  Bailed RICed RICed 
then 
bailed 
later 
Bailed 
but 
RICed 
later 
N 
Birmingham PDO 64.4 20.0 13.3 2.2 45 
 PP 66.0 20.0 6.0 8.0 50 
Cheltenham PDO 55.6 35.6 2.2 6.7 45 
 PP 65.5 17.2 6.9 10.3 29 
Liverpool PDO 58.3 12.5 20.8 8.3 48 
 PP 71.2 19.2 5.8 3.8 52 
Middlesbrough PDO 79.5 15.9 2.3 2.3 44 
 PP 71.7 19.6 0.0 8.7 46 
Pontypridd PDO 50.0 45.0 0.0 5.0 40 
 PP 51.0 28.6 12.2 8.2 49 
Swansea PDO 63.6 18.2 12.1 6.1 33 
 PP 49.0 40.8 4.1 6.1 49 
All areas PDO
s 
62.0 24.3 8.6 5.1 225 
 PP 62.2 24.7 5.8 7.3 275 
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There was no obvious pattern to the number of clients bailed at the outset of Crown 
Court cases or bailed having initially been remanded in custody.  There was perhaps a 
slightly greater tendency of private practice clients to be remanded in custody having 
been bailed initially, but again this may be due to general patterns in the clients’ 
behaviour (as we have seen in Chapter 2, our evaluation of the clients suggests they 
may have more antecedents and so may be more of a bail-risk) and the differences are 
in any event relatively small and not statistically significant. 
 
(v) Advocacy 
An interesting issue is whether there was a different tendency to instruct either outside 
agents in magistrates’ court cases, or barristers in Crown Court cases.  As a result, we 
recorded information on whether the hearings were conducted by an advocate from 
within the firm and from outside the firm 
 
In the magistrates’ court, as a proportion of all hearings on cases, the PDOs only 
instructed advocates outside the firm in 2.7% of hearings, whereas private practice did 
so in 5.8% of hearings.  The difference was not quite statistically significant.  For 
magistrates’ court hearings in cases that were eventually committed or transferred to 
the Crown Court for trial, the PDOs instructed advocates from outside the firm in 
about 4% of hearings, private practice in 6% of hearings. The difference was not 
significant. At the Crown Court level, the PDOs instructed outside advocates in 99.6% 
of hearings, private practice in 98.8% of hearings. Again, the difference was not 
significant. 
 
(vi)  Time Spent on Cases  
 
We were able to compare the time spent on cases by comparing claim information 
data collected from solicitors’ files in private practice with data collected from the 
Case Management System for the PDS.  The results for the two court samples are in 
the Table 3.11a and Table 3.11b.13 
 
                                                 
13  These data report chargeable time only. This was the most consistently and reliably available 
information on private practitioner files and the PDS CMS system.  We conducted a similar analysis 
including the non-chargeable time and this did not produce markedly different results.  
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Table 3.11a  Mean Time Spent on Cases in Magistrates’ Court Files (in minutes, PDS 
Chargeable Time Only) 
 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
N 
Birmingham PDO 439 359 50 52 
 PP 945 2364 338 49 
Cheltenham PDO 360 261 38 48 
 PP 298 296 42 50 
Liverpool PDO** 334 320 45 51 
 PP 731 727 103 50 
Middlesbrough PDO** 367 297 41 50 
 PP 186 150 21 52 
Pontypridd PDO 354 353 50 49 
 PP 256 404 57 50 
Swansea PDO 369 306 43 50 
 PP 382 402 57 50 
All areas PDOs 371 317 18 302 
 PP 465 1065 62 299 
 
There was no consistent pattern across the areas on time spent on magistrates’ court 
cases.  Liverpool PDO spent significantly less time on average than private 
practitioners in their locale, whereas in Middlesbrough the position was the opposite: 
Middlesbrough PDO spent significantly more time than private practice did on its 
cases. 
 
Table 3.11b  Mean Time Spent on Cases in Crown Court Files (in minutes, PDS 
Chargeable Time Only) 
 
 PDS or 
PP 
Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Birmingham PP 5329 44 19668 
 PDS 1401 32 1438 
Cheltenham PP 1180 16 1090 
 PDS 2174 36 4040 
Liverpool PP 1465 37 1170 
 PDS 1264 23 2154 
Middlesbrough PP 1344 46 2124 
 PDS 2144 39 3184 
Pontypridd PP 1371 27 1080 
 PDS 1582 28 2946 
Swansea PP 1250 43 948 
 PDS 4346 24 10613 
All PP 2160 213 9093 
 PDS 2112 182 4764 
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It was not always possible to obtain reliable data on time spent on Crown Court cases, 
but in those cases where data were available, the PDS spent less time on average in 
Crown Court cases in Liverpool and Birmingham, but the reverse was true in the four 
other areas.  The differences between the PDS and private practice were not 
significant.  It is also likely that the results in some areas were affected by the 
inclusion of some very long Crown Court cases (as is indicated by the high standard 
deviations for private practice in Birmingham and for the PDO in Swansea).   
 
Outcomes in Proceedings Cases 
 
Having considered in some detail elements describing the process of case-handling by 
the PDS and private practice in our comparator areas, we move on to look at the 
actual results achieved by the two types of service.  It should be observed from the 
outset that outcome data are difficult to interpret, as outcomes achieved even on 
sizeable samples of cases can be explained at least in part by local variations and 
differences in case types rather than quality of service.   
 
(i)  General pattern of outcomes 
 
The overall pattern of outcomes as recorded in the SPOCC data can be seen in the 
following tables.  Table 3.12a sets out the SPOCC data for proceedings cases.  This 
includes all magistrates’ court cases as well as those cases which complete in the 
Crown Court where a claim is made in the magistrates’ court (mostly cases committed 
for sentence but also possibly some of cases transferred up to the Crown Court for 123F15).  
In relation to the proceedings data, the suggestions are that the PDS have more guilty 
pleas but fewer cracked trials (indeed fewer trials generally); but more 
discontinuances.  There are also fewer committals for trial.  We subject key aspects of 
these differences to more robust analysis below. 
                                                 
15 We are told that cases that are transferred to the Crown Court are not always subject to a legal aid 
claim in the magistrates’ court. 
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Table 3.12a  Outcomes in magistrates’ court proceedings cases (SPOCC) 
 
 Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All Areas N 
 PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP  
 % % % % % % % % % % % % % %  
No Further Instructions  
from client 
2.9 3.9 4.4 2.0 2.7 2.9 3.2 5.5 2.3 1.5 0.7 1.6 2.7 3.9 6279 
Change of Solicitor 6.4 2.6 6.4 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.2 3.1 8.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 4.1 2.6 4215 
Proceedings Discontinued/ 
charges withdrawn 
25.9 19.2 22.5 23.4 12.6 10.2 14.8 16.0 27.0 21.9 20.4 12.9 20.9 17.0 27737 
Guilty Plea 40.9 38.0 50.0 48.0 59.0 60.7 56.5 45.7 50.8 40.0 57.0 59.1 51.2 44.4 72572 
Cracked Trial 5.5 10.9 7.0 5.1 6.2 6.1 7.7 7.4 3.9 9.6 4.9 5.5 6.1 9.0 14571 
Contested hearing or Trial 10.2 11.7 5.5 5.7 6.5 7.3 5.9 7.7 3.9 12.3 5.3 6.1 6.3 9.8 15807 
Representation Order  
withdrawn 
0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 354 
Committal for sentence 1.8 2.2 0.9 1.8 1.5 3.5 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.5 3.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 3598 
Committal for trial 6.0 10.5 3.3 11.8 9.2 5.5 7.0 11.6 0.3 8.9 5.1 9.6 6.2 10.1 16293 
Transfer to Crown Court 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5 831 
Extradition 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 186 
Indictable Only 
 (early hearing/remitted back) 
0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 334 
 548 85089 454 508 14635 13939 1046 35003 307 4956 412 5880 3275 159502 162777 
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Table 3.12b Summary of outcomes from file data (magistrates’ court) 
 
 All Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea 
 PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS PP PDS
 % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Charges withdrawn 22 21 24 16 23 28 20 22 26 26 20 19 20 17 
Bindovers 2 2 2 3 0 0 1 0 4 11 4 0 1 3 
Guilty pleas 69 71 69 75 76 71 56 77** 56 57 77 75 76 70 
Other convictions 8 5 14 3 3 1 18 3 13 3 0 8 1 12 
Acquittals 2 2 2 4 1 0 6 1 1 5 0 2 2 1 
Other 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 
No. of Charges 627 609 130 108 78 110** 96 96 85 74 111 118 127 103 
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We collected similar information in relation to file data, which we set out in Table 
3.12b for completeness.  On the files in our sample, we considered whether there were 
significantly higher numbers of charges, withdrawals, etc.124F16  There were only two 
significant results: Liverpool PDO had a significantly higher number of guilty pleas 
than private practice in their area (consistent with the SPOCC data) and Cheltenham 
PDO had significantly more charges on their files. 
 
Overall, on the file data, in the magistrates’ court the levels of conviction were 
similar, in 79% of the PDS cases the clients were convicted of something and the 
same was true in 77% of private practice cases, a difference that was not significant. 
Similarly, in the Crown Court, overall levels of convictions were similar, in 65% of 
the PDS cases the client was convicted of something and the same was true in 70% of 
private practice cases, a difference which was not significant.  
 
(ii)  Multivariate analysis 
 
As with the investigation stage, in order to make the comparison of outcomes between 
PDS and private practice suppliers statistically robust, we need to compare outcomes 
for like claims. The data available to us from SPOCC allows us to control, primarily 
for cases concluded in the magistrates’ courts, for the type of offence and the number 
of defendants when estimating the differences in outcomes between PDS and private 
practice cases. In addition, it is possible to control for the number of claims made by 
each supplier (a proxy for supplier size). Finally, it could be argued that the 
geographic variation in prosecution and court practices means we should control for 
differences at the local level. The results are shown in Appendix 3.1, Tables 3-6.  The 
analysis was based on cases where the original provider retained the cases throughout 
the proceedings (i.e. excluding those where the client subsequently changed solicitor).  
The results of multiple regression analyses are based on four measures of outcome 
which relate to the proceedings stage (case withdrawn or discontinued, guilty plea, 
trial/hearing, cracked trial).  
 
The results can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. after controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client 
having charges withdrawn or discontinued at the proceedings stage was 
significantly higher in five of the PDOs (Birmingham, Middlesbrough, 
Pontypridd, Swansea and Cheltenham) relative to private supplier cases, 
and significantly lower in only one: Liverpool [Table 3 in Appendix 3.1]. 
2. after controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client 
having a guilty plea entered at the proceedings stage was significantly 
higher in three of the PDOs (Birmingham, Liverpool and Pontypridd) 
relative to private supplier cases, and significantly lower in one: 
Middlesborough [Table 4 in Appendix 3.1]. 
3. after controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client 
having a formal trial/hearing at the proceedings stage was significantly 
                                                 
16 Because of the nature of the data, this a comparison was performed on the number of charges, guilty 
pleas etc. rather than the proportions shown in the table. 
 110
lower for PDO cases in Liverpool and Pontypridd relative to private 
supplier cases, and insignificantly different in the others [Table 5 in 
Appendix 3.1]. 
4. after controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client 
having a cracked trial at the proceedings stage in PDO cases was 
significantly lower in Birmingham, Middlesbrough and Pontypridd relative 
to private supplier cases, and no different in the other three PDOs [Table 6 
in Appendix 3.1]. 
 
As with investigation cases, the picture is, thus, one broadly positive about the 
performance of PDS offices relative to private practice, particularly in 
Middlesbrough., Cheltenham and Swansea.  Liverpool’s results suggest slightly 
poorer performance than local firms on one indicator (lower likelihood of having 
charges withdrawn).  This is the one negative note in relation to the otherwise 
consistently positive finding for the PDOs, as all the other five offices were 
significantly more likely to have charges withdrawn during the proceedings stage than 
private practitioners.   
 
It should be noted, however, that this analysis is based on SPOCC data only. It is not 
sensitive to all the differences in cases explored in Chapter 2, such as the lower level 
of previous convictions and generally lower levels of complexity and seriousness seen 
in PDS cases which might account for the difference in outcomes. 
 
(iii)  Pleas on the day of trial 
One of the most frequent criticisms made of the SPOCC data codes was that of the 
way ‘cracked trials’ were coded.125F17  It was felt that practitioners might have different 
definitions of a cracked trial and also that there was significant overlap with other 
code categories, such as ordinary guilty pleas.  We have more detailed data on 
cracked trials from our file samples.  We defined a cracked trial as any case where 
pleas were indicated on the day of trial.  The figures shown are for the number of 
cracked trials as a proportion of all cases where there are guilty pleas. Table 3.13a 
shows the figures for both magistrates’ court and Crown Court cases. 
 
                                                 
17 The outcome codes have subsequently been updated. 
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Table 3.13a  Proportion of pleas indicated on day of trial (Magistrates’ court and 
Crown Court file samples) 
 
  Magistrates’ court files Crown Court files 
  % No. % No. 
PDO 14.6 48 28.0 25 Birmingham 
PP 18.2 33 41.7 36 
PDO 26.8 41 6.3 32 Cheltenham 
PP 4.9* 41 45.0* 20 
PDO 16.7 42 34.5 29 Liverpool 
PP 26.5 34 29.0 31 
PDO 17.2 40 40.0 25 Middlesbrough 
PP 13.5 38 42.3 26 
PDO 19.4 31 33.3 21 Pontypridd 
PP 16.2 37 25.0 32 
PDO 10.8  37 31.6 19 Swansea 
PP 15.4 39 29.4 34 
PDO 15.0 239 27.8 151 All Areas 
PP 2.6 222 34.6 179 
 
 
In the magistrates’ court there was no consistent pattern and in only one area was 
there any significant difference.  Cheltenham PDO had a far higher proportion of 
pleas on the day of trial than did private practice in the area. 
 
Generally the levels of cracked trial were higher in the Crown Court, perhaps 
reflecting the seriousness of offences being dealt with (and the consequent difficulties 
of clients facing up to a decision on plea) or possibly reflecting the more transient role 
of counsel in these proceedings, where it may be their participation which precipitates 
a plea.  Again, there was no clear pattern and only in Cheltenham was there a 
significant difference, although this time it is private practice cases with significantly 
more cracked trials. 
 
Whilst cracked trials are usually, and to a degree understandably, regarded by policy 
makers as wasteful, the Scottish public defenders research showed that they can have 
positive benefits from the perspective of the defendant.  We were interested in 
identifying the nature of any benefits arising to the defendant from cracked trials. In 
49% of cases there was apparent benefit.  Whilst the PDS appeared more likely to get 
benefit for their clients from a cracked trial (benefit occurred in 54% of PDS cases 
and 43% of PP cases) the differences were not significantly different.  The benefits 
indicated were as follows: 
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Table 3.13b  Benefits to defendants from cracked trials 
 
Guilty plea related to PDS PP 
 % of cracked 
trials 
reduction of charges 12.2 16.7 
substitution of alternative charges 19.5 16.7 
change in phrasing of charge 4.9 6.7 
other apparent benefit 17.1 6.7 
N 41 30 
  
(iv) The nature of the actual convictions 
Tables 3.14a and 3.14b show the profile of lead convictions organised by offence 
categories in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples respectively. 
 
Table 3.14a  Convictions by offence group in Magistrates’ court cases (file sample) 
 PDS 
% 
N PP 
% 
N 
Offences against the 
person 
11.5 27 10.6 24 
Homicide and similar 0 0 0 0 
Sexual 
Offences/Children 
0 0 0 0 
Robbery 1.3 3 0 0 
Burglary 5.1 12 3.5 8 
Criminal Damage 3.8 9 6.2 14 
Theft 22.2 52 26.5 60 
Public order etc 9.0 21 11.1 25 
Drugs supply/possession 
etc 
6.0 14 4.4 10 
Driving offences 26.9 63 21.7 49 
Breach proceedings 9.4 22 8.0 18 
Administration of justice 0 0 0 0 
Other 4.7 11 8.0 18 
Total  234  226 
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Table 3.14b Convictions by offence group in Crown Court cases (file sample) 
 PDS 
% 
N PP 
% 
N 
Offences against the 
person 
23.5 40 20.2 39 
Homicide and similar 4.7 8 0.0 0 
Sexual 
Offences/Children 
4.7 8 3.6 7 
Robbery 4.1 7 5.7 11 
Burglary 9.4 16 12.4 24 
Criminal Damage 2.9 5 4.1 8 
Theft 13.5 23 7.3 14 
Public order etc 10.6 18 11.9 23 
Drugs supply/possession 
etc 
7.6 13 21.2 41 
Driving offences 4.1 7 3.6 7 
Breach proceedings 4.1 7 0.5 1 
Administration of justice 3.5 6 1.6 3 
Other 7.1 12 7.8 15 
Total  170  193 
 
 
The only striking difference is the number of convictions for drug offences in the 
Crown Court, with a much higher number of these in the private practice cases, as 
would be expected from the higher incidence of such cases in private practice 
caseloads (see Chapter 2). 
 
We collected detailed information on the actual lead offence for each case where a 
client was convicted.  The results of that analysis are set out in Appendix 3.2.  This 
shows the lead offence that the client was charged with and the lead offence that they 
ended up being convicted of. This enabled us to consider whether there was any 
discernible difference in the overall pattern of the seriousness of convictions or 
differences in the plea-bargaining achievements of the two services.  No particular 
patterns were apparent, beyond the difference in the number of drugs convictions in 
the Crown Court.   
 
(v)  Offence Characteristics 
To assist in interpreting the outcomes profiles of the PDS and private practice, we 
recorded some detail on the nature of convictions where it was felt this might 
influence sentence.  
 
Clients who were charged in relation to more than one separate incident might be 
expected to get more severe sentences, for example.  In the magistrates’ court, about 
half of all clients were in fact only charged in relation to one incident.  The average 
(mean) number of incidents was the same for private practice and the PDS (1.4 
incidents per client convicted).126F18  In the Crown Court, 49% of PDS clients and 44% of 
                                                 
18 We removed one outlier from the analysis as one private practice client had been convicted in 
relation to over 150 incidents, which would have significantly distorted the mean. 
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private practice clients were charged in relation to one incident only. The mean 
number of incidents for the PDS was 1.6, while the mean for private practice was 2.1. 
The difference was not significant. 
 
The following table shows the aggravating factors identified where the clients were 
convicted in either magistrates’ courts or the Crown Court. 
 
Table 3.15   Potentially aggravating factors for convictions (Magistrates’ court and 
Crown Court  file samples) 
 
 Magistrates’ 
court 
Crown Court 
 PDS % PP % PDS % PP % 
Offence committed whilst on 
bail 
5.1 7.9 1.2 4.4* 
Defendant failed to surrender to 
bail 
5.9 8.7 1.6 2.9 
Breach of trust 1.3 0.9 3.1 2.2 
Pre-meditated 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.7 
Vulnerable victim 2.5 1.3 7.5 5.8 
Racial Aggravation 0.4 0.9 3.1 1.8 
Group offence 3.4 2.2 5.1 4.4 
Weapon used 0.8 2.6 14.5 12.0 
Number 302 299 264 281 
 
With regard to potentially aggravating factors in the magistrates’ courts, the PDS and 
private practice did not have significantly different profiles, with few aggravating 
factors in evidence and no significant differences.  In the Crown Court there was only 
one significant difference, which was a greater tendency for private practice clients to 
commit further offences whilst on bail, perhaps indicating that they were more likely 
to have repeat-offender clients in their case mix. 
  
(vi)  Sentences in the Magistrates’ court 
Sentencing data were derived from our file sample.  Given the numbers involved, the 
results for sentence are presented here at an all areas level.  We tested for differences 
at the office level but found insufficient difference for reporting to be sensible.  Of 
those clients convicted: 
 
• 20% of private practice and 13% of PDS clients were sentenced to immediate 
custody.  The difference was not quite significant.   For cases where the clients 
received custodial sentences, the PDS average length of sentence for those was 
marginally higher (7.0 months compared with 5.3 months) but this difference 
was not significant. 
• 29% of private practice and 35% of PDS clients received fines. The difference 
was not significant.  Of those receiving fines, private practice clients average 
fine was £124, whereas for the PDS it was £175, a difference that was 
significant. 
• 21% of private practice clients received community rehabilitation orders, 
compared with 17% in the PDS.  This difference was not significant.  The 
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average length of these orders was the same for both sets of clients (14 
months). 
• 10% of private practice clients and 18% of PDS clients were ordered to pay 
compensation.  This difference was significant.  Where ordered, average levels 
of compensation were similar: £232 for private practice clients and £252 for 
the PDS clients, a difference that was not significant. 
• 10% of private practice clients received discharges or bindovers, compared 
with 17% of PDS clients.  This difference was significant. 
• The PDS had one client who received a suspended prison sentence, while 
private practice had no such results. 
• 12% of private practice clients received community punishment orders, 
compared with 9% of PDS clients.  Private practice averaged 102 hours and 
PDS clients 98 hours.  Neither of these differences was significant. 
• 1% (3) of private practice clients and 2% (5) of PDS clients received a 
combination order, a difference that was not significant. 
• 2% (4) of PDS client received Drug Testing and Treatment Orders (DTTOs).  
There were no private practice clients who received these orders.  The 
difference was significant. 
• 1% (2) of private practice clients and only one PDS client (0.5%) received an 
attendance centre order, a difference that was not significant. 
 
These results tend to suggest that the sentencing outcomes achieved by the PDS 
and private practice were similar.  We can also investigate the extent to which 
convicted clients risked prison by using an indication of whether a pre-sentence 
report (PSR) was obtained.  Of those convicted 39% of PDS clients and 49% of 
private practice clients were ordered to undergo a PSR.  This difference was 
significant.  It is worth considering the incidence of custody of those who received 
PSRs.  25% of private practice clients and 15% of PDS clients who had a pre-
sentence report received custodial sentences, although the difference was not 
significant.  We also recorded how far the actual sentence deviated from the 
recommendations of the PSR.  The results are inconclusive, in that private practice 
had more clients who were sentenced less severely than the PSR recommendation, 
but more sentenced more severely.  The differences were not, in any event, 
significant. 
 
Table 3.16   How did the sentence relate to the PSR recommendation (Magistrates’ 
court file sample) 
 
 PDS PP 
Less severe 4.3% 7.8% 
About the same 78.3% 70.1% 
More severe 17.4% 22.1% 
Number 69 77 
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(vii)  Sentences in the Crown Court 
As with magistrates’ court cases, given the numbers involved, the results for sentence 
are presented here at an all areas level.127F19  Of those clients convicted: 
 
• 45.9% of PDS and 54.9% of private practice clients were sentenced to 
immediate custody. The difference was not quite significant.  For cases where 
clients received custodial sentences, there was no significant difference in 
length of sentence. 
 
• Community punishment orders were given to 18.0% of PDS clients and 12.8% 
of private practice clients. The difference was not significant. The length of 
these orders for both sets of clients was not significantly different.  
 
• 17.4% of PDS and 12.8% of private practice clients were given Community 
Rehabilitation Orders.  The difference was not significant. The length of these 
orders for both sets of clients was not significantly different. 
 
• 14.0% of PDS and 9.2% of private practice clients were ordered to pay 
compensation. The difference was not significant. The amount of 
compensation ordered by the court did not significantly differ between PDS 
and private practice clients. 
 
• 7.6% of PDS and 8.2% of private practice clients received fines. The 
difference was not significant. The fines received by PDS and PP clients did 
not differ significantly in value. 
 
• 2.9% of PDS clients and 2.1% of private practice clients were given suspended 
sentences. The difference was not significant. 
 
• 1.2% of PDS and 3.1% of private practice clients received combination orders, 
a difference that was not significant.  
 
• 3.5% of PDS clients and 2.1% of private practice clients received DTTOs. The 
difference was not significant. 
 
• No PDS or PP clients received attendance orders or discharges/bindovers. 
 
As with magistrates’ court cases, the results suggest that sentencing outcomes were 
not very different for the PDOs or private practice.  Of those convicted, 66.9% of PDS 
and 64.1% of PP clients were ordered to undergo a PSR. The difference was not 
significant. 43.5% of PDS clients and 56.0% of PP clients who had a pre-sentence 
report received custodial sentences, a difference which was not significant.  The PDS 
did appear to be more likely to get sentences less severe than the PSR 
recommendations. 
 
                                                 
19 We tested for differences at the office level but found insufficient difference for reporting to be 
sensible. 
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Table  3.17  How did the sentence relate to the PSR recommendation? (Crown Court 
file sample) 
 
 PDS PP 
Less Severe 10.7% 0.0% 
About the same 62.7% 64.0% 
More severe 26.7% 36.0% 
N 75 75 
 
(viii)  Appeals 
 
In 9.9% of their convictions, the PDS took substantive steps relating to an appeal. 
This amounted to 17 cases; two were appeals against the conviction, fourteen against 
the sentence and one against both the sentence and the conviction. 4.6% of private 
practice cases were followed up with substantive steps on appeal (9 cases). All were 
against the sentence. Generally the appeals were unsuccessful. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter suggests a number of subtle but important differences in the way cases 
are handled by the PDS compared to private practice.  Whilst it is fair to say that such 
differences as there are not consistent across all six areas, the main differences are 
supportive of the view that the PDS was, with important regional variation, 
performing at higher levels of quality than private practice, especially at the 
investigation stage.   
 
The PDS has proved more likely to attend the police station than private practice over 
the life of this project.  This is particularly true for attendances on own clients.  Both 
the PDS and private practice are less likely to attend police stations for duty callouts, 
although the PDS was still more likely to attend than private practice.  This finding is 
an interesting counterpoint to the observation that salaried staff are less motivated to 
work for clients (and so might be less likely to attend).  This may be less of an issue 
within the PDS currently because as an organisation it has the capacity to give staff 
economic incentives (through callout rates, overtime benefits, etc.) to attend on clients 
at police stations.128F20  More generally, the PDS was under a powerful incentive to 
attract clients and this might well be expected to prompt favourable response to client 
call outs.  Whatever the reason for this finding, it is an important indication in favour 
of the PDS in terms of quality, though there may be efficiency issues if this is a 
reflection of PDOs operating at under-capacity. 
 
The file data indicated that the PDS were spending less time on police station 
investigation cases and this was borne out by the SPOCC data for some PDOs.  This 
could be an artefeact of the different systems and incentives for recording time.  For 
private practice, their livelihoods depended on recording time.  For the PDS, time was 
monitored (particularly towards the end of the project) to ensure the PDS was ‘billing’ 
                                                 
20 Private practice similarly uses incentives to encourage staff to attend police stations. 
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its time effectively, but this is a rather weaker incentive than that operating for private 
practice.  Lower levels of time might also reflect less serious caseloads. 
 
Another interesting indicator of how cases are handled, and one that reflects on the 
assumption that public defenders are more likely to encourage clients to cooperate 
with the prosecution, was the extent to which clients exercised their right to silence in 
the police station.   In four of the areas studied the PDS clients were significantly 
more likely to exercise their right to silence (Middlesbrough, Cheltenham, Pontypridd 
and Swansea). 
 
There were also indications that half the PDS offices were getting better results at the 
investigation stage for their clients.  Middlesbrough, Cheltenham and Swansea PDOs 
had fewer clients charged than private practice, and Middlesbrough and Cheltenham 
PDOs had more clients who were ‘no further actioned’ by the police.  It is worth 
noting that both Middlesbrough and Cheltenham PDOs were more likely to have 
clients who exercised their right to silence. 
 
In terms of the proceedings stage, there were fewer clear differences between the two 
services.  Although some PDS offices (Birmingham, Swansea and Liverpool) 
averaged fewer hearings per case, the position in the other areas was more mixed. 
There were fewer trials in Liverpool and Pontypridd PDS offices.  Reasons for 
adjourning cases were generally similar.  Interestingly there was a slight but 
significant tendency for the PDS cases to have more time between hearings.   
 
In terms of outcomes, all the PDS offices except Liverpool had a higher proportion of 
cases where the charges were dropped than private practice.  Three PDS offices 
(Birmingham, Liverpool and Pontypridd) had more guilty pleas than private practice 
in their areas. 
 
On the basis of the SPOCC data, levels of cracked trial were significantly lower for 
the Middlesbrough, Cheltenham and Swansea PDOs compared to private practice.  
Doubts have been expressed about the validity of SPOCC data on that indicator, and 
in terms of our file analysis (which relies on a much smaller sample) levels of cracked 
trials were generally not significantly different (although our file analysis suggested 
Cheltenham PDO had significantly more clients plead guilty on the day of trial in the 
magistrates’ court and significantly fewer in the Crown Court).  Both the PDS and 
private practice appeared to be getting similar benefits for clients from cracked trials. 
 
Our file data suggests that the actual nature of convictions of clients did not appear to 
differ significantly, save that our private practice cases had a greater proportion of 
drugs cases in the Crown Court.  It will also be remembered from Chapter 2 that there 
are some significant differences in client profiles (especially as regards antecedents 
and peer review ratings of complexity and seriousness).  These factors should be 
borne in mind in interpreting sentences.  Generally there were few significant 
differences.  In both Crown Court and the magistrates’ court cases private practice 
clients more often got prison sentences, were less frequently ordered to pay 
compensation and were more likely to be ordered to do Community Rehabilitation.  In 
the magistrates’ court they had fewer discharges/bindovers.  Private practice clients in 
the magistrates’ court were more likely to be ordered to undergo pre-sentence reports, 
but the differences in this respect were marginal in the Crown Court. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 Evaluation of Quality through Peer Review 
 
This chapter investigates the quality of criminal defence work conducted by Public 
Defender Offices (PDOs) and private practice solicitors through the medium of peer 
review of files. Peer review conducted by fellow professionals, with significant 
expertise in the particular field of legal work, appears to be the most reliable method 
of evaluating the quality of legal services. Quality here refers to the extent to which 
lawyers meet relevant standards of competence, and peer review of quality is to be 
distinguished from ‘value for money’ reviews which have a separate, and distinctive, 
focus. 
 
Methodology and Presentation 
 
The use of peer review as a method of assessing the quality of criminal defence work 
is relatively novel. It was first attempted in 1992, at the outset of Legal Aid 
Franchising, as reported in Lawyers – the Quality Agenda.129F114 It was used to a limited 
extent, in relation to crime, in research conducted by Lee Bridges and Satnam 
Choongh, Improving Police Station Legal Advice,130F115 but it has rarely been used in 
other research into the criminal defence services in England and Wales. A form of 
peer review is used by the CPS Inspectorate to assess the quality of files and court 
advocacy, and ‘peers’ are used by the testing organisations to assess candidates in the 
police station representative and duty solicitor accreditation schemes, although this 
does not involve assessment of case files, nor advocacy in ‘real’ cases. Peer review 
was employed in the evaluation of civil advice services conducted in Quality and 
Cost,131F116 and has continued to be applied in an increasing number of subject categories 
to assess legal work132F117. The knowledge and experience gained from these studies (in 
which many of the research team were involved) have been instrumental in the 
development of the specific methods employed here. Peer review was not used to 
assess quality in the pilot Scottish Public Defender Solicitors Office and other, proxy 
indicators of quality were used.133F118 
 
The peer review framework and methodology were designed to enable objective, 
qualitative judgements to be made about case files and the work represented by those 
                                                 
114 A. Sherr, R. Moorhead and A. Paterson,  Lawyers – the Quality Agenda, London, HMSO, 1994. 
Note that Rosenthal and Williams each considered such issues in the United States earlier. 
115 L. Bridges and S. Choongh, Improving Police Station Legal Advice, London, Law Society and 
Legal Aid Board, Research Study No 31, 1998. 
116R. Moorhead et al. Quality and Cost: Final Report on the Contracting of Civil, Non-Family Advice 
and Assistance Pilot, London, The Stationary Office, 2001. 
117  See, Moorhead and Harding (2003) ‘Quality and Access: Specialist and tolerance work under civil 
contracts’ in R. Moorhead and A. Sherr (eds), An Anatomy of Access: Evaluating Entry, Initial Advice 
and Signposting using model clients, London: Legal Services Research Centre, 2003. 
118 T. Goriely, et al, The Public Defence Solicitors' Office in Edinburgh: An Independent Evaluation, 
Edinburgh, Scottish Executive Central Research Unit, 2001. .  Peer review is now also being developed 
as part of the Scottish legal aid system (See A. Paterson’s paper at International Legal Aid Forum, 
Killarney 2005). 
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files. This distinction is important: on the one hand, a well-presented file does not 
necessarily mean that the substance of the advice and assistance given was competent; 
on the other, criminal defence solicitors often make reference to the oral nature of 
much of their work, and assert that a poorly filled out or badly presented file does not 
necessarily mean that the advice and assistance actually given was of poor quality. 
Whilst there is some truth in this assertion, both Law Society and Legal Services 
Commission (LSC) literature emphasise the importance of keeping adequate written 
records, and as was noted in Quality in Criminal Defence Services: 
 
… maintaining an adequate record is important not only for audit purposes, or 
in the event that the case is passed to another caseworker. Some record 
keeping is evidence of quality per se, since without certain information being 
recorded in writing, it is not possible to perform competently the overall task 
of advising and defending the client.134F119 
 
This chapter presents quality assessment based on two samples which were carried 
out at different times with two different sets of criteria from PDOs and private 
practice firms in the six areas covered by the research. Both studies used similar five-
point scales to rate files and the work they evidenced.  The earlier of these two pieces 
of research (the Investigation File Sample) examined cases after the first year of the 
PDS and focused solely on the investigation stage. It was carried out by a single peer 
reviewer, a former criminal defence practitioner and acknowledged expert on 
qualitative aspects of police station legal advice, who was also a member of the 
research team. 135F120 At this stage the LSC Peer Review system had not yet been finalised 
and assessment by an existing member of the team was a convenient approach. The 
guidance and grading sheet used in the evaluation of the Investigation File Sample are 
included in Appendix 4.1. Information and results emanating from the early file 
sample at the end of the first year of the pilot were fed back to criminal defence 
solicitors from the PDS and to private practice through the medium of a report and a 
set of pro-forma appearing on the LSC website.136F121 
 
A total of 299 files were examined in this first peer review exercise, with the sample 
split between half drawn for the PDS and half from private practice firms operating in 
the same areas.  There were therefore 25 files from each PDO and 25 from private 
practice within each area, with the exception of the Liverpool PDO where 24 files 
were examined. Private practice investigation stage files were based on a random 
sample of such cases conducted in the main police stations served by each of the 
PDOs  
 
The peer review in the second study was more wide ranging, covering all work on the 
criminal defence files selected, including the investigation stage. This was conducted 
through a framework and methodology originally developed for a study of civil, non-
family advice and assistance cases by a research and operations team based at the 
                                                 
119 L. Bridges, et al., Quality in Criminal Defence Services, London,  Legal Services Commission, 
2000. 
120  Professor Ed Cape of the University of the West of England, author of Defending Suspects at Police 
Stations, London: Legal Action Group, 2003.  
121 Version 7 of this document can be viewed currently: 
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/pds/pds6_police_station_attendance_dec03.pdf. 
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Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) on behalf of the LSC. 137F122   Three members 
of this original team were also involved in the current research, and they worked 
together with the principal author of the earlier investigation study criteria in 
developing the methodology for the second stage peer review study. 
 
For this second stage, a team of peer reviewers were carefully selected from an 
independent group of practising solicitors who had considerable experience in 
criminal law and also in supervising and reviewing the files of other fee earners. Peer 
reviewers were chosen on the basis of open application, both from private practice 
and from the PDS. Selected peer reviewers were trained over a two-day period, to 
equip them with the specific evaluative tools that they would need to carry out 
reviews. There was monitoring and further training after they carried out their first 
peer reviews. Both the recruitment and training processes were carried out as part of a 
larger exercise being conducted on behalf of the LSC to develop peer review of 
criminal defence work generally.138F123 
 
After initial training, the peer reviewers assessed the suppliers’ case files. Peer review 
was conducted on closed files, and peer reviewers were instructed to discount those 
files where it appeared that they had been re-arranged, e.g., for the purposes of billing 
or closure. The files were randomly selected by the research team and presented to the 
peer reviewers as stratified samples broken down by region and supplier-category 
(PDO and private practice (PP)). It was intended that there would be a total sample of 
600 files made up of 50 randomly selected cases from each of the supplier-categories 
in each region, with 25 of these relating to cases concluded in the magistrates’ court 
and 25 to Crown Court cases.  Due to some complications, the final tally was three 
files short – 597 – but this was more than sufficient to make statistically significant 
findings based on the sample. 
 
In consultation with the peer reviewers, the researchers developed a full set of 
standard criteria in order to assess the quality of the files and of the firms/PDOs 
reviewed. The peer reviewers used these standard criteria and ratings system to 
determine the quality of advice and legal work provided to clients. Peer reviews were 
carried out individually on case files and subsequently ‘overview reports’ were also 
provided for each firm or PDO where files had been reviewed. 
 
The ratings system used a five-point scale, in which a score of 1 indicated excellence 
while 5 reflected failure. The criteria for indicators and definition of ratings are set out 
in full in Appendix 4.2, although the definitions only reached these fixed forms after 
this exercise was completed. 
 
In the tables for this second study results are listed as average grades. The range of 
possible results goes from 1 which equals “excellent” down to 5 which equals “non-
performance” or very poor. Ranging in between these extremes are 2 “competence 
plus”, which is the equivalent of a good quality file, through 3 “threshold 
competence”, which is a ‘pass’ file down to 4 which equals “below competence” or 
poor. Obtaining a level of 3 is a ‘bare’ or minimum level of competence which a 
                                                 
122 For full details please see R. Moorhead, et.al., Quality and Cost: Final Report on the Contracting of 
Civil, Non-Family Advice and Assistance Pilot, London, The Stationary Office, 2001. 
123 See Independent Peer Review of Legal Advice and Legal Work: A Consultation Paper, London, 
Legal Services Commission, April 2005. 
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solicitor would expect to find on a file. Marks of 1 to 3 are acceptable; marks of 4 and 
5 are not acceptable levels of quality.139F124 The lower the number the better the 
provider’s performance in the category to which the ranking corresponds.  
 
As noted, the study looked at a similar number of magistrates’ and Crown Court files. 
This was necessary to ensure that there was a sufficient Crown Court sample for the 
research team to draw statistically sound conclusions about providers’ capabilities in 
that arena, but it necessitated the separation of results into magistrates’ and Crown 
Court tables, to avoid giving undue weight to providers’ Crown Court activities in the 
analysis. This is because Crown Court cases make up only a small proportion of most 
providers’ overall workload. The tables for the earlier study are fewer and more 
detailed. Rather than averages, they present a breakdown of rankings received by each 
provider in each category as percentages. 
 
The use of tests of statistical significance is similar to that in the other parts of this 
report and is described in detail in Chapter 1.  In particular, where a particular 
difference between the finding relating the PDS and private practice is marked as ‘**’ 
this indicates that it is highly significant on the relevant standard statistical test, 
whereas a difference denoted as ‘*’ is also significant. (A more colloquial way of 
putting it is to say that where we indicate **, there is a 99% chance that the results 
show a real difference between the services, and where we show *, there is a 95% 
chance that the difference is a real one).   In our tables we attach these notations to 
whichever of the PDO or private practice is considered to have scored better on the 
particular finding.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss the findings of the two peer review 
studies in terms of assessments of the overall performance of the PDOs and private 
practice in each area and on an ‘all areas’ basis.  We then go on to look at more 
detailed results of both studies under the following headings: 
 
A. The File 
B. Communication 
C. Information and Fact Gathering 
D. Advice and Assistance 
E. The Work/Assistance 
F. Efficiency 
G. Ethics and Overall Mark 
 
Each section is divided between statistical results, first relating to the earlier 
investigation stage study and then to the court samples, and secondly peer reviewers’ 
general observations on the court files of particular PDO and private practice 
providers.  Comments of peer reviewers in relation to specific files are used for the 
purpose only of elucidating the issues under consideration. Such comments might 
relate to private practice or PDOs, and this is indicated next to the quote where this 
information is available.140F125  No attempt is made to equalise critical and positive 
                                                 
124 The findings of the earlier analysis were originally coded so that 1 equalled non-performance or 
very poor and 5 equalled excellence, however those findings have been retabulated here to avoid any 
confusion. 
125 Unfortunately, in the process of transcribing some information, this information was lost in some 
cases. 
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comments in relation to either mode of delivery and therefore no implication as to the 
relevant performance of the two sectors (which is examined in the statistical tables) 
should be drawn from the balance of quotations reproduced here. This qualitative 
material is useful only in understanding why peer reviewers grade items in the way 
they do. 
 
Overall Performance 
(i) Investigation stage sample 
 
In the first peer review study on investigation stage files, the reviewer gave an overall 
mark for the standard of service/performance, as a separate exercise from the 
assessments made in respect of individual criteria. This criterion was designed to 
prompt an overall impression of the standard of service and performance following 
examination of the file by reference to the various separate criteria, but without 
attempting to add up the 'score'.  The method enabled the reviewer to avoid making a 
judgment where there was insufficient information in the file to enable a judgment to 
be made, but this was the case in only 3% of files.  
 
Table 4.1a:  Level of Service/Performance (Investigation Stage File Analysis) 
 
  
Excellent 
% 
Good 
% 
Competent 
% 
Poor 
% 
Very Poor 
% 
Averag
e 
File
s 
Birmingham PDO  12.0 48.0 36.0 4.0 3.2 25 
 PP 4.2 33.3 33.3 29.2  2.9 24 
Cheltenham 
PDO
* 4.0 68.0 16.0 12.0  
2.4 
25 
 PP  18.2 54.5 27.3  3.1 22 
Liverpool PDO 4.2 8.3 66.7 16.7 4.2 3.1 24 
 PP 13.0 39.1 26.1 17.4 4.3 2.8 23 
Middlesbroug
h PDO  32.0 44.0 24.0  
2.9 
25 
 PP 4.3 30.4 30.4 30.4 4.3 3.0 23 
Pontypridd 
PDO
* 52.0 40.0 4.0 4.0  
1.6 
25 
 PP  13.6 54.5 31.8  3.2 22 
Swansea PDO 8.0 52.0 40.0   2.3 25 
 PP 4.2 62.5 29.2 4.2  2.3 24 
All areas 
PDO
* 11.4 35.6 36.2 15.4 1.3 
2.6 
149 
 PP 4.3 33.3 37.7 23.2 1.4 2.8 138 
 
 
There are two main ways of interpreting data on competence.  One is to ascertain 
what proportion of files ‘passed’ (scored at competent or above).  As Table 4.1a 
shows, at the all areas level the PDOs performed better than private practice on this 
method of interpretation, with 83% of PDOs being assessed as competent or above 
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compared to 75% of private practice, a difference that is near significance.  A fault 
with this method is that it only takes the ‘pass-fail’ distinction as important.  If we are 
concerned to see finer gradations of quality, and in particular, whether PDOs have 
more (or fewer) files at higher levels of quality than private practice, we must 
compare the rankings of both sets of files. Using this method, the overall profile of the 
PDOs was better than private practice, with a higher proportion of cases being 
assessed as good or excellent. This difference was largely attributable to the higher 
proportion of PDO files rated as excellent and lower proportion rated as poor 
compared with private practice.  
 
There is evidence of local variation. All Swansea PDO files and the vast majority of 
Swansea private practice files were competent or above, whereas in the other areas 
both the PDOs and private practice all have proportions of files being graded as poor 
or very poor (although Pontypridd PDO had relatively few). In most areas, a greater 
proportion of private practice files were assessed as poor or very poor compared to 
PDO files, although in Liverpool the proportions were about the same, and in 
Birmingham 40% of PDO files were below threshold competence compared to 29% 
of Birmingham private practice  files.  
 
Comparing the overall averages of PDOs with private practice  in their areas (i.e. 
taking into account the rankings rather than simply whether they were competent or 
not), Liverpool and Birmingham PDOs appear to do worse than their private practice  
counterparts, a difference that is approaching statistical significance. On the other 
hand, Cheltenham and Pontypridd PDOs have a significantly better profile than 
private practice in those areas.  
 
(ii) Court proceedings stages samples 
 
Tables 4.1b and 4.1c below address the state of the suppliers’ files at the magistrates’ 
and Crown Courts respectively in the second study which covered all defence work. 
Each presents the peer reviewers’ findings, broken down by region and provider. The 
key issues they were looking at in relation to providers’ files were overall 
performance, first at the investigation stage of cases, and secondly at the court 
proceedings stages. 
 
This involved an overall assessment of the two samples of work in each court, and it 
was based upon the peer reviewer’s overall impression of the standard of work done 
on the file, rather than a mechanical adding up of the scores given in respect of the 
other criteria. Although we discuss it first, it is the final summary judgement of the 
peer review providing an overall assessment of the work done at each stage and for 
each sample. 
 
The Crown Court sample had passed through three stages: investigation, the 
magistrates’ court and the Crown Court. Therefore peer reviewers provided an overall 
score at each stage. Magistrates’ court files would have passed through only the first 
two stages and were given a score for each, although not all files reviewed would 
have been dealt with by the firm at each stage. 
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Table 4.1b General Assessment, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Overall – 
Investigation 
2.4 2.6 
* 
2.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.9
*
2.0 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.7
Overall – 
Magistrates’ 
Court 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.9
*
2.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.8
 
Table 4.1c General Assessment, Crown Court Sample 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Overall – 
Investigation 
2.7 2.5 
* 
2.2 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.7
 
3.0 
* 
2.4 2.4 2.6
Overall – 
Magistrates’ 
Court 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.9
 
3.0 
* 
2.5 2.7 2.7
Overall – 
Crown Court  
3.4 
* 
2.4 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.7 3.3 3.1 2.4 2.7 2.8
 
 
(a) Investigation stage of court samples 
 
Across all the research areas, the overall investigation stage performance of PDOs in 
the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples appears better than that of private 
practice. The difference was more pronounced in the magistrates’ court sample than 
the Crown Court sample, but in neither was it statistically significant. 
 
Private practice were better in the investigation stage of the magistrates’ court sample 
in Liverpool and Swansea, although the differences were not significant, but in the 
other four regions the PDOs were assessed as having carried out better quality work. 
PDOs significantly outperformed the private practice in Cheltenham and in 
Pontypridd (where the difference was almost a full rank). 
 
In the Crown Court sample, private practice significantly outperformed the PDO at 
the investigation stage in Swansea, but in all other regions were outperformed by the 
PDOs, significantly so in Cheltenham. 
 
It is interesting to compare the results of the peer review of the investigation stage of 
cases as between the earlier study which focussed on this stage only and the later 
study.  Of course, it must be remembered that the two studies involved different peer 
reviewers, criteria and samples. In particular, the earlier study would have included 
cases which were concluded at the police station and did not involve court 
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proceedings.  Also, although at both stages an attempt was made to evaluate the 
quality of police station advice in the context of what happened in the case overall, 
information on the handling of cases beyond the police station and the outcome of 
subsequent court proceedings would not have been available in all files in the earlier 
investigation stage sample.   
 
Bearing these caveats in mind, Table 4.1d below reproduces for both the PDOs and 
private practice their overall ratings in respect of the investigation stage in each of the 
three samples.  On an all areas basis, the performance ratings of both the PDOs and 
private practice showed a marginal improvement between the earlier and later 
samples.  However, the more notable comparisons are to be found in local area 
results.  Three of the PDOs (Birmingham, Liverpool and Middlesbrough) show a 
considerable improvement in their overall ratings of investigation stage performance 
between the earlier and later samples, and Cheltenham PDO (already a strong 
performer in the earlier study) also had a marginally better performance in the later 
samples.  On the other hand, the Pontypridd PDO was evaluated as declining from its 
very high level of overall performance in the earlier study, although it still performed 
on average at or near ‘competence plus’ level in the later samples, and the Swansea 
PDO shows a considerable decline in overall performance levels between the earlier 
and later samples.   
 
Table 4.1d  Comparison of Overall Performance at Investigation Stage (Invesitgation 
Stage, Magistrates’ Court and Crown Court File Samples) 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Investigation 
File Sample 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
2.9 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
3.1 
 
 
3.1
 
 
2.8
 
 
2.9
 
 
3.0
 
 
1.6
 
 
3.2
 
 
2.3 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
2.8
Magistrates’ 
Court File 
Sample 2.4 2.6 
* 
2.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.9
*
2.0 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.7
Crown Court 
file sample 
2.7 2.5 
* 
2.2 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.7
 
3.0 
* 
2.4 2.4 2.6
  
Private practice was also evaluated as performing better in the later samples in all 
areas other than Swansea, although in general their improvement on overall ratings 
were not as great as those shown by the PDOs.  The exception was Pontypridd, where 
the performance of private practice improved and that of the PDO declined between 
the two studies, although the PDO was still judged to be performing better that private 
practice in the later samples.  Swansea was the only area where the performance of 
private practice declined in the later samples, although not so much as that of the 
Swansea PDO.   
 
(b) Court proceedings stages 
 
In terms of their overall performance across all areas at the court stage, PDOs were 
slightly better in the magistrates’ courts sample and in the Crown Court (2.7 to 2.8 in 
each instance), but neither of these differences was statistically significant.  The two 
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sectors scored the same with respect to overall performance across all areas in the 
magistrates’ court stage of Crown Court cases. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample private practice performed better at the court stage in 
Birmingham and Liverpool. They were as good as the PDO in Swansea, but they 
performed worse than the PDOs in the other three regions, including Pontypridd, 
where they were significantly worse.  However, in terms of performance at the 
magistrates’ court stage of Crown Court cases, private practice performed better than 
the PDOs in Liverpool and significantly so in Swansea, but PDOs performed better 
than private practice in the other four areas.   
 
In the Crown Court, the overall performance of private practice was better than the 
PDO in Birmingham and significantly so in Swansea, but the PDOs outperformed 
private practice in the remaining four areas. 
 
Performance on Specific Criteria 
 
A. The File 
 
(i) Investigation stage file sample 
 
In the earlier investigation stage study, the quality of written records in police station 
cases was assessed first by reference to whether a standard form was used to record 
advice and assistance at the police station and, if so, on the adequacy of the form, and 
secondly on how easy the file was to use. 
 
Although standard police station pro-forma are not required, either by the LSC or the 
Law Society, some Law Society literature recommends their use. Partly as a result of 
the earlier study, the PDS has developed its own police station attendance form (PDS 
6) and this has been made generally available to the profession via the LSC website.  
There is some difference of opinion about the utility of standard forms, but the general 
view is that they can be an important element in the provision of a good quality of 
service, and they were used by most firms in the sample, as well as by the PDOs. 
  
Table 4.2a  Use of Standard Forms at the Investigation Stage (The Investigation File 
Sample) 
  No % Yes % Files N 
PDO 0.0 100.0 25
Birmingham PP 8.0 92.0 25
PDO 0.0 100.0 25Cheltenham 
PP 0.0 100.0 25
PDO 4.2 95.8 24Liverpool 
PP 28.0 72.0 25
PDO 0.0 100.0 25Middlesbrough 
PP 4.0 96.0 25
PDO 0.0 100.0 25Pontypridd 
PP 4.0 96.0 25
PDO 0.0 100.0 25Swansea 
PP 0.0 100.0 25
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As Table 4.2a above shows, the vast majority of files examined contained a standard 
police station form, although it is notable that more than a quarter of private practice 
files in Liverpool did not. 
Where a standard form was used, a judgement was made about its adequacy by 
reference to the extent to which the form prompted the securing and recording of 
relevant information, and permitted appropriate narrative entries. For example, a form 
that prompts a record that advice on ‘silence’ was given is not as useful as a form 
prompting a narrative entry of the advice actually given. This is a substantive quality 
issue because, in particular, the advice given may be important in a subsequent 
argument as to whether inferences should be drawn from ‘silence’. It also assists the 
subsequent assessment of the file. It is worth noting that the Crime Transaction 
Criteria may encourage the mere recording of the fact of advice, rather than the 
substance of that advice (see, for example, questions 18 to 22 of the current version of 
the transaction criteria)141F126. 
 
The member of the research team who carried out this earlier study had been 
consulted by the PDS on the design of form PDS 6 but responsibility for the final 
design lay with the PDS. The PDS police station form has undergone several revisions 
since the first version in May 2001.  These have taken place in June 2001, January 
2002, May 2002, July 2003, November 2003 and December 2003.  As data for this 
analysis was collected during the course of 2002 and early 2003, not all of these 
revisions would have been reflected in the results reported here. 
 
In the event, the PDS police station form was assessed as ‘good’ (i.e. was given a 
score of 2). Additional prompts, e.g. for the time of attendance(s) on the client, time(s) 
that disclosure was obtained from the police, and the nature of the charge(s) (as 
opposed to the fact of charge) would have brought it closer to an ‘excellent’ score (i.e. 
1). It might also have been useful to have a prompt for noting property taken from the 
client by the police, although the fact of “seizure of property” was recorded elsewhere 
on the form. Although it is important to include a range of issues on a standard form, 
it was suggested that consideration should be given to providing more space for 
narrative entries relating to crucial items such as disclosure from the police and 
instructions from the client. It was noticeable that even though there was a prompt on 
form PDS 6 then in use, ‘Continued on a separate sheet?’ under the headings “Police 
Disclosure” and “Instructions”, advisers tended to confine entries to the space 
available, sometimes writing between lines towards the end of the record in an 
apparent attempt to avoid using a separate sheet. This seemed likely to result in an 
inadequate written record being made, but could be considered a matter of training 
and supervision as much as of form design. 
 
                                                 
126 Transaction Criteria: Crime ,London, Legak Services Commisssion, at  
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/contracting/cdg_arrangements.asp#crime 
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Table 4.2b  Adequacy of Standard Forms at the Investigation Stage, (The 
Investigation File Sample) 
 
  Missing 
Data % 
Excellent 
% Good % 
Average 
% Poor % 
Very 
Poor % N/A Files 
PDO 4.0 0.0 96.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 25Birmingham 
PP 12.0 0.0 20.0 44.0 24.0 0.0 0 25
PDO 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 25Cheltenham 
PP 0.0 0.0 84.0 8.0 8.0 0.0 0 25
PDO 4.2 0.0 95.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 24Liverpool 
PP 24.0 12.0 32.0 24.0 4.0 0.0 4 25
PDO 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 25Middlesbrough 
PP 4.0 4.0 52.0 16.0 24.0 0.0 0 25
PDO 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 25Pontypridd 
PP 0.0 0.0 16.0 28.0 44.0 8.0 4 25
PDO 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 25Swansea 
PP 0.0 4.0 80.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 0 25
 
As demonstrated in Table 4.2b above, private practice forms were of lower quality 
overall than the PDS form. This was particularly marked in Middlesbrough and 
Birmingham where nearly a quarter of private practice files contained a form that was 
regarded as poor, and in Pontypridd where over half of private practice files contained 
a form that was poor or very poor. The main concerns were lack of prompts to record 
important information such as police disclosure and advice given, and forms 
apparently designed to satisfy auditing criteria without prompting the recording of 
substantive information, for instance, demonstrating that advice as to the meaning of 
the caution was given rather than prompting the recording of what the advice actually 
was. 
 
Looking beyond the particular issue of the police station form, files were assessed in 
terms of their ease of use, with separate assessments being made of legibility and 
layout. The ease with which a police station file can be read and understood is 
particularly important given that research has identified discontinuity of 
representation as a significant feature of criminal cases (i.e., a client may be advised 
and represented by a number of different people during the course of any particular 
case).142F127  The lawyer at court will also often be under considerable time pressure, in 
the context of which it is necessary to be able to quickly assimilate information 
contained on file. Legibility is also important in terms of the ability to demonstrate 
contract compliance by evidence on the file. Although assessment of legibility is 
arguably somewhat subjective, it was assessed on the basis that if the reviewer had 
difficulty reading written records, this was likely to be the case for others who had to 
use the file.  
 
 
                                                 
127 See, for example, M. McConville et al, Standing Accused, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p41. 
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Table 4.2c Legibility of Files at the Investigation Stage, (The Investigation File 
Sample) 
 
  
Missing 
Data % 
Excellent 
% Good % 
Average 
% Poor % 
Very Poor 
% Files 
PDO  0.0 0.0 48.0 24.0 28.0 0.0 25
Birmingham 
PP 0.0  12.0 48.0 36.0 4.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  12.0 68.0 20.0 0.0  0.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 4.0 40.0 32.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  8.3 37.5 33.3 20.8 0.0 24
Liverpool 
PP 0.0  28.0 40.0 28.0 4.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 36.0 64.0 0.0  0.0 25
Middlesbrough 
PP 0.0  12.0 56.0 24.0 4.0 4.0 25
PDO 0.0  36.0 44.0 16.0 4.0 0.0 25
Pontypridd 
PP 0.0  4.0 40.0 40.0 12.0 4.0 25
PDO 0.0  4.0 64.0 32.0 0.0  0.0 25
Swansea 
PP 0.0  44.0 16.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  10.1 49.7 31.5 8.7 0.0 149
All areas 
PP 0.7 23.3 38.7 26.7 9.3 1.3 150
 
 
Table 4.2c shows that the majority of files were legible, although more than a quarter 
of Birmingham PDO files, a fifth of Liverpool PDO files and a fifth of Swansea 
private practice files were poor in this respect.  Across all areas, private practice files 
in general were somewhat more legible than PDO files. 
 
Layout refers to the ease of use of the file bearing in mind the fact that information on 
file may need to be readily accessible to someone other than the person who prepared 
the file, e.g. in subsequent court proceedings. The assessment of layout was to some 
extent problematic since it was apparent that, for a variety of reasons, some files 
reviewed were not in the state they would have been at the relevant time, for example, 
because they had been sorted on being closed, or because some materials had been 
transferred to a court file. 
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Table 4.2d  Layout of Files at the Investigation Stage, (The Investigation File 
Sample) 
 
 
Excellent % Good % Average % Poor % Very Poor % Files 
PDO* 88.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25
Birmingham 
PP 32.0 40.0 24.0 0.0 4.0 25
PDO* 68.0 24.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 16.0 56.0 24.0 0.0 4.0 25
PDO 12.5 58.3 25.0 4.2 0.0 24
Liverpool 
PP 16.0 44.0 28.0 12.0 0.0 25
PDO* 48.0 48.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 25
Middlesbrough 
PP 0.0 80.0 16.0 4.0 0.0 25
PDO* 92.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 25
Pontypridd 
PP 4.0 60.0 32.0 4.0 0.0 25
PDO 56.0 24.0 16.0 0.0 4.0 25
Swansea 
PP 56.0 36.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 25
PDO** 61.1 28.2 8.7 0.7 1.3 149
All regions 
PP 20.7 52.7 22.0 3. 3 1.3 150  
 
Most of the files in all areas were well laid out, with the proportion of files scoring 2 
(i.e. good) or better ranging from 60% of private practice files in Liverpool to 100% 
of Birmingham PDO files. At the all areas level PDOs performed better than private 
practice in this respect, a difference that is highly significant. The differences between 
PDOs and private practice in Middlesbrough, Cheltenham, Pontypridd and 
Birmingham are significant, but in the other two regions they are not. 
 
(ii) Magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples 
  
Tables 4.3a and 4.3b below address the state of the providers’ files dealing with work 
at magistrates’courts and the Crown Court respectively. Each presents the peer 
reviewers’ findings, broken down by area and provider. The key issues they were 
looking at in relation to providers’ files were: 
 
1)  The Effectiveness of File Composition 
2) Appropriateness of Level of Information Recorded at 
Investigation Stage 
3) Appropriateness of Level of Information Recorded Post Charge 
4) Appropriateness of Case Management 
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Table 4.3a The File, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How effective 
is 
composition 
of the file? 2.3 2.6 
** 
2.4 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.8
**
2.5 2.9 2.8  2.8 
** 
2.5 2.8
How 
appropriate is 
the level of 
information 
recorded at 
investigation 
stage? 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.6
**
2.0 3.0
 
3.0 
  *  
2.5 2.4 2.6
How 
appropriate is 
the level of 
information 
recorded post 
charge? 2.5 2.4 
** 
2.5 3.1 2.7 2.8
**
2.4 2.8 2.6 2.9
 
3.0 
 * 
2.5 
 
2.6 
*
2.8
How 
appropriate 
was the 
management 
of the case 
throughout? 2.9 2.4 
** 
2.4 2.9 2.7 2.7
**
2.3 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7
 
Table 4.3b  The File, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How effective 
is 
composition 
of the file? 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6
*
2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 
* 
2.6 2.7
How 
appropriate is 
the level of 
information 
recorded at 
investigation 
stage? 2.7 2.4 
* 
2.2 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.4
*
2.0 2.8
 
2.9 
* 
2.3 2.4 2.6
How 
appropriate is 
the level of 
information 
recorded post 
charge? 2.4 2.6 
** 
2.5 3.1 2.8 2.7
*
2.5 3.0
*
2.4 2.9
 
2.8 
* 
2.4 
* 
2.6 2.7
How 
appropriate 
was the 
management 
of the case 
throughout? 2.9 2.6 
* 
2.3 2.8 2.6 2.5
*
2.3 2.8 2.7 2.9
 
2.9 
** 
2.4 2.6 2.7
 
 
A.1 Effectiveness of File Composition 
 
On an all areas basis, PDOs had more effectively composed files than private practice 
both in the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court samples. The difference was 
highly significant in the magistrates’ courts sample, and significant in the Crown 
Court sample. 
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In the magistrates’ court sample (Table 4.3a above) there were highly significant 
differences between the PDOs and private practice in Pontypridd and in Cheltenham, 
with the PDO being the more effective in both.  In the Crown Court sample the only 
region to register a significant result was Middlesbrough, where the PDO’s file 
composition was more effective than local private practice. 
 
A.2 Appropriateness of Level of Information Recorded at Investigation Stage 
 
In both court samples, PDOs were more likely to have recorded an appropriate level 
of information at the investigation stage than private practice, but there were no 
significant overall results in this category. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, the most impressive comparison comes from 
Pontypridd, where the PDO outperformed  private practice by a full grade (2.0 to 3.0), 
a difference that was highly significant. On the other hand, private practice was 
significantly better in this respect in Swansea. 
 
In the Crown Court sample, PDO performance was significantly better in Cheltenham 
and Pontypridd, but once again the private practice was significantly better in 
Swansea. 
 
A.3 Appropriateness of Level of Information Recorded Post Charge 
 
Overall, the PDOs’ recording of information post charge was more appropriate than 
that of private practice, who they significantly outperformed in both court samples. 
The difference in the overall results was greater in the magistrates’ court sample than 
in the Crown Court sample. 
 
In Swansea private practice were significantly more likely to have recorded an 
appropriate level of information post charge, but in the other regions the PDOs were 
more reliable. In Cheltenham and Middlesbrough this difference was highly 
significant. 
 
Private practice in Swansea was also significantly better in this respect than their local 
PDO in the Crown Court sample. But in Middlesbrough and Pontypridd it was the 
PDOs that were significantly better in the Crown Court sample, and in Cheltenham 
the PDO’s better performance was highly significant. 
 
A.4 Appropriateness of Case Management 
 
Over all areas the case management of PDOs was slightly more appropriate than that 
of private practice (2.6 as opposed to 2.7 in both court samples). The results were not 
statistically significant in either sample. 
 
In the magistrates’ courts sample there were highly significant differences in 
Cheltenham and Middlesborough, where the PDOs outperformed local private 
practice. 
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In the Crown Court sample, private practice outperformed the PDO to a highly 
significant degree in Swansea. The PDOs were significantly better in Cheltenham and 
Middlesbrough. 
 
Discussion 
 
This section has shown the Public Defender Service as significantly better than their 
private practice counterparts at an all areas level in keeping good information, on well 
composed files, appropriately managed. 
 
The structure of a case file can be important for two distinct reasons. In many 
solicitors’ offices a variety of fee-earners work on any particular file and it is 
therefore important that files are composed in such a way that each fee-earner can 
easily make sense of the information on the file.143F128 As the following comments taken 
from peer reviewers’ notes indicate, poor continuity may not only result in an inferior 
standard of work and fee-earners being confused as to how to progress the case, but 
also in clients who are quite unsure of what is happening.  
 
There was a lack of analysis of the credibility of clients’ accounts which could 
have been due to the involvement of numerous fee earners in case preparation. 
This meant that although the basics were done, no-one was taking 
responsibility for the extra work. 
 
Some files were passed through quite a number of fee earners, most of whom 
wrote to the client. Whilst this is understandable, the client could have been 
warned of this or the designated fee earner could have been the signatory on 
the correspondence. 
 
Such problems, however, are not an inevitable outcome when several fee earners 
work on the same case, as peer reviewers’ comments show: 
 
There was no duplication of work, when different fee earners worked on the 
same file, especially when at court. 
 
Various fee earners dealt with the files but there was (sic) no instances when a 
change of fee earner prejudiced the client. 
 
In most files there have been a number of different fee earners and support 
staff working on files but any transmission seems to have been effortless and 
certainly has never prejudiced the client. This appears to be deliberately 
cultivated as there is (sic) often two fee earners named in the initial client 
letter and I suspect that it comes as a natural consequence of working in an 
office that is totally focussed on crime to the exclusion of everything else. 
 
Another reason why file management is important is that advocates appearing in court 
often need to be able to find information on file relatively quickly in order, for 
example, to be able to deal with a query from the magistrate or judge. This takes on 
added significance where a firm is acting for a number of clients in respect of the 
                                                 
128 See L. Bridges, et.al., Quality in Criminal Defence Services, op. cit,  p. 5 
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same allegation or where a client faces a number of different allegations. Sadly, peer 
reviewers found some files that would have failed in this basic function: 
 
The trial notes are pitifully bad. Representatives attending court behind 
advocates have a number of very important functions to fulfil one of which is 
to take an accurate note of the evidence and maintain it in an indexed and 
accessible format. Advocates are reliant upon these notes when it comes to 
speeches as there is nothing worse than misrepresenting what was said by a 
witness. The notes from what little there was of the trial would have been 
unhelpful in this regard and suggest a need for training in note-taking skills. 
The blue instructions folder also contains notes relating to someone else's 
drugs case which appear to have been misfiled. [PDO] 
 
There was particular concern on one file where Counsel was given a 2-day 
trial with three defendants and four witnesses without a set of instructions. 
Counsel had to do his own check as to any possible conflict check (sic) 
between defendants as it had not been carried out by the firm. 
 
Inadequately prepared briefs do little to aid counsel or the client:  Briefs were 
wholly inadequate in that they were usually less than ten lines long and 
consistently stated that counsel should read the client's account in the police 
interview in order to discover the defence instructions, and that counsel should 
read the prosecution papers to assess the prosecution evidence. Briefs rarely 
mentioned the plea and never mentioned the bail situation or any specific 
detail about the offence.  
 
On the other hand, adequately prepared briefs not only aided counsel and client, they 
demonstrated a professional attitutude and level of responsibility in the fee earners. 
 
The fee earner also displayed a clear appreciation of the issues, good evidence 
gathering and prepared briefs to counsel that were never less than competent, 
leading, unsurprisingly, to good outcomes. 
 
Assessment of the level of information recorded in case files is considered in regard to 
the two distinct investigation and post-charge stages. There is no obvious, 
straightforward standard for the level of information that should be recorded in case 
files for either stage, although in the past expectations were created by the Crime 
Transaction Criteria, and various Law Society publications offer guidance. Guidance 
to the peer reviewers indicated that a variety of factors may affect the level of 
information that should be recorded, including the nature and seriousness of the 
allegation, the plea, etc., and that they should take such factors into account when 
making a judgement.  
 
Problems with the organisation of correspondence were common, as hinted at by one 
peer reviewer: 
 
This file is organised to the very highest standard and is very easy to follow 
through. Other PDS offices keep separate correspondence and attendance 
sections which make their files difficult to follow. Here these sections are 
combined so it is very easy to pick the file up and understand what is going on 
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at any stage without having to cross refer to material in separate 
compartments. [PDO] 
 
In other cases, documents were out of order, incomplete or absent. Reviewers often 
noted this sort of disorder, but sometimes, as in the case of one file, it was 
 
shocking. Two unrelated and very serious Crown Court trials [were] combined 
into one file and one brief along with sundry other matters. [PDO] 
 
Some of the improvements the reviewers suggested, with regard to specific files, 
could be applied more broadly. Most files would benefit from “pagination and 
indexing” [PDO] and “good use of proformas” [PDO] not only means that 
information is presented in a familiar and easily accessible format, but it can also save 
time when the file is being prepared. Peer reviewers commented on a supplier’s 
failure to complete pro forma or keep contemporaneous records of telephone calls: 
 
Investigations below competence as much of pro-forma not completed and no 
contemporaneous notes of telephone calls. No advice call give, (sic) 
immediate attendance at the police station. Time recordings of calls wrong. 
[PDO] 
 
In another case it was unclear from the file if the supplier had had any involvement at 
the investigation stage whatsoever.  
 
It was not clear from file whether there was involvement in investigation 
stage. The only clue is that the source of business ringed is ‘PS Duty’. [PDO] 
  
By contrast, a reviewer noted of one case that largely because of the supplier’s 
“prompt and sensible advice” at the investigation stage the client received “a very 
good result indeed” [PDO].  
 
Good management might be important but it seems it might not always be essential to 
ensure a good outcome. One peer reviewer observed,  
 
The outcome [of this case] was exceptionally good, but I am bound to 
conclude it was good luck in the absence of any evidence of good 
management! [PP] 
 
Such cases are rare, however, and reviewers’ comments suggest that better organised 
files are more likely to yield positive outcomes. Although a substantial majority of 
files were managed competently or better, there were cases in which otherwise well 
managed work was let down by simple omissions, a problem evinced in this peer 
reviewer’s comment: 
 
I feel I had no option but to mark down this otherwise well managed file 
because there is no evidence at all that the question of plea/prosecution 
evidence was ever considered. There isn't even a copy of the intoximeter 
printout on file! [PDO] 
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In a similarly flawed case (where an otherwise diligent provider failed to obtain 
primary disclosure) the reviewer noted: 
 
The file is one of those without the case progression checklist on the rear file 
flap. The failing does not appear to have been picked up at an effective review. 
[PDO] 
 
File reviews to identify problems and, if necessary, take corrective action could also 
be more widely beneficial. For example, of one file the reviewer said: 
 
This file is very easy to follow. The police station notes are excellent both in 
relation to observations, information and instructions, advice to client and 
recording of the interview itself. The file is well managed. A file review on 
28th January 2003 identifies the areas that had been overlooked and remedial 
action is taken immediately i.e. chasing witnesses, tapes, charge sheet and 
custody record as there was an apparent period of inactivity on the file during 
December 2002. Good use of trial plan. [PDO] 
 
B:  Communication and Timeliness 
 
(i) Investigation stage file sample 
 
The investigation file sample study did not address issues of communication in a way 
comparable with the later court-based study. However, the earlier study did look at the 
issue of the timeliness both in the first contact with the client (whether by telephone or 
in person) and in the first attendance by a legal adviser at the police station. With 
regard to the former, the General Criminal Contract requires that where a client has 
been arrested and requests advice and the contractor accepts the matter, first contact 
with the client must normally be made within 45 minutes of the initial information 
that a client has requested advice being received (Part D Quality and Performance 
Standards para 5.1). 
 
Timeliness of first contact was assessed on a yes/no basis. Where timeliness of first 
contact was not relevant, e.g. where the attendance was by prior arrangement (as 
where a client is attending at the police station having been previously granted bail to 
attend the police station on a future date), this was indicated by ‘n/a’. As can be seen 
from Table 4.4a, this was so in between 4% and 20% of cases across the different 
areas and sectors.  
 
Timeliness of first contact is an important aspect of good practice and, as noted above, 
is a contract requirement. In order to demonstrate compliance it is necessary for files 
to contain information recording the time that the solicitor or firm became aware that 
advice had been requested and the time that first contact was made. In Table 4.4a 
failure to record this information is indicated by ‘X’. It can be seen that at the all 
regions level, 25% of private practice files and 11% of PDO files did not contain this 
information. There was wide variation in this respect, both as between areas and as 
between private practice and PDO files within areas. For example, in Middlesbrough 
there were no PDO files where this information was not recorded, compared to one 
fifth of private practice files. Similarly, in Pontypridd only 4% of PDO files omitted 
this information compared to four in ten private practice files. On the other hand, 
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nearly 30% of both private practice and PDO files in Liverpool did not include 
information about the timing of first contact with the client. 
 
Table 4.4a: PDO and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Peer Review 
Was first contact timely? 
 
  n/a No Yes x Files 
  % % % % N 
Birmingham PDO 4.0 56.0 28.0 12.0 25 
 PP* 4.0  64.0 32.0 25 
Cheltenham PDO 12.0 16.0 68.0 4.0 25 
 PP 12.0  64.0 24.0 25 
Liverpool PDO 4.2 4.2 62.5 29.2 24 
 PP 8.0  64.0 28.0 25 
Middlesbrough PDO 8 4 88  25 
 PP 4 8 68 20 25 
Pontypridd PDO* 16  80 4 25 
 PP 16 16 28 40 25 
Swansea PDO 20 8 52 20 25 
 PP 8 12 76 4 25 
 
All regions PDO 10.7 14.8 63.1 11.4 149 
 PP* 8.7 6.0 60.7 24.7 150 
 
In order to analyse the differences between files where first attendance was judged to 
be timely, and those where it was judged to be not timely, it is necessary to exclude 
files where this criterion was not relevant as well as those where there was insufficient 
information to make a judgment.  In some cases the timeliness of first contact may be 
outside of the control of the lawyer, for example, where the custody officer does not 
allow contact when first requested. Where this was evident from the file, first contact 
was treated as being timely. At the all areas level 91% of private practice first contact 
was timely, compared to 81% of PDO first attendances, a difference that is 
statistically significant. This difference is largely due to the Birmingham PDO where 
only one third of their first contacts were timely, compared to all Birmingham private 
practice first attendances being timely, a difference that is statistically significant. 
Cheltenham PDO also appeared to perform less well than its private practice  
counterparts, the difference being near significance. Pontypridd PDO, on the other 
hand, performed significantly better than private practice in their locale. 
 
The second measure of timeliness was timeliness of first attendance at the police 
station. The contract requires that where a decision is made to attend on a client at the 
police station in person, attendance should normally be within 45 minutes of the 
decision to attend (Part D Quality and Performance Standards para 5.2). It should be 
noted that this requirement is problematic as an indicator of quality since it relies on 
the time of the decision to attend being recorded and, more importantly, even if it is 
recorded it is often not possible to assess whether the timing of that decision was 
appropriate.  
 
As with timeliness of first contact, this criterion was assessed on a yes/no basis. 
Where timeliness of first attendance was not relevant, e.g. where the attendance was 
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by prior arrangement or where there was no attendance in person, this was indicated 
by ‘n/a’. As can be seen from Table 4.4b, there was significant variation between 
regions in respect of the incidence of ‘not applicables’, but little significant difference 
between PDOs and private practice within regions.  This suggests non-attendance in 
person may be a function of police or defence practitioner practices and/or client 
preferences in certain regions rather than variable quality between PDOs and private 
practice.  
 
Table 4.4b: PDO and Private Practice Investigation Stage File Peer Review 
Was first attendance timely? 
 
  Missing 
data 
n/a No Yes x Files 
  % % % % % N 
Birmingham PDO  4 12 72 12 25 
 PP  8 4 64 24 25 
Cheltenham PDO  20 4 72 4 25 
 PP  16 4 48 32 25 
Liverpool PDO 4.2 29.2 4.2 50 12.5 24 
 PP  28 8 32 32 25 
Middlesbrough PDO*  12 4 84  25 
 PP 4 12 24 48 12 25 
Pontypridd PDO  16 4 76 4 25 
 PP  20 8 44 28 25 
Swansea PDO  16 4 60 20 25 
 PP  20 4 60 16 25 
 
 
All regions 
 
 
PDO 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
16.1 
 
 
5.4 
 
 
69.1 
 
 
8.7 
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 PP 0.7 17.3 8.7 49.3 24.0 150 
 
Timeliness of first attendance is good practice and, as noted above, is a contract 
requirement. In order to make a judgment about this form of timeliness it is necessary 
for both the time the decision to attend was made and the time of first attendance to be 
recorded. It can be seen from Table 4.4b that nearly a quarter of private practice  files 
overall omitted the information necessary to make a judgment about this form of 
timeliness, compared to less than one in ten of PDO files. However, as between and 
within local areas, there is no consistent pattern. All Middlesbrough PDO files 
contained this information, but one fifth of Swansea PDO files recorded inadequate 
information in this respect. Nearly a third of private practice files in Cheltenham and 
Liverpool, and about a quarter of private practice  files in Birmingham and Pontypridd 
also failed to show the relevant information. In a minority of files the information that 
was recorded was clearly incorrect, the time of the first attendance being recorded as 
being prior to the time of the decision to attend. 
 
If those cases where this form of timeliness was inapplicable and those where there 
was no information on the timeliness of first attendance are excluded, PDOs 
performed better than private practice at the all areas level, the difference being near 
significance. Within local areas, Middlesbrough PDO was significantly better than its 
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private practice counterparts in this respect, with 96% of first attendances being 
timely compared to 67% for private practice.  There was no significant difference 
between the PDOs and private practice in the other areas. 
 
(ii) Magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples  
 
This section focuses on the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples and looks at 
the outgoing communication from the lawyer in relation to the client, and in relation 
to others including the prosecution, defence counsel, etc.  The first three criteria 
assess the ‘appropriateness’ of the communications, by reference to the person being 
communicated with. For example, whereas it would be appropriate to use relatively 
complex language and technical legal terms when communicating with other lawyers, 
this would not normally be appropriate when communicating with a client. 
Appropriateness may also address the amount of communication. Where standard 
letters are sent to every client, but much of the information is not relevant or is even 
confusing, this might also be inappropriate. Timeliness will also be very important 
and needs careful judgement in criminal trials. Advice and developments regarding 
any appeal are dealt with separately.  
 
The issues addressed at this stage were: 
 
1) Appropriateness of Communication and Client Handling 
2) Appropriateness of Advice on the Merits of the Case 
3) Appropriateness of Advice to Clients on Case Developments 
4) Appropriateness of Communications with Others 
5) Timeliness of All Communications 
 
Table 4.5a Communication, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How 
appropriate 
were the 
lawyer’s 
communicatio
n and client 
handling 
skills? 2.4 2.6 
** 
2.4 3.0 2.6 2.8
*
2.5 3.0
*
2.4 2.8 2.8 2.7 
** 
2.5 2.8
How 
appropriately 
was the client 
informed of 
the merits of 
their case? 2.6 2.6 
** 
2.6 3.3 2.8 3.3 2.9 2.9
**
2.5 3.1 3.0 3.1 
** 
2.7 3.0
How 
appropriately 
was the client 
informed of 
all 
developments
? 2.6 2.7 
** 
2.4 2.9 2.7 2.8
*
2.4 2.7
**
2.4 3.1 2.7 2.8 
** 
2.5 2.8
How 
appropriate 
was the 
lawyer’s 
communicatio
n with others? 2.6 2.9 
** 
2.4 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.9
*
2.5 3.0 2.9 2.8 
** 
2.6 2.9
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How timely 
was all 
communicatio
n? 2.7 2.6 
* 
2.6 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.7
**
2.3 3.2 2.6 2.7 
* 
2.5 2.7
 
Table 4.5b Communication, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How 
appropriate 
were the 
lawyer’s 
communicatio
n and client 
handling 
skills? 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.0 2.4 2.8
*
2.3 2.9
*
2.4 2.8
 
 
2.8 
* 
2.4 
* 
2.5 2.7
How 
appropriately 
was the client 
informed of 
the merits of 
their case? 2.6 2.8 
* 
2.6 3.4 2.9 3.0
*
2.5 3.0
*
2.5 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 3.0
How 
appropriately 
was the client 
informed of 
all 
developments
? 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.9
*
2.4 2.9
*
2.4 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.7
How 
appropriate 
was the 
lawyer’s 
communicatio
n with others? 2.6 2.6 
* 
2.3 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.1
*
2.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7
How timely 
was all 
communicatio
n? 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.5
*
2.5 2.8
*
2.4 2.9 2.5 2.6 
* 
2.5 2.7
 
 
B.1 Appropriateness of Communication and Client Handling 
 
PDOs’ communication and client handling skills were better than private practice in 
both courts’ samples at the all areas level. The difference was highly significant in the 
magistrates’ courts sample and significant in the Crown Courts sample. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample the Middlesbrough and Pontypridd PDOs 
significantly outperformed local private practice, while the better standard of 
communications from the PDO in Cheltenham was highly significant. The 
Middlesbrough and Pontypridd PDOs were also significantly better than their private 
practice counterparts in the Crown Courts sample. 
 
B.2 Appropriateness of Advice on the Merits of the Case 
 
In both courts the overall performance of private practice was at the level of threshold 
competence (3.0). Meanwhile, PDOs’ advice on the merits of their clients’ cases was 
in the range of competence plus, a difference that was highly significant at the 
magistrates’ court level. 
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The advice of the PDOs in Cheltenham and Pontypridd was highly significantly better 
than that from private practice in the magistrates’ courts sample. 
 
The Cheltenham, Middlesbrough and Pontypridd PDOs gave significantly more 
appropriate advice on the merits than private practice in the Crown Courts sample. 
 
B.3 Appropriateness of Advice to Clients on Case Developments 
 
PDOs were more likely than private practice appropriately to apprise their clients of 
case developments. In the Crown Court, the overall difference was slightly smaller 
than in the magistrates’ courts sample, where it was also highly significant. 
 
In the magistrates’ courts, PDOs outperformed private practice in all regions. They 
were significantly better in Middlesbrough and highly significantly better in 
Cheltenham and Pontypridd. Meanwhile, in the Crown Court sample the PDOs 
significantly outperformed private practice in Middlesbrough and Pontypridd. 
 
B.4 Appropriateness of Communications with Others 
 
PDOs are more likely to communicate appropriately with others. The overall 
difference is slight between suppliers at the Crown Court, but larger and highly 
significant in the magistrates’ courts. 
 
In the magistrates’ courts, Pontypridd’s PDO was significantly better than local 
private practice and the better performance of Cheltenham PDO was highly 
significant. The only significant differences in the Crown Court sample were in 
Cheltenham and Pontypridd, where the PDOs did better than private practice. 
 
B.5 Timeliness of All Communications 
 
The overall timeliness of communications was the same in both courts, with the PDOs 
performing significantly better than private practice. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, the PDOs were significantly better in Cheltenham 
and greatly better in Pontypridd, where the difference was a highly significant 0.9 of a 
grade, with private practice achieving only threshold competence. In the Crown 
Court, the Middlesbrough and Pontypridd PDOs were significantly more timely in 
their communications than local private practice. 
 
Overall, in terms of the criteria addressed under the Communications heading the 
Public Defender Service obtains a clean sweep of significantly better results in the 
magistrates’ courts sample. They are similarly numerically higher in performance in 
the Crown Court sample, although these differences are significant for only 2 of the 5 
criteria. 
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Discussion 
 
One of the challenges in professional-client communication is that clients are a 
heterogeneous group, with sometimes vastly different needs and abilities, as the 
following reviewers’ comments help to illustrate: 
 
Client suffering from schizophrenia and learning difficulties, dealt with 
sympathetically, professionally and appropriately throughout.  [PDO] 
 
This client, a first class honours graduate of good character, was obviously 
fairly demanding. He was kept well informed of developments throughout. 
[PDO]  
 
There did not seem on this file to be any allowance made in letters to the client 
that her understanding was more limited than other clients. The explanation of 
the effects of a Restraining Order was very brief and it doesn't appear that she 
was ever warned that this could happen prior to sentence. [PP] 
 
Good communication, especially with a very anxious client with no previous 
experience of criminal matters. [PDO] 
 
Instructions were obtained in difficult circumstances from a client whose 
command of English was not good. Despite the absence of an interpreter the 
quality of instructions obtained and advice given is good. [PDO] 
 
This is challenging because advising a client as to the merits of his or her case – with 
regard to information obtained from the client, prosecution and others using the law 
relating to the allegation(s) and evidence – is a crucial part of a defence lawyer’s job. 
Peer reviewers assessed the appropriateness of the advice given. The question dealt 
with in their evaluation was not concerned with the advice per se, but with the way in 
which it was communicated to the client. The skills exhibited by suppliers in the way 
they communicated with clients varied greatly, as these comments illustrate:   
 
Very good client skills. [PDO] 
 
One letter only to client. [PP] 
 
Clear client cont. letter, and accurate and succinct advice letter, together with 
outcome letter. [PP] 
 
This client was both articulate and demanding. The suppliers took great care in 
communicating with him and left no stone unturned particularly with regard to 
the expert evidence and obtaining considerable supportive material about his 
drug rehabilitation. [PDO] 
 
Poor letters to defendant not really telling him anything. [PP] 
 
Friendly letters to client and straightforward advice. [PP] 
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Clients must also be properly informed of all relevant developments in relation to the 
lawyer’s work on the file and developments concerning the police, prosecution and 
court, such as new evidence, decisions to amend charges or discontinue, and dates of 
court hearings. However, it must be remembered that communication with a client is 
very much a two-way street, and it can be difficult for lawyers if, for whatever reason, 
their clients are unwilling or unable to engage in a dialogue with them. This was a 
difficulty of which peer reviewers were only too well aware: 
 
Clear evidence on file of a high standard of communication skills with a client 
who was not disposed to accept advice, [the client] was a drug addict 
desperate to secure bail. [PDO] 
 
Good communication skills evident via interpreters although client plainly 
refused to accept advice when offered. [PDO] 
 
In such cases, peer reviewers favoured persistence and understanding, as this 
evaluation reveals: 
 
Client uncommunicative from start to finish. Dealt with professionally and 
sympathetically throughout. [PDO] 
 
Criminal cases normally require defence lawyers to communicate with a range of 
other agencies and individuals such as the police and Crown Prosecution Serive, court 
officials, defence counsel, other defence lawyers and prospective witnesses. Here 
reviewers made straightforward remarks such as: 
 
Good particularly in terms of communication with the probation service. 
[PDO] 
 
Good written representation to the Crown to discontinue. [PDO] 
 
Assisted Probation Officer with report. [PDO] 
 
Good communication with client and CPS resulting in case being concluded 
very satisfactorily on first hearing. [PP] 
 
Communication with clients and with others needs to be ‘timely’ which means that it 
should occur at the correct and appropriate time, neither too early nor too late. As 
some reviewers noted, timeliness was often instrumental in ensuring the clients’ best 
interests were served and the best outcome for the client secured: 
 
Good communication resulting in speedy conclusion. [PP] 
 
Overall this was an especially strong area of performance of the Public Defender 
Service in the  Magistrates’ Court sample, but they also showed themselves to be 
performing well in the Crown Court. 
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C:  Fact Gathering 
 
(i) Investigation stage file sample 
 
The earlier peer review looked at the information lawyers recorded at the 
investigation stage. It focused specifically on the extent of information that should be 
recorded as a matter of good practice (having regard to the particular features and 
requirements of police station practice). For this purpose, the assessment takes 
account of a broad judgement made, so far as could be ascertained, of the apparent 
seriousness and complexity of the case, since less serious or less complex cases may 
not involve much information, or may justify the recording of less information than 
would be required in a more serious or complex case. This criterion differs from that 
concerning the adequacy of police station pro-formas (considered earlier) since even a 
well-designed form may not be fully, or adequately, completed.  
 
Basic information, such as the name and address of the client, was normally recorded. 
Files would receive a low score if (taking into account seriousness and complexity) 
they contained little information concerning disclosure from the police and 
instructions from the client, advice given and reasons for advice; there was a failure to 
record police interviews; failure to record the nature of the charge and, where 
relevant, failure to record bail conditions. Lack of recorded information may reflect 
the fact that information was obtained but was not recorded, or that it was not 
obtained (and therefore could not be recorded). It was frequently not possible to 
discern from the file which of these reasons was relevant. Further, if information was 
not obtained, this may have been because the police or client were unwilling, or 
unable, to disclose it, and this may not have been apparent from the file.  
 
It might be argued, therefore, that it is inappropriate to use the level of recorded 
information as a review criterion. However, the various factors referred to above 
would not invalidate regional comparisons nor, since the seriousness and complexity 
of the case were taken into account in forming a judgement, comparisons between 
PDOs and private practice within regions. Furthermore, the Crime Transaction 
Criteria, in effect, require police station files to contain information concerning the 
allegation and the evidence that has been obtained from the police (para 7), and 
information demonstrating that instructions were taken from the client (para 9).144F129  
 
 
 
                                                 
129 In relation to the latter, for transaction criteria audit purposes, compliance is to be recorded where 
the file contains a note that instructions were not taken prior to the police interview since the “adviser 
may have good reasons for not taking instructions.”  Note also the R. Ede and A. Edwards, Criminal 
Defence: The Good Practice Guide, London: Law Society, 2000, ch 6 and the Criminal Litigation 
Accreditation Scheme Standards of Performance. 
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Table 4.6a Level of Information Recorded –  Investigation File Sample 
 
  
Missing 
data % 
Excellent 
% 
Good 
% 
Average 
% 
Poor  
% 
Very Poor 
% Files 
PDO 8.0  8.0 20.0 60.0 4.0 25
Birmingham 
PP    24.0 32.0 40.0 4.0 25
PDO *   8.0 60.0 20.0 8.0 4.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 4.0  4.0 48.0 40.0 4.0 25
PDO    4.2 50.0 37.5 8.3 24
Liverpool 
PP *   20.0 24.0 32.0 16.0 8.0 25
PDO    20.0 52.0 28.0   25
Middlesbrough 
PP    20.0 48.0 28.0 4.0 25
PDO *   28.0 52.0 20.0    25
Pontypridd 
PP    24.0 44.0 24.0 8.0 25
PDO    20.0 76.0 4.0   25
Swansea 
PP   4.0 40.0 44.0 12.0   25
PDO 1.3 6.0 27.5 39.6 22.8 2.7 149
All Areas 
PP 0.7 4.0 22.7 41.3 26.7 4.7 150
 
However, in the research sample, few if any files that contained little or no 
information from the client recorded any reason for this. If they did so, this was 
reflected positively in the score given; and a similar approach was taken where, rarely, 
the file showed that disclosure requested of the police had been refused. 
 
At the all areas level, there is no significant difference between PDOs and private 
practice.  There is evidence of some regional variation; the majority of Swansea files 
contained at least a satisfactory level of information, whereas files in Birmingham, 
Middlesbrough and Liverpool performed markedly less well in this respect.  
 
However, the differences between individual PDOs and private practice in their areas  
presents a more complex picture. Swansea, Pontypridd, Middlesbrough and 
Cheltenham PDOs all performed better than their private practice counterparts, with 
Pontypridd performing particularly well in this regard both in absolute terms and in 
comparison with private practice in the region. The differences for Swansea and 
Middlesbrough were not, however, statistically significant.  Three-quarters of 
Swansea PDO files scored 3 (competence), with 20% scoring 2 (competence plus), 
and none scoring 1 (excellent), whereas 44% of Swansea private practice files scored 
3, and the same proportion scored 2 or 1. Middlesbrough PDO and private practice 
files were much more similar to each other.  On the other hand, Liverpool PDO 
performed less well than private practice (the difference being significant), as did 
Birmingham PDO (the difference being near significance). Only 4% of Liverpool 
PDO files scored good or excellent, compared with 44% of Liverpool private practice 
files.  In Birmingham only just over a quarter of PDO files scored 3 or better 
compared to just over half of private practice files. Nearly two-thirds of Birmingham 
PDO files were poor or very poor, compared with 44% of private practice files in that 
region. 
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The results indicate that there is no necessary correlation between the use and 
adequacy of police station pro-formas and the level of information recorded. Whilst 
PDOs use the same police station form, there was a large variation in the level of 
information recorded as between different offices. On the other hand, whilst 50% of 
police station forms used by private practice in Pontypridd were poor or very poor, 
over two thirds of files in that region were at least adequate in terms of the level of 
information recorded. 
 
A judgement was made as to whether the lawyer acted appropriately in (a) securing 
disclosure from the police, and (b) obtaining instructions from the client. To a large 
extent, making these judgements from files is dependant upon the level of information 
recorded on the file by the lawyer and, as noted earlier, there may be a variety of 
factors affecting the level of information recorded.  
 
Obtaining disclosure from the police is a criterion principally concerned with 
disclosure about alleged offence(s). The recording of routine information such as 
information in the custody record, times of arrest and detention, was not dealt with 
under this criterion but under Quality of written records. The principal assumption 
made was that a lawyer should take steps to obtain sufficient disclosure from the 
police concerning the alleged offence(s) to enable them, taking into account other 
information such as the client's instructions, to give meaningful advice, especially as 
to what strategy to adopt in interview. The criterion is concerned with the actions 
taken by the lawyer to secure disclosure as opposed to the disclosure actually obtained 
but this, of course, was judged by reference to what was recorded in the file. If, for 
example, the file demonstrated that the lawyer had taken appropriate steps to obtain 
disclosure but in the event failed to obtain it this would, nevertheless, be given a good 
score. If, however, the lawyer had taken appropriate steps but failed to record them, 
and recorded little or no disclosure, it would have received a low score since it was 
impossible to tell from the file that such steps had been taken.  
 
In making a judgement the whole file was considered so that if, for example, written 
disclosure provided by the police was on file, and it was apparent that it had been 
provided by the police prior to the time that the lawyer advised the client, this would 
be taken into account. Finally, in making a judgement about whether the actions taken 
were appropriate, account was taken of factors such as the seriousness of the case, 
whether the client was interviewed more than once, and whether the lawyer had 
attended on a previous occasion in respect of the same allegation (i.e. whether it was a 
bail-back). 
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Table 4.6b Appropriateness of Attempts to Secure Information from Police 
(Investigation File Sample) 
 
  Missing 
Data % 
Excellent 
% 
Good 
 % 
Average 
% 
Poor 
 % 
Very 
Poor % X % Files 
PDO  0.0 0.0 12.0 44.0 40.0 4.0 0.0 25
Birmingham 
PP 4.0 0.0 28.0 36.0 24.0 4.0 4.0 25
PDO * 0.0  0.0 40.0 48.0 8.0 0.0 4.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 0.0  0.0 16.0 44.0 36.0 0.0 4.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 16.7 66.7 16.7 0.0 0.0 24
Liverpool 
PP * 4.0 4.0 56.0 20.0 4.0 4.0 8.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 12.0 36.0 52.0 0.0 0.0 25
Middlesbrough 
PP * 0.0  4.0 24.0 44.0 16.0 4.0 8.0 25
PDO * 0.0  20.0 68.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25
Pontypridd 
PP  0.0 0.0 24.0 40.0 32.0 4.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  4.0 44.0 44.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 25
Swansea 
PP 0.0  8.0 32.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 25
PDO 0.0  4.0 32.2 41.6 20.1 0.7 1.3 149
All Regions 
PP 1.3 2.7 30.0 37.3 22.0 2.7 4.0 150  
 
 
In a small minority of cases there was insufficient information on the file to enable a 
judgement to be made as to whether the lawyer had acted appropriately in obtaining 
information from the police. At the all areas level the difference between PDOs and 
private practice in seeking to secure police disclosure was not significant.  It is a 
matter of concern, however, that in a quarter of private practice files and in a fifth of 
PDO files, the actions taken to secure disclosure were rated as poor or very poor. 
There were marked variations both between areas and as between different PDOs and 
their private practice counterparts. PDOs out-performed private practice in three 
regions, and the differences were significant in Cheltenham and Pontypridd. However, 
Middlesbrough and Liverpool PDOs did significantly less well than private practice in 
their areas. More than half of Middlesbrough PDO files were marked as poor in this 
respect (compared to 20% of Middlesbrough private practice files scoring poor or 
very poor), as were 40% of Birmingham PDO files (compared to 28% of Birmingham 
private practice files scoring poor or very poor).  
 
A similar judgement was made about actions taken to obtain instructions from the 
client. Again, the underlying assumption is that a lawyer needs to obtain sufficient 
information from the client in order to enable him or her to give meaningful advice 
especially as to what strategy to adopt in interview.145F130 As with the previous criterion, 
judgements were made in respect of the steps taken by the lawyer to secure 
instructions rather than in respect of the instructions actually obtained, and similar 
factors were taken into account in making a judgement. If no, or limited, instructions 
were noted on the file, but an explanation for this was recorded, the file would not be 
marked down in this respect. If, however, there were no explanation for the lack of 
instructions recorded in writing, the file would be marked down. 
                                                 
130  Bridges and Choongh found that in nearly 60% of the cases they observed, the lawyer had obtained 
a full  understanding of the client's account prior to the first police interview, although they did not 
observe the written records made by the lawyer. See L. Bridges and S. Choongh, Improving Police 
Station Legal Advice, op. cit., p. 119. 
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Table 4.6c Appropriateness of Attempts to Secure Instructions from Client 
(Investigation File Sample) 
 
  Missing 
Data % 
Excellent 
% 
Good  
% 
Average 
% 
Poor  
% 
Very 
Poor % X % Files 
PDO 0.0  0.0 4.0 16.0 56.0 16.0 8.0 25
Birmingham 
PP * 0.0  0.0 16.0 40.0 24.0 12.0 8.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 20.0 52.0 24.0 0.0  4.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 0.0  0.0 16.0 36.0 36.0 0.0  12.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 12.5 50.0 25.0 12.5 0.0  24
Liverpool 
PP 0.0  4.0 48.0 20.0 16.0 4.0 8.0 25
PDO 0.0  0.0 16.0 24.0 60.0 0.0  0.0  25
Middlesbrough 
PP 0.0  0.0 28.0 28.0 16.0 16.0 12.0 25
PDO * 0.0  8.0 76.0 16.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  25
Pontypridd 
PP 0.0  0.0 16.0 44.0 36.0 4.0 0.0  25
PDO 0.0  4.0 28.0 44.0 24.0 0.0  0.0  25
Swansea 
PP 4.0 4.0 36.0 36.0 20.0 0.0  0.0  25
PDO 0.0  2.0 26.2 33.6 31.5 4.7 2.0 149
All Areas 
PP 0.7 1.3 26.7 34.0 24.7 6.0 6.7 150  
 
 
Overall, relatively few files contained insufficient information to enable a judgement 
to be made about the appropriateness of actions in obtaining instructions from clients, 
although this was the case in more than one in ten Cheltenham and Middlesbrough 
private practice files. At the all areas level, private practice appears to have performed 
slightly better than PDOs in terms of obtaining clients’ instructions, but the difference 
is not significant.  However, at the local level the differences were more marked. In 
Pontypridd the PDO performed significantly better than its private practice  
counterparts. On the other hand, Birmingham PDO performed significantly less well 
than its private practice counterparts, and Liverpool PDO’s poorer performance 
(relative to private practice) was near significance; 72% of Birmingham PDO files 
and 60% of Middlesbrough PDO files being judged as poor or very poor in this 
respect compared to 36% and 32% respectively of their private practice counterparts. 
 
The general picture to emerge from this earlier peer review was one of lack of 
uniformity in performance of the PDOs, in comparison with local private practice, 
between the different areas.  
 
(ii) Magistrates’ Court and Crown Court samples  
 
We now turn to consider the findings on ‘fact gathering’ in the later peer review of 
magistrates’ court and Crown Court files.   As before, since efforts to obtain 
information may not be successful, as a result of an uncooperative client or an 
obstructive prosecution, the review criteria are concerned with the actions taken (or 
not taken) in order to obtain information. Guidance to peer reviewers indicated that 
the fact there were little or no instructions or information on the file should not result 
in the award of a low mark if it is apparent from the file that the lawyer took 
appropriate steps to obtain information but was unsuccessful for reasons beyond their 
control. 
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Peer reviewers looked separately at information from the client, information from the 
police or prosecution, and information from others. The issues addressed at this stage 
were: 
 
1) Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Client 
2) Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Police/Prosecution at 
Investigation Stage 
3) Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Police/Prosecution Post-
Charge 
4) Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Others 
 
Table 4.7 a Fact Gathering, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How effective 
was the 
lawyer in 
seeking 
relevant 
information 
from client? 2.5 2.7 
* 
2.5 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.0
**
2.4 3.1
* 
3.3 2.4 2.7 2.8
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from police/ 
prosecution at 
investigation? 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.7
*
2.0 3.0
* 
2.9 2.2 2.4 2.5
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from police/ 
prosecution 
post-charge? 2.6 2.6 
* 
2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6
*
2.3 2.8
*
2.5 3.1 3.0 2.8 
* 
2.6 2.8
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from others? 2.8 2.5 
* 
2.5 3.2 2.3 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.9
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Table 4.7b Fact Gathering, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How effective 
was the 
lawyer in 
seeking 
relevant 
information 
from client? 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.5 3.0
*
2.5 3.1
* 
3.2 2.5 2.7 2.8
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from police/ 
prosecution at 
investigation? 2.7 2.5 
* 
2.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.6
* 
2.9 2.3 2.5 2.5
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from police/ 
prosecution 
post-charge? 2.4 2.6 
* 
2.4 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
*
2.4 2.9
* 
3.0 2.5 2.6 2.7
In seeking 
relevant 
information 
from others? 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.6
*
2.4 3.1
*
2.6 3.2
** 
3.2 2.0 2.8 2.7
 
 
C.1 Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Client 
 
The overall effectiveness of PDOs and private practice in gathering information from 
their clients is the same in both courts, with PDOs performing slightly, although not 
significantly, better. 
 
In the magistrates’ court in Swansea, private practice was substantially and 
significantly better than the PDO, which they outperformed by almost a full grade. 
The PDOs were better, significantly better in Cheltenham and highly significantly 
better in Pontypridd. In the Crown Court sample private practice was once again 
significantly better in Swansea, but it was the PDO that was significantly more 
effective at gathering information from clients in Pontypridd. 
 
C.2 Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Police/Prosecution at 
Investigation Stage 
 
Overall, suppliers were a little more effective in gathering information from police or 
prosecutors at the investigation stage than they were in gathering information from 
their clients and others. At the all areas level in the magistrates’ court the PDOs were 
slightly better than private practice but the difference was not significant. Peer 
reviewers assessed their performance as equal in the Crown Courts. 
 
In Swansea private practice significantly outperformed the PDO in the magistrates’ 
court. It is worth noting that the difference between private practice and PDO 
performance in Pontypridd was not only significant, but the PDO was judged better 
by a full grade. In the Crown Court, Swansea private practice significantly 
outperformed the PDO once again, but it was the PDO which was the significantly 
better supplier in Cheltenham. 
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C.3 Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Police/Prosecution Post-Charge 
 
Overall, the PDOs were significantly more effective in gathering information from 
police or prosecutors post-charge in the magistrates’ court sample. They were slightly 
better overall in the Crown Court, but the difference was not significant. 
 
In Cheltenham, Middlesbrough and Pontypridd magistrates’ courts the PDOs were all 
significantly more effective than private practice on this criterion. In the Crown Court, 
private practice was significantly better in Swansea, but the PDOs were significantly 
better in Cheltenham and Pontypridd. 
 
C.4 Effectiveness in Gathering Information from Others 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample private practice was outperformed, albeit not 
significantly, by PDOs. However, in the Crown Court, largely due to an exceptionally 
large and highly significant difference in one region, private practice was, on average, 
slightly, but not significantly, better than the PDOs. 
 
Cheltenham provided the only significant difference at a local level for the 
magistrates’ court sample, where the PDO gathered information more effectively than 
private practice. In the Crown Court, the PDOs in Middlesbrough and Pontypridd 
were significantly better than their private practice counterparts. But the most 
interesting result comes from Swansea, where private practice was a highly significant 
1.2 grades better than the local PDO. 
 
The general picture of better, although not necessarily statistically significantly better, 
performance by the PDOs is continued in this section. Also, in contrast to the earlier 
investigation stage peer review, the PDOs were much more consistent  in their 
performance across the different areas, with the exception of the Swansea office.  
Indeed, the results begin to show a consistent divergence in relation to this one PDO 
where results are significantly worse than in local private practice. 
 
Discussion 
 
The characteristically better performance of PDOs was reflected in the observations of 
peer reviewers: 
 
All relevant information obtained from client and CPS. Witnesses ultimately 
un-cooperative despite great efforts on the part of the supplier. [PDO] 
 
Client's instructions clear and appropriate information obtained from CDAT in 
support of change of circumstance application in respect of bail. At the police 
station a great deal of information was eventually teased out of the police.  
[PDO] 
 
They also highlighted the importance of information gathering in reference to a case 
in Swansea, where the private practice were consistently better than the PDO: 
 
Very good proof of evidence and information for the bail applications.  [PP] 
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Although the statistics suggested that Swansea PDO was significantly worse than its 
private practice counterparts in most categories, the following comments about 
practice within the Swansea PDO serve as a reminder that few suppliers, other than 
those with an overall rating of “excellent”, were consistent at all times and in all 
cases.  
 
There seems to be no proof of personal circumstances and the previous 
convictions, which one presumes would be readily available, only arrive late 
in the day. [PDO] 
 
Good detailed proof and comments taken from client at an early stage. [PDO]  
 
A number of reviewers commented on contacts made with professional and other 
sources, for information. 
 
The contact and correspondence with police is particularly impressive. [PDO] 
 
Supplier considered the medical evidence and came to sensible conclusions as 
to the evidence needed. [PP] 
 
Very good, especially the material from the medical records, from the client's 
mother and girlfriend and from the police. [PDO] 
 
Some comments highlighted the amount of effort required to complete this task 
adequately. 
 
Information was sought in all relevant areas including the prosecution, defence 
experts, car auction, CCTV, custody video (which proved crucial), defendant's 
wife. All of this was undertaken promptly and appropriately. No stone was left 
unturned. [PDO] 
 
Other comments point out insufficient effort expended in some cases to secure the 
necessary information. 
 
In a conference at court on 28-06-02 it is agreed that defence witnesses be 
chased. There is one prompt and brief letter to client, which does not elicit a 
response about this, then no further action but no explanation on file. [PDO] 
 
Expected more attempts to obtain unused material from CPS. [PP] 
 
Supplier failed to obtain an early stage a psychiatric report (sic). [PDO] 
 
Potential witnesses – two men and a guard – were never contacted. [PP] 
 
Supplier represented at police station through to Crown Court. Alleged 
assaults happen in front of many witnesses at a party yet no steps are taken to 
obtain details of potential witnesses at police station investigation stage so 
they could be proofed early. [PDO] 
 
 156
A number of reviewers stress the value of efficient, effective fact gathering to the 
progress and outcome of the case. 
 
All required information obtained immediately resulting in speedy conclusion. 
[PDO] 
 
Full information from client obtained in very difficult circumstances clearly 
had great influence on sentence. [PP] 
 
Better information and advice at the outset would probably have enabled the 
case to be concluded in the Magistrate’s Court. [PDO] 
 
Good level of information obtained leading to early withdrawal of prosecution 
case. [PDO] 
 
 
D:   Advice and Assistance 
 
(i) Investigation stage file sample 
 
The investigation file study addressed some different issues from those considered in 
the later analysis, but because of its tighter focus it is able to provide a more detailed 
picture of the lawyer’s actions and advice in the initial stage, a matter which was not 
considered in the court-based study. In the earlier study, files were assessed by 
reference to (a) appropriateness of decision to attend the police station, (b) 
appropriateness of decision to attend police interview with suspect, (c) advice given to 
the client regarding their legal position, and (d) advice to the client regarding strategy 
in police interviews.  
 
Almost all decisions by PDOs and private practice to attend the police station in order 
to advise the client in person (rather than over the telephone) were judged to be 
appropriate, as were decisions of the legal adviser to attend the police interview with 
the suspect.  The most notable finding in the latter respect was the relatively high 
number of cases in some areas where this criterion was non-applicable either because 
there was no police interview with the suspect or the lawyer had been contacted only 
after the police interview had been completed.  This was the case in one third of files 
in Liverpool (both private practice and PDO), which is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence of a culture in Liverpool whereby a significant minority of suspects do not 
ask for legal advice at the police station, or do not ask for it unless and until they are 
charged. In Middlesbrough, nearly one quarter of PDO files were marked ‘not 
applicable’ in respect of this criterion compared to 8% of private practice  files. There 
was also a difference between PDO (16%) and private practice (8%) files in Swansea 
marked as ‘not applicable’ in this respect. These differences tend to indicate 
differences between the type of cases or clients dealt with by private practice  and 
PDOs in the region, but it was not possible to discern what factors were operative. 
 
Advice to clients on their legal position relates to the apparent strength of the police 
case, whether the client has a defence, whether (on the client’s instructions) they are 
guilty or innocent of an alleged offence and, if relevant, the legality of the exercise of 
police powers such as search or the taking of samples. Advice on strategy in police 
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interview refers, in particular, to whether the client should answer questions, and 
whether they should adopt a strategy such as handing in a statement.  
 
The Crime Transaction Criteria do not directly refer to legal advice as to the client’s 
legal position in the sense described above. The relevant parts of the criteria 
concentrate on advice as to interview strategy and, as noted earlier, they tend to assess 
whether the file demonstrates that advice has been given, rather than the content of 
any advice. However, the Police Station Accreditation Scheme Standards of 
Performance indicate that such advice should be given (para 3.8.1), and they contain 
an overall obligation to record advice given (para 1.1.8).  As is the case with police 
disclosure and client’s instructions, the fact that there is no record on the file does not 
necessarily mean that no advice was given, and it should be noted that many police 
station pro-forma did not contain a prompt for such advice to be given and recorded, 
although the PDS form does. Nevertheless, advising clients on their legal position is a 
fundamental part of the role of a defence lawyer at the police station, and a record of 
such advice may be critical to the future conduct, and outcome, of the case. 
  
Table 4.8a Appropriateness of Advice Regarding Client’s Legal Position, 
(Investigation File Sample) 
 
  Excellent 
% 
Good 
 % 
Average 
 % 
Poor 
 % X % Files 
PDO 0.0 4.0 8.0 0.0 88.0 25
Birmingham 
PP 0.0 8.0 8.0 0.0 84.0 25
PDO 0.0 32.0 24.0 4.0 40.0 25
Cheltenham 
PP 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 96.0 25
PDO 0.0 12.5 16.7 4.2 66.7 24
Liverpool 
PP 4.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 72.0 25
PDO 0.0 8.0 12.0 0.0 80.0 25
Middlesbrough 
PP 4.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 84.0 25
PDO 16.0 64.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 25
Pontypridd 
PP 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 96.0 25
PDO 8.0 36.0 8.0 0.0 48.0 25
Swansea 
PP 0.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 76.0 25
PDO* 4.0 26.2 12.1 2.0 55.7 149
All Areas 
PP 1.3 8.7 5.3 0.0 84.7 150
 
The most notable finding demonstrated in Table 4.8a is that at the all areas level the 
majority of files contained no record of advice to the client concerning their legal 
position. Although the PDOs performed significantly better than private practice in 
this respect, it was still the case that over half of all PDO files contained no record of 
such advice.  As noted above, the PDS pro-forma does contain a prompt for advice on 
legal position to be recorded, and Cheltenham, Liverpool, Pontypridd and Swansea 
PDOs all have markedly better results in terms of recording this information than their 
private practice counterparts. In Birmingham and Middlesbrough, on the other hand, 
both the PDOs and private practice failed to record advice to the client in 80% or 
more of their files.  Where advice was recorded, private practice and PDOs performed 
to a broadly similar standard as regards the adequacy of that advice at the all areas 
level, and there were no significant differences at a local level. 
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The Crime Transaction Criteria do require the recording of the fact of advice as to the 
implications of ‘silence’ in the police interview, and whether to answer police 
questions or whether to hand in a statement, although they do not provide for the 
assessment of any advice given or the reasons for such advice. By contrast, the 
Accreditation Scheme Standards of Performance require the lawyer to give ‘reasoned 
and considered’ advice regarding interview strategy (para 3.8.3), and as noted earlier, 
there is an overall obligation to record relevant advice given. This is supported 
elsewhere, for example, in Criminal Defence.146F131 Furthermore, case law on inferences 
from ‘silence’ has demonstrated that the advice given, and the grounds or reasons for 
such advice, can be critical in determining whether inferences should be drawn.  
 
Table 4.8b Appropriateness of Advice Regarding Strategy in Police Interview 
(Investigation File Sample) 
 
  
Excellent 
% 
Good 
 % 
Average 
% 
Poor  
% 
Very 
Poor % 
N/A  
% X % Files 
PDO 0.0 28.0 28.0 8.0 0.0 12.0 24.0 25
Birmingham 
PP 8.0 48.0 12.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 24.0 25
PDO 4.0 68.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 25Cheltenham 
PP 4.0 20.0 24.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 48.0 25
PDO 8.3 20.8 16.7 0.0 0.0 33.3 20.8 24Liverpool 
PP 4.0 16.0 8.0 16.0 0.0 36.0 20.0 25
PDO 4.0 32.0 36.0 4.0 0.0 20.0 4.0 25Middlesbrough 
PP 8.0 20.0 28.0 4.0 0.0 8.0 32.0 25
PDO 56.0 28.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 4.0 25Pontypridd 
PP 0.0 16.0 24.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 52.0 25
PDO 8.0 56.0 12.0 4.0 0.0 12.0 8.0 25Swansea 
PP 8.0 32.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 16.0 0.0 25
PDO 13.4 38.9 18.8 4.0 0.0 14.1 10.7 149
All Regions 
PP 5.3 25.3 23.3 5.3 0.0 11.3 29.3 150
 
The proportion of files in which there was no record of advice regarding interview 
strategy was significantly lower compared to those with no record of advice on legal 
position, although more than a one quarter of private practice files contained no such 
record, as did one in ten PDO files. There is some evidence of local variation in this 
respect, with between one in four and one in five files in Birmingham and Liverpool 
containing no, or little, information as to advice regarding interview strategy, but 
almost all files in Swansea containing such information. It is also noticeable that at the 
all areas level advice as to interview strategy was treated as not being applicable in 
more than one in ten files, which would be the case where there was no police 
interview or where the interview(s) had already been conducted before the solicitor 
was instructed. Liverpool stands out in this respect, which may be evidence that there 
is a significantly different police station culture in that area, with a tendency for 
lawyers to be called into the police station only after the police interview has been 
conducted. 
 
                                                 
131 R. Ede and A. Edwards, op.cit., ch. 6. 
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In order to consider and compare the standard of advice given, it is necessary to 
exclude those files where advice on interview strategy was inapplicable or where 
there was insufficient evidence to make a judgement, and the results can be seen in 
Table 4.8c (below). 
 
Table 4.8c Appropriateness of Advice Regarding Strategy in Police Interview 
(Excluding Files Where it Was Not Applicable or Where There Was Insufficient 
Information to Make a Judgement) (Investigation File Sample) 
 
  Excellent % Good % Average % Poor % Very Poor % Files 
PDO 0.0  43.8 43.8 12.5 0.0     16
Birmingham 
PP 11.1 66.7 16.7 5.6 0.0     18
PDO 4.2 70.8 16.7 8.3 0.0 24
Cheltenham 
PP 7.7 38.5 46.2 7.7 0.0 13
PDO 18.2 45.5 36.4 0.0 0.0 11
Liverpool 
PP 9.1 36.4 18.2 36.4 0.0 11
PDO 5.3 42.1 47.4 5.3 0.0 19
Middlesbrough 
PP 13.3 33.3 46.7 6.7 0.0 15
PDO** 63.6 31.8 4.5 0.0 0.0 22
Pontypridd 
PP 0.0  36.4 54.5 9.1 0.0 11
PDO 10.0 70.0 15.0 5.0 0.0 20
Swansea 
PP 9.5 38.1 52.4 0.0 0.0 21
PDO* 17.9 51.8 25.0 5.4 0.0 112
All Regions 
PP 9.0 42.7 39.3 9.0 0.0 89
 
As might be expected, where interview strategy was recorded, thus enabling a 
judgement to be made, it was normally judged as at least competent, though there are 
a clear group of files for both PDOs and private practice where only a 4 is awarded 
(indicating Below Competence), and this was particularly significant in the case of 
Liverpool private practice files where more than one third of files were so judged. The 
advice recorded as having been given was assessed on a five-point scale. At the all 
areas level, PDOs performed significantly better than private practice. At the local 
level, Pontypridd PDO stands out as performing particularly well with over 95% of 
files being assessed as good or excellent. This is particularly important given the high 
proportion of Pontypridd PDO clients who made no comment interviews at the police 
station. In Birmingham, on the other hand, private practice performed better than the 
PDO, the difference being near significance. In the other regions the differences 
between PDOs and PP were not significant (although in Swansea the difference 
neared significance). 
 
(ii) Magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples  
 
The issues addressed in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court peer reviews at this 
stage were: 
 
1) Quality of the Advice 
2) Appropriateness of the Advice on Plea 
3) Appropriateness of the Advice on Appeal 
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Table 4.9a Advice and Assistance, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How good 
was the 
advice? 2.4 2.6 
** 
2.4 3.1 2.8 2.4
*
2.4 2.8
**
2.2 2.9 2.8 2.8 
** 
2.5 2.8
How 
appropriate 
was the 
advice on 
plea? 
* 
2.3 2.7 
* 
2.4 2.8 
*
2.9 2.4
*
2.4 2.7
**
2.2 2.9 2.7 2.8 
** 
2.5 2.7
How 
appropriate 
was the 
advice on 
appeal? 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.3 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.4 2.8 3.2
 
Table 4.9b Advice and Assistance, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All area  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How good 
was the 
advice? 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.7
*
2.2 3.0
*
2.3 2.8
* 
2.9 2.4 
* 
2.5 2.7
How 
appropriate 
was the 
advice on 
plea? 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.8 
*
2.9 2.5
*
2.3 2.9
*
2.3 2.9
* 
3.0 2.4 2.6 2.6
How 
appropriate 
was the 
advice on 
appeal? 3.0 2.9 
* 
2.8 3.2 3.3 3.1
*
2.6 3.2
*
2.4 3.2
* 
3.2 4.1 
* 
3.0 3.2
 
 
D.1 Quality of the Advice 
 
At the all areas level the quality of PDOs’ advice was significantly better in both 
courts. The difference was highly significant in the magistates’ court sample and 
significant in the Crown Court. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample the PDOs were significantly better in Middlesbrough 
and highly significantly better in Cheltenham and Pontypridd. 
 
Private practice provided significantly better advice in the Crown Court in Swansea. 
But it was the PDOs that were significantly better in Middlesbrough and Pontypridd. 
 
D.2 Appropriateness of the Advice on Plea 
 
The overall results for the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples are rather 
different with regard to the appropriateness of advice on plea – in the magistrates’ 
court PDOs were highly significantly better than private practice, while they 
performed equally well in the Crown Court. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, Liverpool was the only region where the private 
practice was more likely to provide appropriate advice on pleas, a difference that was 
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significant. The PDOs were significantly better in Birmingham, Cheltenham and 
Middlesbrough, and highly significantly better in Pontypridd. 
 
Private practice were significantly better in Liverpool and Swansea, in the Crown 
Courts sample, while the PDOs were significantly better in Middlesbrough and 
Pontypridd. 
 
D.3 Appropriateness of the Advice on Appeal 
 
At the all areas level the difference between the performance of PDOs and private 
practice is greater in the magistrates’ courts, but in the Crown Court the difference is 
still significant. In both samples the PDOs were more likely to provide appropriate 
advice on appeal. 
 
Aside from Middlesbrough, where both sets of suppliers performed equally well, the 
PDOs were better in all local areas in the magistrates’ courts. None of the results were 
significant, but in Pontypridd the PDO was almost a full grade better than private 
practice. 
 
In the Crown Court sample the PDOs were significantly better than private practice in 
Cheltenham, Middlesbrough, Pontypridd and Swansea. 
 
The somewhat mixed picture in individual areas is therefore maintained in this 
section, together with the common trend of better overall results for the PDS at the all 
areas level. 
 
Discussion 
 
Giving good advice is one of the most important elements of the work of criminal 
defence lawyers. The client needs to know where they stand as far as the merits of 
their case are concerted, the strength of the evidence against them and also what 
decisions they need to take in order to react appropriately to the prosecution evidence 
and the procedural requirements of a criminal prosecution. 
 
Cases where clients had not received advice, and the consequences of poor advice, 
were noted by a number of reviewers, across the areas: 
 
Letters to clients did not appear to advise client on the strength of the 
evidence, the likely sentence or their chances of success. On one file, there 
was no mention of strong forensic evidence against the client and the 
consequential high likelihood of a conviction. [PP] 
 
There was a lack, on all files reviewed, of any advice by the suppliers on likely 
sentence. This was especially unfortunate in one case of a s.116 return to 
custody.  No advice was recorded on the consequences of the sentences 
actually imposed. [PP] 
 
Very little advice given to client about anything, even advice about plea to the 
burglary charges was inadequate. [PP] 
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On occasions, errors were made in the advice to the client: On one file, the 
client was not advised of the possibility of a custodial sentence. On another, an 
exceptional hardship argument was not considered.  On a third, the client on a 
summons was advised in a standard letter that they were in jeopardy of a Bail 
Act offence. The fee earner did not consider a potential abuse point stemming 
from the late communication of the information. [PDO]   
 
Some reviewers noted cases where the manner in which clients received information 
and advice was inapproporate:   
 
The practice of sending prosecution and other documents to the client with the 
instruction that they read them carefully, as an alternative to a detailed 
consideration with the client and realistic appraisal of the strength of the 
evidence and assessment of their case, was unsatisfactory. [PP] 
 
Many cases where the quality of the advice given was appropriate and served the 
client well, were also reported. 
 
Excellent. Many solicitors would simply have allowed this client to plead 
guilty. This client could not have received better advice. [PDO] 
 
The quality of advice provided was good, with reasoning for advice being 
documented on attendance notes. [PDO] 
 
Across the areas, reviewers addressed the nature and timeliness of advice on plea, 
including its impact on outcomes:  
  
The advice as to plea of guilty could have been given a little earlier had the 
problem identified by the file review been picked up at an earlier stage. The 
advice thereafter was good and the client received a very lenient sentence. 
[PDO] 
 
On some files it appeared that advice could have been given to enter guilty 
pleas earlier and this would probably have enabled the matters to be concluded 
in the Magistrate’s Court.  Equally concerning was the tactic on one file of 
prolonging a not guilty plea when it was known as a guilty plea from the 
outset. [PDO] 
 
Sound advice on plea leading to good result. [PP] 
 
This was an 82 year-old driver with eyesight difficulties. Whilst I am not sure 
the initial advice to plead not guilty to careless driving was legally sound, it 
enabled the caseworker to negotiate a favourable outcome…well done! [PDO] 
 
I do not think this client could have been better advised. He kept his options 
open until the last minute when a guilty plea was entered on an agreed basis 
favourable to him and surprisingly, given the seriousness of the charge and the 
reputation of the Judge, led to a non-custodial sentence. [PDO]  
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Good detailed advice provided from the outset. At one stage the client 
considered entering a guilty plea simply to dispose of the case.  The supplier 
however provided further advice, which resulted in the Crown discontinuing 
 the case. [PDO]  
 
Historically there has been concern that private practice had financial incentives 
unnecessarily to prolong cases, one feature of which was late advice to plead guilty. 
The research on the Scottish Public Defence Solicitors’ Office (PDSO) found that the 
PDSO resolved more cases at an earlier stage than private practice.147F132 In an attempt to 
ensure that English and Welsh PDS lawyers did not advise clients to plead guilty 
inappropriately, the professional head of the PDS issued guidance to PDS lawyers in 
2002. 148F133 
 
There were no significant differences between private practice and the PDOs on this 
question. This remained the case when the magistrates’ court and Crown Court 
samples were isolated and analysed separately. Typical comments made about 
suppliers included: 
 
There was no undue delay on the part of the solicitor. 
 
No unnecessary delays were caused to the court.  Adjournments were 
generally appropriate. 
 
The matter of giving advice on appeal was raised by a number of reviewers.  
Although some suppliers did give advice on appeal, it was not uncommon for cases 
reviewed to have the following types of comments made.   
 
Although evidence on appeal is adequate, clients are not told of the time limit. 
 
Firms are required to advise clients of their right to appeal against 
sentence/conviction, e.g. merits, time limit.  Only one file has some of this 
information recorded and the firm would be well advised to amend their 
closing letter to include this information. 
 
There was no possibility of an appeal on any of the files reviewed but the firm 
should have added a few lines of formal advice [confirming] what was said at 
court. 
  
Clients should have been advised on rights of appeal, even when the fee earner 
did not consider that an appeal would be advisable. 
 
 
                                                 
132 See Goriely  et al, op. cit.. 
133 This guidance is discussed in Chapter 1 and was published as an annex to the Public Defender 
Service: Review of the first year of operation 2001/02, London, Legal Services Commission, August 
2002 and is also available under the title ‘Guidance on Code of Conduct' at 
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/pds/doc_library.asp. 
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E:   The Work/Assistance 
 
This section deals with the work carried out by the lawyer in furtherance of all the 
communication and the advice given. The issues addressed were: 
 
1) Completeness of Work 
2) Effectiveness of Work in Achieving Client’s Reasonable Objectives149F134 
3) Impact on Bail 
4) Impact on Mode/Venue 
5) Impact on the Process 
6) Impact on Conviction 
7) Impact on Sentence 
8) Prejudice Caused to Client 
 
This section uses different statistical approaches to evaluation. The peer reviewers’ 
assessment of Completeness of Work (E.1) and Prejudice Caused to Clients (E.8) are 
both stated as percentages. A three-point scale rather than a 5 point scale is used to 
evaluate categories E.2-E.7 considering the impact of the suppliers’ work. These 
impact categories all use the following scale: 
 
1 = Better than Expected 
2 = As Expected 
3 = Worse than Expected 
 
The results of this section are also a little different. Here the differences between the 
two modes of delivery are smaller and the overall results in the Crown Court suggest 
that private practice were better in this forum. There are far fewer significant results 
under these headings than any of the other major categories of peer review. Those that 
are significant largely occur at local level and largely show it is the PDOs that are 
better. 
 
E.1 Completeness of Work 
 
This question is concerned with whether the lawyer or firm had done sufficient work 
on the case having regard to the seriousness and complexity of the allegation, the 
nature of the case, etc. The issue of efficiency, and whether work was done that was 
not necessary, is dealt with separately (see Section F). The assessment in respect of 
                                                 
134 This criterion was also included in the earlier investigation stage file peer review, but applying it 
and interpreting the results proved highly problematic for a number of reasons. First, outcomes at the 
investigation stage are determined by a large number of variables which, in the earlier study, could not 
be controlled for. Local police cultures can significantly affect individual decisions and decision-
making. Given the relative position of power, police decisions may be unaffected by legal 
representation that is, in fact, highly competent. Second, it is often difficult to make an assessment of 
whether the result could have been affected by the performance of the lawyer, and circumstances may 
be such that there is little that a lawyer can do to affect the result. For example, overwhelming evidence 
that a person has committed a serious offence may mean that there is little a lawyer can do to affect 
charge and bail decisions. Third, information contained in a police station file was frequently 
insufficient to enable a judgment to be made. For these reasons, the results of the earlier investigation 
stage peer review relating to this criterion are not reproduced here.  
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this question differs from most of the other questions in that it had to be answered as 
either “yes” or “no”.  In general there was a high level of “yes” answers, that is, that 
in the majority of cases all work that should have been done was done. 
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Table 4.10a The Work/Assistance, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Was all the work done that should 
reasonably have been done?  (% yes) 96.7 83.3 
** 
95.2 52.0 78.3 63.6 77.8 81.5 
* 
96.7 71.4 61.5 52.6
** 
84.7 67.2 
Was work done effective in achieving 
the client’s reasonable objectives? 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.2 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.6 
What was the impact of the lawyer on  
a) Bail? 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
b) Mode/Venue 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
c) The Process 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
d) Whether convicted or not? 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
e) Sentence 2.0 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.7 
 167
Was the client prejudiced in any way by 
the work done? (% yes) 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 4.3 14.3 22.2 7.7 0.0 6.7 20.0 5.3 7.5 6.3 
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Table 4.10b The Work/Assistance, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Was all the work done that should 
reasonably have been done?  (% yes) 95.0 75.0
**
95.7 50.0 63.0 79.2 85.7 77.3 81.3 65.6
*
50.0 78.6 77.1 71.4 
Was work done effective in achieving the 
client’s reasonable objectives? 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.6 
What was the impact of the lawyer on  
a) Bail? 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 
What was the impact of the lawyer on  
 b) Mode/Venue 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
c) The Process 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 
What was the impact of the lawyer on  
d) Whether convicted or not? 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 
What was the impact of the lawyer on   
e) Sentence 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.7 
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Was the client prejudiced in any way by 
the work done? (% yes) 5.3 6.9 0.0 0.0 3.8 4.8 4.8 13.0 6.3 3.4 33.3 0.0 8.7 4.7 
 
 
Over all areas the performance of the PDOs was better than that of private practice in 
the magistrates’ court. This difference was highly significant. The PDOs were slightly 
better in the Crown Court, but there the difference was not significant. It is interesting 
to note that while PDOs are less likely to complete all the work they reasonably 
should in the Crown Court (compared to their impressive performance in the 
magistrates’ court sample), private practice (while still less reliable than PDOs) 
performed better in the Crown Court than they did in the magistrates’ courts. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample the PDO in Pontypridd was significantly better, and 
in Cheltenham, not only was the PDO highly significantly better, but it had done 
almost everything reasonably expected of it, while private practice were assessed as 
having carried out all the work they should have in done in just over half of the cases 
in the sample. In the Crown Court, private practice was significantly better in 
Swansea. In Cheltenham, the PDO greatly outperformed private practice and the 
difference was highly significant. 
 
E.2 Effectiveness of Work in Achieving Client’s Reasonable Objectives 
 
This considers the effectiveness of the work done in achieving the clients’ 
(reasonable) objectives, and therefore reflects the skill of the firm/office in defending 
their client having regard to what the objectives of the client were or were likely to be. 
The question refers to the client’s reasonable objectives so that the firm would not be 
marked down simply because its client’s objectives were unreasonable or unrealistic. 
Over all areas, the PDOs were more likely to do better than the peer reviewers 
expected in achieving their clients’ reasonable objectives. This was the case in both 
the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples, although in neither sample was the 
difference significant. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, private practice were better than the PDOs in 
Birmingham and Swansea and equally good in Middlesbrough. In the other three 
regions it was the PDOs who were more likely to do better than expected. 
 
A similar pattern was repeated in the Crown Court, although in Birmingham private 
practice suppliers were equally effective, and in Liverpool and Swansea they were 
better. The three regions where PDOs were better – Cheltenham, Middlesbrough and 
Pontypridd – are the same as the above. 
 
Swansea PDO deserves special mention, because it did particularly badly, receiving 
the worst possible grade of 3 in both the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples. 
 
E.3 Impact on Bail 
 
In both the magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples, private practice and PDOs 
were equally likely to have a slightly better than expected impact on bail, with all 
receiving a grade of 1.9. 
 
In the magistrates’ court sample, neither general mode of supplier was clearly better. 
Private practice were better in Cheltenham and Pontypridd, while the PDOs had a 
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greater impact in Liverpool and Swansea. They were rated as equally effective in 
Birmingham and Middlesbrough. 
 
Although the overall results in the Crown Court showed that both modes of suppliers 
were equal, an examination of the local results suggests that private practice may be 
slightly better: They were rated better in Birmingham and Liverpool, but equal with 
the PDOs in the other areas. 
 
E.4 Impact on Mode/Venue 
 
As with the previous category, private practice and PDOs were equally likely to have 
an impact in the magistrates’ court and Crown Courts, with all suppliers having 
exactly the impact on mode/venue that the peer reviewers expected (2.0). 
 
In the magistrates’ courts sample, there were two local areas where private practice 
performed better (Liverpool and Middlesbrough), two where PDOs were better 
(Birmingham and Swansea) and two where they were equally effective (Cheltenham 
and Pontypridd). 
 
Looking at the local results for the Crown Court sample, private practice appears to be 
better. There was only one region where the PDO did slightly better. In two 
(Birmingham and Cheltenham) private practice were equal to the PDOs and in the 
three remaining areas, they were – albeit slightly – better. 
 
E.5 Impact on the Process 
 
In terms of impact on the process the overall results were quite different between the 
magistrates’ court and Crown Court samples. In the magistrates’ courts the PDOs 
were slightly, but clearly better, while in the Crown Courts the situation was reversed. 
 
Birmingham and Cheltenham were the only local areas where private practice had a 
greater than expected impact on process in the magistrates’ court. In all other areas it 
was the PDOs who were slightly better. 
 
Middlesbrough was the only region where a PDO outperformed private practice on 
this criterion in the Crown Court. They did equally well in Liverpool and Swansea, 
and private practice were narrowly better in the three other localities. 
 
E.6 Impact on Conviction 
 
The overall impact of PDOs on convictions was slightly better than that of private 
practice in the magistrates’ court. In the Crown Court it was private practice that was 
slightly better. 
 
Looking at local area ratings for magistrates’ courts, the PDOs appear to have done 
rather better than suggested by the overall results. Private practice were equally good 
in Cheltenham and Liverpool, but slightly worse in the other four regions. 
 
The PDOs were better than private practice in the Crown Court in Middlesbrough and 
Pontypridd and equal in Liverpool. In the three other areas private practice were more 
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likely than the PDOs to have had an impact better than the peer reviewers had 
expected on conviction. 
 
E.7 Impact on Sentence 
 
This is yet another category where the overall results were the same for both suppliers 
in both courts (1.7). 
 
In the magistrates’ courts, private practice in Birmingham and Cheltenham were 
substantially better than the PDOs. In the other four regions the PDOs were better. 
 
In the Crown Court PDOs were better in Middlesbrough and Pontypridd, but private 
practice had a greater impact on sentencing in the other four regions. 
 
E.8 Prejudice Caused to Client 
 
These results were recorded as percentages, with 0% representing no prejudice caused 
to the client by the suppliers. Overall, there was little difference between suppliers in 
the magistrates’ court sample, although private practice were slightly better. One 
particularly poor result for the PDO in Swansea gives private practice superiority in 
the Crown Court. 
 
Cheltenham stands out at the magistrates’ court level; neither mode of supply caused 
any prejudice to their clients. In Pontypridd and Swansea private practice was better, 
while in the other areas it was the PDOs that were least likely to harm the interests of 
their clients in magistrates’ courts. In Birmingham and Pontypridd the PDOs caused 
no prejudice. 
 
In the Crown Court sample, Cheltenham distinguishes itself again, with neither type 
of supplier prejudicing clients. The PDOs were better in Birmingham, Liverpool and 
Middlesbrough. In Pontypridd private practice was better and in Swansea the result 
for the PDO was particularly concerning. While private practice caused no prejudice 
to clients, the peer reviewers found that Swansea PDO had prejudiced clients in 
almost a third of their files. 
 
In this section, where impact of the work of criminal defenders is considered, there 
appears to be little overall difference between the two modes of provision at an all 
areas level. Impact appears to be about equal across the criteria. One serious issue 
stands out involving prejudice to clients in one-third of cases carried out in the 
Swansea PDO office. 
 
Discussion 
 
Given that the criteria required the peer reviewers to grade impact according to their 
expectations of the suppliers, an important first question is what does “as expected” 
mean? If the peer reviewers expect a high level of performance and outcome, then if 
their expectations are met perhaps the lawyers who are performing “as expected” are 
in fact doing rather well, because the expectations of the peer reviewers are high. 
Conversely, if reviewers do not have such high expectations, then the opposite would 
be true, and “as expected” would be sufficient but mediocre. To discover what the 
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peer reviewers’ expectations might have been, requires a consideration of the 
reviewers themselves. 
 
The peer reviewers were intentionally not selected only from the highest level of 
specialists but were “peers” who are operating at about the same level as other 
existing criminal defence practitioners. As a result: 
 
• They know the political landscape of legal aid. 
• They are aware of the public funding issues that are currently present. 
• They will want to show their colleagues as doing well. 
• They will want to complain about the lack of funding, the pressure in legal aid 
work, but show that their colleagues are still doing a good job despite these 
impediments. 
  
The peer reviewers can differentiate between “good” and “better”. This ability is 
evidenced by their other evaluations, throughout this chapter, which were carried out 
using the five-point scale. As most of the results are around or just under grade 2, this 
means that the impact of most suppliers’ work was (slightly) better than expected. 
And, if we relate this back to their distribution of grades on the five-point scale, what 
the peer reviewers expected was probably something somewhat above “threshold 
competence”, but not rising to the standards of “competence plus”. 
 
In assessing the completeness of work, peer reviewers were asked to suggest work, 
which should have been done on behalf of clients, but was absent from the file. A 
number of comments related to lack of, or limited instructions from the client, for 
example:  
 
No proof of evidence even by the trial date despite the case having been 
proceeding for 14 months  
 
No attempt take instructions re why made admission at police station while 
unrepresented.  
 
Other comments concerned failure to give advice, either about the case or about 
appeal:   
 
No written advice to client on anything other than next court hearing. 
 
No advice on appeal. [PDO]. 
 
Sometimes, advice given was too late:  
 
Client not advised till too late about video evidence against him.  
 
In other cases peer reviewers were concerned that the clients’ cases had not been 
properly investigated or pursued. Thus in one case, no medical report was obtained 
despite the fact that counsel had advised at an early stage that it should be obtained. In 
another case, apparently crucial evidence such as CCTV footage was not pursued, and 
in a further case there were  
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No written instructions, no mitigation taken, and no attempt to assess 
strengths/weaknesses of prosecution case” and the lawyer “missed crucial 
point re. signing on at police station. 
 
A failure to communicate with the client was also apparent in a number of cases, 
giving rise to comments such as  
 
Client not written to after initial hearing re. date of next hearing, advice and 
risk of custody 
 
No outcome letter at all, that I could see.   
 
All of this may give the impression that work often went unfinished, but as the peer 
reviewers’ findings indicate, the majority of files showed that all the work that might 
reasonably be expected had in fact been completed. 
 
Peer reviewers addressed five questions, which sought specifically to identify the 
impact of the lawyer on a number of outcomes in relation to the case. It was an 
attempt to measure the ‘value added’ as a result of that client being represented by 
that firm/office – often a difficult judgement given the number of factors outside of 
the lawyer’s control in any particular case. Nevertheless, if we look, for example, at 
the peer reviewers’ comments regarding the lawyers’ impact on bail, we see that they 
are reflective of the suppliers’ generally high standard of work in this area: 
 
Good results obtained on bail but this should've been a guilty plea and disposal 
on first occasion. [PP] 
 
The hard work on this file reflected the excellent results on bail and sentence. 
[PP] 
 
In a number of cases bail letters were insufficiently specific. If a client had 
been bailed with condition they should have been told what they were, and if 
unconditional bail had been granted this should have been specified. [PDO] 
 
Despite client, did well to obtain bail on first appearance for robbery. [PP] 
 
Some very good bail results in seemingly hopeless cases. [PP] 
 
The peer reviewers were similarly positive about the involvement of lawyers in most 
of the other categories. Consider some of their comments about the impact of lawyers 
on sentencing: 
 
There was encouraging evidence of negotiations with the Crown on reducing 
the gravity of charges. [PDO] 
 
Outcomes were generally good, often as a result of Magistrates Court 
caseworkers taking the initiative in plea-bargaining. [PP] 
 
The firm displays impressive Crown Court preparation by a number of 
caseworkers and some outcomes in such cases were remarkable.  Some of the 
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work on the non-Crown Court files is of the highest standard.  Here clients 
often received far better results than expected either in terms of pleas to reduce 
charges, discontinuance or on sentences. [PDO] 
 
Often good written advice to clients and negotiation of charges down. [PDO] 
 
Generally, better than expected results at court, Advocacy seems competent as 
far as can be ascertained from outcomes. [PP] 
 
The supplier acted in the best interest of their clients and this was especially 
true when it came to sentencing.  There was evidence that advocates tried to 
move cases from one court to another if they felt that a better result for the 
client could be achieved. [PDO] 
 
Finally in this section, the peer reviewers assessed whether in any particular case the 
client had actually been prejudiced by the work done or not done by their lawyer. The 
reviewers’ guidance indicated that they should only conclude that the lawyer had had 
a prejudicial effect on the client where this was clear from the file. As the findings 
indicate, reviewers found relatively little evidence that the clients’ case had been 
prejudiced by the work of the suppliers. 
  
There is a minimalistic approach to recording instructions but there is no 
evidence to suggest any client or outcome necessarily prejudiced by this. [PP] 
 
In most files there have been a number of different fee earners and support 
staff working on files but any transmission seems to have been effortless and 
certainly has never prejudiced the client. [PDO] 
 
On a number of files different fee earners dealt with the case at different times 
with good co-ordination and certainly no prejudice to the client. [PP] 
 
Once again, I could find no agreed record of the client's instructions in the 
form of a proof of evidence. The client was not prejudiced, but on such a 
serious matter, in the Crown Court, one should have been prepared. [PDO] 
 
The impact of each mode of provision seems fairly equal. Unlike the previous 
categories there is little discernible difference between PDOs and private practice 
except in the level of prejudice caused to their clients by one PDO. 
 
F: Efficiency 
 
The issues addressed at this stage were: 
 
1) Efficiency of Work 
2) Effectiveness of Use of Resources 
3) Appropriateness of Disbursement 
 
 176
Table 4.11a Efficiency, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How 
efficiently 
was the work 
carried out? 2.6 2.4 
* 
2.4 2.8 2.6 2.5 
* 
2.3 2.7 
* 
2.3 2.9 2.8 2.7 
* 
2.5 2.8 
Throughout 
the file, how 
effectively 
did the 
organisation 
use 
resources? 
* 
2.8 2.3 
* 
2.5 3.1 2.1 2.6 
* 
2.3 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.7 
Were any 
disbursements 
incurred 
appropriate? 
(%yes) 100 N/A 83.3 100 88.9 100 100 100 100 83.3 83.3 100 90.9 97.4 
 
Table 4.11b Efficiency, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
How 
efficiently 
was the work 
carried out? 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.6 
Throughout 
the file, how 
effectively 
did the 
organisation 
use 
resources? 2.8 2.3 2.4 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.6 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.8 
Were any 
disbursements 
incurred 
appropriate? 
(%yes) 100 100 100 100 87.5 100 100 100 100 87.5 90.9 100 95.3 97.1 
 
 
F.1 Efficiency of Work 
 
Over all areas, the PDOs were significantly better than private practice in the 
magistrates’ courts sample. In the Crown Court, however, there was no difference 
between the efficiency of the suppliers. 
 
In Birmingham, Liverpool and Swansea private practice outperformed the local PDOs 
in the magistrates’ court. In the other three regions the PDOs were significantly better 
and the differences between their ratings were greater than in those regions where 
private practice were the better suppliers. None of the results in the Crown Court were 
significant. 
 
F.2 Effectiveness of Use of Resources 
 
In both courts, the PDOs used resources more effectively over all areas. 
 
Private practice was better in the magistrates’ court in Swansea and, significantly, in 
Birmingham, but the PDOs were better in the other four regions and significantly so 
in Cheltenham and Middlesbrough. 
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In the Crown Court sample, suppliers performed equally well in Liverpool, while 
private practice was better in Birmingham. In all other regions it was the PDOs that 
used the resources most effectively, but none of the results in the Crown Court were 
significant. 
 
F.3 Appropriateness of Disbursements 
 
Peer reviewers recorded the appropriateness of suppliers’ disbursements as 
percentages, rather than using the standard 1-5 gradings. The figures in the table 
represent the percentage of disbursements that were appropriate, so unlike the ratings, 
a higher number shows that the supplier has behaved more appropriately. 
 
Overall private practice was marginally better in the Crown Court and slightly better 
again in the magistrates’ courts. It is worth noting that none of the suppliers were 
judged to have accrued more than 16.7% inappropriate disbursements. 
 
Discussion 
 
The peer reviewers’ comments emphasize the considerable range of performance in 
the different PDOs: 
 
Efficient work throughout leading to quick and satisfactory conclusion. [PDO] 
 
The case was progressed in an efficient manner throughout. [PDO] 
 
It is not clear why no effort was made to see the client and his witnesses to 
proof them between the PDH and trial (some 2 months) until the day before 
the trial. [PDO] 
 
Case could have progressed faster than it did. Supplier could have dealt with 
PBV on the client’s instructions alone. No reason why case could not have 
been committed on day papers received at court. Surprised DJ allowed the 
adjournment. [PDO] 
 
Even within offices there was a range of performance across the cases dealt with, as 
these two comments on files from the same PDO reveal: 
 
Very efficient work throughout, contributing to the successful application to 
stay the proceedings. [PDO] 
 
Numerous fee earners dealt with this case and nobody appeared to have a grip 
on it. [PDO] 
 
Reviewers’ comments sometimes indicate that the delays noted in some cases are 
appropriate, or not entirely the fault of the supplier. 
 
It was absolutely correct to delay instructing an expert until further evidence 
received from the CPS at which stage it became irrelevant. [PDO] 
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The client's complaints about delay are entirely unjustified; the delays and 
listing mix-ups in this case were not the supplier's fault at all. [PDO] 
 
There was a lot of delay and prevarication in the file not all caused by the 
changes of fee earner. [PDO] 
 
There are a number of different aspects to a firm/office’s use of resources. Guidance 
given to peer reviewers stated that consideration should be given to whether work was 
done that was not necessary, and also whether the firm/office made effective use of 
resources both inside and outside the firm, so for example, were agents or counsel 
instructed appropriately? Did the firm make effective use of experts? Overall 
reviewers seemed to regard the use of resources by both PDOs and private practice 
suppliers to be appropriate. The following comments are fairly typical: 
 
Medical reports clearly appropriate and obtained at appropriate stage. [PDO]] 
 
Experts were instructed in relation to firearms residue, blank cartridges and 
CCTV. This was indeed vital in this case. The instructions to the experts were 
first class both initially and in response to further developments/evidence from 
the Crown. [PDO] 
 
The case was progressed efficiently. It was clearly appropriate to instruct the 
enquiry agent and medical expert. [PDO] 
 
Preliminary visit to distant prison was largely unnecessary.  Transcription of 
tapes was unnecessary.  [However,] other work might have been pursued and 
was not, witness enquiries. [PP] 
 
An even better use of resources was noted in a comment where some costs (but not 
others) were shared: 
 
It was appropriate to instruct an expert in handwriting and ESDA and it is 
noted the cost was shared with a co-defending solicitor where there was no 
conflict over the issue. Also appropriate was the decision not to accede to the 
request to share instructing this expert with solicitors for a co-accused who 
requested this where there clearly was a fundamental conflict in respect of that 
issue. [PDO] 
 
Comments about disbursements were generally positive. 
 
G:   Ethics 
 
Tables 4.12a and 4.12b below examine the way in which suppliers dealt with any 
ethical problems arising from their work in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts 
respectively. The specific issue the peer reviewers addressed was: 
 
1)  Where ethical issues arise, were they dealt with appropriately? 
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Table 4.12a Ethics, Magistrates’ Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Where ethical 
issues arise, 
were they 
dealt with 
appropriately
? (%yes) 90.9 90.0 80.0 76.9 100 50.0 100 N/A 100 60.0 
* 
72.2  20.0 
* 
86.7 68.6 
 
Table 4.12b Ethics, Crown Court Sample 
 
Birmingham Cheltenham Liverpool Middlesbrough Pontypridd Swansea All areas  
PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP PDO PP 
Where ethical 
issues arise, 
were they 
dealt with 
appropriately
? (%yes)  100 75.0 85.7 100 100 N/A 42.9 100 25.0 60.0 88.9 66.7 78.0 74.1 
 
 
G.1 The Appropriateness of Dealing with Ethical Issues 
 
This question is relevant where it is clear from the file that there was an ethical issue 
such as conflict of interests, client confidentiality, duty to the court, etc. It is presented 
as a percentage of the cases with ethical issues that were dealt with properly, so the 
higher the number, the better the supplier’s performance. 
 
Overall the PDOs were more likely to deal appropriately with ethical issues than were 
private practice. They were significantly better in the magistrates’ courts and the 
difference was greater there also (almost 20%). 
 
The only significant result at the local level underscores the overall trend, although  
the difference in the Swansea magistrates’ court sample was much larger, with the 
PDO handling ethical issues appropriately in 72% of relevant cases compared to only 
20% for private practice. The latter figure means that private practice in this area 
failed to deal with four fifths of ethical problems in an appropriate manner.  However, 
it is notable that a high proportion of PDO sample files in Swansea (20 out 50 in both 
courts) were identified as containing ethical issues, compared to only 8 out 50 for 
private practice in the area. 
 
The finding that the PDOs handled ethical issues appropriately more often than 
private practice serves to some extent to address concerns about the independence of a 
salaried defence service.      
 
Discussion 
 
There is little in the way of succinct discussion of the ethical issues in the peer 
reviewers’ notes, but it is in dealing appropriately with ethical problems that the 
suppliers receive some of the worst ratings awarded over the entire peer review 
process. It is essential that conflicts of interest are confronted and dealt with properly, 
not merely to maintain professional standards but to protect the client, the integrity of 
the judicial system and the suppliers themselves. Here are examples of the sorts of 
ethical problems that came to the attention of peer reviewers: 
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 This client approached [X] at court in relation to a transfer of rep.  Without 
informing the solicitor instructed and acting under a Rep Order [X] attended 
(19th Feb) the client in prison and took a full proof of evidence. This is 
surprising conduct given the ethical position generally and indeed the absence 
of material upon which to take instructions. The court declined to transfer the 
Rep Order yet [X] attends the client in prison again (28th Feb) without 
notifying the solicitor who was acting under the existing order. This time the 
client was advised on the strengths or otherwise of the prosecution evidence. 
The Rep Order was not transferred until 26th March. Apart from the 
professional discourtesy and the fact that in most circumstances it is wholly 
inappropriate to see, proof and advise a client where someone else is acting 
this work was obviously un-funded although a letter to the client dated 19th 
February suggests that as he signed a document that day he was funded. The 
original solicitor was content for a transfer to take place but this kind of 
cavalier approach to professional ethics needs to be addressed. There is no 
evidence of any internal review taking place on this file, which may have 
brought this to light at an early stage. [PDO] 
 
I was concerned to see a note from the client saying he would plead guilty 
although he didn't think he was. It is clear that mitigation was put forward on 
his behalf. One wonders what mitigation could ethically be advanced in these 
circumstances! This in reality is an issue I take with defence counsel rather 
than the supplier, but a note on file explaining this 'anomaly' would have been 
welcome. [PDO] 
 
Some concerns as to sending out attendance notes of legal advice to client to 
his family but as all other ethical issues dealt with appropriately it may be the 
case that this was agreed and the failing is to note it at the time and perhaps 
get written authorisation from client. [PDO] 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has reported on two peer review studies, one relating solely to work at 
the investigation or police station stage of cases and conducted at an early point in the 
research, after the Public Defender Service had been in operation for between one and 
two years, and the second based on two equal samples of magistrates’ court and 
Crown Court cases.  In both studies, the performance of the PDOs was compared 
with a sample of files drawn from private practitioners working in the same areas and 
relating to cases in the main police stations or courts served by the PDOs   Taken 
together, the two studies represent the largest study involving independent peer 
review of criminal defence files ever conducted. 
 
The earlier study showed a variable pattern of results as regards the quality of work 
undertaken by the individual PDOs, and frequently differences between areas and 
PDOs were more marked than those between the two types of service provider.   
Nevertheless, the results overall tended to show that at this stage the PDOs were not 
performing less well in their police station work than private practice and in some 
respects better.  The specific areas in which the PDOs performed well in comparison 
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with private practice were the adequacy of their police station pro forma, the layout of 
their files, timeliness of first contact with the client, and appropriateness of advice to 
clients on their strategy in police interviews.  The latter finding is important given 
that PDO investigation stage clients tended to make no comment in police interviews 
more often than private practice clients.  On the other hand, private practice tended to 
perform better than the PDOs in relation to legibility of files, information recording 
on files, and the appropriateness of decisions to attend in person at the police station 
and at police interviews.  On the remaining specific criteria included in the first peer 
review study, there was either little to distinguish between the performance of PDOs 
and their private practice comparators taken as a whole, or there was insufficient 
information available to make a judgement  
 
In terms of the adequacy of the overall level of service in police station cases, the 
PDOs generally performed somewhat better in this earlier study than private practice, 
and this was also the case for four of the six individual PDOs.  The PDO in 
Pontypridd was assessed as providing an overall ‘excellent’ service in over half, and a 
‘good’ service in almost all the rest, of its police station cases, and two other PDOs 
(Cheltenham and Swansea) had a majority of their cases assessed as ‘good’ or 
‘excellent’.  The other three PDOs could not be said to have attained similar levels of 
service quality, although all had a majority of their files rated as at least competent in 
terms of overall performance.   
 
There are a number of other features of the results of the first peer review that may be 
highlighted.  First, there were some aspects of police station practice on which both 
the PDOs and private practice performed poorly.  The most notable of these was in 
the failure to record the advice offered to suspects in police stations regarding their 
legal position.  Although the PDOs performed significantly better than private 
practice in this respect, it was still the case that a majority of their files contained no 
record of such advice.  In this respect, the Pontypridd PDO again stood out, with only 
12% of its files containing no record of advice given to suspects on their legal 
position.  
 
A second feature of the earlier peer review findings was the often significant regional 
variations in quality of service at police stations, regardless of whether the service had 
been provided by a PDO or private practice firm.  This in turn is reflected in 
differences in quality performance between individual PDOs.  It would be true to say 
that, while some of the PDOs had attained excellence, others lagged behind, perhaps 
often reflecting standards of service within their locales rather than a national ethos 
for the Public Defender Service as a whole.  In this respect, the PDS is unlike most 
private practices, in that it does benefit from common systems, e.g. in terms of pro 
forma and file organisation and layout, across all of its offices.  Variations in the 
quality of service between PDOs is therefore likely to be a function of how these 
common systems are implemented locally and the lack of more centralised 
professional management of the service during its initial stages of operation. 
 
In this latter respect, the second peer review exercise reported in this chapter shows 
much more consistent results across five of the six PDOs included in the research.  
There is also a clear pattern of these PDOs, and the service overall, performing better 
or at the very least at the same level as private practice in terms of almost all aspects 
of their case handling.  In terms of the individual offices, three stood out as having 
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performed significantly better than private practice on a number of specific measures 
relating to file completeness, communications, fact gathering, and the appropriateness 
of the advice and assistance given to the client.  These were the PDOs in Cheltenham, 
Middlesbrough and Pontypridd.   
 
The one exception among the PDOs in the second peer review was the Swansea 
office, which frequently performed worse than private practice in various aspects of 
their case handling.  This finding contrasts with the generally good performance of 
the Swansea PDO in the earlier study which focussed solely on the investigation 
stage.  The two sets of findings are not necessarily inconsistent: the office could have 
performed well in the early study due to particular personnel working in the police 
station but not have carried this through to its management of cases in the 
magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.  This office also experienced considerable 
changes in personnel, both when some staff shifted to the Pontypridd PDO when it 
opened in September 2002 and later when the original office head left the service.  
 
Two other features of the second peer review results can be noted.  First, although 
there were some significant differences in performance between the PDOs and private 
practice in the Crown Court, again with the PDOs for the most part performing better, 
in general such differences were greater at the investigation and magistrates’ court 
stages of cases.  Secondly, despite these differences in performance on various 
measures of case processing and handling, the study found very few significant 
variations between the PDOs and private practice in terms of specific impacts on 
outcomes.  It may be that this finding demonstrates a need for more work in 
developing outcome measures for criminal defence work.  On the other hand, it may 
also suggest that once a certain level of quality in terms of case handling is reached, 
outcomes tend to be determined more by factors outside the control of the criminal 
defence provider and relating to the wider criminal justice system.  
        
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Costs of Public Defender Offices 
 
 
This chapter examines the cost of the Public Defender Offices (PDOs), both in 
general and in comparison with private practice solicitors undertaking legally-aided 
criminal defence work in the same localities.  We originally explored two ways of 
carrying out the latter comparison, one based on the ‘cost to the public purse’ and the 
second on the ‘cost to the provider’ of criminal legally-aided defence services.150F135  
Whilst the ‘cost to the public purse’ approach is the most meaningful comparison for 
our purposes (indicating actual costs to the Treasury of the two forms of service), 
supplementing this with a ‘cost to the provider’ analysis would help to explore the 
underlying cost base and sustainability of two types of provision.  However, it proved 
impossible to obtain sufficient data from private practice firms about their cost base in 
terms of staff numbers and salaries, office overheads, etc. to enable the ‘costs to the 
provider approach’ comparison to be made.  
  
The ‘cost to the public purse’ method compares the costs paid by the Legal Services 
Commission (LSC) to private practice firms for the conduct of criminal legal aid 
cases, with that incurred by the LSC for similar cases undertaken by the PDOs.  Data 
on the costs paid to private practice for criminal legal aid cases in police stations and 
magistrates’ courts151F136 are readily available from SPOCC.  It should be noted that 
SPOCC data cover only the costs paid to firms and not other costs to the public purse 
of administering such payments and the provision of criminal legal aid services more 
generally, such as those incurred in the processing of contract claims, the conduct of 
cost and quality audits of both private practice firms and PDOs, and the 
administration of local duty solicitor schemes.152F3 
 
PDOs have also been required, as part of this research, to file claims under SPOCC 
for the cases they have completed, including a calculation of the costs they would 
have been eligible for had they been paid for these cases under criminal contract 
rates.153F4 However, these claims are ‘notional’ in two respects.  First, they do not form 
the basis for the payment of costs to the PDOs.  Rather, the PDOs have been funded 
directly from the LSC for all of their costs, including staff salaries, accommodation, 
office expenses, computers, and expenses of cases such as travel costs and 
disbursements.  Secondly, it follows from this that the costs entered on SPOCC claims 
by PDOs do not represent the actual costs to the LSC of the cases conducted by them.  
It is necessary instead to calculate the costs of these cases through some method 
                                                 
135  These two methods are described in more detail in L. Bridges, et.al., Methods for Researching and 
Evaluating the Public Defender Service, Legal Research Institute (University of Warwick) and Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies (London), February and August 2002 
(http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/pds/methodology_paper.pdf.  
136  We have had to adopt a different method for comparing cost on Crown Court cases, which is 
discussed below.   
3 For reasons discussed below, our calculations of the cost of private practice cases do not include such 
central administrative costs of criminal contracting. 
4 This practice was continued until April 2005.   
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whereby the direct expenditure by the LSC on the PDOs is divided between the cases 
which they have completed.   
 
The most obvious way of distributing PDO cost is on the basis of the time that they 
spend in completing cases.  Unfortunately, although the costs paid under contracts are 
calculated on the basis of standard rates paid for the time and other inputs into each 
case, since the advent of criminal contracting for such services in 2001, firms (and the 
PDOs) have not been required routinely to report information on time and other inputs 
on the SPOCC claim form and therefore these data are not available to the Legal 
Services Commission on a systematic basis.  Nevertheless, to assist the research and 
the management of the PDS, PDOs have been required from the outset separately to 
record the amount of time spent on each case which they conduct.154F5  For an initial 
period of just over a year, these data were recorded on each individual case file but 
subsequently time recording was incorporated into the service’s computerised Case 
Management System (CMS).155F6 
 
Data on time have been used for two purposes.  The first has been to calculate an 
overall ‘cost of time’ figure for each PDO, by dividing the costs of each PDO for each 
year covered by the research by the total amount of time spent by that office on 
casework in the year.  The second has been to provide a method for attributing these 
costs to individual cases.  This has been done by multiplying the time recorded on 
CMS for individual cases by the overall ‘cost of time’ figure for each office.156F7  This 
provides an estimate of the actual costs of PDO cases, as distinct from the ‘notional’ 
costs entered under SPOCC, which can then be compared with the costs of private 
practice claims in the same areas.    
 
The above provides only an outline of the method of cost comparison adopted in this 
research.  At each stage, it has been necessary to make a number of assumptions 
which are explained more fully below.  We look first at the issue of time spent by 
PDOs on cases, including in relation to the staffing of each office.  We then go on to 
examine the cost of the PDOs and the calculation of their ‘cost of time’.  Finally, we 
carry out the calculation of the cost of PDO cases based on time spent on them and 
compare this with the costs paid to private practice for various types of legal aid case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Private practice firms must also record this information on their own case files and make it available 
to the LSC auditors when required.  The lack of a centralised source of data on the time spent on cases 
by private practice has limited the extent to which we have been able to compare the efficiency (as 
distinct from the cost effectiveness) of the two forms of service provision in terms of how long it takes 
them to deal with comparable cases.  Some comparative time data has been obtained from private 
practice through our own case file samples (see Chapter 2), and further reference is made to this basis 
of comparison of the two types of service later in this chapter.   
6 The intention was that the data recorded during the initial period of operation would eventually be 
transferred onto CMS, but in the event it proved necessary to mount a special data collection exercise 
to obtain information direct from the case files on the amount of time spent on these cases.  This 
covered between 300 and 400 files in each of the four initial PDOs, including work done both in 2001-
2 and early 2002-3.  These data have subsequently been combined with that derived from CMS. 
7 Where work on a particular case has been spread over more than one year, different ‘cost of time’ 
figures have been used for each year in order to calculate the total cost of the case.  
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Time Spent on Cases 
 
(i)  Time recording in PDOs 
 
PDOs have recorded their work under the headings of 'chargeable', 'non-chargeable' 
and 'pro bono', with further divisions under each heading between time spent, letters 
written and telephone calls made in respect of each case.  In common with private 
practice, time spent on cases has been recorded on CMS in six minute units,157F8 with 
each letter written and telephone call made counting for one six minute unit.158F9   
 
The distinction between chargeable, non-chargeable and pro bono work is important.  
Chargeable work represents work which normally would be billable either to the LSC 
under criminal (or civil) legal aid or otherwise to a private client.  Of course, the 
PDOs were generally restricted to carrying out only such work that would normally 
be eligible for criminal legal aid, and therefore were not in a position either to 
undertake civil legal aid work or to bill privately for any work undertaken.  They were 
allowed to carry out a small amount of pro bono work as a means of recruiting or 
retaining clients.  In this latter respect, their practices were similar to those of many 
private practitioners, who will occasionally carry out criminal work free for 
established or potential clients who they would normally expect to bring them legally-
aided work.  The total amount of pro bono work recorded in the PDOs covered by the 
research in 2003-4 (when time recording was probably most accurate) was 2.5% in 
Birmingham, 2.6% in Liverpool, 6.2% in Middlesbrough, 2.9% in Swansea/ 
Pontypridd and 2.6% in Cheltenham.  For our purposes, pro bono work has been 
treated as a form of non-chargeable work. 
 
Non-chargeable work can be of two types.  First, it can involve work on cases that are 
otherwise legally-aided but where the specific item of work is not eligible for 
payment under legal aid.  This can be termed as case-related non-chargeable work.  
Such non-chargeable work is common to both private practice and to PDOs, and we 
have no reason to believe that the incidence of case-related non-chargeable time 
should have been greater in the PDOs than in private practice.159F10 Indeed, if this were 
the case it would indicate that PDOs would have been using their special funding 
position, of having their costs paid directly by the LSC rather than having to claim 
                                                 
8  The normal practice in both private practice firms and the PDOs is to round up any fraction of six 
minutes to the next whole six minute unit.  However, our understanding is that the PDS at an early 
stage decided to record direct case work time exactly and not in six  minute units.  This is likely to have 
resulted in a slight under-recording of total time spent on cases compared with private practice.   
9 For cases not recorded on CMS during the initial period of operation of the PDS, it was often not 
possible to determine the exact number of telephone calls made in police station advice cases, 
especially where a standard fixed fee was recorded covering all telephone advice.  Each such standard 
fee was also counted as representing six minutes.  It is also important to note that certain types of work 
were not recorded on CMS in terms of time spent on them.  This was the case for time spent on standby 
as police station duty solicitor and acting as a court duty solicitor, both of which were not separately 
recorded on CMS until June 2003.  Another method has therefore had to be adopted to take account of 
these forms of work (see below). 
10 In 2003-4, when recording of non-chargeable time by the PDOs appears to have been most 
comprehensive, between 2.9% and 14.3% of all non-chargeable time in the PDOs included in the 
research was devoted to ‘production of letters/documents’ or to ‘time spent on telephone calls’.    
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them on a case-by-case basis, in order to undertake types of work for clients that 
would normally be outside the scope of legal aid.   
 
The second type of non-chargeable time is that spent on work that is not directly 
related to specific cases, such as general office or practice administration (including 
preparing legal aid claims and other bills), training for staff, etc.  Again, such work is 
common both to private practice and the PDOs, although here it is arguable that the 
PDOs may have been required to undertake more non-case related non-chargeable 
work than would normally be expected in private practice.  Certainly during the initial 
operation of the PDOs the office heads and other staff would have been involved in a 
great deal of non-case related work in setting up the offices, recruiting staff, and 
establishing administrative systems.160F11  Office heads were also required to attend 
meetings with the LSC relating the general management and development of the 
service as a whole.  A certain amount of PDO staff time has also had to be devoted to 
the requirements of the research, including preparing and filing SPOCC claims.  
Finally, some of the PDOs have become involved in general criminal justice 
initiatives in their areas.161F12   
 
The issue that this raises for the research is to what extent non-chargeable time should 
be taken into account in calculating cost of time and of cases in the PDOs, in 
comparison with private practice.  There are problems associated with any attempt to 
take account of non-chargeable time in our calculations.  Practices of the PDOs varied 
quite considerably, both between offices and over time, as regards the recording of 
non-chargeable time.  In 2001-2, non-chargeable time accounted for under 3% of all 
time recorded by the PDOs included in the research, and in 2002-3 this increased to 
just under 13%.  However, in 2003-4 non-chargeable time constituted just under half 
of all time recorded by the PDOs.  These variations probably reflect both 
improvements in the consistency of time recording by the PDOs and a general change 
in practice in the later year whereby staff were required to account for all their 
working time and not just that related to specific cases or other types of work. 162F13   
 
Beyond these methodological problems, it has been decided to base our calculations 
only on chargeable time and not to include any non-chargeable time.  The main 
reason for this is that we are seeking to address the question of how much it has cost 
the public purse to obtain criminal legal aid services through a salaried service in 
comparison with what it would cost to obtain similar services from private practice.  
By definition, non-chargeable work falls outside the scope of what would be eligible 
                                                 
11 In interviews with PDO staff, it was generally felt that the administrative and 'bureaucratic' demands 
on them were greater than these staff had previously experienced when working in private practice.  
See Chapter 7 for further discussion of these interviews. 
12 Again, in 2003-4, between 7.1% and 13.8% of non-chargeable time recorded in each of the PDOs 
included in the research was devoted to management, administration, supervision, practice 
development and marketing; between 3.3% and 17% to attendance at meetings; between 6.9% and 
11.6% to staff training, and between 17.2% and 28.6% was taken up with staff holidays and sickness.  
However, by far the largest proportion of non-chargeable time (between 25.8% and 48.9%) was 
recorded as ‘other’.  Time spent directly with the researchers did not account for more than 0.6% of 
non-chargeable time in any of the offices.   
13 The latter change is illustrated by the fact that in 2002-3 the research PDOs recorded an average of 
820 hours per fee-earning member of staff, whereas in 2003-4 this increased to an average of 1738 
hours recorded per member of staff.  Of this increase of 918 hours per staff recorded between the two 
years, 748 hours were attributable to an increase in the recording of non-chargeable time.     
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for payment under criminal legal aid.  As noted above, so far as case-related non-
chargeable time is concerned, although there are no data available on this from private 
practice, we have no reason to believe that PDOs would have devoted more non-
chargeable time to cases than their private practice counterparts.  Equally, both sectors 
will have incurred non-case related, non-chargeable time on office administration, 
training, etc.  However, as discussed above, it is arguable that the PDOs have engaged 
in other forms of non-case related, non-chargeable work to a greater extent than might 
normally be expected in private practice. and under our methodology the costs of this 
work has been added into and therefore increased direct case costs for the PDOs.  
However, we have no means of estimating the extent of such work or comparing it 
with what would normally be incurred in private practice.   
 
(ii)  Chargeable time in PDOs 
 
Bearing these factors in mind, Table 5.1 presents data relating to the chargeable and 
non-chargeable (with the latter including pro bono) time recorded by each of the 
PDOs included in the research during the first three years of operation of the service 
(2001-2004), with more abridged data on chargeable time in each office for the 
subsequent two years (2004-2006) which strictly fell outside the period of the 
research.163F14  As will be seen, three of the initial four PDOs (Birmingham, Liverpool 
and Middlesbrough) each recorded between 1500 and 2000 hours of chargeable time 
in their first year of operation, whereas the Swansea PDO recorded 3326 chargeable 
hours.  This reflected both the early success of the Swansea PDO in recruiting clients 
in comparison with the other offices and the heavy dependence of the other offices 
during this period on duty solicitor work for obtaining clients (see Chapter 2).   
 
In their second year of operation, these initial four PDOs all recorded significant 
increases in chargeable time.  The greatest increase was in Liverpool where recorded 
chargeable time grew by 215% between 2001-2 and 2002-3, followed by the 
Middlesbrough PDOs with a 189% increase and the Birmingham PDO with a 125% 
increase in recorded chargeable time between the two years.   By this time, the 
Pontypridd PDO had been opened as a ‘branch office’ of the Swansea PDO, and the 
two offices combined achieved a 136% increase in chargeable time compared with 
that recorded in the Swansea PDO the previous year.  Also, the Cheltenham PDO 
opened in late 2001-2, and in what was effectively its first full year of operation in 
2002-3 it recorded nearly 4500 chargeable hours,164F15 which was more than any of the 
other PDOs in its opening year. 
 
The data show that, other than in the Birmingham PDO, this growth in chargeable 
time continued into 2003-4, although at a slower rate than in the previous year.  
Between 2002-3 and 2003-4, chargeable time increased by 43% for the Liverpool 
PDO, by 10% in Middlesbrough, 16% in Swansea/Pontypridd, and by 30% in 
Cheltenham (in what was effectively the second year of operation of this office).  In 
                                                 
14 Because the Cheltenham PDO came into operation only late in 2001-2, we show it in the tables in 
this chapter after the other PDOs included in the research.  Also, we have included data on time and 
costs for this office for the short period it was open in 2001-2 in the figures for 2002-3, its first full year 
of operation.  Data on the Swansea and Pontypridd PDOs were combined on CMS for some time, and 
we have therefore shown this in a number of tables as one combined office for the purposes of 
analysing time and costs. 
15 This includes 10.77 hours of chargeable time carried forward from 2001-2. 
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the Birmingham PDO, however, the amount of chargeable time recorded in 2003-4 
was actually 16% less than in the previous year, although there appear to have been 
significant staff vacancies in this office during the year (see below).   
 
Although falling outside the research period, the figures for 2004-5 show that 
recorded chargeable time reduced by 3% in the Birmingham office and by 2% in the 
Swansea and Pontypridd offices. These reductions were despite the fact that these 
offices had more staff in 2004-5 than the previous year, in the case of the Birmingham 
PDO significantly so (see below), and suggest that these offices at least had 
temporarily reached a plateau in the number of clients they were attracting and cases 
being conducted.   Both the offices in Liverpool and Middlesbrough continued to 
show an increase in chargeable hours recorded in 2004-5.  In Liverpool, where there 
was also a significant increase in staff, chargeable hours increased by 4% over the 
previous year.  In Middlesbrough chargeable hours increased by 10%, although this 
may be related to the fact that the data for this year combine the returns for both the 
original Middlesbrough office and the Darlington branch office, whereas the figures 
for previous years relate solely to the Middlesbrough office.  The Cheltenham PDO, 
in what was effectively its third full year of operation, recorded a further 20% annual 
increase in chargeable hours in 2004-5. 
 
Figures for 2005-6 show very sizeable increases in chargeable hours recorded at all 
the PDOs included in the research.  During this year, the Birmingham PDO recorded a 
59% increase in chargeable hours over the previous year,  the Liverpool PDO  a 53% 
increase, the Middlesbrough and Darlington PDOs a 46% increase, and the 
Cheltenham PDO a 70% increase.  Growth in chargeable hours in the Swansea and 
Pontypridd PDOs during 2005-6 was less dramatic, amounting to a 11% increase in 
comparison with the previous year.  In the Birmingham PDO and the Middlesbrough 
and Darlington PDOs, the growth in recorded chargeable hours in 2005-6 was 
associated with slight decreases in staff, but in the others there was an increase in staff 
working in the offices between 2004-5 and 2005-6 (see below).  The growth in 
chargeable hours recorded over this period was also likely to be a product of the 
development of a central business team and of new forms of performance targets for 
each of the PDOs.165F16   
 
                                                 
16 These are discussed in Chapter 1.   
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Table 5.1    Annual Recorded Chargeable and Non-Chargeable Time in Public Defender Offices, 2001-2005 
 
 
  
 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea and
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All Research Offices
2001-2       
  Chargeable 1,992.29 1,548.4 1,596.34 3,326.11  8,463.14 
  Non-chargeable  40.43 71.27 33.74 70.41  215.85 
       
2002-3       
  Chargeable 4,488.62 4,874.49 4,608.59 7,849.08 4,488.68 26,309.46 
  Non-chargeable  865.64 151.73 746.78 785.88 1333.20 3,883.23 
       
2003-4       
  Chargeable 3,766.76 6,987.31 5,076.98 9,077.90 6,438.15 31,347.10 
  Non-chargeable  2,460.31 6,305.39 6,484.98 8,449.47 6,448.76 30,148.91 
       
2004-5       
  Chargeable 3,658.20 7,289.2 7,392.76 8,871.77 8,337.39 35,549.32 
       
2005-6       
  Chargeable 5,800.09 11,162.03 10,798.93 9878.86 14,215.17 51,855.08 
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Staffing and Utilisation of Staff Time in PDOs 
 
The above data need to be related to staffing levels within the PDOs.    Initially, it was 
planned for each PDO to have a senior solicitor appointed as office head, two or three 
further solicitors, and a similar number of accredited police station representatives.  
This decision was based on the PDOs needing rapidly to build a client base from 
scratch whilst being able to provide a fully comprehensive service, and on concerns 
that there might be a reluctance among other local private practice providers to 
cooperate with the PDOs at least at the outset of the service.166F16  The staffing model 
adopted is very likely to differ significantly from that on which private practice firms 
might be expected to seek to establish a new office, where staffing would be limited 
initially to the numbers of fee-earning staff sustainable by a limited client base, with 
further staff being engaged as the number of clients and cases gradually increased.  It 
is also the case that new private practice firms are often created out of spin-offs from, 
and even splits of, existing firms and therefore start with some established clients of 
the solicitors concerned.   
 
In this latter respect, it may be noted that it was primarily in Swansea and Liverpool 
among the initial PDOs that senior staff were recruited from the general local area and 
therefore had some local following among clients to build upon.  The Cheltenham 
PDO, established a year later, although its original head was recruited from outside 
the area, did have other staff who had previously practised within the locality.  The 
PDO opened during 2002-3 in Pontypridd was established as a branch of the Swansea 
PDO and therefore began with an established client base transferred from Swansea.    
 
Table 5.2 shows the levels of fee-earning 167F17 (shown in terms of full time staff 
equivalents) of each PDO during the research period covering the first three years of 
operation of the service, again with additional data relating to the following two years.  
The figures take account of staff vacancies that arose from time to time during the 
course of these years.  As will be seen, three of the four initial offices started with a 
model that involved a mixture of solicitors and accredited representatives, although 
these three offices varied in the extent to which they retained their initial staff even 
throughout the first year.  The Birmingham PDO started with a different staffing 
structure, consisting only of solicitors but with no accredited representatives, although 
the original staff included one member initially recruited as an accredited 
representative but who at the time of his employment was completing his qualification 
as a solicitor.  This staffing model was retained through the first three years by the 
Birmingham PDO, with solicitor staff later being joined by trainee solicitors as part of 
a deliberate staffing policy.  Only in 2004-5 did the Birmingham PDO take on an 
accredited police station representative.   
 
Otherwise, the staffing model of solicitors supported by accredited representatives 
was maintained in all the offices, including Cheltenham when it opened in Spring 
2002, with all offices gradually building their staffing numbers from the first year 
onwards.  The Swansea PDO also took on a trainee solicitor in its second year of 
operation, as did the Cheltenham PDO in 2004-5.  The only significant exception to 
this was in Birmingham where continuing staff recruitment problems meant that 
                                                 
16 These issues are discussed more fully in Chapter 1. 
17 This includes the office head who in every case has been a senior solicitor, other solicitors, 
accredited representatives and trainee solicitors.   
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overall numbers dropped between 2002-3 and 2003-4, recovering somewhat in 2004-5 
but reducing again in 2005-6. 
 
Table 5.2 also shows the average number of chargeable hours recorded in each office 
per fee-earning member of staff over the five years.  Given the initial staffing model 
adopted and the need to recruit a client base from scratch, it is perhaps not surprising 
that none of the initial four PDOs achieved a very high average number of chargeable 
hours per member of fee earning staff in their first year of operation.  This ranged 
between 400 and 450 chargeable hours per staff member in the Birmingham, 
Liverpool and Swansea offices, down to an average of only 334 chargeable hours in 
Middlesbrough in 2001-2.  The Cheltenham PDO was the most successful in its first 
full year of operation, in 2002-3, with 573 average chargeable hours recorded per 
member of staff.  By this time, all the other PDOs had significantly increased their 
average number of chargeable hours per staff, with Birmingham averaging 659 
chargeable hours per staff, Middlesbrough and Swansea/Pontypridd PDOs both 
achieving an average of over 700 hours and the Liverpool PDO an average of nearly 
950.   
 
By 2003-4, three of the PDOs (Liverpool, Swansea/Pontypridd and Cheltenham in 
only its second full year of operation) were averaging close to or in excess of 900 
chargeable hours per fee earning member of staff.  The Middlesbrough PDO had also 
increased its previous year’s average but less significantly, to just under 800 average 
chargeable hours.  The Birmingham PDO also nearly achieved an average of 800 
average chargeable hours, although on the basis of fewer total chargeable hours 
recorded, thus reflecting their reduced staffing numbers in this year.   
 
In 2004-5, three of the four original PDOs (now in their fourth year of operation) 
experienced a decrease in average chargeable hours per fee earning member of staff. 
This appears to have been the result of a deliberate policy to increase solicitor staff in 
some of the offices in order to boost the number of clients recruited especially through 
duty solicitor referrals, which did not prove immediately successful.  The most 
dramatic decline was in Liverpool, where a combination of a small increase in overall 
chargeable hours recorded (+4%) and an increase of staff numbers by a third, meant 
that the average per staff member reduced from nearly 900 to just under 700 
chargeable hours.  The Birmingham PDO also recorded a decline in chargeable hours 
per staff member for similar reasons.  The average chargeable hours per staff member 
in the Swansea and Pontypridd PDOs decreased from nearly 1,000 in 2003-4 to just 
under 900 in 2004-5.  Only the Middlesbrough PDO, of the four original offices, 
showed a continuing increase in average chargeable hours per staff in 2004-5, 
although this may have been a function of these figures including those for the 
Darlington branch office in this year.168F18  The Cheltenham PDO, in its third full year of 
operation, increased its chargeable hours per fee earner by a further 20% over the 
previous year and was thus the first of all the PDO to record an average of more than 
1,000 chargeable hours per fee earner in a year.  
 
One question is what norm, in terms of average chargeable hours per fee earner, the 
PDOs should be working toward.  In fact, no such target was set during their initial 
                                                 
18 Both the chargeable hours and staff from the Darlington office are included with Middlesbrough in 
2004-5 amd 2005-6. 
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period of operation, in recognition of the difficulties they were likely to encounter in 
recruiting up to a full client base.  Latterly the service has adopted a target of 1,100 
chargeable hours per fee earner, comparable to that which has been used by the Legal 
Services Commission in other areas such as contracting with not-for-profit providers 
for civil legal aid.  Evidence collected recently by Frontier E169F18 from a survey of over 
300 firms with legal aid contracts (covering both civil and criminal legal aid) showed 
that just under 10% achieved fewer than 800 chargeable hours per fee earner, with a 
further 17% between 800 and 999 chargeable hours per fee earner.  On the other hand, 
approximately a quarter of the firms in this survey were producing in excess of 1,400 
chargeable hours per fee earner in a year.  There was also evidence in the survey that 
criminal legal aid firms tended to achieve higher average chargeable hours per fee 
earner than those operating in other types of legal aid.    
 
Although there are problems with the  Frontier Economics survey,170F19 it would 
therefore appear that by 2004-5 four of the PDOs included in this research were 
operating at a level that would have placed them in the bottom quartile of legal aid 
firms in terms of the number of chargeable hours achieved per fee earner, with two 
(Birmingham and Middlesbrough) being in the bottom 10%.  The Cheltenham PDO, 
on the other hand, had by the end of its third full year, achieved an average of 
chargeable hours per fee earner close to the median for legal aid firms, although 
possibly somewhat lower than this when compared with firms specialising in criminal 
legal aid.   
 
The most recent figures for chargeable hours recorded by the PDOs, for 2005-6, show 
a dramatic improvement, with the Birmingham PDO achieving 1,450 chargeable 
hours per fee earner during the year; the Cheltenham PDO around 1,300, Liverpool 
PDO just over 1,200; and the Middlesbrough PDO between 1,100 and just over 1,200 
(depending on whether or not trainees are included in the calculation).  Only the 
Swansea/Pontypridd PDOs, with between 700 and just over 800 chargeable hours per 
fee earner for 2005-6, failed to record an increase from the previous year.171F20  This 
suggests that two of these PDOs (Birmingham and Cheltenham) will be in the top 
quartile of criminal defence offices in respect of chargeable hours per fee-earner, three 
(Middlesbrough, Liverpool and Pontypridd) in the middle two quartiles, and one 
(Swansea) in the bottom quartile.   
 
What is unclear from these data is how far improvements in the number of chargeable 
hours per fee earner are the product of the PDOs recruiting more clients and/or 
undertaking more cases than in earlier years; the better recording of and therefore 
increases in the time actually spent on cases; or some combination of both of these 
factors.  If the increases primarily reflect improved recording practices rather than an 
increased number of clients and/or cases, this would not imply any significant 
reduction in case costs.  On the other hand, an increase in clients and/or number of 
                                                 
18 A market analysis of legal aided services provided by solicitors, London, Frontier Economics Ltd, 
December 2003 (available at www.dca.gov.uk). 
19 The response rate was low and  biased towards larger firms.  Whilst one might surmise that this may 
lead to an estimate of higher levels of chargeable time, it is also fair to say that the PDOs were of a size 
which would make this group a better comparator, than a completely representative sample of the 
population of all legal aid firms large and small.. 
20 The separate figure for the Pontypridd PDO is 1,123 chargeable hours per fee earner and for Swansea 
between 570 and 680. 
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cases would mean that average case costs may have been significantly reduced from 
earlier years.  We compared the percentage increases in chargeable hours per staff in  
2005-6 with the rate of increase in the number of new cases recorded per 172F20 in each of 
the PDOs during the same period.  This shows that while chargeable hours per staff  
in the Birmingham PDO in 2005-6 were 80% higher than in the previous year, the 
number of new cases taken on per fee earner was only 42% higher.  In the Liverpool 
PDO, where  number of chargeable hours per fee earner was 75% higher than the 
previous year, the number of new cases recorded per staff was only 35% higher.  
Again, in the Middlesbrough PDO chargeable hours per fee earner increased by 40% 
but new cases per fee earner by only 15%.  In the Cheltenham PDO the number of 
chargeable hours per fee earner increased by 20% and the number of new matters per 
fee earner by 12%.  These figures suggest that, in all of the PDOs where there was an 
increase in chargeable hours recorded per fee earner, this was not matched by the 
same level of increase in new matters opened per fee earner, and that perhaps as much 
as half of the increase in chargeable hours would be attributable to better time 
recording practices.  However, this would still mean that the remainder of the increase 
in chargeable hours does represent a real increase in productivity per staff and 
therefore a reduction in costs per case.   
 
 
                                                 
20 In each case using the number of solicitors/barristers and accredited representatives (but excluding 
trainees) as the base for the calculations. 
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Table 5.2    Annual Staffing Levels and Utilisation of Staff Time in Public Defender Offices, 2001-2005 
 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea and 
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham 
(1) 
All Research 
Offices 
2001-2       
Fee Earning Staff (ftes)       
  Solicitors/Barristers 3.03 1.78 3 3.65  11.46 
  Accredited Representatives  1.84 1.78 3.4  7.02 
  Trainee Solicitors 1.48   0.73  2.21 
Total (excluding trainees) 3.03 3.62 4.78 7.05  18.48 
Total (including trainees) 4.51 3.62 4.78 7.78  20.69 
       
Chargeable Time       
Total 1,992.29 1,548.4 1,596.34 3,326.11  8,463.14 
per fee earner (excluding trainees) 657.5 427.7 334.0 471.8  458.0 
per fee earner (including trainees) 441.7 427.7 334.0 427.5  409.0 
       
2002-3       
Fee Earning Staff (ftes)       
  Solicitors/Barristers 4.81 2.98 3.91 5.94 5.04 22.68 
  Accredited Representatives  2.16 2.18 3.98 2.8 11.12 
  Trainee Solicitors 2   1  3 
Total (excluding trainees) 4.81 5.14 6.09 9.92 7.84 33.8 
Total (including trainees) 6.81 5.14 6.09 10.92 7.84 36.8 
       
Chargeable Time       
Total 4,488.62 4,874.29 4,608.59 7,849.08 4,488.68 26,309.26 
per fee earner (excluding trainees) 933.2 948.3 756.7 791.2 572.5 778.4 
per fee earner (including trainees) 659.1 948.3 756.7 718.8 572.5 714.9 
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2003-4       
Fee Earning Staff (ftes)       
  Solicitors/Barristers 2.75 4.89 3.42 5.85 4.17 21.08 
  Accredited Representatives  3 3 3.33 2.91 12.24 
  Trainee Solicitors 2   0.07  2.07 
Total (excluding trainees) 2.75 7.89 6.42 9.18 7.08 33.32 
Total (including trainees) 4.75 7.89 6.42 9.25 7.08 35.39 
       
Chargeable Time       
Total 3,766.76 6,987.31 5,076.98 9,077.9 6,438.15 31,347.1 
per fee earner (excluding trainees) 1,369.7 885.6 790.8 988.9 909.3 940.8 
per fee earner (including trainees) 793.0 885.6 790.8 981.4 909.3 885.8 
       
2004-5       
Fee Earning Staff (ftes)       
  Solicitors/Barristers 4.12 6.42 5.38 6.71 4.2 26.83 
  Accredited Representatives 0.42 4 3 2.75 3.08 13.25 
  Trainee Solicitors 0.5 0 0 0.42 0.33 1.25 
Total (excluding trainees) 4.54 10.42 8.38 9.46 7.28 40.08 
Total (including trainees) 5.04 10.42 8.38 9.88 7.61 41.33 
       
Chargeable Time       
Total 3,658.2 7,289.2 7,392.76 8,871.39 8,337.39 35,549.32 
per fee earner (excluding trainees) 805.8 699.5 882.2 937.8 1,145.2 887.0 
per fee earner (including trainees) 725.8 699.5 882.2 897.9 1,095.6 860.1 
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2005-6       
Fee Earning Staff (ftes)       
  Solicitors/Barristers 4.0 6.75 6.0 9.92 5.8 32.47 
  Accredited Representatives - 2.35 2.92 2.0 4.53 11.8 
  Trainee Solicitors -  1.5 1.5 0.8 3.8 
Total (excluding trainees) 4.0 9.10 8.92 11.92 10.33 44.27 
Total (including trainees) 4.0 9.10 9.52 13.42 11.13 48.07 
       
Chargeable Time       
Total 5,800.09 11,162.03 10,798.93 9,878.86 14,215.17 51,855.08 
per fee earner (excluding trainees) 1,450.0 1,226.6 1,210.6 828.8 1,376.1 1,171.3 
Per fee earner (including trainees) 1,450.0 1,226.6 1,134.3 736.1 1,277.2 1,078.7 
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Costs of the Public Defender Offices 
 
Data were provided by the Legal Services Commission on various costs associated 
with the setting up and running of the Public Defender Service in each of its initial 
three years of operation.  These data included separate annual outturn figures for each 
of the PDOs, including the two offices not covered by the research (Chester and 
Darlington).  In addition, annual outturn figures were provided for the central ‘policy 
and legal’ costs incurred by the LSC in the direct administration of the PDS, including 
the salary costs of central staff directly employed within the PDS.  These central costs 
included internal recharges for central services associated with the initial recruitment 
of staff and procurement and setting up of offices. 173F21  
 
However, no attempt has been made to apportion the costs of other LSC staff, 
particularly working within the Criminal Defence Service, who might have 
contributed to the setting up and administration of the PDS in these years.  As noted 
previously, such staff also contribute to the administration of the contracting system 
under which private practice firms provide criminal legal aid services, and any 
attempt to apportion their costs to the PDS would have necessitated also providing an 
estimate of the central costs of administering criminal contracts as well.174F22  It was 
therefore decided to base our calculations of costs of both the PDS and private 
practice criminal legal aid services on the direct costs associated with these two forms 
of service and to exclude indirect costs associated with central administration of the 
Criminal Defence Service as a whole. 
 
Each outturn statement divides costs between running costs (including salary costs,  
communications, office supplies and machinery rental and maintenance, travel and 
subsistence, training and recruitment, publicity and publications, and miscellaneous 
items such as professional membership fees).  Accommodation costs (e.g. office 
rental) are shown separately, as is capital expenditure for fixture and fittings, furniture 
and equipment, and computers (including both hardware and software).   
 
(i)  Running costs 
 
The running costs figure for each office include sums directly associated with case 
work such as salaries and items which would be charged as disbursements by private 
practice, such as travel costs and payments to counsel and experts.  The latter have not 
been separated out for the purposes of our calculations but included in the overall 
costs of the PDOs and subsequent ‘cost of time’ figures for each office.  Therefore, 
when comparisons are drawn between PDO case costs and those of private practice 
for legally-aided criminal defence work, it is important to note that the cost of 
disbursements have also been included for private practice in their cost per case 
figures.  This does not apply to counsel’s fees in Crown Court cases, where such fees 
for both PDS and private practice cases are paid directly from the legal aid authorities 
to counsel (see below). 
 
                                                 
21 Private practice firms, particularly those with multiple offices, are likely to incur similar central 
administrative costs. 
22 For example, the introduction of contracting for criminal legal aid in 2001 required the setting up of a 
new data management system to process contract claims and administer payments to private practice 
firms. 
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For the purposes of calculating a cost of time for each PDO, salary and running costs 
associated with central staff specifically and exclusively employed to service the PDS 
have been distributed across each of the PDOs operational in a given year on the basis 
of that office's percentage share of the total local running costs of the same year.  This 
means that in 2001/2 central running costs were divided between five offices 
(Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Swansea and C175F22), while in 2002/3 they were 
distributed across these offices and three others (Pontypridd, Chester and Darlington).  
A small element of central running costs incurred pre-April 2001 were included in the 
2001/2 costs for the PDOs.   
 
As noted previously, certain types of service provided by the PDOs, including police 
station duty solicitor standby and court duty solicitor work, were not recorded in 
terms of the time spent on them on files or the Case Management System during the 
periods covered by the research.  In order to account for such work in subsequent 
‘cost of time’ calculations, it has been necessary to deduct a notional value for it from 
the costs of each PDO, based on the value of claims filed by the PDOs for each of 
these services and entered onto SPOCC.  The whole of the value of police station 
standby claims has been deducted in each year, while for court duty solicitor work the 
total value of claims in 2001-2 and 2002-3 and one-sixth of those for 2003-4 have 
been deducted.  These deductions are shown separately in the tables below. 
 
(ii) Capital and one-off costs 
 
A major consideration in determining the cost of the PDOs is how capital and other 
one-off costs of setting up the service are to be included.  It would clearly be 
unrealistic that the total of such costs should be included in the year in which the 
expenditure was initially incurred.  Instead, one would expect such costs to be 
depreciated or written off over a period of time.  Although the period of such 
depreciation/write-off may vary according to the particular type of expenditure (e.g. 
fixtures and fittings, computers), we have assumed a standard four year depreciation 
period for all such items.176F23  This corresponds with the period of the initial public 
defender experiment and research evaluation.      
 
Equally, a judgement has been required as to which of the various PDOs that became 
operational during the first two years of the service such capital and one-off costs 
should be attributed.  For example, in the case of the costs incurred centrally pre-April 
2001 on human resources and office procurement services from the LSC, it is clear 
that these related solely to the four initial PDOs in Birmingham, Liverpool, 
Middlesbrough and Swansea.  On the other hand, a large item of expenditure during 
the first year of the service related to the setting up of the computer and Case 
Management System for the service as a whole.  Although this initially applied to 
only the four offices opened in that year, it was subsequently extended to other offices 
(Cheltenham and Pontypridd within the research, and Chester and Darlington outside 
                                                 
22 Although because the Cheltenham office opened only late in this year, these costs have been shown 
in the tables below as in 2002-3. 
23 We were advised that the standard period of depreciation used by the LSC and for other Government 
agencies varies between three and five years, according to the type of capital expenditure involved.  We 
have no evidence as to the period over which private practice firms might similarly write off capital 
expenditure.  Of course, this element of cost only applies to the ‘high’ estimate of PDS costs set out 
below, as the ‘low’ estimate relates only to running costs. 
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the research).  It therefore seems right that the central costs of computing should be 
spread and written off across all eight of the offices that will have used the system 
during the initial four year period of operation of the PDS.   
 
The following is a brief explanation of how each item of capital or one-off 
expenditure has been treated: 
 
(a)  Local capital expenditure 
 
This has been attributed to the relevant PDO and written off over a four year period 
from the year of the initial expenditure.  
 
(b)  Central computer costs 
 
The central computing costs have been distributed across all eight offices opened 
during the initial two years of the service, in proportion to the office’s share of the 
total of local computing costs during this period.  These have then been written off 
over a four year period from the year of initial expenditure. 
 
(c)  Other capital and one-off costs 
 
These include the costs of LSC human resources and office procurement services in 
relation to the setting up of the initial PDOs.  These costs have been shared evenly 
between these four offices.  Other items of expenditure have been proportioned across 
all eight offices.  All such costs have been written off over a four year period from the 
year of initial expenditure.   
 
There are two other aspects of the treatment of capital and one-off costs to be noted.  
First, there was an element of central computer costs during the first year that can be 
considered as ‘wasted’.  This was the result of an initial policy decision to provide 
each PDO with its own ‘stand alone’ local computer network.  This policy was 
subsequently changed in favour of linking all PDOs into the LSC’s central computer 
network.177F24  The costs associated with the development of local systems have been 
separately identified and shown in the tables below.  These wasted costs have been 
written off over four years across all eight offices.                                                                                         
 
Finally, we have applied a capital interest charge of 6% per annum in 2001-2 and 
2002-3 and of 3.5% in 2003-4, which is a standard practice in government accounting 
for capital made available to public bodies.  This has been charged annually to the 
outstanding capital and one-off costs (i.e. less the amount written off or depreciated) 
in each year.  The outstanding capital has been calculated as an average of the amount 
outstanding at the beginning and at the end of each financial year.  This would be the 
equivalent of interest paid on borrowing for capital expenditure that might be incurred 
in private practice. 
 
                                                 
24 For further details, see Chapter 1. 
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(iii) Data on Costs of the PDOs 
 
Based on the above assumptions, Table 5.3 shows the breakdown of costs of the 
PDOs across each of the first three years of operation of the service.  There are a 
number of general observations that are worth making about these costs.  First, by far 
the largest element of overall costs of the PDOs in these years were local running 
costs such as salaries, rent and disbursements.  Local running costs accounted for 
between 77% and 81% of overall costs of the initial four PDOs in 2001-2, with the 
share of central running costs further accounting for between 6% and 7% of  the 
overall costs of each office in this year.  In 2002-3 local running cost constituted 85% 
of overall costs in each of the initial four PDOs and 82% in the Cheltenham PDO, 
with the share of central running costs accounting for a further 5% to the overall costs 
of each office in this year.  In 2003-4, local running costs accounted for between 79% 
and 84% of the overall costs of each PDO, with the share of central running costs 
accounting for nearly another 8% to the overall costs of each office.   
 
Once capitalised over the four year experimental period of the PDS, capital and set up 
costs (including wasted computer costs and the Government capital charge) amounted 
to between 10% and 17% of annual overall costs of any PDO in these years. To the 
extent that there is a cost differential between PDOs and private practice (see below), 
it would therefore seem that this is only partially attributable to the fact that the 
former were being established as an entirely new service requiring extensive start-up 
costs and capital investment at the outset.  Rather, the main driver of PDS costs has 
been its day-to-day operational expenses. 
 
In this respect, the initial staffing policy of the PDOs, of providing them with a full 
complement of solicitors and accredited representatives to provide a comprehensive, 
24-hour a day service to clients, has been a major contributory factor to these costs.  
For example, in 2003-4, staff costs alone accounted for 49% and 56% of the overall 
costs, and between 62% and 68% of the running costs, of each of the PDOs.  The 
number of staff also influenced the size of office accommodation required, and it is 
also arguable that both in their location and standards of accommodation, the PDO 
offices were more expensive than might normally have been expected in private 
practice.  In 2003-4, accommodation costs represented between 6% (for Swansea and 
Pontypridd) and 14% (for Birmingham) of overall costs, and between 7% and 18% of 
running costs, of the various PDOs. 
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Table 5.3   Annual Costs of the Public Defender Offices, 2001-2004 
 
2001-2 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough  Swansea  All Research 
Offices 
 £ £ £ £ £ 
Running costs      
  local (1) 308,509 387,512 332,413 375,943 1,404,377 
    less court duty and standby(2) -13442 -5046 -8642 -5416 -32546 
  share of central costs (3) 25,898 32,727 28,035 31,674 118,334 
Sub-total 320,965 415,193 351,806 402,201 1,490,165 
      
Depreciation of capital and other one-off costs (4)      
  local capital costs 48,328 34,963 42,884 61,273 187,448 
  central computing costs (5) 7,915 7,957 7,454 12,857 36,183 
  other central capital and one-off costs (6) 7,233 7,233 7,233 7,233 28,932 
Sub-total 63,476 50,153 57,571 81,363 252,563 
      
Running + capital/start-up costs 384,441 465,346 409,377 483,564 1,742,728 
      
Government charge on outstanding capital (7) 13,490 10,852 12,952 20,688 57,982 
      
Running + capital/start-up costs + Govt charge on 
outstanding capital 
397,931 476,198 422,329 504,252 1,800,710 
      
  (wasted computer costs) (8) 3,884 4,005 3,752 6,472 18,113 
  (charge on wasted computer costs) 837 841 788 1,359 3,825 
      
Total costs less wasted computer costs 393,210 471,352 417,789 496,421 1,778,772 
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2002-3 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea 
and 
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All 
Research 
Offices 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Running costs       
  local (1) 456,384 481,143 495,553 661,124 449,239 2,543,443 
    less court duty and standby (2) -21,617 -1,490 -11,246 -12,545 -3,792 -50,690 
  share of central costs (3) 26,748 28,115 29,027 38,753 26,881 149,524 
Sub-total 461,515 507,768 513,334 687,332 472,328 2,642,277 
       
Depreciation of capital and other one-off costs (4)       
  local capital costs 48,798 36,759 49,257 62,722 49,753 247,289 
  central computing costs (5) 8,744 8,791 8,235 9,253 7,228 42,251 
  other central capital and one-off costs (6) 7,245 7,245 7,245 7,245 178 29,158 
Sub-total 64,787 52,795 64,737 79,220 57,159 318,698 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs 526,302 560,563 578,071 766,552 529,487 2,960,975 
       
Government charge on outstanding capital (7) 9,815 8 ,079 10,141 12,076 16,278 56,389 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs 
 + Govt charge on outstanding capital 
536,117 568,642 588,212 778,628 545,765 3,017,364 
       
  (wasted computer costs) (8) 3,984 4,005 3,752 4,216 3,985 19,942 
  (charge on wasted computer costs) 598 601 563 783 622 3,167 
Total costs less wasted computer costs 531,535 564,036 583,897 773,629 541,158 2,994,255 
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2003-4 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea 
and 
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All Research 
Offices 
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Running costs       
  local (1) 400,990 565,215 447,245 853,310 479,551 2,746,311 
    less court duty and standby (2) -2,793 -2,514 -4,699 -8,227 -2,643 -20,876 
  share of central costs (3) 39,391 53,624 43,363 79,112 47,004 262,494 
Sub-total 437,588 616,325 485,909 924,195 523,912 2,987,929 
       
Depreciation of capital and other one-off costs (4)       
  local capital costs 49,498 37,006 49,301 63,173 47,177 246,155 
  central computing costs (5) 8,864 8,912 8,348 14,362 3,846 44,332 
  other central capital and one-off costs (6) 7,245 7,245 7,245 7,245 7,245 36,225 
Sub-total 65,607 53,163 64,894 84,780 58,268 326,712 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs 503,195 669,488 550,803 1,008,975 582,180 3,314,641 
       
Government charge on outstanding capital (7) 3,462 2,900 3,654 6,943 4,254 21,213 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs  
+ Govt charge on outstanding capital 
506,657 672,388 554,457 1,015,918 586,434 3,335,854 
       
  (charge on wasted computer costs) 209 211 197 380 91 1,088 
  (wasted computer costs) (8) 3,984 4,005 3,752 6,517 1,729 19,987 
Total costs less wasted computer costs 502,464 668,172 550,508 1,009,021 584,614 3,314,779 
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Notes to Table 5.3 
 
(1)   All local office costs, including accomodation and disbursements. 
 
(2)   Not recorded in chargeable time figures for year.  Deduction based on notional claims for costs registered on SPOCC for these services in 
the year. 
 
(3)   Distributed across offices on basis of each offices % share of total local running costs. 
 
(4)   Depreciated over 4 years from year of initial expenditure. 
 
(5)   Distributed across offices on basis of each office's % share of total local computer costs. 
 
(6)   Includes central HR and office procurement costs on initial four offices. 
 
(7)   Based on 6% of average of outstanding capital at beginning and end of year in 2001-2 and 2002-3 and 3.5% in 2003-4. 
 
(8)   See text for explanation of wasted computer costs. 
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The Cost of PDO Time 
 
Using the above time and cost data, it is possible to calculate a number of ‘cost of 
chargeable time’ figures for each of the PDOs included in the research.  These 
calculations are shown in Table 5.4 below.  The different ‘cost of time’ calculations 
are based on: 
 
(i)  Running costs only 
 
This is based on each office’s annual running costs, including accommodation costs 
and share of central running costs.  It does not include any capital or one-off costs of 
the service.  This forms the basis of the 'low cost' comparison between PDO and 
private practice average case costs in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
(ii)  Running + capital and set up costs 
 
This includes the annual running costs as above, plus the amount of capital and one-
off costs written off or depreciated in each year.  It does not include either the 
Government interest charge on outstanding capital or wasted computer set up costs.  
As will be seen by a comparison with the ‘running costs only’ calculations, the capital 
and set up costs of the service accounted for as little as 8% and at most 17% of these 
combined costs for any of the PDOs in any of the three years.   
 
(iii)  Running + capital/set-up costs + Government charge on outstanding capital 
 
This is the same figure as in (ii) above, but with the capital interest charge included.  
It is provided to demonstrate the relatively marginal impact of the capital interest 
charge on the hourly rate.  It provides the highest estimate of PDO costs. 
 
(iv) Running + capital/set-up costs + Government charge on outstanding capital, less 
wasted costs computer costs (Total costs less wasted computer costs). 
 
This is the same figure as in (iii) above, but with the wasted computer costs, incurred 
during the first year in setting up ‘stand alone’ computer networks in each PDO, 
excluded.  Again, the deduction of these wasted computer costs has only a marginal 
effect on the overall ‘cost of time’ figure for each office.  It is arguable that this 
estimate of ‘cost of time’ provides the fairest basis for comparison with private 
practice costs, as private practice would also incur capital costs and interest charges 
on loans but would not necessarily incur additional costs of installing the wrong type 
of computer system.  This forms the basis of the 'high cost' comparison between the 
PDOs and private practice average case costs in the following sections of this chapter.   
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Table 5.4    Annual Costs of Chargeable Time in Public Defender Offices, 2001-2004 
 
2001-2002      
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea All Research Offices
      
Total chargeable time (hours) 1992.29 1548.4 1596.34 3326.1 8463.14 
      
Running costs only £320,965 £415,193 £351,806 £402,201 £1,490,165 
hourly rate (‘low estimate’) £161.10 £268.14 £220.38 £120.92 £176.08 
      
Running + capital/start-up costs £384,441 £465,346 £409,377 £483,564 £1,742,728 
hourly rate £192.96 £300.53 £256.45 £145.38 £205.93 
      
Running + capital/start-up costs 
+ Govt charge on outstanding capital 
£397,931 £476,198 £422,329 £504,252 £1,800,710 
hourly rate £199.74 £307.54 £264.56 £151.60 £212.77 
      
Total costs less wasted computer costs £393,210 £471,352 £417,789 £496,421 £1,778,772 
hourly rate (‘high estimate’) £197.37 £304.41 £261.72 £149.25 £210.18 
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2002-2003       
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea and 
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All Research 
Offices 
       
Total chargeable time (hours) 4,488.62 4,874.49 4,608.59 7,849.08 4,488.68 26,309.46 
       
Running costs only £461,515 £507,768 £513,334 £687,332 £472,328 £2,642,277 
hourly rate (‘low estimate’) £102.82 £104.17 £111.39 £87.57 £105.23 £100.43 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs £526,302 £560,563 £578,071 £766,552 £529,487 £2,960,975 
hourly rate £117.25 £115.00 £125.43 £97.66 £117.96 £112.54 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs 
 + Govt charge on outstanding 
capital 
£536,117 £568,642 £588,212 £778,628 £545,765 £3,017,364 
hourly rate £119.44 £116.66 £127.63 £99.20 £121.59 £114.69 
       
Total costs less wasted computer 
costs 
£531,535 £564,036 £583,897 £773,629 £541,158 £2,994,255 
 hourly rate (‘high estimate’)  £118.42 £115.71 £126.70 £98.56 £120.56 £113.81 
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2003-2004       
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea and
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All Research Offices
       
Total chargeable time 3,766.76 6,987.31 5,076.98 9077.9 6,438.15 31,347.1 
       
Running costs only  £437,588 £616,325 £485,909 £924,195 £523,912 £2,987,929 
hourly rate (‘low estimate’) £116.17 £89.20 £95.71 £101.81 £81.38 £95.32 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs £503,195 £669,488 £550,803 £1,008,975 £582,180 £3,314,641 
hourly rate £133.59 £95.81 £108.49 £111.15 £90.43 £105.74 
       
Running + capital/start-up costs 
 + Govt charge on outstanding capital 
£506,657 £672,388 £554,457 £1,015,918 £586,434 £3,335,854 
hourly rate £134.51 £96.23 £109.21 £111.91 £91.09 £106.42 
       
Total costs less wasted computer costs £502,464 £668,172 £550,508 £1,009,021 £584,614 £3,314,779 
 hourly rate (‘high estimate’) £133.39 £95.63 £108.43 £111.15 £90.80 £105.74 
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 Using the ‘total costs less wasted computer costs’ figure as the basis a ‘high’ estimate 
of PDS costs, Table 5.5 below shows a year-on-year comparison of the ‘cost of 
chargeable time’ in the various PDOs.  During their first year of operation, the 'cost of 
chargeable time' in each of the initial four PDOs varied widely, ranging from a high of 
just over £300 per hour in Liverpool to a low of just under £150 per hour in Swansea.  
Average hourly costs in all of these offices reduced considerably in their second year 
of operation, with the greatest reduction being in Liverpool, from over £300 down to 
£115 per hour (-62%).  Average hourly costs were more than halved in the 
Middlesbrough PDO between its first and second year of operation, while those in the 
Birmingham PDO were cut by 40% and those in the Swansea/Pontypridd PDO by a 
third.  The Cheltenham PDO in its first full year of operation, in 2002-3, had 
relatively low costs in comparison with the other PDOs, of £120 per hour, reflecting 
its early success in recruiting clients.  However, this rate of improvement levelled off 
and in some instances was reversed in 2003-4, with the average hourly costs of the 
Birmingham PDO increasing from the previous year by 11% and those of the 
Swansea/Pontypridd PDO by 13%.  The Liverpool and Middlesbrough PDOs only 
further reduced  their average hourly costs by 17% and 14% respectively, while the 
Cheltenham PDO, it its second full year of operation, reduced its average hourly costs 
by 25% compared with the previous year.   Similar trends are also shown in Table 5.5 
in terms of a ‘low’ estimate of PDS costs based on ‘running costs only’. 
 
Although not directly comparable, it is interesting to compare these hourly costs 
figures for the PDS with the hourly rates that would be paid to private practice 
solicitors for undertaking various forms of criminal legal aid work. 178F25 These are shown 
in Table 5.6 as applicable during 2003-4.  Although in certain exceptional cases in the 
magistrates’ court and the Crown Court up to 100% enhancement is allowed on the 
published rates (200% in serious fraud cases), in the vast majority of ordinary cases 
the hourly rates paid to private practice under contracts or Crown Court legal aid are 
significantly lower than the average hourly costs of the PDOs. 
                                                 
25 The hourly cost figures for the PDS include all their costs, whereas the hourly rates for private 
practice cover only part of the costs they might be paid for undertaking various forms of cases.  For 
example, private practice might additionally be allowed unit costs for specific items of work such as 
letters written and telephone calls made and will be separately reimbursed for disbursements on cases.  
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Table 5.5    Cost of Chargeable Time of PDOs, 2001-2004 
 
 
 
 Birmingham Liverpool Middlesbrough Swansea and 
Pontypridd 
Cheltenham All Research Offices
 £ £ £ £ £ £ 
‘High cost’ estimate 
2001-2 197.37 304.41 261.72 149.25  210.18 
2002-3 118.42 115.71 126.70 98.56 120.56 113.81 
2003-4 133.39  95.63 105.43 111.15  90.80 105.74 
‘Low cost’ estimate 
2001-2 161.10 268.14 220.38 120.92  176.08 
2002-3 102.82 104.17 111.39 87.57 105.23 100.43 
2003-4 116.17 99.59 108.04 114.06 92.25  95.32 
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Table 5.6    Legal Aid Hourly Rates payable to Private Practice, 2003-4 
 
 
Investigation Stage  
  Advice and assistance  
       Preparation £49.90 
       Travel and waiting £26.30 
  Police Station   
    Attendance on client or others  
       Duty solicitor ordinary case £52.00-£69.50 
       Duty solicitor serious offence £60.00-£80.00 
       Own solicitor £52.00 
    Travel and waiting  
       Duty solicitor £52.00-£69.05 
       Own solicitor  £28.80 
  
Proceedings Stages  
  Magistrates’ courts  
    Duty solicitor  
       Advice and assistance £53.85-£67.30 
       Travel and waiting £26.30 
    Advice and assistance  
       Preparation  £49.70 
       Advocacy £62.35 
       Travel and waiting £26.30 
    Representation order  
       Preparation £49.70 
       Advocacy £62.35 
       Attendance on counsel £34.00 
       Travel and waiting £26.30 
  Crown Court  
   Category of fee earner  A B C 
       Preparation £53.00 £45.00 £29.75 
       Attendance £42.25 £34.00 £20.50 
       Travel and waiting £25.75 £24.75 £12.50 
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Comparison of Costs between PDOs and Private Practice 
 
(i)  Police stations and magistrates' courts 
 
We now turn to the question of how PDO costs compare with those of private practice 
firms undertaking similar types of case under criminal legal aid.  As noted earlier, 
since the introduction of general contracting for criminal legal aid in 2001, solicitors 
have not been required to report the actual time spent on cases to the Legal Services 
Commission.  Rather, they return a claim for their 179F26 and other expenses 
(disbursements) associated with the case.  The 'cost to the public purse' of these 
private practice cases is the amount of money paid for the case under the contract to 
the firm by the Legal Services Commission.180F27 
 
PDOs were also required during the period of the research to return similar claims, 
based on the amount of costs they would have been eligible for if operating under a 
criminal contract.  Of course, in the case of the PDOs these claims were only notional, 
as their actual cost were paid directly by the LSC and not on a case-by-case basis 
under contracts.  However, the requirement on them to report cases through the 
contract reporting system (SPOCC) enabled the researchers to identify the cases 
handled by the PDOs.  We then matched these with the data recorded on the PDS 
Case Management System showing the amount of time (including an allowance for 
letters and telephone calls) associated with these cases.  The actual (as distinct from 
the notional) costs of each PDO case was then calculated by multiplying the time 
spent on the case in each of the three years of our survey by the relevant 'cost of 
chargeable time' figure for each PDO in those years. 181F28   For this purpose, two 'cost of 
chargeable time' estimates have been used: a 'low' figure based on running costs only 
                                                 
26 These costs are related, either directly or indirectly through translation into standard fees, to the 
amount of time spent on the case, but it is left to the solicitor to translate this into a cost claim based on 
the time recorded on the case file but not to report the time as such to the LSC.   
27 As discussed earlier, we have not included the general costs associated with the running of the CDS 
under the Legal Services Commission’s budget, as these costs would have been related to both PDS 
and contracted private practice.  
28 For example, if a case in a PDO involved y hours in 2001-2 and z hours in 2002-3, the cost of the 
case was calculated  as y multiplied by the hourly cost of chargeable time for that PDO in 2001-2 plus z 
multiplied by the hourly cost of time for that PDO in 2002-3.  Where cases are grouped by year for 
reporting purposes, this has been done on the basis of the year when the claim was reported and 
processed through SPOCC.  
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and a 'high' figure based on all costs associated with the PDS (including capital/set-up 
costs and the Government charge on outstanding capital, less the 'wasted' computer 
costs).  The actual cost of PDO cases under these two estimates can then be compared 
with the amount paid under criminal contracts to private firms for conducting similar 
types of case. 
 
Unfortunately, it was not always possible to match the cases reported by PDOs under 
SPOCC with those recorded on the PDS Case Management System.  This was 
particularly the case in the initial year of operation of the PDOs, when CMS was not 
up and running and therefore few case details were recorded on it.  For this reason, the 
comparison of costs between private practice and the PDOs in this first year tends to 
be based on relatively few PDO cases and therefore must be treated with some 
caution.  The calculation of PDO average case costs in 2002-3 and 2003-4 are based 
on larger numbers of cases and are therefore more reliable.    
 
For the purpose of our analysis, comparisons of average case costs were made in 
various categories of case.  These included (i) investigation stage cases where there 
was a full attendance by the legal advisor at the police station (i.e. excluding 
telephone advice only cases); (ii) proceedings cases involving only advice and 
assistance (i.e. without representation in court) (iii) proceedings cases which 
concluded at the magistrates' court at an early hearing; and proceedings cases in the 
magistrates' courts which resulted in a claim for (iv) a lower standard fee, (v) a higher 
standard fee or (vi) a non-standard fee.182F29   
 
Table 5.7a shows the average cost of cases in these various categories in each of the 
three years of our analysis across the research PDOs as a whole, compared with those 
incurred by private practice in the same areas, based on the 'high' estimate of PDO 
costs (which we regard as the most realistic basis for calculating PDO costs).  Table 
                                                 
29 Under criminal contracting, solicitors claim separately for the 'investigation' (police station) and 
'proceedings' (magistrates' court) stage of each case, but must include all work done at each of these 
stages in a single claim for that stage.    Different levels of standard fees are paid in magistrates' court 
proceedings cases based on the ‘core cost’ incurred, which in turn are primarily on the amount of time 
spent on the case (e.g. a lower standard fee for a case that involves between £0 and £y ‘core costs’; a 
higher standard fee for a case that involves between £y and £z ‘core costs’; and a non-standard fee 
based directly on the amount of ‘core costs’ incurred on the case where these exceed £z ).  However, 
the total cost of such cases include both the standard fee and any additional allowable expenses of the 
case. 
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5.7b translates the average cost figures into ratios, showing the extent by which PDO 
costs exceeded those of private practice.  Thus, in 2001-2 PDO average costs across 
all research offices were just over twice as high as those of private practice for lower 
standard fee claims in the magistrates' courts, over two and half times higher for 
police station attendance claims, and over three times higher for advice and assistance 
only and early hearing claims in magistrates' courts.  Data on PDO costs in the other 
categories were insufficient to make valid comparisons.  These cost differentials 
between PDOs and private practice narrowed in the second year of operation of the 
service, but PDO average costs were still between 1.5 times and twice as high as those 
for private practice in all categories where sufficient data are available.  The picture in 
the third year of operation is mixed compared with the previous year, with costs 
differentials in some categories decreasing slightly but increasing in other categories.  
However, the 2003-4 figures show a remarkable consistency, with the PDO average 
costs being between 1.69 and 1.76 times higher than private practice in all categories 
of claim other than non-standard fee cases in magistrates' courts, where the difference 
was slightly lower at just under 1.6 times higher. 
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Table 5.7a   Cost of Cases in Public Defender Offices (‘High’ Estimate) and Private 
Practice Firms by Type of Cases and Year Case Concluded, 2001-4 
 
  PS attendance claims Free Standing A&A 
(proceedings) 
Early Hearings 
  Mean S.D. N Mea
n 
S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
2001-2 PDS £602 £467 55 £241 £174 3 £399 £451 14 
 PP £230 £164 37567 £77 £50 2357 £120 £83 1490 
2002-3 PDS £395 £384 1300 £168 £165 146 £180 £166 197 
 PP £243 £173 45292 £82 £62 3541 £116 £73 1727 
2003-4 PDS £414 £340 1675 £134 £142 246 £181 £122 197 
 PP £245 £174 46209 £79 £69 2827 £106 £64 1397 
 
  Lower St. Fee Higher St. Fee Non-st. Fee 
  Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
2001-2 PDS £658 £605 18 . . 0 . . 0 
 PP £318 £125 30385 £815 £251 4684 £1,579 £2,045 895 
2002-3 PDS £572 £426 790 £1,591 £569 56 £1,157 . 1 
 PP £328 £281 43259 £842 £252 8067 £1,705 £1,376 2262 
2003-4 PDS £578 £395 1068 £1,427 £745 165 £2,724 £1,538 35 
 PP £328 £133 43846 £841 £261 7688 £1,712 £1,568 2372 
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Table 5.7b 
Ratio of Average Cost of Cases in Public Defender Offices (‘High’ Estimate) to 
Average Costs in Private Practice Firms (=1) by Type of Case and Year Case 
Concluded, 2001-4 
 
 Police 
Station 
Attendanc
e claims 
Free 
Standing 
A&A 
(proceedings
) 
Early 
Hearing
s 
Lowe
r St. 
Fees 
Highe
r St. 
Fees 
Non
-st. 
Fees 
2001
-2 
2.62 3.13 3.33 2.07  .. 
2002
-3 
1.63 2.05 1.55 1.74 1.89  
2003
-4 
1.69 1.70 1.71 1.76 1.70 1.59 
 
 
 
 218
Table 5.8a provides a more detailed breakdown of investigation stage attendance case 
costs for each of the research PDOs, compared with local private practitioners, based 
on cases completed over the whole three years of our study and the 'high' and 'low' 
estimates of PDO costs.   This shows that, based on the ‘high’ estimate of PDO costs, 
the average cost of police station attendances by the Middlesbrough PDO was  2.75 
times higher than local private practice, while in the remaining areas the average cost 
of PDO police station attendances was between 1.87 and 1.99 times higher than local 
private practice in those areas.  Based on the ‘low’ estimate of PDO costs, average 
police station attendance cost for the Middlesbrough PDO were 2.4 times higher than 
those of local private practice, while in the other areas average PDO police station 
attendance costs were between 1.64 and 1.8 times higher than those of private practice 
in their areas.  
 
Table 5.8b shows the breakdown of case costs in the various categories of 
proceedings claims for each of the PDOs (based on the 'high' estimate of their costs) 
and private practice over the whole three years, while Table 5.8c translates these data 
relating to average costs into ratios showing the extent by which PDO costs exceeded 
those for local private practice.  These calculations take no account of differences in 
caseload (which we do below using multivariate analysis) but they illustrate neatly if a 
little crudely the extent of difference between the two services.  Thus, across the six 
research PDOs and five proceedings claims categories, there were 17 instances where 
PDO costs, based on the ‘high’ estimate, were more than twice as high as those from 
private practice, and only one instance where PDO costs fell below 1.5 times higher 
than private practice.   
 
Tables 5.8d and 5.8e repeat the above analysis but this time using the 'low' estimate of 
PDO costs, based on annual running costs alone and with no allowance for capital or 
set-up costs or charges.  This is provided in order to demonstrate that, even on this 
analysis, PDO average costs in a third of instances were still more than twice those of 
local private practice, and in only five instances fell below 1.5 times greater than 
private practice. 
 219
Table 5.8a   Costs of Investigation Stage Attendance Cases for PDO ('High' and 'Low' 
Estimates) and Private Practice in Six Areas, 2001-4 
 
  Lower costs estimate Higher costs estimate 
  Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Mea
n 
N Std. 
Deviation 
Birmingham PDS £422 426 £321 £487 426 £369
 PP £258 68,483 £171 £258 68,483 £171
Liverpool PDS £411 518 £356 £453 518 £394
 PP £242 24,685 £176 £242 24,685 £176
Middlesbrough PDS £428 663 £321 £489 663 £368
 PP £178 14,462 £139 £178 14,462 £139
Pontypridd PDS £435 291 £320 £480 291 £356
 PP £241 3,817 £153 £241 3,817 £153
Swansea PDS £439 513 £513 £489 513 £572
 PP £248 10,799 £186 £248 10,799 £186
Cheltenham  PDS £361 738 £324 £407 738 £368
 PP £212 18,225 £163 £212 18,225 £163
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Table 5.8b    
 
Costs of Proceedings Stage Cases for PDO ('High' Estimate) and Private Practice in Six Areas, 2001-4 
 
 
 
 
  Free standing 
advice and 
assistance 
Early Hearings Lower Std. Fee Higher Std. Fee Non-std. Fee 
  Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Birmingham PDS £223 £180 36 £409 £323 6 £783 £552 349 £2,021 £726 38 £3,042 £1,734 11 
 PP £91 £64 3260 £143 £84 1797 £345 £134 67038 £871 £249 13381 £1,807 £1,802 3532 
Liverpool PDS £118 £100 128 £204 £212 226 £606 £404 506 £1,721 £1,049 46 £2,751 £762 2 
 PP £73 £55 2500 £90 £58 1517 £313 £337 27178 £785 £256 5248 £1,528 £1,657 1727 
Middlesbrough PDS £175 £192 41 £153 £89 56 £637 £437 333 £1,492 £600 49 £2,392 £680 13 
 PP £64 £63 1147 £110 £61 17 £283 £105 13207 £766 £253 1164 £1,412 £1,162 335 
Swansea PDS £185 £157 130 £268 £150 27 £553 £421 230 £1,459 £701 32 £4,252 £2,601 6 
 PP £79 £44 1104 £114 £64 786 £314 £138 3937 £802 £276 960 £1,874 £2,089 215 
Pontypridd PDS £162 £274 48 £234 £188 22 £586 £393 218 £1,502 £660 33 £3,345 £1,007 4 
 PP £70 £85 569 £90 £63 446 £282 £106 12131 £779 £266 1230 £1,521 £736 225 
Cheltenham PDS £173 £146 25 £231 £169 79 £671 £503 313 £1,565 £737 41 £3,331 £2,165 8 
 PP £70 £85 569 £90 £63 446 £282 £106 12131 £779 £266 1230 £1,521 £736 225 
 
 
 221
 Table 5.8c   Ratio of Average Proceedings Stage Cost between PDO ('High' Estimate) and Private Practice (=1) in Six Areas, 2001-4 
 
  Free standing advice
and assistance 
Early Hearings Lower Std. Fee Higher Std. Fee Non-std. Fee 
       
Birmingham PDS 2.45 2.86 2.27 2.32 1.68 
Liverpool PDS 1.62 2.27 1.94 2.19 1.80 
Middlesbrough PDS 2.73 1.39 2.25 1.95 1.69 
Swansea PDS 2.34 2.34 1.76 1.82 2.27 
Pontypridd PDS 1.82 3.08 1.61 1.62 1.91 
Cheltenham PDS 2.47 2.57 2.38 2.01 2.19 
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Table 5.8d 
 
Costs of Proceedings Stage Cases for PDO ('Low' Estimate) and Private Practice in Six Areas, 2001-4 
 
  Free standing 
advice and 
assistance 
Early Hearings Lower Std. Fee Higher Std. Fee Non-std. Fee 
  Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Birmingham PDS £194 £157 36 £348 £265 6 £682 £481 349 £1,759 £631 38 £2,653 £1,518 11 
 PP £91 £64 3260 £143 £84 1797 £345 £134 67038 £871 £249 13381 £1,807 £1,802 3532 
Liverpool PDS £107 £91 128 £184 £188 226 £552 £366 506 £1,572 £966 46 £2,538 £704 2 
 PP £73 £55 2500 £90 £58 1517 £313 £337 27178 £785 £256 5248 £1,528 £1,657 1727 
Middlesbrough PDS £152 £165 41 £135 £78 56 £558 £381 333 £1,313 £524 49 £2,112 £603 13 
 PP £64 £63 1147 £110 £61 17 £283 £105 13207 £766 £253 1164 £1,412 £1,162 335 
Swansea PDS £166 £140 130 £244 £138 27 £497 £380 230 £1,320 £639 32 £3,869 £2,419 6 
 PP £79 £44 1104 £114 £64 786 £314 £138 3937 £802 £276 960 £1,874 £2,089 215 
Pontypridd PDS £147 £251 48 £215 £173 22 £533 £357 218 £1,369 £601 33 £3,053 £918 4 
 PP £89 £56 306 £76 £41 132 £365 £146 4486 £927 £223 311 £1,749 £1,283 75 
Cheltenham PDS £153 £130 25 £205 £150 79 £594 £445 313 £1,397 £659 41 £2,978 £1,959 8 
 PP £70 £85 569 £90 £63 446 £282 £106 12131 £779 £266 1230 £1,521 £736 225 
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Table 5.8e  Ratio of Average Proceedings Stage Cost between PDO ('Low' Estimate) and 
Private Practice (=1) in Six Areas, 2001-4 
 
 Free standing advice 
and assistance 
Early Hearings Lower Std. Fee Higher Std. Fee Non-std. Fee
Birmingham 2.13 2.43 1.98 2.02 1.47 
Liverpool 1.47 2.04 1.76 2.00 1.66 
Middlesbrough 2.38 1.23 1.97 1.71 1.50 
Swansea 1.65 2.83 1.46 1.48 1.75 
Pontypridd 2.10 2.14 1.58 1.65 1.53 
Cheltenham 2.69 2.28 2.11 1.79 1.96 
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Finally, we subjected these data on the relative costs of PDO and private practice cases to 
multivariate analysis, the purpose of which was to control for any influences on these 
differences that might be attributable to factors such as case complexity, offence type, 
and location of the police station or magistrates' court served.183F30   This provides the best 
comparison between PDO and private practice costs.  The results are shown in Appendix 
5.1.  These strongly support the existence of very significant differences in costs between 
PDOs and private suppliers, using our CMS-derived estimates of PDO costs. After 
controlling for case complexity and location, costs were found to be significantly higher 
in all PDOs by comparison with private practice claims.  This was true for both 
investigation claims and magistrates’ court proceedings claims. The costs per 
investigation claim were between £152 and £216 higher (depending on the particular 
PDO) than in private practice, even using the ‘low’ estimate of PDO costs. The costs per 
magistrates’ court claim were between £74 and £349 higher (again depending on the 
particular PDO) than in private practice, again using the ‘low’ estimate of PDO costs. On 
average, PDO investigations are predicted to cost between 71% and 93% more than the 
predicted private practice average (£240.83). PDO magistrates’ court proceedings cases 
are predicted to cost between 41% and 58% more than the predicted private practice 
average (£450.42). 
  
We have discussed earlier in this chapter some of the underlying factors which will have 
contributed to these large cost differentials between PDOs and private practice, such as 
the relatively high staffing levels and support costs of PDOs and their slow build up of 
clients and cases resulting in fewer chargeable hours being completed per staff than might 
normally be expected in private practice.  Another factor that might be thought to have 
contributed to the high average case costs in PDOs is that they could have devoted more 
time to cases than would be the norm in private practice, especially as their low case 
numbers would have given staff greater freedom to do so.  It is possible to test this 
possibility by comparing the amount of the notional claims entered on SPOCC by PDOs 
with the costs actually claimed in similar cases by private practice.  As both sets of claims 
are related, either directly through hourly rates or indirectly through standard fees, to the 
time spent on the case, they can provide a reasonable proxy for comparing the time spent 
on cases as between PDOs and private practice. 
 
We subjected the data relating to SPOCC claims for both investigation and magistrates’ 
court proceedings cases to multivariate analysis similar to that carried out above, i.e. 
controlling for the number of defendants, whether the claim was for a youth or duty 
solicitor case, supplier size (as measured by the number of claims made), and type of 
offence. In addition each regression controlled for the location of the local police station 
(for investigation claims) or the court (for proceedings claims) (see Appendix 5.2).  With 
investigation claims, it was shown that costs notionally claimed under SPOCC for PDOs 
tended to be lower than private practice in Birmingham and Liverpool, higher in 
Middlesbrough, and no different in the remaining areas.  With magistrates' court 
                                                 
30 The specific variables included in this analysis were the number of defendants involved in the case, 
whether the case involved youth court or duty solicitor work, supplier size (as measured by the total 
number of claims filed by each supplier), type of offence, location of the police station (investigation 
claims) or magistrates' court (proceedings claims).   
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proceedings claims, all the research PDOs reported lower SPOCC costs than private 
practice in their areas, with the exception of Cheltenham where there was no difference 
between the PDO and private practice.  Although costs reported under SPOCC are at best 
only a proxy for time actually spent on cases, these findings would indicate that, with the 
one exception of the Middlesbrough PDO in respect of investigation stage claims, none 
of the PDOs appear to have devoted more time to cases than would be the norm in private 
practice in their areas.  Therefore, the explanation for the much higher 'cost per case' in 
the PDOs reported above is likely to lie with the other factors that have already been 
identified, namely with their higher operational costs and under-utilisation of staff 
resources due to the slow build-up of a client base.   
 
 
(ii)  Crown Court Cases 
 
As noted earlier, in order to compare costs between the PDOs and private practice in 
Crown Court cases, a somewhat different methodology had to be employed.  Crown 
Court cases are not covered by the General Criminal Contract, but instead private practice 
solicitors (and barristers) are remunerated separately for their work on such cases.184F31    We 
obtained data on the costs paid to private practice solicitors in just over 45,000 cases 
concluded in the main Crown Court centres served by the research PDO185F32 during three years 
2001-2 to 2003-4.  These data included costs paid to solicitors (less disbursements) but 
not counsel fees.   
 
For their part, the PDOs did not prepare ‘mock’ Crown Court claims in the same way as 
they did through SPOCC for investigation stage and magistrates’ court proceedings cases.  
Instead, we identified their Crown Court cases from the PDS Case Management System, 
including the number of chargeable hours recorded as having been spent on these cases in 
the Crown Court.186F33  We then multiplied the amount of time by the same ‘cost of time’ 
figures used earlier in the analysis of PDS investigation stage and magistrates’ court 
costs.187F34  As noted earlier, our calculation of ‘cost of time’ included expenditure by the 
PDOs on disbursements (but not counsel fees in the Crown Court), whereas 
disbursements were not included in the data we obtained on private practice Crown Court 
cases.  As a result, our data somewhat underestimate private practice Crown Court costs 
in comparison with the PDOs.  We obtained data on a total of 424 Crown Court cases 
                                                 
31 Until April 2003, such payments were administered by the Court Service.  Although from that date the 
Legal Services Commission became responsible for Crown Court legal aid, the separate system of payment, 
administered outside the General Criminal Contract, has been maintained. 
32 These were Birmingham Crown Court for the Birmingham PDO; Liverpool Crown Court for the 
Liverpool PDO; Teeside Crown Court for the Middlesbrough PDO; Gloucester Crown Court for the 
Cheltenham PDO; and Swansea, Cardiff and Merthyr Crown Court for the Swansea and Pontypridd PDOs. 
33 Time spent in the magistrates’ court was excluded in ‘either way’ cases, as these costs would have been 
included in our magistrates’ court proceedings sample.  However, in ‘indictable only’ cases the time spent 
in magistrates’ courts was included in the Crown Court cost calculation. 
34 It is important to recognise that under our methodology the costs of the PDOs in police stations, 
magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court have been calculated on the basis of the same hourly cost rate.  
This may differ from private practice, where the average hourly costs paid to solicitors under legal aid at 
these various stages might be higher in the Crown Court than at police stations or in magistrates’ courts.   
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concluded by the research PDOs, although only 372 of these were in the main Crown 
Court centres for which we had comparable private practice data. 
 
Table 5.9 shows the distribution of both PDS and private practice Crown Court cases 
across different cost categories, based on our calculation of PDS costs using the ‘high 
cost’ estimate of their ‘cost of time’.  A significant feature of this distribution is that 
while private practice had 214 Crown Court cases (0.5%) with costs exceeding £100,000, 
the PDS had no cases with similar costs.  Similarly, while private practice had a further 
176 cases (0.4% of the total) with costs above £50,000 but not more than £100,000, there 
was only one PDO case (0.2% of all PDO Crown Court cases) with similar costs.   
Moreover, these categories of high cost Crown Court cases accounted for no less than 
44% of the total costs of all private practice Crown Court cases included in our sample, 
whereas the one high cost PDS Crown Court case accounted for just 7.4% of all their 
estimated costs in the Crown Court.  This indicates that at least during their initial years 
of operation the PDOs did not become involved to any notable extent in longer and more 
costly Crown Court cases of the type which, although only constituting a small minority 
of private practice cases at this level, nevertheless account for a high proportion of the 
overall costs paid to solicitors for their work in the Crown Court. 
 
 
Table 5.9  Distribution of PDO and Private Practice Crown Court Cases in Selected 
Crown Court Centres by Costs, 2001-2 to 2003-4 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 No. 
of 
cases 
% Value 
£000s 
% No. of 
cases 
% Value 
£000s 
% 
Less than £1k 148 34.9 76 5.9 21338 46.9 10007 5.8 
£1001 - £2k 89 21.0 127 9.8 10838 23.8 15663 9.1 
£2001 - £5k 135 31.8 435 33.5 9196 20.2 27934 16.3 
£5001 - £10k 37 8.7 248 19.1 2358 5.2 16134 9.4 
£10001 - £20k 9 2.1 131 10.1 835 1.8 11286 6.6 
£20001 - £50k 5 1.2 185 14.2 494 1.1 15316 8.9 
£50001 - £100k 1 0.2 96 7.4 176 0.4 11859 6.9 
£100001 - £200k     120 0.3 16617 9.7 
£200001+     94 0.2 46540 27.2 
 
This finding raises a methodological issue in respect of a comparison of average Crown 
Court case costs between the PDS and private practice.  Obviously, to include the high 
cost cases identified above in such a comparison would have the effect of greatly 
increasing average case costs for private practice, far more than would be the case for the 
PDS.  We therefore decided to compare Crown Court costs between the PDS and private 
practice for each of the relevant Crown Court centres on two bases, one of which includes 
all cases and the other which excludes cases exceeding £100,000 in value.  Table 5.10a 
shows this comparison based on both our ‘high’ and ‘low’ estimates of PDS costs for the 
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total sample, while Table 5.10b shows the same calculations for cases up to £100,000 in 
value.   
 
When higher cost cases are included, the PDS is shown to have lower average case costs 
in five of the Crown Court centres.  In Liverpool PDS average Crown Court costs were 
between 54% and 58% lower than private practice (depending on whether the ‘high’ or 
‘low’ estimate of PDS costs is used); in Birmingham PDS Crown Court average case 
costs were between 40% and 48% lower; and in Cardiff PDS average Crown Court case 
costs were between 25% and 32% lower.  There were two other Crown Court centres 
where the difference between PDS and private practice average case costs were more 
marginal.  In Swansea Crown Court PDS average case costs were 17% below private 
practice on a ‘low’ estimate of their costs but only 8% lower on a ‘high’ estimate.  In 
Teeside PDS Crown Court average case costs were 12% less than private practice on a 
‘low’ estimate but only 1% less on a ‘high’ estimate.  Finally, there were two Crown 
Court centres where average PDS Crown Court costs were considerably higher than those 
of private practice, even with the most high cost cases included in the sample.  In 
Gloucester PDS Crown Court costs were on average between 59% and 79% higher and in 
Merthyr they were between 23% and 42% higher.    
 
When higher cost cases above £100,000 are excluded from the analysis, the average 
Crown Court costs of private practice in the various courts are reduced considerably, but 
the average cost of PDO Crown Court cases remains the same since they had no cases 
with such high costs.  Under this analysis, it is still the case that in Liverpool average 
PDO Crown Court costs are between 18% and 25% lower than private practice depending 
on whether a ‘high’ or ‘low’ estimate of PDO costs in used.  In Birmingham PDO 
average Crown Court case costs are 13% lower than private practice under the ‘low’ cost 
estimate but virtually the same under the ‘high’ cost estimate, while in Cardiff average 
PDO Crown Court case costs were between 4% and 12% lower.  In all the other courts, 
PDO average Crown Court costs were consistently higher than those for private practice, 
once cases in excess of £100,000 are excluded from the analysis.  In Teeside PDO 
average Crown Court case costs were between 22% and 38% higher; in Swansea between 
61% and 79% higher; in Merthyr between 63% and 79% higher; and in Gloucester 
between 59% and 79% higher.   
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Table 5.10a  PDO and Private Practice Crown Court Costs analysed by Court, 2001-1 to 
2003-4: All Cases 
 
  ‘Low’ cost ‘High’ cost 
Court  Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Birmingham PDS £2,088 £1,569 41 £2,401 £1,804 41
 PP £4,010 £32,337 11356 £4,010 £32,337 11356
Liverpool PDS £1,963 £4,611 93 £2,145 £5,023 93
 PP £4,663 £40,752 11789 £4,663 £40,752 11789
Teeside PDS £2,471 £2,466 88 £2,803 £2,798 88
 PP £2,821 £22,348 6496 £2,821 £22,348 6496
Cardiff PDS £2,287 £1,931 10 £2,517 £2,142 10
 PP £3,369 £17,341 8526 £3,369 £17,341 8526
Swansea PDS £3,955 £11,770 54 £4,399 £12,965 54
 PP £4,765 £35,091 3444 £4,765 £35,091 3444
Merthyr PDS £2,824 £5,212 26 £3,093 £5,697 26
 PP £2,178 £10,909 1851 £2,178 £10,909 1851
Gloucester PDS £2,683 £4,804 60 £3,020 £5,401 60
 PP £1,689 £3,078 2013 £1,689 £3,078 2013
 
 
Table 5.10b  PDO and Private Practice Crown Court Costs analysed by Court, 2001-2 to 
2003-4: Cases up to £100,000 
 
  ‘Low’ cost ‘High’ cost 
Court  Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
N 
Birmingham PDS £2,088 £1,569 41 £2,401 £1,804 41
 PP £2,408 £6,157 11300 £2,408 £6,157 11300
Liverpool PDS £1,963 £4,611 93 £2,145 £5,023 93
 PP £2,625 £6,270 11714 £2,625 £6,270 11714
Teeside PDS £2,471 £2,466 88 £2,803 £2,798 88
 PP £2,027 £4,818 6477 £2,027 £4,818 6477
Cardiff PDS £2,287 £1,931 10 £2,517 £2,142 10
 PP £2,611 £5,811 8497 £2,611 £5,811 8497
Swansea PDS £3,955 £11,770 54 £4,399 £12,965 54
 PP £2,451 £5,675 3413 £2,451 £5,675 3413
Merthyr PDS £2,824 £5,212 26 £3,093 £5,697 26
 PP £1,733 £3,103 1847 £1,733 £3,103 1847
Gloucester PDS £2,683 £4,804 60 £3,020 £5,401 60
 PP £1,689 £3,078 2013 £1,689 £3,078 2013
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We carried out multivariate analysis on the Crown Court data relating to cases with costs 
in excess of £100,000.  We were limited in the data available to us on Crown Court cases, 
but were able to control for location and for offence type (as indicated by broad 
groupings of offences) through multivariate analysis.  This provides greater confidence 
that any differences in cost that are identified are attributable to differences between 
public defenders and private practice.  However, because the analysis only controls for 
two sets of variation (offence type, which is necessarily general in nature, and court) 
there may be other factors which are not addressed by this analysis.  For that reason, this 
analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Nevertheless, where cases of a value greater than £100,000 are excluded, the PDS was 
not found to have significantly different Crown Court costs when compared with private 
practice after offence type and court location were controlled for.   This was true whether 
we used the lower cost assumptions for calculating the PDOs costs or the higher cost 
assumptions (Table 1 and 2, Appendix 5.3).  This suggests that much of the difference in 
average costs between the PDOs and private practice found in particular courts, as 
discussed above, may have been attributable to different case types dealt with by the two 
services. More generally, the evidence does not reliably suggest that the PDS overall was 
either cheaper or more expensive than private practice in the way that it dealt with Crown 
Court cases. 
 
This finding is interesting, given the very much higher ‘cost of time’ figures that have 
been applied in this analysis to the time recorded by the PDOs on Crown Court cases, 
compared to the various legal aid hourly rates under which payments to solicitors in 
private practice would have been calculated (see Table 5.6).  The fact that there were no 
significant differences in the resulting overall costs of Crown Court cases between the 
two sectors when these greatly different hourly rates were applied might be thought to 
indicate that, in general, the PDOs recorded less time on such cases than private practice.  
Some evidence of this is available from an exercise, commissioned by the PDS separate 
from this research, under which an experienced costs draughtsman was asked to examine 
the files relating to 40 PDS cases involving Crown Court 188F35 and to compare the costs 
claimed by the PDS under various legal aid rates with those that have been claimed by 
private practice solicitors in similar cases.  This analysis concluded that, especially in the 
more complex Crown Court cases, the PDOs recorded less time and other work on the 
files than might have been expected if the same cases had been conducted by private 
practice solicitors.  This was partly due to the PDOs failing to enter onto the files time 
and work which, from other information available, it was clear had been completed on 
these cases, but also may have reflected less actual time spent by the PDOs on these cases 
than would have been anticipated had they been handled by private practice solicitors. 
 
However, we have considerable reservations about the methodology employed in the 
above exercise.  The analysis in some respects reflected the notional claims filed under 
SPOCC during the research by the PDOs for their work in police stations and 
magistrates’ courts, in the sense that the draughtsman was calculating what the PDOs 
would have been paid for the work recorded under legal aid rates, rather than their actual 
                                                 
35 Three of the cases involved committals to the Crown Court only for sentence. 
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costs.  Also, unlike our analysis of SPOCC claims, where a comparison was made with 
actual claims filed by private practice solicitors, the draughtsman was comparing PDS 
notional costs on Crown Court cases with his own estimate of the time and work that 
private practice solicitors might have devoted to similar cases and the payments they 
would have received for this.  In other words, the exercise involved notional evidence as 
regards both PDO and private practice Crown Court costs. 
 
In this respect, it will be recalled that the evidence from our own (albeit limited) sample 
of Crown Court files drawn directly from both the PDOs and private practice indicates 
that it was only in Birmingham and Liverpool that less time on average was recorded by 
the PDOs than by private practice in Crown Court cases (see Table 3.11b in Chapter 3).  
From this we would conclude that the evidence on the time spent by PDOs and private 
practice on Crown Court cases is at best inconclusive.  
 
Another factor that may have influenced the above results showing a lack of cost 
differentials in Crown Court cases handled by the two types of service is methodological.  
The methods used to calculate PDS costs operated so as to apply the same hourly rate to 
all types of case, whether in the police station, magistrates' court or Crown Court, 
whereas one would expect private practice to claim at lower hourly rates for police 
station and magistrates' court work and, especially once uplifts are taken into account, 
higher rates for Crown Court work (see Table 5.6 above).  If it were possible to calculate 
similar variable rates for the PDS, the effect would be to reduce its cost differentials with 
private practice for police station and magistrates' court cases but to increase them for 
Crown Court cases.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined various factors which have contributed to the costs of the 
Public Defender Service, especially during the first three years of its operation.   During 
this period the service involved high costs, primarily due to the staffing levels with which 
the PDOs were initially established but also because of the relatively expensive office 
accommodation in which some of the PDOs were housed.  Of course, the PDOs were 
being set up from scratch and therefore entailed start up and capital costs, but once these 
costs were capitalised and written off over the period of the pilot, they did not make a 
substantial contribution to the overall cost of the service.  
 
A more important factor leading to the relative expense of the PDS has been the slow 
build up of clients and cases over the initial period of their operation, resulting in a 
significant under-utilisation of capacity during the whole of the period covered by this 
research.   During the first year of operation in 2001-2, the initial four PDOs averaged 
just over 400 ‘chargeable’ hours per ‘fee-earning’ member of staff.  In 2002-3 the 
Cheltenham PDO had opened, and the research PDOs increased their overall annual 
average of chargeable hours per fee earner to just over 700, while in the third year of the 
service in 2003-4 this increased to just under 900 chargeable hours per fee earner.  This 
appears to be in the lower quartile of the chargeable hour targets that private practice 
criminal defence firms would have been expected to achieve.  Preliminary figures for the 
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research PDOs in 2004-5 show little overall improvement in their average chargeable 
hours, although more dramatic increases were recorded in 2005-6.  However, these 
improvements appear only partially to reflect an actual increase in clients and cases and 
otherwise to be attributable to improved recording of time spent on cases, which would 
not in itself lead to a reduction in overall case costs.  
 
The combination of high staff and other running costs and under-utilisation of capacity in 
the PDOs has meant that they have entailed very high ‘costs of chargeable time’ over the 
period of the research.  Based on a ‘high’ estimate of their cost, including capital and 
start-up costs (but not wasted computer costs), the research PDOs had an average cost of 
£210 per chargeable hour in 2001-2.  This was reduced to just under £114 in 2002-3 and 
to just under £106 in 2003-4.  Even on a ‘low’ estimate, based on their running costs 
only, the research PDOs had an average cost of £176 per chargeable hour in 2001-2, 
reduced to £100 in 2002-3 and to £95 in 2003-4.  Although these figures include 
disbursements, they still are substantially higher than the hourly rates on which criminal 
legal aid payments are normally paid to solicitors in private practice. 
 
These high hourly costs of the PDOs during their first three year’s of operation translated 
in substantially higher cost per case when compared with private practice, especially at 
the investigation and magistrates’ court proceedings stage.  The most reliable data in this 
respect comes from multivariate analysis, which allows for the influence of such factors 
such as location, offence type and case complexity on costs to be controlled for.  In terms 
of police station attendance cases, PDO average case costs tended to be between 71% and 
93% higher than those for comparable private practice firms, while in magistrates’ court 
proceedings cases PDO costs were between 41% and 58% higher.  These differences in 
case costs in the police station and at magistrates’ courts are due primarily to the higher 
costs of the PDOs and do not reflect any tendency by the PDOs to spend longer on such 
cases.  
 
The evidence relating to comparative Crown Court costs is less clear-cut, partly due to 
limitations of the data available to us on private practice solicitors’ costs but also because 
the PDOs largely did not handle the type of lengthy, complex and relatively high cost 
cases in the Crown Court which, although constituting only a minority of all Crown Court 
cases, account for a sizeable proportion of overall legal aid expenditure in this area.  Once 
the effect of such high cost cases and of other independent variables that may impact on 
costs have been controlled for, there appears to be no significant difference overall in the 
estimated costs of PDO and private practice Crown Court cases.  Given that PDO costs 
have been estimated on higher hourly charging rates than would normally be available to 
private practice solicitors under the various forms of criminal legal aid, this might be 
thought to suggest that the PDOs spent less time on Crown Court cases, but our evidence 
from a sample of Crown Court files drawn directly from both sectors again indicates that 
there was no significant overall difference in the time recorded by the PDOs and private 
practice on their Crown Court cases during the research period.   
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Chapter 6  
Perceptions of the PDS outside the Service 
 
This chapter reports on results from various surveys of criminal justice professionals and also of  
criminal defence clients.  Whilst peer review has been used as the primary means of evaluating 
quality of the PDS (see Chapter 4), we wanted to explore the views of a variety of criminal 
justice professionals, particularly in relation to perceptions of quality, independence and the 
impact of the PDS on local criminal justice ‘markets’.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the views presented here are based on the perceptions of the 
particular respondents, which may not reflect the reality of PDS (or indeed private practice) 
criminal defence work.  As will be seen below, respondents sometimes had limited direct 
experience of the PDOs and their lawyers.  It is also possible that respondents from some 
professional groups may have been expressing a prejudice against state employed lawyers 
generally, rather than reflecting their actual experiences of the PDOs.  This prejudice may be 
thought to have especially influenced the responses of private practice solicitors, many of whom 
expressed considerable hostility to the setting up of the PDOs in their areas, at least initially, and 
who considered that for various reasons they constituted unfair competition with their own firms.  
It is possible that the responses of some barristers and even District Judges may also have been 
influenced to a degree by similar preconceptions possibly based, in part, on adverse views 
derived from perceptions of the standard of public defender schemes in the USA.    
 
With regard to clients’ perceptions, whilst acknowledging that they may not be the best indicator 
of the technical quality of criminal defence work, it was felt that it was important to test clients’ 
perceptions of the quality of the PDS compared to private criminal defence practitioners, 
particularly in view of the importance of client choice.   
 
Survey of Criminal Justice Professionals 
 
(i)  Sample 
 
The first part of the chapter reports on perceptions of the PDS among CPS lawyers, police 
custody sergeants, District Judges (Magistrates’ Court) and criminal defence solicitors and 
barristers in private practice who work in the areas covered by the six PDOs included in the 
research.  We decided to undertake postal surveys of these professional groups. Questionnaires 
were circulated directly to all barristers included on the relevant PDOs’ lists of experts and to a 
sample of solicitors in private practice taken from the duty solicitor lists for each of the research 
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areas.189F137 We also sent questionnaires directly to District Judges sitting in the main magistrates’ 
courts served by these PDOs.190F2 
 
Questionnaires were sent to a total of 219 barristers, 138 solicitors in private practice and 18 
District Judges.  Our method of circulating questionnaires to the police and CPS lawyers was 
indirect, in that we sent a batch of questionnaires to the relevant police forces and CPS areas and 
requested that they be circulated to relevant custody officers and prosecuting lawyers and 
returned directly to us. 
 
The number of completed questionnaires returned from each of these groups is shown in Table 
6.1.  Because of the indirect method of distributing the questionnaires, we are unable to 
determine the response rate from the police and CPS.  The overall response rate from barristers 
was 18%, from solicitors in private practice 31%, and from District Judges 89%.  Because of the 
low response rate from the first two of these groups, we cannot maintain that the views expressed 
are necessarily representative of these types of professional groups.  It should also be borne in 
mind that responses from some groups were concentrated in particular areas so that, for example, 
over half those from the police came from Middlesbrough and Cheltenham, and nearly 70% of 
responses from barristers and 55% from private practice solicitors came from Liverpool and 
Birmingham.  The survey results from these groups may therefore reflect their experiences of the 
particular PDOs rather than of the PDS as a whole.  
                                                 
137 We decided to circulate the questionnaire to individual solicitors, rather than to firms.  In particular, we were 
concerned to canvass the views of solicitors holding different positions in private practice, whether as partners or as 
employees of the firms. 
2 We did not include Crown Court judges, lay magistrates, Justices’ Clerks or other magistrates’ court clerks in our 
survey for various reasons.  We took the view that Crown Court judges would have limited direct experience of 
differences between the PDOs and private practice, given that most of their dealings would be with members of the 
Bar who serve both sectors.  Similarly, it was thought that individual lay magistrates would only have limited 
experience of the PDOs.  Although we made various attempts to contact the relevant magistrates’ courts in order to 
obtain the views of Justices’ Clerks and other magistrates’ court clerks, we were largely unsuccessful in obtaining 
their cooperation. 
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Table 6.1: Responses to Surveys of Criminal Justice Professionals 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges 
Barristers Private 
Practice 
Solicitors 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Birmingham 5 12.5 4 13.8 4 25.0 12 29.3 15 34.9 
Cheltenham 6 15.0 7 24.1 2 12.5 1 2.4 6 14.0 
Liverpool 6 15.0 3 10.3 0 0 16 39.0 11 25.6 
Middlesbrough 14 35.0 9 31.0 4 25.0 3 7.3 5 11.6 
Pontypridd 8 20.0 1 3.4 2 12.5 2 4.9 0 0 
Swansea 0 0 4 13.8 2 12.5 6 14.6 6 14.0 
Swansea/ 
Pontypridd 
0 0 0 0 2 12.5 0 0 0 0 
Not 
ascertained 
1 2.5 1 3.4 0 0 1 2.4 0 0 
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0
 
 
(ii) Contact with criminal justice professionals 
 
We asked survey respondents to indicate the level of contact they had had both with private 
practice and the PDS to help us gauge the extent to which the PDS had made an impact and also 
the amount of experience on which respondents were forming judgments.  We would, of course, 
expect there to be significantly less experience of the PDS than of private practice because there 
are far more private practitioners in any area and also because of the relatively recent 
establishment of the PDS. 
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Table 6. 2: In the past three months, how many times have you had professional experience of 
private practice lawyers? 
 
 CPS Police District Judges  Barristers 
 N % N % N % N % 
Not at all 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 to 5 times 0 0 2 6.9 0 0 1 2.4 
6 to 10 times 1 2.5 3 10.3 0 0 1 2.4 
More than 10 times 39 97.5 24 82.8 16 100.0 38 92.7 
Not ascertained       1    2.4 
Totals  40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0
 
 
Table 6.3: In the past three months, how many times have you had professional experience of 
Public Defender Service lawyers? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges 
Barristers Private 
Practice 
Solicitors 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Not at all 1 2.5 7 24.1 0 0 12 29.3 2 4.7 
1 to 5 times 15 37.5 10 34.5 6 47.5 17 41.5 13 30.2 
6 to 10 times 8 20.0 4 13.8 1 6.25 5 12.2 10 23.3 
More than 10 times 15 37.5 8 27.6 9 56.25 5 12.2 18 41.9 
Not ascertained 1 2.5      2 4.9   
Total N 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that, as predicted, all the professional groups surveyed had high levels 
of contact with private practitioners in the three months prior to the survey, and lower levels of 
contact with the PDS.  Notably, only a quarter of the barristers who responded had been in 
professional contact with the PDS on six or more occasions during that period. 
(iii)  Perceived quality 
 
Whilst quality and independence are interrelated concepts, the survey first asked for respondents’ 
views on aspects of the quality of work carried out by the PDS, and then asked for views 
specifically on perceptions of independence. Respondents were asked their opinion on how PDS 
lawyers compare with private practice lawyers in their area in terms of the quality of their 
representations/advocacy.   
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Table 6.4: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in your area on the quality of their representations/advocacy? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Better 5 12.5 0 0.0 0 0 2 4.9 0 0.0 
About the same 27 67.5 17 58.6 13 81.25 23 56.1 12 27.9 
Worse 3 7.5 2 6.9 1 6.25 4 9.8 19 44.2 
Too many variables to say 4 10.0 4 13.8 2 12.5 4 9.8 9 20.9 
Don’t Know/Not applicable 1 2.5 5 17.2 0 0 6 14.6 2 4.7 
Not ascertained   1 3.4   2 4.9 1 2.3 
N 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
 
The results in Table 6.4 suggest that the PDS were broadly perceived as being of similar quality 
to private practice in this regard, although private practitioners were more likely to say that they 
were worse.  Where a difference between the PDS and private practice was reported, barristers 
and judges were marginally more likely to say that the PDS was worse than better, whereas CPS 
lawyers were marginally more likely to say that PDS lawyers were better. However, in all cases, 
the numbers involved are very small. 
 
As noted earlier, respondents were encouraged to explain their responses and where this was 
done, it unsurprisingly tended to confirm the picture set out above.  Some CPS respondents 
suggested that within private practice and the PDS there was variability in quality depending on 
the individual lawyers concerned: 
Performance is very varied dependent upon advocate and class of case. Some perform 
very well whilst others seem to flounder if faced with more than two cases in any list. 
Some are extremely competent and very eager, however others require more experience. 
Positive CPS comments on the PDS focused on the lack of financial incentive colouring their 
lawyers’ judgment and affecting their working practices: 
I think that they are better than their Private Practice colleagues because they are not 
‘money driven’. Cases are not seen ‘on and on’ in an attempt to maximise legal aid 
payments. 
[PDS lawyers are] More prepared. Attend Court early. In a position to proceed 
immediately.   
Several CPS respondents praised PDS lawyers for being more polite and pleasant to them, and 
this CPS lawyer saw them as being more understanding of the CPS: 
The PDS lawyers have an excellent understanding of the role of the CPS and therefore do 
[not] set unrealistic timetables re. demands for case progression. Advocating is good and 
liaison excellent. 
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On the other hand, whilst the majority of police respondents said that PDS lawyers performed 
about the same as private practice lawyers, some of them commented on their perception of a 
variable standard of PDS lawyers and on their lack of preparedness in spite of having small 
caseloads before the court. 
The majority of barristers said that they thought PDS lawyers were about the same as private 
practice lawyers in terms of quality of representations and advocacy. Some of their narrative 
responses provide a more nuanced explanation of this perception:  
The quality is better than poor firms, but similar to average good firms. 
Generally the PDS seems to provide a service of the same standard to any other High 
Street Practice. They seem to be viewed in a similar vein by both lay clients and others 
within the criminal justice system . 
However, some barristers argued that there was not a level playing field between private practice 
and the PDS, for example: 
 
They have taken high quality staff from private practice paid them more/holidays/pension 
and given them a lower case load. The quality is generally very high in consequence. 
As we have seen, private practice solicitors were more critical of the PDS.  Some of those who 
said that PDS lawyers were of a similar standard to private practice observed that most of the 
PDS lawyers came direct from private practice and were therefore likely to be of a similar 
standard. Others, however, pointed to a perception that incentives and structures had an adverse 
impact on PDS quality: 
No incentives to work hard to achieve good results. Salary [in] excess of local solicitors 
and benefits (pension etc.) make lawyers complacent. 
They lack the volume of work and do not appear regularly before the court. It has a high 
turnover of staff which affects consistency and credibility. They do not get the same co-
operation and assistance from other defence lawyers. 
In contrast to the perceptions of some other professional groups, a recurrent theme in the 
responses of private practice solicitors was that those recruited to the PDS were either 
inexperienced or, more commonly, lawyers who had not succeeded in private practice and who 
were poorly motivated to do their best for clients.  There were also some more specific criticisms 
of the quality of work perceived by private practitioners: 
Quality of advocacy poor appears to suggest poor case preparation. 
Public defender could not distinguish "Plea Before Venue" on a guilty plea and Mode of 
Trial….  Obviously did not understand basic practice.191F3 
Several comments referred to the lack of ‘day-in, day-out’ advocacy resulting from low case 
volumes, and some suggested that cultural differences between PDS and private practice lawyers 
accounted for differences in quality:  
                                                 
3 In either-way cases the defendant is asked to indicate what they would plead, and mode of trial is only relevant if 
they indicate a not guilty plea or fail to indicate a plea. 
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By comparison the private firm advocates seem more willing to take extreme or risky 
positions on behalf of the client and frequently this works to the advantage of the client’s 
interests. 
A couple of them are quite experienced but lacking flair. There are one or two others who 
are clearly inexperienced and make up for lack of ability/knowledge by being aggressive. 
 
(iv)  Perceived ability to deal with the prosecution 
 
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of the effectiveness of the  PDS in dealing with 
the prosecution. 
 
Table 6.5: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in your area on their effectiveness in dealing with the prosecution? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Better 7 17.5 0 0 0 0 2 4.9 0 0 
About the same 25 62.5 15 51.7 12 75.0 21 51.2 21 27.9 
Worse 6 15.0 1 3.4 2 12.5 5 12.2 9 20.9 
Too many variables to say 1 2.5 4 13.8 1 6.25 2 4.9 3 7.0 
Don’t Know/Not applicable 1 2.5 9 31.0 1 6.25 11 26.8 18 41.9 
Not ascertained         1 2.3 
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
The results are similar to those for quality of representations/advocacy with the majority of 
respondents, other than private practice solicitors, indicating that the effectiveness of the two 
sectors was about the same. Again, a relatively small minority of CPS and barrister respondents 
indicated that they thought that the PDS was better, and a small (but slightly larger) minority of 
all professional groups indicated that the PDS was worse than private practice. Private practice 
provided an exception to this picture, with only just over a quarter indicating that the PDS was 
about the same, and a fifth indicating that the PDS was worse than private practice. Perhaps 
surprisingly, nearly half of private practitioners did not feel able to indicate a view.  
 
Some CPS respondents suggested that the PDS might be more likely to deal with cases 
expeditiously, and that they were more effective negotiators who were more likely to be 
proactive in contacting the prosecution, rather than simply leaving cases to be dealt with at the 
court.  Conversely, some PDS lawyers were described as, “abrasive and unrealistic” by one CPS 
respondent and “more inflexible in their approach” by another, who described in more detail 
what they meant: 
…[T]here tends to be more common sense in the approach of private practice lawyers 
and more taking legal points (not always with a great deal of merit) from PDS. 
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These perceptions of the PDS were also reflected in the comments of some private practitioners: 
[The PDS] Appear to have a strange attitude towards the Crown. Very confrontational 
approach on the whole. 
 [G]eneral tendency to be confrontational not always in the interest of the client and 
certainly not the public purse. 
Whilst barristers generally felt that the PDS lawyers were about the same as private practice 
lawyers on this criterion, one who thought they were worse explained it in the following terms: 
 
In my opinion they fulfil their duty and requirements. There is no ambition, enthusiasm 
or real drive, whilst always very nice, easy to deal with, they appear to lack the drive 
necessary to succeed without the limitless supply of Government funds. 
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(v)  Dealing with other defence lawyers 
 
A similar question was asked in respect of PDS lawyers dealings with other defence lawyers, the 
results of which are shown in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in your area on dealing with other defence lawyers? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Better 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.4 0 0 
About the same 21 52.5 10 34.5 8 50.0 18 43.9 14 32.6 
Worse 4 10.0 0 0 1 6.25 7 17.1 13 30.2 
Too many variables to say 0 0 3 10.3 0 0 2 4.9 8 18.6 
Don’t Know/Not applicable 15 37.5 16 55.2 7 43.75 13 31.7 7 16.3 
Not ascertained         1 2.3 
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100 41 100.0 43 97.7 
 
Understandably, there was generally a greater tendency for respondents, other than private 
practice lawyers, to be unable or unwilling to express a view. Of those that did, the majority felt 
that the PDS were about the same as private practice, although nearly a third of private practice 
lawyers thought that the PDS was worse.  
CPS respondents who commented other than to say the PDS were about the same as private 
practice suggested that some PDS lawyers were “hostile” in their dealings with other firms. 
Others, however, appeared to view it, in effect, the other way round, pointing to resistance 
amongst private practitioners to working with the PDS: 
There are still issues about 'competition' between private practice and PDS lawyers which 
seem to result in efforts to hinder the work of the PDS lawyer rather than work for the 
benefit of clients and the CJS. 
Similar views were expressed by some barristers: 
Private practice lawyers are suspicious of them [and] are less likely to co-operate. They 
[the PDS] become isolated in the legal community.  
I do not think they are respected by private practice lawyers because they are not viewed 
as independent. 
A mistrust of PDS lawyers was also reflected in the comments of some private solicitors:  
There remains a mistrust of PDS lawyers by those in private practice. The generous 
funding of the PDS and the perception that they are not profit driven means many 
defence lawyers are more wary of the PDS. It is also true that PDS lawyers have a certain 
arrogance which it is believed is due to the safety net effects of not having to make a 
profit. 
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However, other private solicitors indicated that early concerns about the PDS had subsided, for 
example: 
Early misgivings about the political motive for setting up such a service have now 
subsided, they have not taken a large share of the market and on a personal level were 
known to most practitioners prior to PDS being set up. 
  
(vi)  Effectiveness in dealing with the police 
 
Finally, in this part of the survey, respondents were asked about their view of the effectiveness of 
the PDS in dealing with police compared to private practice. 
 
Table 6.7: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in your area on their effectiveness in dealing with the police? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private Practice 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Better 1 2.5 0 0 0 0 1 2.4 0 0 
About the same 7 17.5 18 62.1 6 37.5 13 31.7 8 18.6 
Worse 3 7.5 4 13.8 1 6.25 3 7.3 4 9.3 
Too many variables to 
say 
0 3 10.3 0 0 2 4.9 1 2.3 
Don’t Know/Not 
applicable 
29 72.5 3 10.3 9 56.25 19 46.3 30 69.8 
Not Ascertained   1 3.4   3 7.3   
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
Again, and for understandable reasons, a high proportion of respondents, other than custody 
officers, felt unable or unwilling to assess the PDS on this criterion. The majority of police 
respondents felt that the PDS performed about the same as private practice in this respect. 
 
The perception, identified earlier, that some PDS lawyers acted in an abrasive or confrontational 
manner was reflected in the comments of some CPS respondents, for example:  
 
The general impression given is that PDS make demands of police rather than requests, 
generally in inappropriate cases. 
However, this did not appear to be reflected in the view of custody officers (the majority of 
whom thought the PDS to be about the same as private practice in terms of their effectiveness in 
dealing with the police), but a number of them did, contrary to the views of some private 
practitioners, consider that the PDS could be too defence minded, as the following comments 
show: 
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An apparent standard is to encourage ‘No Reply’.192F4 
 
Long delays in attending to 'thwart' the custody clock. 
 
(vii)  Overall service provided to clients 
 
Having considered the individual aspects of the quality of work of the PDS, respondents were 
then asked to provide an overall rating of the quality of service that PDS lawyers provide to 
clients compare to that provided by private practice.   
 
Table 6.8: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in your area on the overall quality of the service they appear to give to their 
clients? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Better 8 20.0 0 0 0 0 7 17.1 1 2.3 
About the same 21 52.5 19 65.5 12 75.0 19 46.3 12 27.9 
Worse 4 10.0 3 10.3 1 6.25 5 12.2 18 41.9 
Too many variables to say 0 0 3 10.3 0 0 1 2.4 2 4.7 
Don’t Know/Not applicable 7 17.5 3 10.3 3 18.75 5 12.2 9 20.9 
Missing   1 3.4   4 9.8 1 2.3 
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
Although the overall profile of responses is broadly similar to those given in respect of the 
individual aspects of quality, the responses of CPS and barrister respondents to the question on 
overall quality of service to clients is slightly more favourable to the PDS, with over 70% of CPS 
respondents and over 60% of barrister respondents rating the PDS as the same or better than 
private practice.  The predominant view, however, is that the PDS provides the same quality of 
service to clients as private practice. The only exception is private practice itself, which rated the 
PDS as providing a worse quality of service to clients, possibly reflecting a continued hostility to 
the concept of a public defender service. 
 
A number of CPS respondents indicated that the PDS were more willing than private practice 
solicitors to advise and act decisively and expeditiously in the interests of their clients, for 
example:  
They do not waste court time and get maximum [sentence discount] for guilty pleas if 
appropriate. They also defend clients with enthusiasm and are solid lawyers. 
The PDS lawyers appear to have their clients’ interests at heart not their firms. 
                                                 
4 There is evidence that PDS lawyers were more likely than private practice lawyers to advise clients to remain silent 
in police interviews. See Chapter 3. 
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Whilst many of the private practice firms in this area provide good quality advice and 
service to their clients, some are still more willing to advise not guilty pleas or [apply for] 
spontaneous adjournments to attract business rather than considering an individual’s 
needs. 
On the other hand, a minority of CPS respondents reported poor quality work by PDS lawyers: 
A number of cases have been noted where [poor] or inaccurate advice has been given by 
a PDS advocate resulting in the defence solicitors having to step in to defuse situations 
and take over representation. 
I have seen instances of very bad advice given… 
Again, the minority of custody officers who rated the PDS as worse than private practice 
indicated what they felt was an inappropriate adversarial stance taken by PDS lawyers. One, for 
example, suggested that an adversarial stance was resulting in more charging of PDS clients: 193F5 
[The PDS] Often advise no comment which results in charge when a caution would have 
applied in cases where the evidence appears incontrovertible. 
Barristers tended to repeat the same kind of comments made in respect of the individual aspects 
of quality, but some respondents commented on the good quality of PDS case work, such as:  
Preparation of briefs and background research is on [a] par with the best solicitors. 
On the other hand, some barristers believed that the fact that PDS lawyers are directly employed 
by the state affects their approach: 
The PDS tend to work with a Civil Service mind set. They do not work the long hours 
that private solicitors do, and with client access to the same person 24/7. It is a tick box 
availability regime without the continuity required. Staff who were in the private sector 
have changed their approach when working for the PDS. 
Similar comments were made by some private practice solicitors, and others made the more 
directly political point that in their view, despite the absence of a ‘level playing field’ in financial 
terms, this did not benefit clients: 
I am not convinced that I have seen any advantage to clients from the provision of service 
by the PDS. The tax payer has not had value for money given the set up costs. The 
establishment of the PDS has created a far from level playing field. No other private firm 
would obtain capital to perform so poorly and represent so few clients. 
However, this comment appears to be directed more to ‘value for money’ aspects of the PDS (on 
which there may be justifiable criticisms) rather than to quality of service to the client. 
 
(viii)  Quality of Briefs to Counsel and Preparation from Barrister’s Perspective 
 
In addition to the general question on quality, barristers were asked whether they perceived any 
difference in the quality of briefs to counsel prepared by the PDS. 
                                                 
5 Our analysis of investigation stage outcomes showed that overall fewer PDS clients were charged than private 
practice clients although, of course, outcomes are determined by a number of variables. See Chapter 3. 
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Table 6.9: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers with regard to the quality of briefs to counsel? 
  
 N % 
Better 11 26.8 
About the same 18 43.9 
Don't know 5 12.2 
Not ascertained 1 2.4 
Total 41 100.0 
 
Although the predominant response is that the PDS performed ‘about the same’ as private 
practice, more barristers were positive about the quality of briefs than about quality generally.  
Those barristers who said that the PDS was better ranged between describing their briefs to 
counsel in terms such as ’superb’ and ’better than the extremely poor standard to which most 
firms have now sunk.’   
Barristers were also asked directly about the standard of case preparation by the PDS compared 
to private practice. 
Table 6.10: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers with regard to the standard of case preparation? 
 
 N % 
Better 7 17.1 
About the same 21 51.2 
Worse 3 7.3 
Too variable to say 3 7.3 
Don't know 5 12.2 
Not ascertained 2 4.9 
Total 41 100.0 
  
Here, the responses are similar to the assessment of overall quality of service to clients, with the 
majority believing that the PDS was the same as or better than private practice in terms of case 
preparation.   
 
(ix) Independence issues 
 
Since, from the outset, concern was expressed in a number of quarters about the independence of 
PDS lawyers, we asked respondents a series of questions directed at a number of aspects of 
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independence.194F6 They were first asked about their views as to the willingness of PDS, as 
compared with private practice, lawyers to challenge the police or prosecution. 
 
Table 6.11: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers with regard to their willingness to challenge the police or prosecution? 
 CPS Police District 
Judges 
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
More willing 1 2.5 3 10.3 1 6.3 1 2.4 1 2.3 
About the same 32 80 15 51.7 10 62.5 25 61.0 19 44.2 
Less willing 1 2.5 1 3.4 1 6.3 4 9.8 11 25.6 
Too variable to say 2 5 5 17.2 2 12.5 0 0.0 2 4.7 
Don't know/not applicable 3 7.5 3 10.3 2 12.5 10 24.4 9 20.9 
Not ascertained 1 2.5 2 6.9   1 2.4 1 2.3 
Totals 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0
 
As with the previous questions, the predominant response was that the PDS are about the same in 
this respect.  A quarter of private practitioners, and ten per cent of barristers indicated that in 
their view there was a tendency for PDS lawyers to be less willing to stand up to the police or 
prosecution.  However, this was not reflected by the other professional groups. One in ten 
custody officers thought that PDS lawyers were more willing to challenge the police or 
prosecution, possibly reflecting the view of some custody officers that PDS lawyers were ‘too 
adversarial’. However, the response of the majority of custody officers to questions relating to 
the ‘adversariality’ of the PDS was that they are about the same as private practice. 
 
A similar question was asked, about the willingness of PDS lawyers to ‘stand up’ for their 
clients. 
 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this issue and the PDS Code of Conduct. 
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Table 6.12: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers in their willingness to 'stand up' for their clients? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
More willing 0.0 0 1 3.4 0 0 1 2.4 2 4.7 
About the same 36.0 90 17 58.6 13 81.25 24 58.5 13 30.2 
Less willing 0.0 0 1 3.4 0 0 4 9.8 18 41.9 
Too variable to say 1.0 2.5 5 17.2 1 6.25 1 2.4 3 7.0 
Don't know/not applicable 2.0 5.0 3 10.3 2 12.5 10 24.4 6 14.0 
Not ascertained 1.0 2.5 2 6.9   1 2.4 1 2.3 
Total 39.0 97.5 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
Not surprisingly, the results were broadly the same as for the previous question, although fewer 
custody officers appeared to think that PDS lawyers were more adversarial than private practice 
lawyers, whereas private practitioner respondents appeared to be more critical of PDS lawyers in 
relation to their willingness to stand up for their clients compared to their willingness to 
challenge the police or prosecution. 
 
Finally in this section, we asked a question which was designed to elicit views about the 
willingness of PDS lawyers, where they advised their clients to plead guilty, to do so at an early 
stage. The research of the Scottish Public Defender Service Office found a tendency for PDSO 
lawyers to advise guilty pleas earlier than private practice,195F7 and we wanted to find out whether 
there was a perception that this might be happening with the PDS in England and Wales. 
                                                 
7 T. Goriely et al, The Public Defence Solicitors’ Office in Edinburgh: An Independent Evaluation, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive Central Research Unit, 2001. 
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Table 6.13: In your opinion how do Public Defender Service lawyers compare with private 
practice lawyers where a client is advised to plead guilty, in their willingness to advise a client to 
plead guilty at an early stage of the proceedings? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
More willing 7.0 17.5 0 0 1 6.25 3 7.3 10 23.3 
About the same 22.0 55 9 31.0 8 50.0 23 56.1 9 20.9 
Less willing 1.0 2.5 4 13.8 0 0 0 0.0 2 4.7 
Too variable to say 2.0 5 6 20.7 0 0 0 0.0 21 48.8 
Don't know/not applicable 7.0 17.5 8 27.6 7 43.75 14 34.1 0 0 
Not ascertained 1.0 2.5 2 6.9   1 2.4 1 2.3 
Total 40 100.0 29 100.0 16 100.0 41 100.0 43 100.0 
 
Although the predominant view of those respondents who felt able to express an opinion was 
that the PDS was about the same as private practice in this respect, there was a slightly less 
neutral response than for previous questions.  Interestingly the CPS respondents who did not feel 
the PDS acted similarly to private practice in this regard, felt the PDS were more inclined to 
advise a guilty plea earlier than private practice. On the other hand, those custody officers who 
thought there was a difference between the PDS and private practice, were more likely to think 
that PDS lawyers were less willing than private practice to advise an early guilty plea.  Again, 
this may reflect the view of a minority of custody officers that PDS lawyers are more adversarial 
than private practice lawyers. Certainly, the CPS respondents would be more likely to have direct 
experience of this than custody officers.  Interestingly, private practice respondents were, if 
anything, more equivocal on this than on other issues in that, compared to the other questions on 
independence, a greater proportion thought that practice was too variable to say. 
 
(x)  Impact on the local market 
 
The original rationale for the PDS, as expressed in the government White Paper Modernising 
Justice, was that a mixed system would provide better value for money for the taxpayer.196F8  If this 
is correct, it is inevitable that a PDS would have an impact on the criminal defence ‘market’. We 
wanted to obtain the views of criminal justice professionals as to whether PDOs had made an 
impact locally, and the nature and form of such impact.  Respondents were thus asked what 
impact they thought the PDS had on their area in terms of quality, choice and the local private 
profession, and they could indicate as many responses as they thought applicable as well as any 
other impact that was not specified in the question. 
 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 1 
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Table 6.14: What impact, if any, do you think the setting up of a Public Defender Office has had 
in your area? 
 
 CPS Police District 
Judges  
Barristers  Private 
Practice  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
No significant impact 24 60 18 62 11 68.8 27 65.9 25 58.1 
Taken work away from private 
solicitors 
5 12.5 2 7 4 25.5 12 29.3 16 37.2 
Improved the quality of criminal 
defence services 
7 17.5 0 0 1 6.3 3 7.3 0 0.0 
Reduced the quality of criminal 
defence services 
2 5 2 7 0 0 2 4.9 6 14.0 
Improved choice for suspects and 
defendants 
15 37.5 6 21 4 25.0 8 19.5 3 7.0 
Reduced choice for suspects and 
defendants 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other (Please specify) 0 0 2 7 0 0 2 4.9 9 20.9 
 
The dominant response, including that of private practice respondents, was that the PDOs have 
had no significant impact in the areas where they were set up. Given that even in those areas with 
relatively few private practice suppliers, the proportionate number of clients represented by most 
of the PDOs is relatively small, this is not surprising. A substantial minority of barristers, judges 
and private practice respondents felt that PDOs had taken clients away from private practice. 
Again, this is not surprising given a potential client base that was not increasing to any great 
extent, and that this option could be validly indicated even though the impact on private 
practitioners was minor. Again, other than for private practice respondents, a substantial minority 
of respondents thought that the PDO had improved client choice. Given that the establishment of 
a PDO is likely to have increased the number of suppliers available in any particular area, such a 
response is not surprising. Views about the impact on quality of criminal defence services are 
fairly neutral, with only CPS respondents indicating in any numbers that the PDO had improved 
quality and, conversely, few private practice lawyers indicating that they had reduced quality.  
 
Survey of Client Views 
 
Attempts to obtain views of criminal clients on the quality of the services they have received 
from their lawyers have often proved unsuccessful, as a result of unrepresentative samples and 
poor response rates.  Obtaining clients’ views relating to police station legal advice can be 
especially problematic.  If the client is not charged with a criminal offence, his or her contact 
with the particular solicitors’ firm or PDO may be relatively short.  On the other hand, if they are 
charged and the firm continues to represent them in subsequent court proceedings, there is a risk 
both that any approach by researchers to obtain views on the investigation stage will interfere 
with the on-going solicitor-client relationship and that the client’s views of what happened at the 
police station will be flavoured by the subsequent handling and outcome of the case.  There is 
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also the problem that (as criminal defence lawyers can themselves testify) it may be difficult to 
keep track of the whereabouts of, or to make contact with, criminal defence clients. 
 
We decided to seek the views of the clients in the same sample of cases on which we based our 
file analysis,197F9 rather than drawing separate samples for these purposes.  This meant that there was 
an inevitable delay between the actual provision of legal advice in these cases and our approach 
to clients, as we were required to wait until the PDO or private practice firm had completed their 
relevant cases before we could sample them.  It was not uncommon for a period of some months 
to elapse before this process was completed.     
 
We also conducted a pilot early on to attempt to contact clients in one of the areas by telephone 
soon after we had obtained their details from the files.  Because of the low incidence of client 
telephone numbers on lawyers’ files and the logistical problems we experienced in trying to 
encourage clients to speak to us on the telephone, we discontinued this method of seeking client 
views. 
 
As a result, during the period of file data collection for each of our three samples (police station, 
magistrates’ court and Crown Court) a survey was conducted, seeking the opinions of the clients 
of private practice law firms and  PDOs in all six pilot regions. Clients were drawn from the files 
we looked at in each of the six regions.  We contacted all clients for whom a residential address 
was given.  This meant, in particular, excluding those who were imprisoned at the end of their 
case.  Whilst this means our sample is biased towards a group of non-imprisoned clients, it is not 
a bias likely to favour one service over another.  Our response rate across the three samples was 
11%.  This is poor but not unusual for this sort of client survey.  
  
                                                 
9 See Chapter 1 for a general description of this sample. 
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 (i)  The investigation stage 
 
There were 47 respondents in this sample, 25 who were PDS clients, and 22 who were private 
practice clients. 
 
Table 6.15: Responses from Clients in Investigation Stage Sample 
 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
Birmingham 5 20 3 13.6 8 17.0 
Cheltenham 6 24 3 13.6 9 19.1 
Liverpool 2 8 3 13.6 5 10.6 
Middlesbrough 3 12 5 22.7 8 17.0 
Pontypridd 2 8 2 9.1 4 8.5 
Swansea 3 12 5 22.7 8 17.0 
Missing 4 16 1 4.5 5 10.6 
N 25  22  47  
 
The sample shows that we have a spread of respondents from all areas and from both sectors, 
although in all instances numbers are very small. 
 
To assist in the contextualisation of client perceptions of the service they had received, we asked 
clients whether they had used the same lawyers prior to the case that we were asking them about.  
It is possible that those with prior service have already formed a view that their lawyer is ‘good’ 
and therefore would be more likely to rate their services highly.   
 
Table 6.16:  Police station clients: Have you ever used these lawyers before? 
 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  14 56.0 8 36.4 22 46.8 
Yes 11 44.0 14 63.6 25 53.2 
N 25  22  47  
 
Although more private practice clients had used the same lawyers previously, there was no 
significant difference between the two sectors regarding whether the client had used the lawyer 
before, but a significant proportion of the PDS respondents did have prior experience of PDS 
lawyers.  
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We first sought to obtain factual information about the interview process in the police station 
from clients.  In particular, some of the survey questions were designed to pick up the extent to 
which lawyers in the two sectors took an interventionist approach to police station work, by 
being willing to intervene with the police or stop the interview to advise their clients. 
 
Table 6.17: Police station clients: When interviewed, did your legal adviser say anything to the 
police? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  6 24.0 5 22.7 11 23.4
Yes 13 52.0 14 63.6 27 57.4
Don’t Know 6 24.0 2 9.1 8 17.0
Not ascertained 0  
 
1 4.5 1 1.8 
 N 25  22  47  
 
Although slightly more private practitioner clients said their lawyer intervened, the difference is 
not statistically significant, and is mainly accounted for by the higher proportion of PDS clients 
who did not know the answer to this question. 
 
Table 6.18: Police station clients: Did your legal adviser stop the interview to talk to you in 
private? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  12 48.0 12 54.5 24 51.1
Yes 8 32.0 9 40.9 17 36.2
Don’t Know 2 8.0 0 0 2 4.5 
Not ascertained 3 12 1 4.5 4 8.5 
 N 25  22  47  
 
A slightly higher proportion of private practice clients thought the lawyer had stopped the 
interview to talk to them, but the difference was not statistically significant and was accounted 
for by clients not answering the question or answering ‘don’t know’. 
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Table 6.19: Police station clients: If yes to either, do you think this helped your case? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  0  1 4.5 1 2.1 
Yes 16 64.0 14 63.6 30 63.8
Don’t Know 4 16.0 1 4.5 5 10.6
Not ascertained 5 20.0 6 27.3 11 23.4
N 25  22  47  
 
Where the client reported that there had been such an intervention by their lawyer, they were 
asked if they thought that this had helped their case. Clients in both groups were similarly 
confident that any intervention had helped. 
 
The next set of questions concerned clients’ views of the quality of service they received.  It is, 
of course, always important to emphasise that client surveys measure perceived quality of service 
and that this can be quite different from technical quality.198F10 
 
Table 6.20: Client Perceptions of Service: Police Station 
 
  Excellent 
 
% 
Good 
 
% 
OK 
 
% 
Poor 
 
% 
Very 
Poor 
% 
Don't 
know 
% 
N 
PDS 64 28 8 0 0 0 25 Overall, how good was your 
representation? PP 59 18 9 9 5 0 22 
PDS 52 24 16 4 0 4 25 How good was your lawyer at getting 
information about your case from the 
police? 
PP 46 23 14 9 5 5 22 
PDS 60 16 20 4 0 0 25 How good was your lawyer at 
explaining what was happening at the 
police station? 
PP 55 23 9 5 5 5 22 
PDS 44 24 24 0 4 4 25 How good was your lawyer at 
preparing you for interview? PP 55 23 5 18 0 0 22 
PDS 44 28 24 0 0 4 25 How good was your lawyer at 
understanding your point of view? PP 41 36 5 18 0 0 22 
PDS 48 24 16 4 0 8 25 How good was your lawyer at assisting 
you during your interview? PP 59 14 18 5 5 0 22 
 
These findings are broadly positive: clients generally rated their lawyers highly on the criteria we 
used to measure satisfaction.  This is consistent with client surveys of the legal profession 
generally.199F11 There are no significant differences between the PDS and private practice, and there 
                                                 
10 R. Moorhead, A. Sherr and A. Paterson, (2003) ‘What Clients Know: Client perspectives and legal competence’, 
10/1 International Journal of the Legal Profession 5-37. 
11 Ibid.  
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is no consistent pattern in terms of the proportion of clients who rate their lawyers excellent or 
good on any particular criterion.  Private practice clients indicated more frequently than PDS 
clients that they thought their lawyers were poor or very poor, but the number of such clients was 
low. 
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Table 6.21: Future Use of Lawyers (Police Station Survey) 
 
  Yes 
 
% 
No 
 
% 
Don’t 
Know 
% 
N 
PDS 84 12 4 25 If arrested again, would you use 
the same legal adviser? PP 73 27 0 22 
PDS* 28 16 56 25 Would you use the Duty 
Solicitor? PP 14 64 23 22 
PDS 20 20 60 25 Would you use another solicitor? 
PP 27 41 32 22 
PDS 8 28 64 25 Would you not use a solicitor? 
PP 5 55 41 22 
PDS 0 0 100 25 Would you use a solicitor from 
the PDO which has recently 
opened in your area? 
PP 27 50 23 22 
 
Very few clients said they would not use a solicitor if arrested again, and relatively few said they 
would not use the same legal adviser.  Many were sceptical of using a duty solicitor.  There was 
one significant difference between PDS and private practice, which is that the PDS clients were 
more inclined to say they would use the duty solicitor scheme.  This may have been because they 
were more likely to have come to the PDS lawyer via the duty scheme and were therefore happy 
with instructing via that route. 
  
(ii) The proceedings stage 
 
There were 90 respondents in this sample, 45 from each supplier-type. About three fifths 
of the respondents’ cases were heard in magistrates’ courts, with around two-fifths in the 
Crown Court. The responses from magistrates’ court and Crown Court clients are 
recorded in separate tables.  Generally, we have not identified regions separately as the 
number of responses is too low to make such analysis meaningful. 
 
Table 6.22: Data on Clients from Magistrates’ Court sample 
 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
Birmingham 6 21.4% 5 19.2% 11 20.4% 
Cheltenham 6 21.4% 5 19.2% 11 20.4% 
Liverpool 1 3.6% 5 19.2% 6 11.1% 
Middlesbrough 3 10.7% 7 26.9% 10 18.5% 
Pontypridd 7 25.0% 0 0.0% 7 13.0% 
Swansea 5 17.9% 4 15.4% 9 16.7% 
 N 28  26  54  
 
The magistrates’ court sample was fairly balanced save in terms of the absence of clients 
from private practice in Pontypridd and the relative absence of PDS clients in Liverpool.   
 
Table 6.23: Data on Clients from Crown Court sample 
 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
Birmingham 6 35.3 3 15.8 9 25 
Cheltenham 1 5.9 2 10.5 3 8.3 
Liverpool 3 17.6 4 21.1 7 19.4 
Middlesbrough 3 17.6 6 31.6 9 25 
Pontypridd 2 11.8 0 0.0 2 5.6 
Swansea 2 11.8 4 21.1 6 16.7 
 N 17  19  36  
 
 
Responses from private practice and PDO clients show greater regional variation in the 
Crown Court sample than they did in the magistrates’ court sample, and once again there 
were no responses from private practice clients in Pontypridd. 
 
An issue to bear in mind when considering client evaluations of service is the extent to 
which they have had experience of that lawyer type  in more than one case.   
 
  
Table 6.24: Magistrates’ Court:  Have you ever used these lawyers before? 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  13 46.5 12 44.4 24 45.5 
Yes 14 53.5 14 55.6 29 54.5 
N 27  26  53  
 
There is little apparent difference between the two sectors in the magistrates’ court 
sample, with slightly more than half the respondents having used their lawyer before. The 
position is similar in the Crown Court sample, where slightly more of the PDS 
respondents had previous experience of the same lawyer, though the difference is not 
significant.  
Table 6.25: Crown Court:  Have you ever used these lawyers before? 
 Public Defender 
Service 
Private Practice Total 
 N % N % N % 
No  8 50 11 59.7 19 54.7 
Yes 8 50 8 42.3 16 45.3 
N 16  19  35  
 
Most of the questions asked of clients gave them the opportunity to grade their lawyer on 
a scale ranging from Excellent to Very Poor.  The results for magistrates’ court sample 
are set out in Table 6.26.  None of the differences between lawyer type are statistically 
significant, and clients generally rated both PDS and private practice lawyers as excellent 
or good on each of the criteria.  In very general terms, private practice had more excellent 
ratings than the PDS, but the PDS tended to have a larger proportion of clients rating their 
services as good or better. 
 
Table 6.27 shows the same data for clients in the Crown Court sample, and in this sample 
there is a more obvious trend and some significant differences.  In particular, the PDS 
Crown Court clients reported satisfaction levels at around 70% or 80%, indicating their 
lawyer was good or excellent on particular criteria, whereas private practice tended to 
report satisfaction levels at around 30-50%.  The two statistically significant differences 
relate to two questions. The first was ‘Overall, how good was your representation? In 
response, 59% of PDS clients rated their lawyer as excellent compared to only 26% of 
private practice clients, and similar proportions of clients rated their lawyers as good 
(24% and 26% respectively). Slightly more private practice clients rated their lawyer as 
poor or very poor. The second question was ‘How good was your lawyer at explaining 
what was happening in your case?  Again, 59% of PDS clients rated their lawyer as 
excellent compared to only 26% of private practice clients, and similar proportions of 
  
clients rated their lawyers as good (24% and 21% respectively). More private practice 
clients rated their lawyer as poor or very poor. 
  
Table 6.26: Client perceptions of service (magistrates' court) 
 
  Excellent Good OK Poor Very 
Poor 
Don't 
know 
N 
PDS 43% 36% 14% 0% 7% 0% 28 Overall, how good was your representation? 
PP 68% 4% 24% 0% 4% 0% 26 
PDS 57% 25% 14% 0% 4% 0% 28 How good was your lawyer at explaining what was 
happening in your case? PP 58% 15% 19% 0% 4% 4% 26 
PDS 52% 28% 12% 4% 4% 0% 25 How well did your lawyer know the details of your 
case? PP 58% 13% 17% 8% 4% 0% 24 
PDS 60% 16% 4% 8% 8% 4% 28 How good was your lawyer at advising you whether 
to plead guilty? PP 48% 24% 20% 4% 4% 0% 26 
PDS 44% 20% 20% 0% 8% 8% 25 How good was your lawyer at getting information 
from the prosecution to help with your case? PP 52% 16% 12% 12% 4% 4% 25 
PDS 39% 22% 17% 4% 9% 9% 23 How good was your lawyer at negotiating with the 
prosecution to get you a better deal? PP 60% 8% 12% 8% 8% 4% 25 
PDS 64% 24% 4% 0% 8% 0% 25 How good was your lawyer at representing you in 
court? PP 65% 17% 4% 9% 4% 0% 23 
PDS 54% 17% 13% 4% 4% 8% 24 How good was your lawyer at advising you on what 
sentence you might get? PP 57% 13% 13% 13% 4% 0% 23 
PDS 36% 43% 0% 7% 14% 0% 14 How good do you think your lawyer was at preparing 
the case for your trial? PP 57% 14% 14% 0% 14% 0% 14 
 
  
 
Table 6.27: Client perceptions of service (Crown Court) 
 
  Excellent Good OK Poor Very 
Poor 
Don't 
know 
N 
PDS 59% 24% 6% 12% 0% 0% 17 Overall, how good was your representation? 
PP 26% 26% 26% 16% 5% 0% 19 
PDS 59% 24% 12% 6% 0% 0% 17 How good was your lawyer at explaining what was 
happening in your case? PP 26% 21% 32% 11% 11% 0% 19 
PDS 41% 41% 12% 6% 0% 0% 17 How well did your lawyer know the details of your 
case? PP 31% 13% 44% 6% 6% 0% 16 
PDS 35% 29% 12% 18% 0% 6% 17 How good was your lawyer at advising you whether 
to plead guilty? PP 19% 19% 38% 19% 6% 0% 16 
PDS 44% 19% 6% 13% 13% 6% 17 How good was your lawyer at getting information 
from the prosecution to help with your case? PP 12% 18% 29% 18% 12% 12% 16 
PDS 29% 29% 6% 6% 6% 24% 17 How good was your lawyer at negotiating with the 
prosecution to get you a better deal? PP 6% 18% 29% 12% 12% 24% 17 
PDS 59% 24% 0% 6% 12% 0% 17 How good was your lawyer at representing you in 
court? PP 35% 18% 29% 12% 6% 0% 17 
PDS 35% 41% 6% 6% 0% 12% 17 How good was your lawyer at advising you on what 
sentence you might get? PP 24% 18% 35% 12% 6% 6% 17 
PDS 46% 27% 18% 0% 9% 0% 11 How good do you think your lawyer was at preparing 
the case for your trial? PP 21% 36% 29% 7% 7% 0% 14 
 
 
 Discontinuity of representation has been a significant issue in the literature on 
criminal defence lawyers.200F12 In our survey, clients were asked, “How many different 
lawyers from this firm did you see during your case?” 
 
Table 6.28: Magistrates’ Court: How many different lawyers from this firm did you 
see during your case? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
One 11 37.0 7 26.9 
Two 7 25.9 9 34.6 
Three 5 18.5 4 15.4 
Four 5 18.5 1 3.8 
Five or more 0 0.0 3 11.5 
Don’t Know 0 0.0 2 7.7 
N 28  26  
 
Table 6.29: Crown Court: How many different lawyers from this firm did you see 
during your case? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
One 5 29.4 1 5.3 
Two 1 5.9 4 21.1 
Three 3 17.6 4 21.1 
Four 7 41.2 4 21.1 
Five or more 1 5.9 6 31.6 
N 17  19  
 
In both the Crown Court and magistrates’ court samples there was a tendency for 
clients to see more than one lawyer, and this was the case for both PDS and private 
practice clients.  Although more of the PDS clients answering the survey dealt with 
only one lawyer, the differences between private practice and the PDS were not 
significant and they were, in any event, in a minority. 
 
It is noted elsewhere in the 201F13 that the timeliness of advice on plea is an important 
issue, which relates both to efficiency of the ‘system’ and to whether lawyers, in the 
way in which they provide advice, act in their clients best interests. We were 
interested to discover clients view on this matter, and thus they were asked, ‘Did your 
lawyer offer timely advice on when to plead?’. 
 
                                                 
12 See, in particular, M. McConville, et. al., Standing Accused, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 41. 
13 See in particular Chapter 4. 
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Table 6.30: Magistrates’ Court: Did your lawyer offer timely advice on when to 
plead? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
No Advice 0 0.0 2 10.5 
Too Soon 1 5.3 0 0.0 
About Right 17 89.5 13 68.4 
Too Late 0 0.0 1 5.3 
Don’t Know 1 5.3 3 15.8 
N 19  19  
 
The great majority of PDS clients in the magistrates’ court sample thought that their 
lawyer provided timely advice on when to plead (89.5%). A smaller, but still large, 
proportion of private practice clients thought their lawyers’ advice was timely 
(68.4%), with most of the remainder not knowing . Two private practice clients said 
that they had not received advice on plea, whereas no PDS clients said this. 
 
Table 6.31: Crown Court: Did your lawyer offer timely advice on when to plead? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
Too Soon 0 0.0 3 37.5 
About Right 7 70.0 2 25.0 
Too Late 1 10.0 2 25.0 
Don’t Know 2 20.0 1 12.5 
N 10  8  
 
In the Crown Court sample  PDS clients had fewer concerns about the timeliness of 
plea than did the private practice clients, although the number of clients providing 
valid data on this question was small, and the differences were not statistically 
significant.   
 
Another way of examining client perceptions of quality is to ask whether the client 
would instruct the same lawyer on a future occasion.   
 
Table 6.32: Magistrates’ Court: Would you use the same lawyer again? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
No  4 14.3 3 12.0 
Yes 22 78.6 19 76.0 
Don’t Know 2 7.1 3 12.0 
N 28  25  
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In the magistrates’ court sample the results for the PDS and private practice are 
similar, with the majority of both PDS and private practice clients saying that they 
would use the same lawyer again. 
 
Table 6.33: Crown Court: Would you use the same lawyer again? 
 
 Public Defender Service Private Practice 
 N % N % 
No  3 17.6 4 21.1 
Yes 12 70.6 10 52.6 
Don’t Know 2 11.8 5 26.3 
N 17  19  
 
In Crown Court sample there was evidence of a greater willingness of PDS clients to 
use the same lawyer again, but the numerical differences are very small. 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter is concerned with perceptions of legal professionals and clients, and it is 
interesting to contrast them with, in particular, the peer review quality assessment 
reported in Chapter 4. Perceptions may be affected by a range of factors, including 
specific experiences in individual cases and of individual personnel. This may explain 
some of the contrasting views within professional groups in relation to aspects of 
performance such as advocacy or effectiveness in dealing with the police and 
prosecution.  
 
The overwhelming perception of criminal justice professionals concerning the PDS is 
that it performs at a similar level of quality and in a similar way to private practice.  
This was the case for respondents (who felt able to express a view) from all 
professional groups, other than private practice solicitors, in respect of all questions 
concerning quality and independence. Where there was a perceived difference 
between the PDS and private practice which, except in the case of private practice 
respondents, was normally the view of a small minority of respondents in any 
particular professional group, there was a tendency for more respondents to rate the 
PDS somewhat more poorly than private practice.  
 
In relation to many of the issues, this may be explained by the particular professional 
interests of that group. For example, slightly more custody officers rated the PDS as 
worse than private practice in terms of their effectiveness in dealing with the police 
than those who rated it as better. On the other hand, more thought the PDS more 
willing to challenge the police than those who thought the PDS were less willing to do 
so. In other words, these custody officers thought that PDS lawyers were more willing 
to challenge the police which may have resulted, given their position in the criminal 
justice system, in them taking the view that the PDS was less effective in its dealings 
with the police. This suggestion of greater adversariness on the part of PDS lawyers, 
is consistent with our findings at the investigative stage that PDS lawyers were more 
likely than their private practice counterparts to advise silence in police interviews.202F14 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 3. 
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However, there is no evidence from respondents from other professional groups that 
greater adversariness at the investigative stage carried through to the proceedings 
stage. 
 
It is to be expected that private practice solicitors would, on the whole, have a 
negative attitude to the PDS because of the perceived threat that the PDS represented 
to their interests. However, in interpreting the results reported in this chapter it must 
be remembered that the strongest overall perception is that the PDS is broadly the 
same as private practice in terms of quality and independence, and that it has had no 
significant impact on criminal defence services in their locality other than increasing 
the choice available to clients and taking some work away from private practice. 
 
The most obvious factor when reviewing the results of the client survey is that clients 
of both the PDS and private practice characteristically believe that they are provided 
with a high quality service. It is fair to question the ability of clients to judge the 
service received, given the opacity of the legal system and the asymmetries of 
knowledge between lawyers and their clients. The survey addresses these concerns to 
some extent, by asking respondents to evaluate their lawyers’ ability to explain their 
cases to them, and their knowledge of their case details, such as securing information 
from, and negotiating with, the prosecution (matters which clients might legitimately 
be expected to understand and evaluate). In the magistrates’ court sample the results 
for both provider-groups were broadly similar. In the Crown Court sample, however, 
clients were generally happier with the service provided by the PDS. That said, the 
differences are mostly not statistically significant and the surveys are themselves 
based on low response rates from the total client base we sampled.  As a result, such 
differences as there are should be treated with caution. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
PDS Staff Perceptions of the Service 
 
 
This chapter examines the views and attitudes of Public Defender Service staff both in 
relation to their experience of working for the service and in respect of a range of 
wider issues. Many of the staff working for the PDS, particularly lawyers and 
accredited representatives, previously worked in private practice and are thus able to 
make comparisons between the two types of provider across a range of issues. Such 
issues include management and administration, career progression and professional 
development, and other factors internal to the service. In addition, many of the 
questions concerning independence and quality that were asked of criminal justice 
professionals working outside of the PDS (see Chapter 6) were also asked of PDS 
staff in order to provide a useful comparison. We were also interested in obtaining the 
views of staff as to how they saw the PDS developing in the future.  
 
Of course, the data presented consists of the perceptions of staff. On occasions, their 
perceptions may not accord with those of others in the PDS, or the LSC. Further, 
those perceptions may not reflect the reality of the situation and, where appropriate, 
we indicate this in the text or in footnotes. We did not conduct a similar survey of 
private practice staff, and many of both the positive and critical assessments of the 
PDS may have direct analogues in the experience of staff and partners working in 
private practice. 
 
Sample and Method 
 
Semi-structured, face-to-face, interviews were conducted with the office heads of the 
Birmingham, Cheltenham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Pontypridd and Swansea 
offices during December 2004 and the early months of 2005. The sample consisted of 
all of the office heads then in post but did not include those originally appointed as 
heads of the Swansea and Middlesbrough offices but who had left the service before 
the interviews were conducted. All of the office heads had previous experience of 
working as criminal defence lawyers in private practice.  
 
Telephone interviews were conducted with members of staff from the same six PDOs 
during December 2004. The staff sample comprised all ‘fee-earning’ staff in the six 
offices, consisting of 18 solicitors/barristers (including one trainee solicitor), 
hereinafter termed lawyers, and 13 accredited representatives.  Those in the staff 
sample had worked in their current offices between one and 43 months, and five of 
them had experience of working in more than one PDO.  Of the 31 interviewees in the 
staff sample, 27 had experience of working in private practice (that experience 
ranging between two and 29 years). The interview data for the staff sample were 
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content analysed to identify themes, commonly expressed views and pertinent 
comments made by individuals or small numbers of interviewees.   
 
All of the interviews were conducted according to a structured schedule, but 
interviewees were given the opportunity to explain in narrative form their responses to 
those questions. 
 
 
Working for the PDS 
 
Respondents in the office head and staff samples were asked a number of open 
questions designed to discover their views on working for the PDS. The office heads 
were asked an open question designed to elicit their views on the advantages and 
disadvantages of working in a large public organisation, that is, the Legal Services 
Commission, but were encouraged to consider specifically matters relating to 
management and policy. In the case of the staff sample, the question was framed in 
terms of their likes and dislikes about working for the PDS. Both groups were also 
asked about the differences between working for the PDS and for private practice. In 
the case of the staff sample, they were specifically asked to identify differences 
relating to (a) professional development and training, (b) career development and 
opportunities, and (c) other working conditions.  
 
In this chapter we deal first with the likes and dislikes (staff), and the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages (office heads), of working for the PDS, and then go on 
to consider responses concerning perceptions of differences in working for the PDS 
compared to private practice. In relation to the staff sample, all 31 interviewees listed 
one or more ‘likes’. Most also identified ‘dislikes’, but two interviewees who had 
only recently joined the PDS could not list ‘dislikes’. Our analysis indicated that the 
‘likes’ could be meaningfully grouped under the themes employment conditions, 
resources, professional/ethical approach and working environment, and the ‘dislikes’ 
under the themes management structure, administrative burden and working 
conditions. The themes are not wholly discrete, but they do provide a useful means of 
presenting the data.  The order in which the themes are reported in this section gives 
some indication of the frequency (from most to least) with which likes/dislikes were 
listed by interviewees in the staff sample.203F141 
 
(i) Advantages of working for the PDS 
 
(a) Conditions of employment 
 
Conditions of employment, including holiday entitlement, pensions, employment 
rights, a flexible approach to working and ‘fringe benefits, were high on the list of 
factors that staff said they liked about working for the PDS 
 
                                                 
141 The themes identified here were data-driven; that is, they were not suggested to the staff 
interviewees, nor were they decided prior to the analysis being conducted.   
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(b) Resources  
 
Resources, such as training, structured career development and staffing levels were 
also frequently listed as ‘likes’.  Those who elaborated suggested that staffing levels 
were sufficiently high to allow back-up, flexibility and time to deliver a quality 
service, impacting favourably on their ability to deliver a professional service.  One 
lawyer’s comments are typical. 
 
There is a commitment to training which goes beyond the minimum.  There is a 
real opportunity to better yourself. (Lawyer) 
 
The resources issues extended beyond training to the level of cover within the office, 
for example, for duty rota, and simply having more time to deal with clients. 
 
Safety net in the team – cover is always provided. (Accredited representative)  
 
Because of the size of the office we can cover being on call effectively. 
(Lawyer) 
 
Having time to deal with clients, time to deal with them as real people with real 
problems.  (Lawyer) 
 
Some of the office heads also identified such factors as advantages in working for the 
PDS. 
 
The advantages are that you’ve got the resources – if you need, you know, to 
send somebody on a training course or need to send somebody to another office 
to help out or that sort of thing. That’s always there. (Office head) 
 
(c) Professional/ethical approach 
 
The suggestion that the PDS facilitates a more professional and ethical approach was 
reflected in the belief of many staff that they were able to be more client-focused, 
providing a quality service that is not fee-driven.  Most interviewees acknowledged 
that this approach was largely possible because of the resources available to them 
within the PDS. Typical comments included: 
 
PDS provides more quality service than private practice because we have the 
resources and time to give a real service to clients.  (Accredited representative) 
 
Doing law without doing law for money or profit.   (Lawyer) 
 
(d) Working environment 
 
There was a further, albeit less frequently listed, group of ‘likes’ under the theme of 
working environment.  This included references to office atmosphere, supportive 
colleagues and work-life balance, reflecting personal, rather than physical, working 
conditions.  Again, overlap between themes is apparent since adequate resources and 
an ethical approach each contributed to what interviewees liked about their working 
environment. 
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The office atmosphere is very good. Support and guidance from experienced 
lawyers, lack of pressure to earn fees because we’re not-for-profit.  (Lawyer) 
 
Personally valued.   A better quality of life and work-life balance than in private 
practice.  (Accredited representative) 
 
 
(ii) Disadvantages of working for the PDS 
 
(a) Management and structure 
 
The majority of staff interviewed reported dislikes relating to management and 
structure, including a perceived remoteness of central/senior management, inter-
professional tensions (e.g. lawyers with administrators), lengthy decision-making 
processes and recruitment difficulties.  Typical comments referred to: 
 
Huge organisation, everything is so slow, for example, implementation of 
changes in forms, recruitment process.  (Lawyer) 
 
Central structure [that] is remote from the practical demands of the job – this 
can be very frustrating.  (Lawyer) 
 
The two factions - legal staff versus administrators - there is no real teamwork.  
With administrators being civil servants and having no role in supporting legal 
staff and no understanding of what legal staff do.  (Accredited representative) 
 
The latter respondent expressed a view suggesting that the ‘client-focus’ gained from 
being freed from fee pressures might be compromised by a bureaucratic approach to 
the service. 
 
The service has become about ticking boxes …, not about what we do on the 
ground for clients.  Interference from the centre.  (Accredited representative) 
 
Recruitment processes were a particular concern. 
 
Inordinate time taken in recruiting means PDS loses possible recruits.  
(Accredited representative) 
  
Such concerns were also voiced by office heads, but in their case they were 
articulated by reference to their role as managers within a large organisation.  
 
Disadvantages – firstly, size of the organisation in terms of practicalities… less 
flexibility, the common things that one gets with a big organisation. Less 
flexibility to deal with perhaps staffing issues.  (Office head) 
 
But such concerns were often tempered by recognition that this was, perhaps, a price 
to pay for the advantages of working for a large organisation. The same office head 
continued: 
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But the knock on effect with that is that there are major advantages in terms of 
internal training, a lot of skills within the organisation to tap into, a designated 
personnel department.  (Office head) 
 
Nevertheless most of the office heads voiced considerable concern about the 
disadvantages of working for the PDS in terms of lack of flexibility, long lines of 
decision-making, etc, and contrasted it with their experience in private practice. 
 
These processes are slow and most of us in private practice were used to making 
a decision and doing it the next day, be it staff recruitment, purchasing 
equipment. That plainly cannot happen in this kind of organisation and yet it is 
plainly a disadvantage. It goes with the territory.  (Office head) 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, at the outset of the PDS the office heads reported to the 
professional head of service, an experienced private criminal defence lawyer who was 
also a part-time member of the Legal Services Commission, in respect of professional 
matters. While this role has been maintained, a new full-time post of Head of the PDS 
was created in 2004, to act as line manager for the individual office heads, and this 
post was filled by one of the office heads. 
 
Most, if not all, office heads felt positively about having a professional head of 
services who was respected both within the PDS and outside, although some 
expressed the view that such a position may not be necessary in the longer term. 
Others, on the other hand, felt that having a professional head was more important 
than having an executive head of the PDS, although opinion was divided about the 
latter. 
 
I like the professional head, and of course that is required by statute anyway. If 
there is an element of duplication, I don’t think we necessarily need a head of us 
[ie. a head of employed services].  (Office head) 
 
It makes logical sense to have a Head of the PDS  and I think in terms of having 
a professional head, I am not sure how necessary that is longer term. I can 
understand the need for it during the pilot period, to make sure that things are 
done as they should be. But whether that position will last…   (Office head) 
 
(b) Administrative burden 
 
Many of the staff also specifically identified bureaucratic processes in negative terms, 
including auditing, form-filling and an inappropriate focus on collecting statistics.  A 
number of interviewees commented that such processes hampered them in providing a 
quality legal service to their clients.204F142   
 
Forms and red tape can be burdensome… Auditing is pedantic in the extreme, 
especially checks on the non-legal side.  (Lawyer) 
 
                                                 
142 The central PDS view is that the service remains client focused and that there is not an overly-
burdensome auditing process. 
 270
There was a perception amongst some staff that this problem had intensified recently, 
possibly to the detriment of the quality of service to clients. 
 
Confusion about the function of the PDS.  It started being about… Focus is now 
less on helping clients and more on statistics.  (Lawyer) 
 
There was a consensus amongst the staff interviewed that they carry a considerable 
administrative burden, and that legal staff had to deal with administrative tasks that 
would be more appropriately dealt with by clerical staff.  This was viewed as a waste 
of resources as well as reducing the senior support available, particularly to junior 
staff.   
 
Waste of resources expecting lawyers to do their own typing and admin… This 
will become a real problem as we get busier.205F143  (Lawyer) 
 
Lack of availability of senior staff / office head to support the lawyers because 
of their other management and administrative commitments. 
(Accredited representative) 
  
(c) Working conditions 
 
Dislikes relating to working conditions referred to the physical working environment, 
including open-plan office space, and building work that affected only some of the 
offices. It is clear that some staff are more averse to an open-plan office layout than 
others.   
 
Perhaps surprisingly, some office heads voiced concerns about lack of opportunities 
for career advancement within the PDS. This was linked to the ways in which 
different skills were valued. 
 
What may make you a successful lawyer doesn’t necessarily guarantee that you 
will go far in the PDS… So you can be fiery, difficult, obstructive and 
outspoken, which are all qualities that will make you a very good defence 
lawyer, but in fact this organisation might not [value them]. You might well be 
held back. Because, I mean, in terms of career advancement, really the only way 
to advance in this organisation is through the management route.  (Office head) 
 
Whilst there was support for the notion that there ought to be common policies and 
working practices applying to all PDOs, there was evidence of tensions concerning 
the way in which those policies were formulated. It was also clear that some of the 
tensions stemmed from the fact that in private practice, lawyers of the standing and 
experience of office heads would have been in charge of, or part of a small group of 
partners who would have formulated policy. 
 
If we meet as partners, we’ll discuss things and reach decisions. Things are now 
driven centrally. Decisions are made well outside of my office that impact 
immediately upon my office.  (Office head) 
                                                 
143 We are informed by the PDS that whilst lawyers are expected to do some of their word-processing, 
they are not required to type briefs to counsel, long proofs of evidence or lengthy client-care letters. 
 271
 
Other office heads, however, did not feel so excluded from the policy-making process 
and, in any event, felt able to work with (or around) policies formulated for the whole 
service. 
 
Some of them [common policies] are difficult, but I will always put my views 
forward to try and influence any points I think that need to be changed… 
Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, you’ve got to live 
with it. That’s what you have to do in a big organisation…It can be a little bit 
frustrating at times, but I wouldn’t say it was problematic. You can always work 
round it or through it, should we say.  (Office head) 
 
 
Differences between Working for the PDS and Private Practice 
 
Interviewees in the staff sample were asked to compare the PDS and private practice 
in terms of professional development and training, career development and 
opportunities, and other working conditions.  To a considerable extent the data 
gathered below elaborate comments made, unprompted, in response to the above 
likes/dislikes question. Office heads were asked a similar question, but were 
specifically asked to consider the differences in terms of staff management, how case-
work is conducted, professional development and training, career development and 
opportunities, and other working conditions. 
 
(i) Professional development and training 
 
As noted earlier, many staff identified the training opportunities available in the PDS 
as a positive benefit. The majority of staff interviewees reported that, compared to 
private practice, the PDS was more proactive in its attitude to training, provided easier 
access to, and greater choice in, training, and also that training was better resourced.   
 
PDS is more focused than in private practice, training is not done grudgingly or 
seen as an indulgence but thought about proactively.  Private practice firms are 
under more financial and time pressures so training is not seen as important but 
as an indulgence.  (Lawyer) 
 
Interviewees who commented directly on professional development generally did so 
in terms of training being targeted at the needs of the individual rather than simply the 
needs of the PDS.  
 
In private practice training is limited to the firm’s benefit rather than personal 
development.  In the PDS the focus on personal development is greater 
including the option to take a degree.   (Accredited representative) 
 
Not all interviewees, however, were unconditional in their praise of the training and 
professional development offered by the PDS. Such adverse comments were not 
confined to staff in only one office. For example, a number of interviewees 
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commented that training, particularly training for the higher rights qualification, fell 
below promises and expectations.206F144 
 
PDS training is not as good as I expected on joining.  I expected to be able to 
qualify for higher rights but that has not been the case.  (Lawyer) 
 
Other negative comments suggested the training policy and structure favoured junior 
staff and not surprisingly, therefore, there was a tendency for such negative comments 
to be voiced by lawyers rather than accredited representatives. 
 
There is more development of junior staff than you would find in private 
practice, but then professional development seems to stop.  (Lawyer) 
 
Most office heads regarded the training opportunities and policies in the PDS in 
positive terms, both for legal staff and administrative staff, and also for themselves as 
managers. 
 
(ii) Career development and opportunities 
 
Most staff interviewees indicated that, in general, there was greater scope for career 
development and more career opportunities in the PDS than in private practice.  A 
number of respondents however pointed out that, as the PDS and private practice have 
very different structures, one is:   
 
Not comparing like with like.  In private practice the only option is a 
partnership, this is not available in the PDS.   (Lawyer) 
 
In acknowledging these differences in structure, a number of staff interviewees 
reported that they welcomed the opportunity the PDS offered for them to become 
involved in management and to gain further qualifications.   
 
PDS offers more opportunities for example in management, although no 
partnerships.  It has better structured career development than private practice.  
It’s also fairer, it’s about your skills -  not ‘if your face fits’.  (Lawyer) 
 
As in the above quotation, several more interviewees voiced their approval that 
‘merit’ rather than ‘nepotism’ influenced career advancement within the PDS.   
 
Another limiting factor cited by several interviewees related to the current, pilot-
nature of the PDS.  Whilst acknowledging the potential for career advancement within 
the PDS, these interviewees suggested that career development and opportunities 
would only become a practical reality if, and when, the PDS expanded. 
 
These differing attitudes towards career development and opportunities in the PDS 
were also reflected in the views of the office heads. On the one hand, it was 
commonly believed that the PDS provided excellent career development opportunities 
for those who were not qualified as lawyers. Examples were given of staff being 
                                                 
144 According to the PDS Annual Report 2005/05, at the end of 2004/5 seven PDS lawyers had the 
higher rights qualification, a number which had increased to 11 by the time the annual report went to 
print. 
 273
given the opportunity, and funding, to undertake law degrees and courses leading to 
qualification as lawyers. Similarly, opportunities were provided for some who had 
experienced difficulties in securing training contracts or pupillage. One office head 
was particularly enthusiastic in this regard, and contrasted the PDS positively with 
private practice. Another stated that career opportunities in the PDS were 
‘immeasurably superior’ to those available in private practice, and another said: 
 
Virtually without fail every member of staff is doing something to advance them 
as [an] individual. That has been probably the biggest single difference between 
what happens in private practice and the PDS.   (Office head) 
 
Indeed, the view was expressed by one office head that part of the role of the PDS 
should be to provide training opportunities for lawyers and prospective lawyers who 
may then move into private practice. In other words, it was suggested that the PDS 
should be a training and career development resource for the whole criminal defence 
profession. 
 
However, there were some negative views amongst the office heads about career 
development opportunities in the PDS. The specific concern about training for the 
higher rights qualification raised in the staff interviews was also repeated by some of 
the office heads, although it may be that this resulted from a (possibly temporary) 
change in PDS policy towards this type of training.207F145 Another concern raised by a 
number of the heads related to the fact that in private practice career progression – 
becoming a partner – was quite clear cut, whereas in the PDS it was less certain. For 
some, this resulted from the pilot nature of the PDS. For others, however, the tension 
between being a good lawyer and a good administrator, and the perceived emphasis 
on administration within the LSC, meant that they felt that advancement within the 
LSC depended on the latter rather than the former. 
 
(iii) Other working conditions 
 
The factors relating to working conditions most frequently cited by the staff 
interviewees were flexitime, flexible working patterns and physical working 
environment.  All respondents who cited ‘flexibility’ did so positively, generally 
without elaborating further. Views on the physical working environment divided 
opinion.  Of the 17 staff interviewees who mentioned it in response to this question, 
11 made positive comparisons with private practice.  The remaining six, however, 
were dissatisfied with their office environment.  Of these, five were from the same 
office (Liverpool), although it should be noted that staff from other offices had 
complained in similar terms when listing their likes/dislikes (see above). A typical 
comment is: 
 
Open-plan means it’s difficult to concentrate, although it’s good in terms of 
flexibility in working hours.  (Lawyer) 
 
                                                 
145 The evidence is that many private practice solicitors who have gained this qualification have not 
made extensive use of their right to act as advocates in the Crown Court, and this may have been a 
factor in the PDS policy toward providing such training. However, it has now been decided as a matter 
of policy in at least one of the PDOs that the service should provide as much of its Crown Court 
advocacy ‘in-house’ as possible. 
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Only one interviewee mentioned open-plan office space in wholly positive terms, as 
follows: 
 
Open-plan structure works well, it helps ensure teamwork.  (Lawyer) 
 
The office heads were generally positive about working conditions, especially as 
compared to those in private practice. Working conditions in private practice were 
described as ‘Dickensian’ by one office head, and another commented: 
 
This office is much nicer than any private firm. My previous firm used to smell 
of urine when you came through the main entrance hall, and it was all pretty 
basic really. It’s much nicer here.  (Office head) 
 
One interesting question is whether PDS staff believe that better training and career 
opportunities, and better working conditions, have a positive impact on the conduct of 
cases and client care. Office heads were not asked specifically about such a 
connection, but one commented that it was too early to say: ‘the jury’s out on that’. 
 
(iv) Other differences between the PDS and private practice 
 
Office heads were also asked to identify significant differences between the PDS and 
private practice in terms of staff management and casework. With regard to the 
former, there was a consensus that management, at the office level, was better in the 
PDS than in private practice. However, it was felt that this comes at a cost. A number 
of them referred to the (large) amount of their time spent on management, and to the 
difficulty of ‘getting the balance right’. One felt this tension acutely. Although he 
found his management functions ‘interesting’, he also felt it important that he devote, 
and be seen by his staff to devote, sufficient time to casework. 
 
50% of my time goes to management, 50% of my time is supposed to be fee-
earning work. It’s taken me personally a while to get that balance right. I want to 
be in court as much as possible… I’m a lawyer, that’s what I should be doing. I 
also feel strongly that this is what I show to the rest of the staff, that it’s busy. 
And I’m hardworking as I am in order that they give me respect.  (Office head) 
 
Of the three office heads who commented on casework generally, one thought that the 
standard in the PDS was the same as ‘any good firm’, although the paperwork was 
better. The other two thought that PDS casework was better, although one of them 
thought that this may be attributable to the (lower) volume of work rather than quality 
per se. However, these views should be seen in the context of the issues dealt with in 
the next section. 
 
 
Quality and Effectiveness 
 
Interviewees in both samples were asked a series of closed questions designed to elicit 
views about quality of service and effectiveness, comparing the PDS with private 
practice. Some of these question were similar to those asked of professionals outside 
of the PDS. These are dealt with in Chapter 6 where it was noted that, except for 
private practitioners, the majority view was that there was little, if any, perceptible 
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difference between the PDS and private practice. With this set of questions, 
interviewees were asked to say whether the PDS was better or worse, or more 
effective or less effective, than, or the same as, private practice.  If these ratings were 
judged inappropriate, interviewees could opt instead for ‘don’t know’ or ‘too many 
variables to say’. They were also asked to identify reasons for any differences 
identified. 
 
(i) The quality of representation and advocacy 
   
Over half of the staff interviewees (17 interviewees, 55%) and five out of the six 
office heads thought that PDS and private practice lawyers were about the same in 
terms of quality of representation and advocacy, although about a third of the staff 
sample (10, 32%) felt PDS lawyers were better. Those who thought that PDS lawyers 
were better in this regard tended to attribute it to good teamwork, quality and staffing 
resources, having time to prepare, being client-focused and not being fee-driven.  For 
example: 
 
More time to get the right result for the client, driven by quality issues and not 
financial concerns.  (Lawyer) 
 
Because we deal with things as quickly as possible without compromising the 
client’s best interests. We also give better advice generally.  (Lawyer) 
 
Generally we have the support and good internal structures (better file 
management, review etc.) and also have sufficient time to prepare effectively. 
(Lawyer) 
 
Only one (staff) interviewee thought PDS lawyers were worse than those in private 
practice 
 
because they don’t put the work in.  
 
 
(ii) Effectiveness in dealing with the prosecution  
 
Just under half of the staff interviewees (14, 45%), and half of the office heads, 
thought that PDS lawyers were more effective than those in private practice in dealing 
with the prosecution.  Over a third of the staff interviewees (11, 35%) thought both 
groups were about the same.  None of the interviewees thought PDS lawyers were 
less effective than their private practice counterparts. 
 
Those that thought that PDS lawyers were better than those in private practice in 
dealing with the prosecution attributed it to some of the same factors as those relevant 
to quality of advocacy and representation (e.g. more time, not fee-driven and client-
focused). Some attributed it to having a better working relationship with the CPS, for 
example:  
 
We liaise with the CPS more in each case, and have a more proactive 
relationship with them.  (Lawyer) 
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We are more inclined to get involved with the CPS at an early stage.  (Lawyer) 
 
This view, that there was better inter-agency co-operation, was explained by some in 
terms of shared organisational structures, common goals and a joint concern to 
expedite matters quickly and in the client’s best interests, or by the PDS being 
perceived as different from private practice defence lawyers. 
 
We have shared common goals, both salaried government employees, both 
doing a job. No animosity and also no issues around financial incentives. 
(Lawyer) 
 
A lot of lawyers have good local experience/contacts and get on well with them. 
We are also known for doing a good job. We are not seen as cowboys and have 
good working relationships with the CPS.  (Lawyer) 
 
Of course, it is just such perceptions that led some private practitioners to question the 
independence and quality of service provided by the PDS, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
(iii) Effectiveness in dealing with other defence lawyers 
   
Most staff interviewees (21, 68%) thought PDS lawyers and those in private practice 
were about the same in terms of their effectiveness in dealing with other defence 
lawyers.  A few, however, reported that PDS staff were either more effective (3, 10%) 
or less effective (2, 7%). A similar divide was found with the office heads, with half 
believing that PDS and private practice lawyers were about the same in this regard, 
one believing them to be more effective, and two to be less effective. A number of the 
staff and office heads reported that they had faced hostility from private practice 
defence lawyers,208F146 although a number reported that this had improved as the PDS 
became more established. 
 
 
(iv) Effectiveness in dealing with the police 
 
About half of staff interviewees (16, 52%) and half of the office heads thought that 
PDS staff were more effective than private practice lawyers in dealing with the police. 
About a third of the staff interviewees (10, 32%), and a half of office heads, thought 
both groups were about the same, a view that accords with the majority of custody 
officers surveyed.209F147  None thought that PDS lawyers were less effective than those in 
private practice in dealing with the police. 
 
Those that thought that PDS lawyers were more effective in dealing with the police 
explained it in terms of a mutual professional respect and understanding, partly 
attributed to both being government agencies, as well as to PDS staff being efficient, 
rigorous, client-focused and not driven by financial imperatives. As with relationships 
with the CPS, this raises questions about independence of the PDS although, as will 
                                                 
146 A view supported by some of the CPS and barrister respondents. See Chapter 6. 
147 Although there was a minority of custody officers who considered that PDS lawyers took a more 
aggressive and adversarial approach to representing clients in police stations than lawyers from private 
practice. See Chapter 6. 
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be seen later, independence is not regarded as problematic by the majority of staff or 
office heads. The following comments are typical of those that thought that PDS 
lawyers were more effective.  
 
The attitude of the police is better to the PDS.  I think they think we are on their 
side.  (Lawyer) 
 
The police take the PDS seriously because we are there simply to do a good job 
for our clients.  (Accredited representative) 
 
As with the CPS, they know we are there to do a job not just to make money. 
We are looking after our clients’ best interests with no other motivation such as 
financial concerns. For example, we deal with cautions early and over the phone 
and let the police get on with their job.210F148  (Lawyer) 
 
(v) Overall quality of service to clients  
 
All of the office heads, and nearly three-quarters of staff interviewees (23, 74%) 
thought PDS lawyers provided a better service to clients than those in private practice. 
It was seen in Chapter 6 that most professional respondents from outside the PDS, 
other than solicitors in private practice, thought that the overall service to clients 
provided by the PDS was about the same as that provided by private practice, 
although about a fifth of CPS, and just less than a fifth of barrister, respondents 
agreed with the views of PDS staff on this issue. Few of the staff (4, 13%) thought 
they provided a service to clients that was ‘about the same’ as private practice in 
terms of quality and, as we have already noted, only one staff interviewee thought 
they provided a worse service than private practice lawyers.  
 
Better quality of service was attributed to the PDS having the resources and 
organisational structures (e.g. not being fee-driven, sufficient time and staff, support 
of colleagues, manageable caseloads) to deliver a service that had clients’ best 
interests as the underpinning principle.   
 
We don’t have as many case files as in private practice and therefore time to 
deal with clients as individuals and focus on client care.  (Accredited 
representative) 
 
We get second opinions on cases from colleagues, including careful review of 
all evidence.  (Lawyer) 
 
Two more themes are suggested by the narrative responses to this question. Firstly, 
clients are seen as active agents within the process.   
 
We have better client care, we take client feedback on board.   (Lawyer) 
 
                                                 
148 According to the Head of the PDS dealing with police cautions over the telephone is not in 
accordance with PDS policy. 
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It is about getting things sorted at an early stage, giving advice that is relevant to 
the client, listening to and hearing clients, better advice to achieve the right 
result for the client.  (Accredited representative) 
 
Secondly, the PDS is seen as providing a more holistic service which better serves 
clients’ interests (and, implicitly, those of the wider society, e.g. by reducing 
recidivism). 
 
We offer a wider service, for example, we can refer to other agencies.  We will 
work with clients to help prevent them from re-offending. We will also get help 
for clients where it may not be 100% required in the case but is significant in 
helping them, for example, a mental health report.  (Accredited representative) 
 
We offer a holistic approach in dealing with clients - part of what we do is to 
break offending cycles.  (Solicitor) 
 
(vi) Funding as a source of conflict of interests 
 
Interviewees in both samples were asked if they thought that the way that the PDS is 
funded makes conflicts of interest between lawyer and client more or less likely than 
in private practice. Just under half of the staff interviewees (14, 45%), and a third of 
the office heads, thought PDS staff were less likely than those in private practice to 
experience conflict of interest as a result of the funding structure.  Over a third of the 
staff sample (12, 39%) and half of the office heads suggested that the level of conflict 
would be about the same for both groups. None suggested that PDS lawyers would be 
more likely to experience conflict than those in private practice. 
 
Explanations for lack of conflict centred on the fact that with a public service, fee-
earning and profit motive were irrelevant. 
 
We have no concern with the financial impact of the case.  We want a result as 
early as possible and have no incentive to prolong cases.  (Lawyer) 
 
Private practice lawyers are always conscious of the need to make money and 
this is more likely to cause conflicts.  (Lawyer) 
 
No private paying clients – we don’t deal with money just clients.  (Lawyer) 
 
 
Independence and Professional Ethics 
 
Interviewees were asked a series of questions designed to obtain their views on 
independence and a number of related professional and ethical issues. As in the 
previous section, these were closed questions and, again, interviewees were asked to 
say whether the PDS was better or worse, or more effective or less effective, than, or 
the same as, private practice.  If these ratings were judged inappropriate, interviewees 
could opt instead for ‘don’t know’ or ‘too many variables to say’. They were also 
asked to identify reasons for any differences identified. In addition, office heads were 
asked a more open question about independence, and specifically asked whether they 
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had ever had a case in respect of which they had had to refer to the PDS Code of 
Conduct and/or refer a professional conduct matter to the professional head of service.  
 
(i) Independence 
 
When the creation of the PDS pilot was being considered by Parliament, concern was 
expressed about whether lawyers employed by a public organisation would be 
sufficiently independent, specifically in the sense of acting in the best interests of 
clients without regard to any organisational or political pressures that may be placed 
on public defenders. It was for this reason that the Access to Justice Act 1999 s16 
required the LSC to prepare a Code of Conduct for its employees that was subject to 
approval by the Lord Chancellor and by both Houses of Parliament. The Code of 
Conduct was approved and published in 2001.211F149 
 
Interviewees in both samples were asked whether, in their view, there was any 
difference between PDS lawyers and private practice lawyers with regard to their 
independence. The majority of staff interviewees said that PDS and private practice 
lawyers were about the same in terms of their independence (20, 64%). Six (19%) 
stated that PDS lawyers were more independent that their private practice 
counterparts, and two (7%) felt them to be less independent. This contrasted with the 
views of office heads, five of whom stated that PDS lawyers were more independent. 
 
Those staff interviewees who thought that PDS lawyers were more independent 
largely explained this by reference to the fact that they were not influenced by the 
profit motive. The following comments are typical. 
 
Because there is no profit incentive, there is no other pressure than to do the best 
job for the client.   (Accredited representative) 
 
Our commitment is to the client, because of the way we are funded we are not 
there for any other reason.   (Accredited representative) 
 
Some suggested that they had to be more vigilant in terms of independence because of 
preconceptions about the PDS. For example: 
 
Because of initial suggestions that the PDS was part of the police, we have more 
to prove.  (Accredited representative) 
 
The office heads, when asked specifically whether they thought there were any 
particular issues of independence regarding the PDS, either vigorously asserted their 
independence or described it as a non-issue, as in the following comments. 
 
The day anyone starts putting any pressure on me to do what isn’t right by the 
client, I will walk out the door. And I think generally my experience is that 
people in the PDS feel the same. I think it comes down to your personal 
integrity in the end.  (Office head) 
 
                                                 
149 Code of Conduct for Employees of the Legal Services Commission who provide services as part of 
the Criminal Defence Service, London, Legal Services Commission, 2001. For a discussion of the 
development of the Code, see Chapter 1. 
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No, I think this is completely not an issue. I think there is absolutely no issue 
about our lack of independence. The way in which we deal with cases is on [a] 
case by case basis, the only thing that guides us is the interest of the client. 
There is no pressure whatsoever on us to deal with matters in a certain way. 
(Office head) 
 
However, a number of the office heads prefaced their answers by specifically defining 
independence in terms of the work they did for clients, going on to say that in that 
sense there was no pressure on them in terms of acting independently. But in the case 
of at least one office head there was some evidence of an awareness that 
independence was a complex issue and of ambiguity over whether it might be 
compromised in other ways as a result of recent management changes with the 
service. 
 
In  terms of what I do for the client, no [independence is not an issue]. But I can 
see us becoming more centrally driven. The policy will be imposed as to how 
you operate in your area, and I am not sure, is that independence? In terms of 
how I understand independence to be, what I do for my client, no, I am 
independent. I can do what I think is best for my client.  (Office head) 
 
In fact a minority of the office heads referred to central ‘control’ on a number of 
occasions in their interviews, giving the impression that they thought it was an issue 
that had become of greater significance since the early days of the PDS.  
 
 
(ii) Willingness to challenge, and to ‘stand up’ for clients 
 
In order to probe the issue of independence more closely, interviewees in both 
samples were asked two closely related questions: were PDS lawyers more or less 
willing than private practice defence lawyers to challenge the police or prosecution; 
and were PDS lawyers more or less willing to ‘stand up’ for their clients. Not 
surprisingly, responses to these two questions were similar, with 19 (61%) of staff 
interviewees saying that there was no difference between PDS and private practice 
lawyers in respect of both issues. Four of the office heads were of the same view in 
respect of willingness to stand up to police or prosecution, and half thought the same 
in respect of standing up for clients. Just under a third of staff interviewees thought 
that PDS lawyers were more willing to challenge the police/prosecution, and about a 
third thought that PDS lawyers were more willing to stand up for their clients than 
private practice defence lawyers. None thought PDS lawyers were less willing in 
respect of either question. This contrasts with the perceptions of professionals outside 
of the PDS, very few of whom thought that PDS lawyers were more willing than 
private practice lawyers to ‘stand up’ for their clients.212F150  
 
Interviewees linked their willingness to challenge the police/prosecution with their 
independence; because they were independent they felt free to challenge. Willingness 
to stand up for clients was linked to the client focus of the PDS, but many also 
                                                 
150 Although one in ten custody officers did think PDS lawyers were more willing to ‘stand up’ for their 
clients. See Chapter 6. 
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referred to resources and funding as key factors which enabled them to act in the best 
interests of clients. The following comments were typical. 
 
We give the client priority – they are our only priority.  (Accredited 
representative) 
 
We have more options in dealing with clients, for example, being able to refer 
them to other agencies.  We are prepared to make sure they get the best service 
and help.  (Lawyer) 
 
(iii)  Willingness to advise an early guilty plea 
 
One aspect of independence, and one that was identified by the evaluation of the 
Scottish PDSO, concerns the actions of public defenders in advising clients to plead 
guilty. It has been argued that an indicator of lack of independence is a greater 
tendency or willingness of PDS lawyers to advise clients to plead guilty at an early 
stage of the proceedings; although there is some methodological difficulty in 
determining whether, if such a tendency is identified, it operates to the detriment of 
clients. Interviewees in both samples were asked whether, in their view, there was any 
difference between PDS and private practice lawyers, where a client is advised to 
plead guilty, in their willingness to advise a client to plead guilty at an early stage of 
the proceedings. This was the only question in this section where the majority of 
respondents suggested differences between PDS and private practice lawyers. 
Thirteen (42%) staff interviewees, and all of the office heads, said that PDS lawyers 
were more willing,213F151 and five (16%) staff interviewees said that they were less 
willing. Just under a third rated them as about the same, which was the view of the 
majority of criminal justice professionals surveyed. 
 
Those who said that PDS lawyers were more willing to advise an early guilty plea 
tended to explain it in terms of the PDS not being concerned with making a profit, and 
in terms of it being in the client’s interests, but reference was also made to 
experience.214F152 
 
Not fee driven. If someone is going to plead guilty with me in a first hearing, I 
would be far more likely to do it now than I would have been in private practice. 
If they are going to plead guilty they should do so as soon as they can if the 
evidence is there.  (Office head) 
 
We have no financial incentive to adjourn or prolong cases.  Also, it is in the 
client’s interest to plead early.  (Lawyer) 
 
 
                                                 
151 A view supported by nearly a quarter of private practice lawyers, and nearly a fifth of CPS lawyers, 
surveyed. See Chapter 6. 
152 The data on ‘cracked’ trials showed no significant differences between the PDS and private practice 
at a national level (see Chapter 3). The peer review data found no significant differences between the 
PDS and private practice in terms of the timeliness of guilty pleas (see Chapter 4). 
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(iv) Guidance and training regarding independence 
 
Finally in this section, staff interviewees were asked what guidance and/or training 
they had received in respect of independence whilst working for the PDS. We were 
specifically interested to discover whether they had ever had a case in respect of 
which they had had to refer to the PDS Code of Conduct, and/or whether they had 
ever referred a matter to the professional head of the PDS. The latter questions were 
also asked of the office heads. 
 
Thirteen staff interviewees (42%) reported that they had received no guidance or 
training in respect of independence since joining the PDS.  The remainder reported 
that they had received guidance or training on induction, at team meetings or at file 
reviews.  Although not specifically asked to comment, four of the interviewees who 
said they had received no training commented to the effect that training was 
unnecessary.   
 
Only one staff member reported that they had specifically referred to the Code of 
Conduct in respect of a case, and this person had also referred a professional conduct 
matter (relating to legal professional privilege) to the professional head of the PDS. A 
further four staff interviewees reported having referred a professional conduct matter 
to the professional head of the PDS.  One interviewee would not give details, but the 
others commented as follows. 
 
A case transferred to the PDS with a complaint, from firm originally acting, that 
they had been unfairly criticised in court.  It was not upheld.  (Lawyer) 
 
A matter referred on a conflict of interest question – the case was handed over to 
a private practice firm.   (Accredited representative) 
 
A breach of client confidentiality issue where concerns were raised about the 
client’s danger to custody officers - intentions to harm expressed to solicitor. 
(Lawyer) 
 
Half of the office heads had had cause to refer to the PDS Code of Conduct and/or 
had referred at least one matter to the professional head of the PDS. However, they 
were generally reluctant to disclose details on the basis that they were confidential.  
 
 
The Creation and Development of the PDS 
 
(i)  Location and staffing structures 
 
We were interested to discover from office heads their views on the creation and 
subsequent development of the PDS.215F153 We did this by a series of open questions, 
starting with a question on the initial creation of the PDS, particularly in relation to 
the geographical location of PDOs and in relation to staffing structure and numbers. It 
should be noted that that only two of the six office heads we interviewed had been 
employed by the PDS from the beginning, and a number of those who had joined the 
                                                 
153 See Chapter 1 for an account of the setting up of the PDS and the location of offices. 
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service later said that they were not aware of the original rationale for the location of 
offices. 
 
There was a measure of agreement that not all of the locations, especially some of 
those in large cities with a large number of suppliers, were necessarily appropriate. It 
was understood by some that there was a number of reasons why specific towns and 
cities were chosen, and that to an extent decisions were based on a compromise 
between a number of sometimes conflicting factors. Certainly, when asked if, were 
the PDS to start again, anything different should be done, a number of the heads said 
that they would not choose the same locations, and Liverpool, Birmingham and 
Pontypridd were specifically mentioned in this regard. Smaller towns with a rural 
hinterland, and a small supplier base, were identified by some as being the kinds of 
location that should be chosen for PDS offices. 
 
A second aspect of this question concerned the precise location of the PDOs within 
the town or city, and the nature of the offices, that is, whether they are ‘shop front’ 
offices often in ‘prime’ positions.  A number of office heads said that they understood 
why such locations and ‘formats’ were chosen (in particular, the need to demonstrate 
‘presence’ in a town), but there was a fair degree of consensus that ‘shop front’ 
premises were both expensive and unnecessary, especially given that the nature of 
criminal defence work is such that there is little ‘passing trade’.  
 
With regard to staffing structures, it was understood that there was a need to operate a 
service that was able to operate ‘24/7’ from within its own resources and that this 
dictated, to a large extent, the number of ‘fee-earners’ required for each office. 
Equally, it was recognised that this is not how private practice would have approached 
the opening of a new office, and that inevitably it would result in an expensive 
service, at least in the early years before a client-base was fully developed.  
 
(ii) Developing a client base 
 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that no special powers or facilities were granted to the PDS 
in terms of client recruitment, and that PDOs had to recruit a client base ‘from 
scratch’ without any form of preferential treatment compared to private practice.216F154 
The various offices have had different experiences in developing a client base, with 
some being more successful than others. Given the decisions made about location and 
staffing structure, the development of a client-base inevitably has a critical impact on 
cost-effectiveness, which is dealt with further below. We were interested to ascertain 
the views of office heads about this issue, and to discover whether they thought that it 
was easier or harder for the PDS to develop a client base than for private practice, and 
whether employing local staff made a difference. 
 
Most office heads were agreed that employing local staff did have a positive impact 
because they may already have a ‘following’ and would have local contacts. Thus for 
those offices that did not recruit local staff, it was felt that client recruitment was 
inevitably adversely affected.  
 
                                                 
154 See Chapter 1. 
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A number of other factors were identified as making client recruitment difficult, 
including the fact that, in some locations, there was a well-established private supplier 
base, that private practice was able to offer ‘inducements’ to clients such as 
cigarettes,217F155 and that many potential clients did not know what the PDS was. This, in 
the view of some office heads, was exacerbated by the attitudes and actions of some 
private practice solicitors. It was believed that rumours were deliberately spread, for 
example, that the PDS were part of the police. Much of this was put down to fear on 
the part of the private profession. One office head explained that the PDS was 
established at about the same time as contracting was introduced, and that there was 
acute concern that this might be the beginning of the end for private practice. 
 
And there was this fear at the time that the PDS was going to be a huge success 
and rolled out almost overnight…it was almost like we were a big stick with 
which to threaten private practice…I don’t say the LSC did that overtly, but 
certainly the feedback and the interaction I saw from defence practitioners… 
was very much that.  (Office head) 
 
(iii) A common ethos and innovation 
 
It is well established that local cultures and practices are an important feature of the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales.218F156 In this context, we were keen to 
ascertain the extent to which the PDS has been successful in establishing a common 
ethos across the different offices. Having a common ethos does not necessarily mean 
that all offices have to provide the same service in the same way, and so we also 
wanted to understand whether office heads felt that they had been able to innovate in 
the way that they provide services. 
 
Specific factors identified as being part of a common approach were trying to resolve 
cases more quickly (although one office head was ‘vexed’ by his belief that the ‘PDS 
has tended to plead slightly later’); trying to provide a holistic service (by, for 
example, referring clients with difficult underlying problems to appropriate agencies), 
and not having ‘the distraction of profit’. However, perhaps surprisingly, a number of 
the office heads gave the impression that they had not given the issue much thought, 
and there was little attempt by the office heads to develop the issue of a common 
ethos much further. 
 
A number of the office heads mentioned mechanisms used by the PDS to try and 
develop a common ethos, such as joint training and peer review of each other’s files. 
Further, it was suggested by some that the appointment of a Head of the PDS would 
contribute to the development of a common ethos. 
 
There was also recognition by a number of the heads that there were limits to 
common working practices, particularly as a result of local cultures and practices. 
Few of them specified these in any detail, but one gave the example of different 
                                                 
155 The Code of Conduct (note 9) para 8.1 provides that a PDS employee must not offer any 
inducement, gift, etc., other than refreshments or cigarettes for a client’s immediate consumption in the 
employee’s presence. 
156 See generally L. Bridges et al, Quality in Criminal Defence Services, London, Legal Services 
Commission, 2000, and L. Bridges and A. Abubaker, Work Patterns and Costs under Criminal 
Contracting, London, Legal Services Commission, 2000. 
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sentencing practices in different courts requiring a different approach to advice to the 
client and to mitigation. Another expressed it in these terms. 
 
As regards to differences between offices, there are always regional differences 
in the way the practicalities are carried out on a day-to-day basis, and also 
you’ve got different characters in different offices so the feel of the offices is 
very different.  (Office head) 
 
With regard to the capacity for innovation, a number of the office heads interviewed 
were fairly newly appointed and thus were still working their way into the job. One of 
these felt that the most urgent need, on his appointment, had been to cope with a 
‘haemorrhaging of clients’, and dealing with this took priority over innovation. He 
would liked to have delivered services differently, but did not feel that he had yet had 
the opportunity to innovate. A number of the heads referred to having spent time 
developing links with ‘outreach groups’ such as advice centres and CABx, the 
probation service, and judges, although much of this appeared to be concerned with 
publicising the service and client recruitment rather than delivering services in 
innovative ways. 
 
There were two common themes on innovation, although to an extent these were 
aspirations rather than current activities. The first, mentioned by a number of heads, 
was the idea of delivering services by means of lawyers working some distance from 
the office, equipped with laptops and modern means of communication. This was 
regarded as being of particular importance in providing criminal defence services in 
rural areas. The second was using referrals – to alcohol and drugs agencies, for 
example – in order to provide a more holistic service to clients. A further innovation, 
raised by one head, concerned a specific plan to bring new recruits into the profession 
by working closely with a local university, although another head had similar plans 
for his office. 
 
One office head felt that the capacity for innovation at the office level was becoming 
more difficult. Asked whether he had been able to innovate, he replied: 
 
Initially yes, because the LSC had no idea how an office was run. So you got 
pretty much a blank canvas. But more and more, that is being constrained 
because you have a corporate plan in the LSC which is then fed out to the 
department, which is fed out to [the] central business team, which is fed out to 
your office.  (Office head) 
 
 
(iv)  Workload and cost-effectiveness 
 
Most, if not all, of the office heads appeared, not surprisingly, to be acutely aware of 
the issues and pressures surrounding caseloads, workloads for staff, and cost-
effectiveness. With regard to staff workloads, experiences varied. One, for example, 
felt that he personally was working much harder than he had done in private practice, 
and that this was also true for his staff. Asked what the incentives were, he mentioned 
overtime pay, but thought that mostly it was because of a ‘sense of public service’ 
amongst his staff. 
 
 286
Most of us come from private practice and  are used to working hard, and maybe 
team spirit. I think we look after each other and if the next person’s working 
hard, we do the same. And I think also it’s just a public service ethos, which I 
think is generally underestimated in this country.  (Office head) 
 
Interestingly, the same head recognised that some of the work being done was work 
that would not be paid for in the context of private practice. 
 
I mean, sometimes a lot of my management role is spent naturally telling people 
that some of the work you do is not necessary and sometimes people get really 
stuck into a case and do a lot… and at the billing stage you have to write [it] off 
as actually being irrelevant.  (Office head) 
 
Nevertheless, he believed that the ability of staff to do this was one of the benefits of 
the PDS. 
 
I mean, one of the advantages about us not having to worry about fees is that 
that puts them on the side. All you have to concentrate on is [the] client before 
you. What can I do best, how may I best to a good job for them. I hope I’m not 
being too romantic about the PDS, but I do think that is right.  (Office head) 
 
Other heads felt that their staff worked about the same number of hours as equivalent 
staff in private practice, but said that they worked differently, partly because of the 
greater resources available to them. However, there was a recognition that there was 
an apparent mismatch between the claim that they worked as hard, or harder, than 
those in private practice, but that their chargeable time was less.219F157 
 
So they work differently. In terms of working harder, I can’t answer that. I think 
it’s a bit of a loaded question because [if] we said to my staff ‘Do you think you 
work harder?’ many will say to me they feel they work harder now than in 
private practice. [But] you look at the chargeable time they claim. It’s not as 
much.   (Office head) 
 
None of the heads explicitly accepted that their staff worked less hard than in private 
practice, although one did say: 
 
There must also be those who perceive an easier life. I’m sure there must be 
those in the organisation for the nine to five job, with the advantages of a large 
organisation.  (Office head) 
 
On cost-effectiveness, there was a general recognition that the PDS is more expensive 
than private practice. Some of the reasons for this have already been alluded to: 
starting from scratch with the resources to provide a 24/7 service, and expensive 
accommodation. References were also made to ‘reasonable or better salaries’, 
paperwork and recording (both on case files and ‘statistics’), and ‘central costs’.  
 
In terms of making the PDS cheaper, it was felt that money could be saved on 
accommodation, but that some of the other costs such as those relating to staffing and 
                                                 
157 See Chapter 5. 
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management were necessary. Further, it was felt that providing a good quality service 
was bound to be more expensive. 
 
Well, I suppose it could be as [cheap] as private practice, but at the end of the 
day we tend to spend more time with clients than perhaps private practice 
would. So from a legal aid point of view, you know, you can cut corners in 
private practice far easier than you can with the PDS.   (Office head) 
 
You will always be more expensive, in my view, if you provide the level of 
support for training and development, working conditions, and some 
restructuring which the PDS do. With… private practice you are always going to 
have an extra quid in mind.  (Office head) 
 
Whilst some heads believed that as caseloads increased, costs would come down, 
none of them mentioned reducing ‘non-chargeable’ time spent on cases and other 
work as a means of reducing costs.  
 
 
Perceptions of the Impact of the PDS  
 
The creation of a public defender service was, in some quarters at least, a 
controversial initiative and it appears that many private practitioners were concerned 
both about the long term plans of the government in respect of criminal defence 
services and, in the shorter term, about the impact of PDOs on their businesses. We 
wanted to obtain the views of those working for the PDS on their perceptions of the 
impact of the PDS. We did this in two ways. First, we asked both staff and office 
heads a closed question about the impact of the setting up of a PDS in their area. They 
were given the following list of options, and could select as many as they thought 
relevant and provide narrative comment: no significant impact, taken work away from 
private practice, improved the quality of criminal defence services, reduced the 
quality of criminal defence services, improved choice for suspects and defendants, 
reduced choice for suspects and defendants, and ‘other’. This was the same question 
as asked of criminal justice professionals outside of the PDS.220F158 Second, we asked a 
more open question of office heads only, seeking their views on the impact of the 
PDS on the LSC (and its management of the CDS), on the government and its 
criminal justice policies, and on the rest of the criminal justice system. 
 
The two effects most frequently selected by the staff interviewees were ‘improved the 
quality of criminal defence services’, and ‘improved choice for suspects and 
defendants’. These factors were always selected together and were selected by staff in 
all six participating office.  Overall, 27 (77%) of the staff sample selected them.  The 
opposites (reduced quality/ reduced choice) were not selected at all, either by 
interviewees in the staff sample or the office head sample. In Chapter 6 we showed 
that whilst relatively few criminal justice professionals thought that the PDS had 
improved quality, substantial minorities of all groups other than private practice 
solicitors did think that the PDS had increased client choice. 
 
                                                 
158 See Chapter 6. 
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The explanations given by PDS respondents for selecting these items echoed much of 
what has been reported in this chapter.  Interviewees said that the PDS had provided a 
client-focused, not-for-profit, quality service.  The service was resourced to enable 
staff to work towards ‘getting the right result for each client’ effectively and 
efficiently.  Interviewees said that this combination of factors made for ‘healthy 
competition’, although one or two put it more bluntly.  
  
The PDS has forced private practice to raise its game a bit as a result of the 
competition.  (Lawyer) 
 
Almost half of the interviewees (15, 48%) suggested that the PDS had taken work 
from private solicitors in their area, a view with which a substantial minority of 
barristers, private practice solicitors and judges surveyed concurred.  The three (10%) 
interviewees who selected ‘no significant impact’ explained that that the ‘market’ was 
sufficiently large to provide both public and private lawyers with clients.  
 
We have too few cases – opening 2 or 3 files in a day at best – because of the 
fact that there are a number of very good quality firms locally who get the work.  
(Accredited representative) 
 
The market for clients is so large and this is a small office.  It’s hard to have any 
significant impact.  (Lawyer) 
 
Interestingly, this was the response of the majority of criminal justice professionals 
surveyed.221F159 
 
The ‘other’ category only generated one response, from an office head, that added to 
the effects specifically mentioned. 
 
From an employee’s point of view… it’s given younger solicitors an opportunity 
to try a different way of working. I think the older ones are probably not that 
interested, but certainly the younger ones get an opportunity to try something 
different.  (Office head) 
 
As noted above, the open question to office heads was designed to elicit responses 
about the effects of the PDS at a national, rather than a local, level. With regard to the 
impact on the LSC, and its management of the CDS, half of the office heads believed 
that the PDS has had a significant impact on the LSC in terms of improving its 
understanding of criminal defence lawyers and criminal defence practices. 
 
Yeah, I think they have learnt a lot about what it actually is to have a criminal 
practice, and what is needed, so that they can plan for that.  (Office head) 
 
Yes, we’ve had people in our office from the LSC auditors…some of them have 
their eyes opened to the fact that when you’re in the police station you’re not 
necessarily dealing with one case; you could be dealing with half a dozen… It 
gives them an understanding on why some things are not put on files, and 
                                                 
159 See Chapter 6. 
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putting that into perspective… they were amazed about the amount of waiting 
time that was not our fault.  (Office head) 
 
Perhaps understandably, office heads were generally less clear about the impact of the 
PDS on government policy and the rest of the criminal justice system. However, two 
of the office heads did articulate interesting views in this respect. One expressed 
astonishment at the lack of the defence perspective in the formulation of government 
policy: ‘the defence has no voice’. Another made the following comment: 
 
You meet people at the DCA [Department for Constitutional Affairs] and you 
realise that they don’t really know who we are. I mean its slightly disconcerting, 
disheartening at times. These people, who are very nice, interesting, people who 
come along and they are totally interested in this, but really haven’t got a clue. 
(Office head) 
 
 
How should the PDS Develop in the Future? 
 
Finally, both sets of interviewees were asked an open question on how the PDS 
should develop in the future.  Whilst a few of the staff interviewees expressed concern 
at the lack of forethought and planning that had gone into setting up the PDS, most 
were also able to provide concrete suggestions for the future development, and there 
was a large degree of consensus. 
 
Need for clear idea of the expansion beyond the pilot stage – there is no clear 
message on our continued role and no vision.  This needs to be communicated to 
all offices.  (Lawyer) 
 
The PDS needs to decide what direction to go in – similar to private practice or 
different. We should be different given that we are non-profit making. 
(Accredited representative) 
 
Two broad themes were indicated, firstly focusing on the expansion of the PDS, and 
secondly focusing on reforms to the management and structure of the service. To deal 
with expansion first, the majority view was that the PDS should expand to meet local 
needs ‘to fill gaps in provision by providing a quality service’, and avoid setting up 
offices in areas already adequately served with good quality legal services.  
 
The PDS should develop to meet local need and not act in competition with 
large numbers of existing suppliers.  (Lawyer) 
 
Offices should be set up where private practice is not providing adequate quality 
or choice.  (Lawyer) 
 
However, this was not a unanimous view, and one office head believed that the PDS 
‘should be in every town in England and Wales’. 222F160  
                                                 
160 A minority view within the PDS that might, nevertheless, be seen as according with the initial 
Government view of the need for ‘a mixed system, combining both private and staff lawyers’ in which 
‘the two systems will, in effect, both complement and compete with one another’. See Cm 4155, 
Modernising Justice, London, HMSO, 1998, para 6.19. 
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A number of interviewees highlighted the need to concentrate on rural areas and areas 
‘of real need’ and to think ‘creatively’ and ‘innovatively’ about how services could 
best be provided to such communities.  
 
PDS offices should only develop into rural areas where private practice is not 
effective in providing a service, and specifically not in London, Manchester, and 
similar locations.  We should be about meeting needs and not competing with 
private practice.  (Lawyer) 
 
For example, using the […] office as an area office, there could be a satellite 
system of lawyers and offices to allow cover in other areas as duty solicitors.  
This could involve laptops or remote working rather than the expense of setting 
up new offices.  This would allow us to meet area needs more effectively.  
(Lawyer) 
  
A number of interviewees suggested that the PDS should expand to deliver a different 
kind of service than that provided by private practice, providing a more holistic 
service, including outreach work, and which works with community groups and other 
agencies.   
 
We should expand to give advice in other areas of law, for example, welfare 
benefits, family, housing, debt - so we provide quality legal services across the 
board to meet needs.  (Lawyer) 
 
Need to make better and more connections with community groups dealing 
with, for example, drug and alcohol dependency, homelessness, to help with re-
offending. We need to work to help clients improve their lives. Reducing re-
offending will also reduce the need for public funding for criminal advice and 
representation  (Lawyer) 
 
A few suggested that the PDS should be more proactive in promoting its legal service 
to clients, and one office head believed that there should be a system of directing 
clients to the PDS, although he accepted that it could have a ‘downside’ in terms of 
the lawyer/client relationship. 
  
We should be able to advertise our services.  (Lawyer) 
 
The PDS should focus on getting clients in from the streets now that quality is in 
place.  There should be a focus on market and business development. 
(Accredited representative) 
 
Finally in this section, one office head believed that the PDS should provide an 
example of best practice, which would also assist in improving the standards of 
private practice. 
 
I think it has a function to be a provider of a scheme for excellence, that’s pretty 
important. And I think we should be a yardstick for how private practice can do 
it, and I think we should work in conjunction with private practice, and be an 
example of best practice, and I mean by that not in cash [terms], or the way you 
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run a file, or secure [a] guilty or not guilty, but your approach [to] the client and 
how you care for the client.   (Office head) 
 
The second area of proposed development related to management and structure. Here, 
interviewees were quite clear that the underpinning principle of the PDS should be a 
client-focused service.  However in various ways, directly and indirectly, most 
seemed certain that management and structural changes were necessary to ensure this 
was realisable goal for the PDS in the future.  Interviewees again raised the issues of 
administration being a time-consuming burden and the collection of statistics a 
stumbling block, which interfered with them providing a quality service to clients.   
 
We need to focus on the service we deliver and not admin for the sake of  
admin.  We need to streamline things, the case management system for example, 
and focus on what is important – delivering an excellent service to clients. 
(Lawyer) 
 
PDS needs to get away from the administrator mindset and run offices like 
solicitors’ firms, that is with administrators working with and supporting  legal 
staff.  (Accredited representative) 
 
Once the pilot ends we need to move away from the focus on statistics and move 
towards service.  For example, we need to develop business by bringing in 
experienced staff and be more proactive in developing offices and business (as 
private practice would do in terms of expanding their business). 
(Accredited representative) 
 
Another issue returned to under this theme was the need to review recruitment 
procedures and career development.   
 
There is a need to make sure we get the right people in the recruitment process – 
it’s not just about filling seats but about attracting those who see criminal law as 
a vocation.  (Lawyer) 
 
There should be clear information about what the PDS does and development of 
work placements to ensure on-going recruitment into the PDS. 
(Accredited representative) 
 
Career development structure needs to be more flexible.  (Lawyer) 
 
A number of comments suggested that some PDS staff, specifically lawyers, felt they 
are undervalued, or not wholly understood, by others within the LSC and the wider 
criminal justice system.  Such comments (mostly from one office) included: 
 
We should continue to provide information on the work of the PDS to enable the 
LSC to understand what is happening in practice on the ground.  (Lawyer) 
   
There is scope for the PDS to assist in the review of changes in the criminal 
justice process.  (Lawyer) 
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The PDS is needed politically for benchmarking, best practice, and the 
evaluation of changes in the criminal law. The PDS needs to raise awareness 
and levels of understanding in government about the role of the PDS and impact 
it has. (Lawyer) 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Broadly, the lawyers and accredited representatives we interviewed had a positive 
attitude to working for the PDS. This was an informed perception since the vast 
majority of them also have experience of working in private practice. Whilst they 
were, of course, expressing opinions about a service which they knew was being 
evaluated, the fact that they were prepared to express criticisms demonstrates that 
their positive views were not simply self-serving. The staff valued what they saw as 
the client-focused, not-for-profit, quality service, principles of the PDS.  They 
acknowledged that the PDS approach was possible because of the way in which the 
service was resourced, but were also clear that the quality, experience and 
commitment of PDS staff themselves played a considerable role in delivering these 
principles. A number of staff saw scope for economies to be made, particularly by 
trimming administration and bureaucracy, and by moving away from expensive city 
centre, shop-front, office locations 
 
Overall, interviewees did not see themselves as better than private practice lawyers 
per se, a view that accords with the majority of criminal justice professionals working 
outside the PDS that we surveyed. However, the interviews suggest that in general 
PDS staff do have a more positive view of the quality of their work and their 
relationships with other professionals such as the CPS and the police  Generally they 
felt that they work under a system (not-for-profit compared to fee-driven) that enables 
them to provide a better, generally more holistic, client-centred service and to adopt a 
more rigorous approach when representing their clients, although there was a concern 
that this could be adversely affected by bureaucratic factors. One of the major 
concerns in setting up the service, that of independence, was not felt to be problematic 
although surprisingly four in ten of them said that they had received no guidance or 
training on the issue. 
 
Most of the staff said that they liked the employment conditions, such as job security, 
holiday entitlement, training, and career development opportunities, associated with 
being part of a large, public organisation, although specific concerns were expressed 
by some, particularly in relation to working in an open-plan office environment.  
However, many regarded other aspects such as management structures, administration 
and bureaucracy, as both unnecessary and as impediments to them delivering a quality 
service, and some of the office heads expressed concern about a lack of autonomy as 
compared to those working at a similar level in private practice.  
 
Interestingly, a number of interviewees suggested that sharing the same ‘government 
employee’ status as other professional groups they worked with, particularly the 
police and CPS, helped them foster good working relationships with them. Some PDS 
staff felt that the status of the PDS aided them in delivering a high standard of client-
care, and allowed them to adopt a rigorous approach to client representation, and none 
expressed concern that this might compromise, or be seen to compromise, their 
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independence and ability to work in the best interests of their clients.  This suggests 
that PDS staff see a better relationships with police and the CPS, who do not simply 
perceive them as being ‘in it for the money’, as conducive to them standing up for 
clients in the police station and at court although, as we showed in Chapter 6, this 
view was not reciprocated by a minority of those we surveyed in the those 
organisations.   
 
We saw in Chapter 6 that most criminal justice professionals that we surveyed took 
the view that the PDS had not had a significant impact on the local criminal justice 
market. The majority of the PDS staff, on the other hand, believed that setting up the 
PDOs had led to improvements in the quality of criminal defence services and in 
increased choice for suspects and defendants.  About half of the PDS staff also 
believed that the PDS had taken work away from private practice, but generally it was 
felt that given the size of the ‘market’, this did not have a significant impact on 
private practice.   
 
With regard to the future of the PDS, some concern was expressed about a perceived 
lack of certainty and of a clear sense of direction for the service. The majority felt that 
the PDS should expand to meet gaps in provision, for example, in rural areas, but that 
it should avoid opening offices in areas that are already well provided for by private 
practice. These may be contrasted with the initial Government intention in setting up 
the PDS, that it should lead to a more general ‘mixed’ pattern of delivery of criminal 
defence services throughout the country. A common theme was the desirability of 
developing a more ‘holistic’ service, meaning more outreach work, expanding the 
service into areas of law related to crime (such as housing, welfare benefits and debt), 
and working more closely with community and other groups dealing with, for 
example, drug and alcohol dependency and homelessness. In doing so, the PDS could 
both be a ‘scheme for excellence’ and could assist in ‘reducing re-offending [which] 
will also reduce the need for public funding for criminal advice and representation’.   
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The Government initially defined the objectives of the Public Defender Service 
primarily in terms of its potential to deliver a more cost effective criminal defence 
service of better or at least equal quality to that provided by private practice under 
contracts.  In this way, it was hoped that the PDS would serve as a 'benchmark' in 
terms of both cost and quality for contracted criminal defence services.  As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the Legal Services Commission re-framed and widened the objectives of 
the PDS during its initial period of operation.   
 
For our own part, we aimed in the research to evaluate the PDS in terms of its cost 
effectiveness; quality of service; patterns of case conduct; client recruitment, retention 
and satisfaction; independence; effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of 
management structures; and impact on local patterns of supply.  As regards many of 
these criteria, the evaluation has been based on a comparison between the services 
provided by the six Public Defender Offices included in the research and those 
offered by private criminal defence solicitors operating under contracts within the 
same localities.  A final aim of the research has been to provide recommendations on 
future models of a PDS of appropriate quality, cost and independence and an 
assessment of the future role of the PDS and the balance between it and private 
practice in various areas.  In setting out our conclusions, we follow the order of this 
report, dealing first with patterns of case conduct and outcomes, then with issues of 
quality and independence, cost effectiveness, management, and finally with our 
recommendations for future development. 
 
Patterns of Case Conduct and Outcomes 
 
There was evidence that the PDOs, over the period of the research, have dealt on the 
whole with somewhat less serious or complex cases than their private practice 
comparators.  This applies not only in terms of the PDOs not being involved in the 
highest cost Crown Court cases but also more generally in terms of their caseloads in 
police stations, magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.  This would be expected of a 
service that has had to start and to recruit clients 'from scratch' and which as a result 
was particularly dependent in some areas on duty solicitor referrals.  We would expect 
this difference between the PDS and private practice to diminish over time, although 
it is likely to require a specific initiative for the service to become heavily engaged in 
the longer, more complex and expensive Crown Court cases on any significant 
scale.223F161   
 
The main differences between the two sectors in terms of case processing and 
outcomes appear to have occurred in respect of custodial legal advice.  There was 
evidence that PDO advisers were more likely to attend in person on clients held in 
police stations than their private practice counterparts.  There was no consistent 
pattern across the PDOs as regards the amount of time spent on police station advice 
                                                 
161 Since the finish of the research, a specialist Crown Court unit has been established based in the 
Cheltenham PDO. 
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cases or in attending on the client, in comparison with private practitioners in their 
areas.  However, there was a clear pattern in several of the areas of clients being 
advised to exercise their right to silence more often by PDO advisers than by those 
from private practice.  This pattern of advice appears to have led to more positive 
outcomes for PDO clients in police stations, with their being more likely than clients 
of private practice not to be charged or summoned for a criminal offence. 
 
The evidence as regard the processing of court cases, whether in magistrates’ courts 
or the Crown Court, does not show such significant differences as between the PDOs 
and private practice.    In general, PDO cases involved fewer hearings per case but 
more time between court hearings.  For cases being committed to the Crown Court, 
the PDS tended to have fewer hearing in magistrates’ courts but more in the Crown 
Court.   
 
There was evidence that one of the PDOs recorded significantly less time on 
magistrates’ court cases than private practitioners in its areas (although this may have 
been related to the PDO having a higher incidence of guilty pleas), while another 
PDO spent significantly more time on magistrates’ court cases.  Data on time spent on 
Crown Court cases was less reliable but also showed mixed results, with two PDOs 
spending on average less time, and four PDOs more time than private practice firms 
in their areas.  These results were likely to be affected in some areas by the inclusion 
in the sample of some very long Crown Court cases which, as noted above, the PDOs 
were generally less likely to handle.   
  
Cases handled by three of the PDOs tended to end in guilty pleas more often than 
those of private practitioners in their areas, but for five of the PDOs there was also a 
greater likelihood that the case would result in the charges against the defendant being 
dropped.  There were few significant differences between the two sectors in terms of 
sentences received.  
 
These findings tend to indicate that, insofar as they are intended to provide a 
generalist service to criminal suspects in police stations, there may be limited 
advantages of a salaried service in terms of case processing and outcomes.  Clearly, if 
suspects represented in police stations are more likely not to be charged or summoned 
for a criminal offence, this has advantages both for the clients and for the public purse 
in terms of cost savings.  The evidence as regards the handling of proceedings cases in 
magistrates’ courts is more ambiguous.  A tendency for PDS clients to plead guilty 
more often, while obviously involving cost savings, would only be considered to be 
advantageous to clients if there was evidence that this resulted in convictions for 
lesser offences and/or more lenient sentences, which was not evidenced by this 
research.  Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the relative advantages of the 
PDS in respect of the handling of Crown Court cases, especially given the differences 
between the make up of the Crown Court caseload of the two sectors during the 
period of the research (with the PDS tending not to handle very high costs cases).  
 
Our interviews with key personnel in both the LSC and the Public Defender Service 
itself suggest that, partly because of the research evaluation and its focus on the 
comparison with private practice, there was a tendency during this period for the 
PDOs to mirror private practice and not to experiment greatly in terms of new forms 
of service delivery.  Latterly, there have been limited attempts at such 
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experimentation, including the opening of further ‘branch’ offices in Chester and 
Darlington, provision of ‘outreach’ service from the Cheltenham PDO based in the 
offices of other services in smaller rural towns, involvement in new criminal justice 
initiatives such as the Community Justice Centre in Liverpool and early referrals of 
defendants for drug treatment, and most recently the establishment of a PDO Crown 
Court unit based at Cheltenham.  Our research has not involved an evaluation of these 
initiatives or of their effectiveness, both in assisting clients or achieving cost savings 
in the wider criminal justice system. 
  
Quality and Independence 
 
The evidence of our research is that the PDS has achieved the objective of being able 
to provide a generalist criminal defence service which is of good quality, equal and in 
many respects better than the general standard of service provided by private 
practitioners in comparable areas.  The quality of the service provided by the PDS 
certainly was not uniform in the early stages of the service when a number of the 
PDOs appeared to be performing in certain respects less well than local private 
practice.  However, our second and more comprehensive peer review study showed 
that, with the exception of Swansea where the PDO performed below the level of 
private practice according to a number of criteria224F162, all the other PDOs included in 
the research were performing consistently well, with some of the PDOs achieving 
standards significantly better than private practice and at levels of excellence or 
‘competence plus’ on the various measures of case handling.   
 
In this respect, perhaps the greatest strength of the PDS, in comparison with private 
practice, lies in its ability to present good information, well communicated to clients 
in well structured files. It is possible that these results are partly attributable to the 
extra time available to legal staff in the PDS given their smaller caseloads during the 
period of the research.  However, the quality standards achieved are also likely to be 
the result of the development and refinement of systems across the PDOs in terms of 
standard forms and letters and the case management system (CMS), and of training 
and staffing associated with implementation of these systems, including each PDO 
having a quality manager. The PDS police station pro forma has also benefited from 
advice from the research team and was subsequently revised in the light of the 
findings of our earlier investigation stage peer review.   Many of these systems, 
including the various forms, file cover, standard letters and manual, have been made 
more widely available to private criminal defence firms through publication on the 
internet.  
 
Our view is that peer review, involving assessment of case work by independent and 
experienced criminal defence professionals, provides the best basis for evaluating 
quality.  However, the above findings are supported by other sources of evidence.  
The overwhelming view of the criminal justice professionals we surveyed was that 
there was little perceptible difference between the quality of service provided by 
PDOs and private practitioners in their areas.  The one exception to this was solicitors 
in private practice, whose views are very likely to have been influenced by a 
                                                 
162 We have been asked to note that there were significant changes in the management of the Swansea 
PDO in 2003, and while our second peer review took place after this, many of the cases included in the 
second peer review of the Swansea office would have had work done on them prior to these 
management changes.   
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perception of competition with the PDOs, which they have seen as being over-
resourced and working under capacity and therefore facing less pressure and able to 
devote more time to cases.  Although it is probably right to discount a number of the 
specific criticisms of PDOs emanating from private practitioners regarding the quality 
of their work, it is fair to say that the challenge facing the PDS in the future will be to 
maintain the levels of quality they have achieved at the same time as increasing their 
client numbers and caseloads and/or restraining their costs (see below).   
 
Again, although our client surveys achieved very low response rates and therefore 
produced no statistically significant results, the general view expressed was one of 
satisfaction with the quality of service received, whether from a PDO or a private 
practice provider.  This echoes the findings of client surveys conducted by the PDOs 
and by private practitioners.   
 
It is also likely that staff morale within the PDS has contributed to the standards of 
service achieved.  The staff, almost all of whom had previous experience of private 
practice, valued what they saw as the client-focused, not-for-profit, quality service 
principles of the PDS.  They acknowledged that the PDS approach was possible 
because of the way in which the service was resourced, but were also clear that the 
quality, experience and commitment of PDS staff themselves played a considerable 
role in delivering these principles. Generally they felt that they worked under a system 
that enabled them to provide a better, generally more holistic service and to adopt a 
more rigorous approach when representing their clients.  Again, the challenge now 
facing the PDS, given some of the views staff expressed on the demands of 
administration and ‘bureaucracy’, will be to maintain morale and commitment in  
light of the need to increase workloads and control costs and the implementation of 
the management tools to achieve these objective.  
 
The issue of the perceived independence of a salaried criminal defence service 
featured very prominently in both the professional and political debates that 
surrounded the setting up of the PDS.  However, within this research we have found 
no evidence that, as regards interference in the conduct of individual cases, this has in 
practice been an issue of concern among PDS staff, their clients, or indeed other 
criminal justice professionals, including solicitors in private practice.  To the contrary, 
there was evidence, such as that relating to the tendency of some PDOs to advise 
clients in police stations to exercise their right to silence more often, which positively 
points to the PDS having an independent approach to defending its clients.   
 
We also have no evidence that clients perceive the PDS as less independent than 
private practice criminal defence firms operating under contracts.   Such perceptions 
continue to exist amongst some private practitioners and a minority of other criminal 
justice professionals, who tend to see a salaried service as per se being potentially 
more vulnerable to political interference.  On the other hand, many of the staff 
working within the PDS regard themselves as having more independence in the 
conduct of cases precisely because they are working within a ‘not-for-profit’ setting 
and with fewer constraints on the time they can devote to particular clients and cases.    
 
There was support for the role of the professional head of service as a referral point 
for complaints and particular issues of professional conduct, although in practice 
relatively few such referrals have been made.  It was also considered that this role had 
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made a significant contribution to establishing the professional credibility of the PDS 
from the outset.  The current professional head of service has also seen it as part of his 
role to provide general guidance on issues of professional conduct extending beyond 
the PDS to the criminal defence service as a whole.  In this respect, the notes of 
guidance he has issued on advising on guilty pleas and adjournments, on police 
station advice, and in particular on the CDS objectives may be seen as performing an 
important role in defending the independence of the CDS as a whole. 
 
The more recently created Head of the PDS has now assumed some of the functions 
of the professional head of service in investigating specific complaints, but it must be 
questionable whether the holder of this post, with direct responsibility for the Central 
Business Team, would be perceived as having the same degree of independence from 
the day-to-day operation of the PDS or credibility with the wider criminal defence 
profession.  Indeed, early concern was expressed in some quarters that the 
professional head of service should not be a member of the Legal Services 
Commission, although in practice this has probably placed the current holder of this 
post in a better position to advocate the position of the PDS within overall LSC 
policy.  
 
Cost Effectiveness 
 
On the basis of the evidence of its operations over the period of the research, the case 
that the PDS can provide general criminal defence services at a comparable cost to 
contract providers remains unproven.  Even using our 'low' estimate of PDS costs, 
based on their running costs only and excluding capital and start up costs, there was a 
very significant cost differential between the average case costs of the PDS during its 
first three years of operation and comparable private practice, ranging from between 
40% to just over 90% higher for the PDS depending on the area and type of case.  The 
one exception to this could be in relation to Crown Court cases, where the PDS and 
private practice appear to have comparable costs in terms of the types of smaller and 
medium-cost cases in which both sectors are engaged.  However, the PDS has not 
become significantly involved in the types of high costs cases in the Crown Court 
which account for significant proportions of legal aid expenditure in this area, and 
therefore meaningful comparison at this level have not been possible to make. 
 
Of course, many of the factors relating to the way the PDS was established, discussed 
in Chapter 1, have had an adverse impact on the service's costs.  These include the 
decisions relating to the location, staffing and accommodation of the PDOs and the 
'level playing field' basis on which they were required to compete with private 
practice for clients. It is also worth noting that cost comparisons were made with the 
generality of private practice in each of the areas served by PDOs, and it may be that 
where private practice firms themselves open new offices they will experience similar 
high initial case costs as the PDOs. More generally, unlike other jurisdictions in 
which salaried defenders have been introduced, there already existed in England and 
Wales both a highly comprehensive system of public criminal defence services and an 
extensive network of private practice firms to provide them.  As a result, in most of 
the areas in which PDOs have been established (the one exception among the PDOs 
included in the research being Cheltenham) there were few evident 'gaps' in the local 
market for criminal defence services that could be exploited in order to build a client 
base.   
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These factors have combined to ensure that all the PDOs have been operating below 
capacity, as measured in terms of 'chargeable hours' per fee earner, throughout the 
period of the research.   Data on 'chargeable hours' and utilisation of staff time for the 
most recent complete year, 2005-6, indicate a significant improvement by most of the 
PDOs in the number of chargeable hours recorded per member of staff.  How far this 
latest trend in fact reflects an actual increase in clients and cases (as distinct from an 
improved recording of time spent on cases) and therefore a real decrease in average 
case costs is more difficult to determine.  In any event, our research points to the need 
(also recognised by the senior management of the service) for the PDS to exercise 
greater control over their operating costs if they are in fact to provide a comparable 
service to private practice criminal defence firms in terms of costs.   
 
Of course, the issue of whether the PDS provides a cost effective service cannot be 
determined solely on the basis of a comparison between its average case costs and 
those of contracted providers alone.  There may be additional benefits of the PDS to 
the LSC and to the Government which outweigh its higher average case costs.  
 
Management 
 
One of the decisions taken when the PDS was first established, partly as a reaction to 
the concerns expressed about independence, was that it should have a relatively 
devolved management structure, with each PDO head given considerable autonomy 
over the running of their local office.  There was also a collegiate form of central 
management, operated through the PDS Management Committee with the 
professional head of service as chair and each PDO head as a member, along with the 
Head of the CDS and other representatives of the LSC.  Important areas of service 
development, such as the creation of standard forms and file organisation, were 
largely delegated to the PDO heads, and it was not until 2001 that a full-time 
administrator was appointed to the PDS team centrally.   Also, an initial decision was 
taken, again on grounds of independence, that each PDO should have a ‘stand alone’ 
computer system.  This policy was subsequently changed in favour of linking the 
PDOs into the LSC computer network for management (but not case management) 
purposes.  Although initially contracted out, much of the development work on the 
PDS Case Management System was also undertaken within one of the PDOs and then 
rolled out to other offices, not becoming fully operational until the second year of the 
service.  
 
This devolved structure contributed to a lack of consistency in management and in the 
quality of services of the PDOs during their initial period of operation.  Arguably, it 
also contributed to a lack of clarity as to the objectives of the service, with the 
individual PDOs and their heads pursuing somewhat different strategies toward 
service development.  Of course, these strategies were also influenced by differences 
in the local contexts and markets in which they were operating.  Nevertheless, during 
the second year of the service problems with inconsistency in standards began to 
come to light, partly through the research but also when the professional head of 
service extended his role to undertaking limited quality assessments of files in each 
PDO.  It was at this stage that the PDS began to develop centrally various service and 
management targets against which the work of each PDO might be assessed. 
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Eventually, the devolved management structure was replaced in 2004, following the 
appointment of one of the PDO heads to the post of Head of PDS and the 
establishment of a PDS Central Business Team which came to be based not in the 
LSC London headquarters but in the Birmingham PDO. 225F163   This change meant that 
the PDO office heads, who had previously reported for management purposes to the 
Head of the CDS, a non-lawyer, would now become responsible for both professional 
and management matters to the Head of PDS, an experienced criminal defence 
solicitor.   
 
As noted in Chapter 7 when reporting on the views of staff of the service, these 
changes in management structure have created their own tensions within the PDS, 
especially among some of the PDO heads, who have seen the development of further 
targets relating to client recruitment, chargeable time and the mix of cases dealt with 
by their office as potentially undermining their autonomy and independence to 
develop their local services in line with their perceptions of local needs and 
circumstances.  Similar anxieties have also been expressed, if less forcefully, by other 
staff, in terms of their complaints about excessive ‘administration’ and ‘bureaucracy’.  
On the other hand, the internal data we have seen from the PDS does suggest that the 
new management structure has begun to have an effect in, for example, driving up 
chargeable hours recorded by a number of the PDOs.  Our own second stage peer 
review also clearly showed that a more consistent standard and quality of service has 
been achieved across all but one of the PDOs over time.   
 
One alternative model for administering the PDS that was raised by a number of 
respondents to the initial consultation on setting it up was that the LSC might grant 
aid another body to run the service.  Such an ‘arms’ length’ arrangement was seen as 
one possible means to further ensuring the independence of the service.  It was not 
pursued at the time, in part because the tight deadline set by Government for the PDS 
to become operational did not allow sufficient time to identify or set up a body to run 
the PDS separately from the LSC.  Whether such a structure should now be 
reconsidered depends on the objectives that might be set for the development of the 
PDS beyond its pilot phase.   However, it is important to recognise that operation 
through an ‘arms’ length’ structure would not resolve but only transfer to the new 
body the potential conflict between central and more devolved operational 
management of the service.  As it would also require some form of medium-term 
contract between the LSC and the new body, it might introduce an unnecessary 
element of inflexibility into the future development of the service. 
 
                                                 
163 Consideration was given at this time to establishing a salaried service for immigration in 
Birmingham, to operate alongside the PDO there, but this plan was not implemented. 
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Future Development of the PDS 
 
Perhaps one of the clearest lessons to be drawn from the pilot and our research 
evaluation is the need for a clear understanding within Government, the LSC and the 
staff of the PDS of the policy objectives behind the PDS.  Certainly, when the service 
was originally launched there was ambiguity as to its purposes, which may well have 
contributed to the atmosphere of distrust among private practice criminal defence 
solicitors (themselves having to adapt at the same time to the new contracting regime) 
as to the Government and LSC’s motives in setting up the new service.   The political 
and professional controversy surrounding the launch of the PDS itself served to 
reinforce a risk averse approach within the LSC to the way in which it was set up.  
Eventually, the lack of clear policy objectives filtered through, by way of the 
devolved management structure, to those responsible for running the individual 
PDOs. 
 
Of course, this report is being published at a time when Government is raising 
fundamental questions about the objectives of the criminal justice system as a whole 
and the role of criminal defence and criminal legal aid within that system.   Lord 
Carter’s Review of Criminal Legal Aid Procurement was established in 2005 to 
examine the whole way in which publicly-funded defence services are being 
purchased and delivered.  As our own report was being finalised, the interim findings 
of the Carter Review were published,226F164 recommending the replacement of the current 
system of contracting for criminal defence services, based to a considerable extent on 
hourly-determined prices, and involving very large numbers of private practice firms 
across the country.  In particular, the Carter interim report argued that the “sheer 
number of suppliers in many urban areas makes it difficult for them to obtain 
sufficient volumes of work to structure themselves in the most efficient way.” 227F165  This 
clearly echoes and helps to contextualise the experience of the PDOs in terms of the 
competition they faced from private practice in attempting to establish a client base 
and a cost effective service during the course of this research.   
 
The Carter review is proposing a phased transition to a new system of procurement, in 
which there would be a much smaller number of ‘preferred suppliers’ with whom the 
LSC would contract, initially based on a more comprehensive system of fixed prices 
per case for most criminal defence services.  Eventually, once the number of suppliers 
has been reduced, a system of “managed competition” will be introduced in which 
these suppliers will tender against each other, based on set quality standards, the 
capacity of the firm, and competitive pricing, for volumes of criminal defence 
services in groups of local police stations and associated magistrates’ court and 
Crown Court work.  As well as establishing “an appropriate quality standard” through 
                                                 
164 Lord Carter’s Review of Legal Aid Procurement, Procurement of Criminal Defence Services: 
Market-based reform, London, Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2006.   The final report of the 
review, setting out detailed proposals for implementation of its recommendations, has subsequently 
been published.  See Lord Carter’s Review of Legal Aid Procurement, Legal Aid: A market-based 
approach to reform, London, Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2006.  The Government has 
subsequently announced its intentions to proceed with the reform of criminal defence procurement 
broadly on the lines proposed by Lord Carter.  See CM 6993, LegalAid Reform: The Way Ahead, 
London, Department of Constitutional Affairs and Legal Services Commission, November 2006. 
165 Procurement of Criminal Defence Services, ibid., p. 4.  In fact, as noted in Chapter 1, the current 
number of suppliers, estimated at 2,500 solicitors’ offices nationally, represents a reduction of well 
over half from the number operating prior to the introduction of the current contracting system in 2001. 
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the “preferred supplier approach and measured by peer review” as a prerequisite for 
competitive tendering,228F166 the Carter Review interim report recognised that there may 
be a need to set a lower pricing limit below which tenders will not be accepted, so as 
“to prevent unrealistic bids destabilising the market”.229F167 
 
It is against the background of the Carter Review recommendations that the future 
development of the PDS needs to be considered.  For its part, the Government has 
tended from the outset to see the PDS as part of a mixed system for the delivery of 
criminal defence services, operating alongside contracted private practice providers, 
the two types of service both complementing and competing with one another.  In 
particular, the PDS would provide a means of ‘benchmarking’ contracted private 
practice providers in terms of both value for money and quality.  A secondary 
objective was to provide the LSC with an alternative form of delivery which could be 
used where there were gaps in service provision, due to the implementation of 
contracting or for other reasons.  In this latter respect, the PDS has proved its value 
particularly in Cheltenham among the locations included in this research, where the 
PDO has now been established as the largest single provider of criminal defence 
services and the base for experimentation in service delivery in more rural areas.      
 
Apart from this and when viewed in terms of these original objectives, it cannot be 
said that the PDOs included in our research, as they have developed during the period 
of pilot, have provided either effective competition or a means of ‘benchmarking’ 
private practice criminal defence firms specifically in terms of the cost of their 
services under contracts.  These would include police station legal advice, particularly 
those cases requiring an attendance in person on the suspect,230F168 and the vast majority 
of routine cases in the magistrates’ courts.  The PDS has so far provided only limited 
comparisons with private practice in respect of Crown Court cases and in particular 
has not become involved, due to an early policy decision (now reversed) to exclude 
them from such work, in the types of longer, more complex and high costs cases that 
absorb a high proportion of legal aid costs in the Crown Court.  The limited 
comparisons we have been able to draw between the PDS and private practice in 
lesser cost Crown Court cases suggest that, once factors such as the nature of the 
charges and location are taken into account, there is in fact no significant cost 
differential between the PDS and private practice, and this may suggest that the PDS 
does have a benchmarking role in terms of the costs and efficiency in the conduct of 
Crown Court cases.   Further investigation of the specialist Crown Court unit that has 
now been established in the Cheltenham PDO would be required before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn in this regard. 
 
The PDS has also been seen as one mechanism for benchmarking the quality of 
criminal defence services.  In this respect, the PDS does appear to have evolved over 
the period of the pilot as an example of good quality criminal defence service, 
comparable to the best private practice firms.  Taken together, these firms, perhaps as 
                                                 
166 Ibid., p. 21.  While initially the Carter Review accepts that the LSC will have a role in determining 
these quality standards, it recommends that eventually the task of monitoring these standards will be 
one primarily for the professional bodies, namely the Law Society and the Bar Council. 
167 Ibid., p. 25. 
168 Proposals have been advanced for reform of the provision of police station legal advice over the 
telephone, through the development of CDS Direct.  See Legal Services Commission Press Release, 
‘Telephone Advice Pilot to go Ahead’, 13 November 2004. 
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identified through the LSC’s ‘preferred supplier’ programme, and the PDS could 
provide the basis for further developing the Commission’s quality assurance 
mechanisms in respect of criminal defence services, including further refinements of 
qualitative peer review as employed in this research.  One of the recommendations of 
an earlier study on the piloting of criminal contracting was that the LSC should 
establish a Criminal Quality Review group in partnership with the best criminal 
defence firms.  It is arguable that the dynamics of contracting as a mechanism for 
purchasing legal aid services, at least in its present form, does not encourage such 
partnership arrangements and the open sharing of information and expertise that they 
require.  Nor is it obvious that a system of competitive tendering, as proposed by the 
Carter Review, would form the basis for the development of a stable and long-term 
partnership between the LSC and private practice suppliers. In this context the PDS as 
a directly funded mechanism of service delivery may have an important role to play in 
bridging the ‘information gap’ between the LSC and its main providers of criminal 
defence services. 
 
Indeed, all those who we have interviewed within the PDS and the LSC have testified 
to the role that the service has already played in increasing the understanding of those 
responsible for the administration and development of the CDS as a whole into the 
dynamics of local service delivery in this field.  It is more questionable how far such 
lessons have been extended to and been absorbed within those sections of 
Government responsible for criminal legal aid policy and expenditure decisions, let 
alone for wider criminal justice policy.  The PDS has also been able to demonstrate 
during the pilot its value as a ‘test bed’ for developing particular management tools 
and forms of service delivery which could have a wider applicability across the CDS 
as a whole.  Management developments have included the package of PDS forms for 
recording and reporting information on cases, the CMS computer case management 
system, and peer review.  Developments in service delivery have included outreach 
services organised through other organisations, involvement of some PDOs in local 
criminal justice initiatives around diverting offenders outside the normal criminal 
justice system and into treatment programmes, and the establishment of a specialist 
Crown Court unit.   
 
Of course, it is conceivable that these types of initiatives could equally well be 
developed through private practice providers, although again the contract  relationship 
(with or without competitive tendering) may not provide an ideal basis for this type of 
developmental partnership between the LSC and local providers.  At the same time, if 
the PDS is to be developed, not so much as a direct competitor with and benchmark 
for private practice but as a tool of service development and improvement for the 
CDS as a whole, then it will be necessary that the PDS continues to operate in a range 
of different types of area as a general criminal defence service provider, and to do so 
with greater efficiency and cost effectiveness than the service was able to 
demonstrated at least in its first three years of operation.  In this respect, while it is 
obvious, at least in retrospect, that some of the locations chosen for pilot PDOs were 
not appropriate, in other areas (such as Cheltenham) the PDS has proved its value as a 
mechanism for filling gaps in local service delivery.  Indeed, it is arguable that much 
more could have been done during the pilot in developing this objective of the PDS, 
for example in extending the service more into rural locations and other areas of poor 
supply, including experimenting with new forms of service delivery.  
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The preliminary findings of our research were made available to the Carter Review 
team, and on this basis they have concluded that “initial indications are that although 
the model adopted delivers quality defence services it does not achieve the 
efficiencies expected from independent suppliers.”231F169  The interim report of the 
review goes on to state: 
 
In most circumstances a publicly owned and controlled defence service should 
be able to compete on the same terms as others.  It is also questionable as to 
whether the provision of a criminal defence service fits well within the general 
remit of the Legal Services Commission.  However, there is a potential for a 
public defence service in areas where the independent market cannot provide 
sufficient coverage for an efficient cost.232F170 
Our own view is that this is to define possibly too narrow a role for the PDS within 
the context of a more “managed market” for criminal defence services, as 
recommended by the Carter Review.  As argued above, the PDS would seem to have 
an important role in the continuing development of quality standards and service 
innovation in criminal defence, which it may well prove difficult to replicate under 
either the existing system of contracting with private practice or one based on 
competitive tendering.  In this respect we would note that the Carter Review 
recommendations appear to us to be based on a somewhat static view of acceptable 
quality standards, scope of service and modes of service delivery in this field.  Nor, 
given the historic record in this respect, would we share the confidence that the Carter 
Review appears to place in the legal professional bodies as the primary guarantors of 
the quality in the delivery of criminal defence services.233F171 
 
As we have indicated, we have evaluated the PDS in the context of what in most 
urban areas is a highly competitive and crowded (if not efficient) market for the 
provision of criminal defence services.  If the Carter Review proposals for a more 
“managed market” are implemented, the market context in which the PDS might 
operate would be very different, with far fewer private practice suppliers for clients to 
choose from and the LSC being more active, eventually through the competitive 
tendering system, in allocating work between these suppliers.  Indeed, one of the risks 
                                                 
169 Ibid., p. 16. 
170 Ibid.  The final report of Lord Carter’s Review does not develop this suggestion further and, indeed, 
contains only one mention of any form of public defender service.  This is in the context of alternative 
options to the proposed ‘market-based approach’ to reform based on competitive tendering through a 
number of private practice suppliers in each area.  One such option considered was the “creation of an 
independent public defender” that “would allow for a few very large, independent regional suppliers to 
win work” and to be assigned monopoly control of all duty solicitor work in police stations and 
magistrates’ courts, but with the power to issue vouchers to clients to allow them to utilise other 
suppliers.   Such an approach is rejected on the grounds that it would represent “a substantial, 
unmanaged change for suppliers and a fundamental departure from the way the justice system in 
England and Wales has evolved” as well as posing “significant risks to both quality and access.” (see 
Legal Aid: A market-based approach to reform, op. cit., p. 53).  Nor is the future of the Public 
Defender Service raised as a topic in the Government consultation paper issued to accompany Lord 
Carter’s final report (see Legal Services Commission and Department of Consitutional Affairs, Legal 
Aid: a sustainable future, Consultation Paper CP 13/06, July 2006. 
171 See, in particular, M. McConville, et. al., Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of 
Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994 for a critical review of the 
standards of criminal defence in Britain in a period when the Law Society and Bar Council were 
primarily responsible for overseeing quality standards and prior to the establishment of the Legal 
Services Commission or it predecessor body, the Legal Aid Board.  
 306
of the system proposed by the Carter Review is that criminal defence work in any 
particular area could be concentrated amongst so few private practice suppliers as to 
make the LSC overly dependent on them for the continuing supply of services and to 
render client choice virtually meaningless.234F172  As we have seen, the Carter Review 
interim report  itself recognised this danger, insofar as it has recommended that a 
minimum price be fixed below which tenders for services will not be accepted, but 
without explaining how in practice such a minimum price would be determined.   
 
An alternative would be to maintain the PDS on a more general basis and, through the 
“managed market”, allocate to it a proportion of criminal defence work, with the size 
of the allocation in any particular area varying depending on strength of the remaining 
local private practice provision.235F173  However, the PDS allocation should be of 
sufficient size to enable the service to operate efficiently in terms of its staffing and 
other resources, and it would be for the LSC through its management of the PDS to 
ensure that its costs remained at least comparable to those otherwise determined in the 
locality under the competitive tendering process.  This does not necessarily imply that 
PDS cost should always be equal to or below those resulting from competitive 
tendering, since one of the purposes of maintaining the PDS would be to provide a 
basis for the LSC to determine a minimum price below which high quality criminal 
defence services cannot be maintained.  Another important function of the PDS in this 
scenario would be to provide a guarantee of client choice between service providers in 
any given area.   
  
In summary, it is difficult on the basis of the research evaluation of the PDS pilot to 
recommend that the service be developed, in the context of the current system of 
contracting, as a large-scale provider of generalist criminal defence services or as a 
means of providing competition with or cost benchmarking for private practice 
providers in this field on a nation-wide basis.  On the other hand, even in this context 
the PDS does have a role to play both in benchmarking and further developing quality 
standards in criminal defence and as an integral part of the service development 
programme of the CDS, and to fulfil this role it must be maintained as a generalist 
criminal defence service provider, if not in all the present sites then at least in a 
considerable number and range of localities across the country.  In this role the PDS 
may well be able to develop and demonstrate more efficient ways of delivering 
criminal defence services in particular sectors, such as the Crown Court, which will 
have a wider applicability across the CDS as a whole.   Beyond this, and looking 
forward from the Carter Review to the possible development of competitive tendering 
for criminal defence services, we can envisage a wider role for the PDS as an essential 
guarantor of quality standards, minimum costs and client choice of representative in a 
more “managed market” for such services.   
                                                 
172 As explained in Chapter 1, this was one of the local market conditions that was taken into account in 
selecting the sites for the original PDOs. 
173 As discussed in Chapter 1, the prohibition under the Access to Justice Act 1999 on requiring clients 
to use the services of LSC employed lawyers, as well as other considerations, prevented such an 
allocation of a share of the market to the PDS when it was established.  Although it is theoretically 
possible that a “managed market” and system of competitive tendering would not necessarily lead to 
particular individuals being required to use the service of only one provider, in practical terms this is 
very likely to be one of the consequences of the Carter Review recommendations.  This issue is not 
addressed in the Carter Review interim report. 
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Appendix 2.1     Offence Categories used in Case File Analysis 
 
 
 
OFFENCE CODE CATEGORY 236F
174 
MAXIMUM 
PENALTY 
Offences against the person 01   
Common Assault/Battery  0101 SO 6 months 
ABH (s.47 OAPA)  0102 EW 5 years 
GBH and/or wounding (s.20)  0103 EW 5 years 
GBH/Wounding with intent (s.18)  0104 IO Life 
Threat to kill 0105 EW 10 years 
Obstructing a police officer 0106 SO 1 month 
Assault on a police officer 0107 SO 6 months 
Child neglect/assault/abandon/ill treat 0108 EW 10 years 
Abduction 0109 EW 7 years 
Kidnap 0110 IO Life 
False imprisonment 0111 IO Life 
Homicide and similar 02   
Death by dangerous driving (s.1 RTA) 0201 IO 10 years 
Death by careless (etc.) driving (s.3A RTA) 0202 IO 10 years 
Manslaughter 0203 IO Life 
Murder 0204 IO Life 
Sexual offences/children 03   
Attempt/Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl 
under 16, s.6 
0301 EW 2 years 
Attempt/Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl 
under 13, s.5 
0302 IO Life 
Indecent Assault, s14 or 15 0303 EW 10 years 
Assault with intent to commit buggery, s.16 0304 IO Life 
Indeceny/indecent conduct with or towards 
children 
0305 EW 2 years 
Attempt/Rape, s.1, s.37 Sexual Offences Act 
1956 
0306 IO Life 
Indecent exposure 0307 SO 3 months 
Possession of indecent photos of children 0308 EW 3 years 
Robbery 04   
Robbery/Assault with intent to rob (s.8) 0401 IO Life 
Burglary 05   
Dwelling house, s.9 0501 EW 14 years 
Otherwise, s.9 0502 EW 10 years 
Aggravated Burglary, s.10 0503 IO Life 
Criminal damage 06   
Criminal damage, under £5000 0600 SO 6 months 
Criminal damage, s.1(1) over £5000 0601 EW 10 years 
With intent/Aggravated, s.1(2) 0602 IO Life 
Arson, s.1(3) 0603 EW Life 
Threats, s.2 0604 EW 10 years 
Possession with intent, s.3 0605 EW 10 years 
Theft 07   
Going equipped, s.25 0701 EW 3 years 
Abstracting electricity, s.13 0702 EW 5 years 
                                                 
174 IO – Indictable only; EW – Either way; SO – Summary only 
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Making off without payment, s.3 1978 Act 0703 EW 2 years 
Deception   0704 EW 5 years 
False accounting s17 0708 EW 7 years 
Theft 0709 EW 7 years 
Handling/receiving etc s22 0710 EW 14 years 
Blackmail 0711 IO 14 years 
Taking vehicles without authority/consent 
(includes “being carried” offences) 
0712 SO 6 months 
Aggravated TWOC s.12A 0713 EW 2 years 
Forgery/false instrument etc. 0714 EW 10 years 
Conspiracy to defraud 0715 IO 10 years 
Public order etc. 08   
Drunk and disorderly  0801 SO Fine level 3 
Harassment, alarm or distress s.5 0802 SO Fine level 3 
Threatening behaviour/intentional harassment 
etc s.4, s4A 
0803 SO 6 months 
Affray s.3 0804 EW 3 years 
Offensive weapon s1 PCA 1953 0805 EW 4 years 
Bladed or pointed instrument s139 CJA 1988 0806 EW 2 years 
Violent disorder s.2 0807 EW 5 years 
Riot s.1 0808 IO 10 years 
Breach of the Peace 0809 Non-criminal  
Drugs supply, possession, etc. 09   
Class A    
Importation237F175 0901 EW life 
Supply 0902 EW life 
Possession 0903 EW 7 years 
Possession with intent to supply  0904 EW life 
Production 0905 EW life 
Occupier, etc., permitting 0906 EW 14 years 
Class B    
Importation* 0907 EW 14 years 
Supply 0908 EW 14 years 
Possession 0909 EW 5 years 
Possession with intent to supply  0910 EW 14 years 
Production 0911 EW 14 years 
Occupier, etc., permitting 0912 EW 14 years 
Class C    
Importation* 0913 EW 5 years 
Supply 0914 EW 5 years 
Possession 0915 EW 2 years 
Possession with intent to supply  0916 EW 5 years 
Production 0917 EW 5 years 
Occupier, etc., permitting 0918 EW 5 years 
Driving offences 10   
Failure to produce documents 1001 SO Fine level 3/4 
Alcohol offences (incl. Failure to provide 
breath test) 
1002 SO 3-6 months 
Driving without insurance/tax 1003 SO Fine level 5 
Driving without an MOT 1004 SO Fine level 4 
Driving whilst disqualified 1005 SO 12 months 
Failure to stop/report 1006 SO 6 months 
Careless driving 1007 SO Fine level 4 
Other, incl. speeding, etc. 1008 SO various 
Driving without a licence 1009 SO Fine level 3 
Driving otherwise than in accordance with a 1010 SO Fine level 3 
                                                 
175 Includes evading prohibition on importation under Customs and Excise Management Act 
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licence 
Dangerous driving 1011 EW 7 years 
Breach proceedings 11   
Breach of community order 1101  Fine  
Fail to surrender to bail/absconding 1102 SO 3 months 
Administration of Justice Offences 12   
Intimidating witnesses 1201 EW 5 years 
Perjury 1202 IO 7 years 
Perverting the course of justice 1203 IO Life  
Other 13   
 
Notes: 
 
• Treat Attempt as the substantive offence 
• Treat Racially Aggravated offences as the substantive offence.  
• Conspiracy, incitement, aid, abet counsel or procure, treat as the substantive 
offence (except conspiracy to defraud) 
• If uncertain as to whether it comes within one of the categories, enter under 
'Other'. 
• When entering an offence under 'Other', specify the relevant statutory 
provision including section number. 
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Appendix 3.1    Multivariate Analysis of Outcomes at the Investigation Stage 
 
In Tables 1 to 6 below, we present multiple regression analyses on cases where 
clients are retained throughout for six measures of outcome: two relating to the 
investigation stage (charge brought, no further action taken) and four relating to the 
proceedings stage (case withdrawn or discontinued, guilty plea, trial/hearing, cracked 
trial).  
 
The regressions are all estimated using data from all claims paid in the comparator 
regions. The independent variables in each case are the number of defendants, 
whether the claim is for a youth or duty solicitor case, supplier size (as measured by 
the number of claims made), and type of offence (11 indicator variables). In addition 
each regression controls for the location of the local police station (for investigation 
claims) or the court (for proceedings claims). The coefficients labelled Birmingham, 
Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Swansea, Cheltenham and Pontypridd show the size of the 
outcome differences for each of these PDOs compared with private suppliers, and the 
associated (robust) t-statistics show the statistical significance of these differences.238F176  
The results can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
charges made against them at the investigation stage was significantly lower in three 
of the PDOs [Middlesbrough, Swansea and Cheltenham] relative to private supplier 
cases, and no different in the remaining three [Table 1]. 
2.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
no further action taken  against them at the investigation stage was significantly 
higher in two of the PDOs [Middlesbrough and Cheltenham] relative to private 
supplier cases, and no different in the remaining four [Table 2]. 
3.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
charges withdrawn or discontinued at the proceedings stage was significantly higher 
in five of the PDOs [Middlesbrough, Swansea and Cheltenham] relative to private 
supplier cases, and significantly lower in only one: Liverpool [Table 3]. 
4.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
a guilty plea entered at the proceedings stage was significantly higher in three of the 
PDOs [Birmingham, Liverpool and Pontypridd] relative to private supplier cases, and 
significantly lower in one: Middlesborough [Table 4]. 
5.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
a formal trial/hearing at the proceedings stage was significantly lower in Liverpool 
and Pontypridd relative to private supplier cases, and insignificantly different in the 
others [Table 5]. 
6.  After controlling for case complexity and location, the likelihood of a client having 
a cracked trial at the proceedings stage was significantly lower in Birmingham, 
Middlesbrough and Pontypridd relative to private supplier cases, and no different in 
the other three PDOs [Table 6]. 
                                                 
176 T-statistics are calculated using standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Without this 
correction  estimates may be inefficient. 
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Table 1: Regression of outcome= “charge made” in relation to PDO status 
controlling for offence type and police station (all investigation claims in 
comparator regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  133513 
                                                       F( 21,132753) =  175.75 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0430 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0375 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .46881 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      charge |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |  -.0153689   .0031225    -4.92   0.000     -.021489   -.0092489 
        you2 |  -.0160266   .0051495    -3.11   0.002    -.0261195   -.0059337 
        dut2 |  -.0556985   .0032442   -17.17   0.000    -.0620572   -.0493399 
      sumsup |   .0000159   8.03e-07    19.77   0.000     .0000143    .0000175 
        off2 |   -.102802   .0133888    -7.68   0.000    -.1290439   -.0765601 
        off3 |  -.1030544   .0077981   -13.22   0.000    -.1183384   -.0877703 
        off4 |  -.0202533   .0064084    -3.16   0.002    -.0328136   -.0076931 
        off5 |  -.0047187   .0050447    -0.94   0.350    -.0146062    .0051688 
        off6 |  -.0474002   .0060446    -7.84   0.000    -.0592474   -.0355529 
        off7 |  -.0183074    .003963    -4.62   0.000    -.0260748   -.0105399 
        off8 |  -.0179331   .0078756    -2.28   0.023    -.0333692    -.002497 
        off9 |   .0695947   .0056998    12.21   0.000     .0584232    .0807662 
       off10 |   .0299994   .0057436     5.22   0.000      .018742    .0412567 
       off11 |   .1866816   .0050076    37.28   0.000     .1768668    .1964963 
       off12 |  -.0061466   .0060007    -1.02   0.306    -.0179079    .0056147 
        bham |   .0167715   .0206534     0.81   0.417    -.0237088    .0572519 
       lpool |  -.0248979   .0183826    -1.35   0.176    -.0609274    .0111316 
       mboro |  -.0629752   .0193543    -3.25   0.001    -.1009093    -.025041 
      swnsea |  -.0531092   .0189424    -2.80   0.005    -.0902359   -.0159824 
       chelt |  -.0468063   .0191802    -2.44   0.015     -.084399   -.0092135 
       ponty |    -.01831   .0271053    -0.68   0.499    -.0714358    .0348158 
       _cons |   .6348343   .0050193   126.48   0.000     .6249966    .6446721 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        stat |   absorbed                                     (739 categories) 
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Table 2: Regression of outcome= “no further action” in relation to PDO status 
controlling for offence type and police station (all investigation claims in 
comparator regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  133513 
                                                       F( 21,132753) =  130.52 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0382 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0327 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4441 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         nfa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |   .0197669   .0032254     6.13   0.000     .0134452    .0260887 
        you2 |  -.0192662   .0047646    -4.04   0.000    -.0286048   -.0099277 
        dut2 |  -.0139752   .0030006    -4.66   0.000    -.0198562   -.0080941 
      sumsup |  -8.53e-06   7.64e-07   -11.17   0.000      -.00001   -7.03e-06 
        off2 |   .1234857   .0131913     9.36   0.000     .0976309    .1493404 
        off3 |   .1336451   .0076489    17.47   0.000     .1186534    .1486368 
        off4 |   .0683755   .0062678    10.91   0.000     .0560907    .0806603 
        off5 |   .0382797   .0048761     7.85   0.000     .0287226    .0478367 
        off6 |   .0025255   .0055951     0.45   0.652    -.0084408    .0134917 
        off7 |   .0230377   .0037551     6.14   0.000     .0156777    .0303977 
        off8 |   .0210543    .007489     2.81   0.005      .006376    .0357326 
        off9 |   -.074996   .0051862   -14.46   0.000    -.0851609   -.0648312 
       off10 |   -.065126   .0051522   -12.64   0.000    -.0752241   -.0550278 
       off11 |  -.1361145   .0047082   -28.91   0.000    -.1453425   -.1268865 
       off12 |   .0003781   .0057108     0.07   0.947    -.0108149    .0115711 
        bham |   -.013565    .019004    -0.71   0.475    -.0508125    .0236825 
       lpool |   .0325463   .0171745     1.90   0.058    -.0011154    .0662079 
       mboro |   .0597143   .0190586     3.13   0.002     .0223598    .0970687 
      swnsea |   .0080046   .0171542     0.47   0.641    -.0256173    .0416264 
       chelt |   .1003696   .0187724     5.35   0.000     .0635761    .1371632 
       ponty |    .037367   .0258935     1.44   0.149    -.0133837    .0881178 
       _cons |   .2868168   .0049395    58.07   0.000     .2771356    .2964981 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        stat |   absorbed                                     (739 categories) 
 
 
 314
Table 3: Regression of outcome= “case withdrawn/discontinued” in relation to PDO 
status controlling for offence type and court (all proceedings claims in 
comparator regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  164705 
                                                       F( 21,164375) =  240.41 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0509 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0490 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .37288 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     withdrn |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |   .0047609    .002722     1.75   0.080    -.0005741    .0100959 
        you2 |   .0069463   .0030725     2.26   0.024     .0009242    .0129684 
        dut2 |   .0000189     .00621     0.00   0.998    -.0121526    .0121905 
      sumsup |  -7.05e-06   5.13e-07   -13.75   0.000    -8.06e-06   -6.05e-06 
        off2 |  -.1007216   .0218064    -4.62   0.000    -.1434617   -.0579815 
        off3 |  -.0834398   .0087692    -9.52   0.000    -.1006272   -.0662524 
        off4 |   -.092351   .0087081   -10.61   0.000    -.1094187   -.0752833 
        off5 |  -.0859191   .0045519   -18.88   0.000    -.0948407   -.0769975 
        off6 |  -.0276682   .0052946    -5.23   0.000    -.0380456   -.0172909 
        off7 |   -.146387    .003099   -47.24   0.000     -.152461    -.140313 
        off8 |  -.1457637   .0048713   -29.92   0.000    -.1553113    -.136216 
        off9 |  -.0377843   .0043142    -8.76   0.000    -.0462401   -.0293285 
       off10 |  -.1682863   .0041286   -40.76   0.000    -.1763783   -.1601943 
       off11 |  -.1761978   .0031835   -55.35   0.000    -.1824375   -.1699582 
       off12 |  -.1191419    .003852   -30.93   0.000    -.1266916   -.1115922 
        bham |   .0416237   .0194992     2.13   0.033     .0034056    .0798418 
       lpool |  -.0275772   .0110799    -2.49   0.013    -.0492936   -.0058608 
       mboro |   .0707712   .0189441     3.74   0.000     .0336411    .1079013 
      swnsea |   .0400192   .0192647     2.08   0.038     .0022608    .0777776 
       chelt |   .1209709   .0210126     5.76   0.000     .0797866    .1621552 
       ponty |   .0760714   .0281866     2.70   0.007     .0208264    .1313165 
       _cons |   .2891803   .0040746    70.97   0.000     .2811941    .2971664 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (309 categories) 
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Table 4: Regression of outcome= “guilty plea” in relation to PDO status 
controlling for offence type and court (all proceedings claims in comparator 
regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  164705 
                                                       F( 21,164375) = 1137.50 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1460 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1443 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .46055 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      guilty |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |  -.0505616   .0073894    -6.84   0.000    -.0650447   -.0360784 
        you2 |   .0176988   .0036447     4.86   0.000     .0105552    .0248424 
        dut2 |   .0231509   .0074566     3.10   0.002     .0085362    .0377656 
      sumsup |   7.19e-06   6.75e-07    10.64   0.000     5.86e-06    8.51e-06 
        off2 |  -.0048347   .0223299    -0.22   0.829    -.0486008    .0389315 
        off3 |  -.0731411     .00747    -9.79   0.000    -.0877822   -.0585001 
        off4 |  -.0571125   .0075945    -7.52   0.000    -.0719976   -.0422273 
        off5 |   .0806033   .0049227    16.37   0.000      .070955    .0902516 
        off6 |   .1947209   .0057046    34.13   0.000       .18354    .2059017 
        off7 |    .401957   .0034231   117.42   0.000     .3952478    .4086662 
        off8 |   .3088448   .0064474    47.90   0.000     .2962081    .3214816 
        off9 |   .1388407   .0044769    31.01   0.000     .1300661    .1476154 
       off10 |   .2750611   .0056472    48.71   0.000     .2639927    .2861296 
       off11 |   .3788896   .0038162    99.29   0.000       .37141    .3863692 
       off12 |   .3580966   .0044823    79.89   0.000     .3493113    .3668819 
        bham |   .0955933   .0209057     4.57   0.000     .0546187     .136568 
       lpool |   .0918143   .0145789     6.30   0.000       .06324    .1203886 
       mboro |  -.0496352   .0214189    -2.32   0.020    -.0916158   -.0076546 
      swnsea |  -.0085875   .0236984    -0.36   0.717    -.0550358    .0378609 
       chelt |  -.0455269   .0244884    -1.86   0.063    -.0935236    .0024698 
       ponty |   .1432506   .0296975     4.82   0.000     .0850441    .2014571 
       _cons |   .2471989   .0082571    29.94   0.000     .2310151    .2633826 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (309 categories) 
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Table 5: Regression of outcome= “formal trial” in relation to PDO status 
controlling for offence type and court (all proceedings claims in comparator 
regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  164705 
                                                       F( 21,164375) =  165.88 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0330 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0310 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .30613 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       trial |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |   .0137847   .0031841     4.33   0.000     .0075438    .0200255 
        you2 |   .0460553   .0026833    17.16   0.000      .040796    .0513146 
        dut2 |  -.0424603   .0039911   -10.64   0.000    -.0502828   -.0346378 
      sumsup |   4.45e-06   4.56e-07     9.77   0.000     3.56e-06    5.35e-06 
        off2 |   -.101044   .0154724    -6.53   0.000    -.1313695   -.0707185 
        off3 |  -.0929709    .006384   -14.56   0.000    -.1054834   -.0804584 
        off4 |  -.0426089   .0081374    -5.24   0.000    -.0585581   -.0266597 
 
        off5 |  -.1149667   .0033094   -34.74   0.000    -.1214531   -.1084802 
        off6 |  -.0398495   .0043893    -9.08   0.000    -.0484525   -.0312466 
        off7 |  -.1065692   .0026201   -40.67   0.000    -.1117046   -.1014337 
        off8 |  -.0995902   .0039398   -25.28   0.000     -.107312   -.0918683 
        off9 |  -.0511685   .0035287   -14.50   0.000    -.0580847   -.0442524 
       off10 |   -.138322   .0030552   -45.27   0.000    -.1443101   -.1323338 
       off11 |  -.0721939   .0029284   -24.65   0.000    -.0779335   -.0664543 
       off12 |  -.1030223   .0030628   -33.64   0.000    -.1090253   -.0970193 
        bham |  -.0124267   .0137103    -0.91   0.365    -.0392986    .0144451 
       lpool |  -.0189042    .007514    -2.52   0.012    -.0336316   -.0041769 
       mboro |  -.0153703   .0107227    -1.43   0.152    -.0363866     .005646 
      swnsea |  -.0132893   .0114805    -1.16   0.247    -.0357909    .0092123 
       chelt |   -.006962   .0120239    -0.58   0.563    -.0305286    .0166046 
       ponty |  -.0607234   .0136226    -4.46   0.000    -.0874234   -.0340233 
       _cons |   .1519936   .0041157    36.93   0.000     .1439269    .1600602 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (309 categories) 
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Table 6: Regression of outcome= “cracked trial” in relation to PDO status 
controlling for offence type and court (all proceedings claims in comparator 
regions where solicitor was retained throughout) 
 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =  164705 
                                                       F( 21,164375) =  111.99 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0213 
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0194 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29224 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     cracked |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    noofdefe |   .0042122   .0020853     2.02   0.043      .000125    .0082993 
        you2 |   .0355125   .0025352    14.01   0.000     .0305435    .0404814 
        dut2 |   3.10e-06    .004714     0.00   0.999    -.0092363    .0092425 
      sumsup |  -4.57e-08   4.32e-07    -0.11   0.916    -8.93e-07    8.01e-07 
        off2 |  -.0869545    .013256    -6.56   0.000     -.112936   -.0609731 
        off3 |  -.1009301   .0047124   -21.42   0.000    -.1101663   -.0916939 
        off4 |  -.0586707   .0068589    -8.55   0.000     -.072114   -.0452273 
        off5 |  -.0734363   .0031653   -23.20   0.000    -.0796402   -.0672323 
        off6 |  -.0356737   .0039293    -9.08   0.000    -.0433749   -.0279724 
        off7 |  -.0684586   .0024299   -28.17   0.000    -.0732212   -.0636961 
        off8 |  -.0625546   .0037951   -16.48   0.000    -.0699929   -.0551163 
        off9 |   -.009521    .003415    -2.79   0.005    -.0162143   -.0028278 
       off10 |  -.1009033   .0028236   -35.74   0.000    -.1064374   -.0953692 
       off11 |  -.0306196   .0027913   -10.97   0.000    -.0360906   -.0251486 
       off12 |  -.0673968   .0028768   -23.43   0.000    -.0730351   -.0617584 
        bham |  -.0582009   .0106804    -5.45   0.000    -.0791343   -.0372674 
       lpool |   .0018692    .008358     0.22   0.823    -.0145123    .0182506 
       mboro |  -.0248839   .0101897    -2.44   0.015    -.0448556   -.0049122 
      swnsea |  -.0180035   .0109453    -1.64   0.100     -.039456    .0034491 
       chelt |   -.000327   .0134108    -0.02   0.981    -.0266119    .0259579 
       ponty |  -.0464823   .0132551    -3.51   0.000    -.0724621   -.0205025 
       _cons |   .1328802   .0031594    42.06   0.000     .1266879    .1390726 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (309 categories) 
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Appendix 4.1  Peer Review of Police Station Files  Guidance and Gradings 
 
 
Scoring 
 
Where numerical scale is used 1 = Excellent 
     2 = Competence Plus/Good 
     3 = Threshold Competence/Average 
     4 = Incompetent/poor 
     5 = Non-performance/Very poor239F177 
 
N/A = Not applicable  X = Insufficient information recorded to make 
judgement 
 
Data Collection Form 
UFN………………………...  Contractor name and 
area……………………….. 
  
Name……………………….  PDS 
office…………………….……………………. 
 
Offence for which 
arrested/detained…………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Length of consultation with client prior to first police interview: 
 
…………..mins  N/A  X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
 
1. Quality of written records 
 
Standard form 
Standard form used?   Yes   No  
 
Adequacy of standard form  1 2 3 4 5
 N/A 
 
Comment? 
                                                 
177 For the original data collection, the scoring scale was reversed (i.e. 1 = non-performance and 5 = 
excellence), but to provide consistency with the second stage peer review, the results as reported in 
Chapter 5 were recalculated according to the above scale. 
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Ease of use of file 
Legibility     1 2 3 4 5 
 
Layout     1 2 3 4 5 
 
Comment? 
 
 
Level of information recorded  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Comment? 
 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
Was first contact timely?  Yes    No   X
 N/A 
 
Was first attendance at 
police station timely  Yes     No   X
 N/A 
 
Comment? 
 
 
3. Decision to attend police station 
 
Was the decision to attend/not attend the police station appropriate? 
 
     Yes    No   X  
 
Comment? 
 
 
4. Decision to attend police interviews (where interviews were held) 
 
Was the decision to attend/not attend police interview(s) appropriate? 
 
   Yes   No   X   N/A  
 
Comment? 
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5. Obtaining information/instructions 
 
Does the lawyer appear to have acted appropriately in securing information from 
the police?       
1 2 3 4 5 X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
Does the lawyer appear to have acted appropriately in obtaining instructions from 
the client?       
1 2 3 4 5 X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
6. Giving advice 
 
Does the advice given to the client regarding their legal position appear to be 
appropriate? 
      1 2 3 4 5 X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
Does the advice given to the client regarding strategy in police interview appear to 
be appropriate 
     1 2 3 4 5 N/A X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
7. Police interview(s) 
 
Do the actions of the lawyer in the police interview(s) appear to be appropriate? 
 
     1 2 3 4 5 N/A X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
8. Representations as to charge and bail 
 
Do representations regarding charge appear to be appropriate 
 
     1 2 3 4 5 N/A X 
 
Comment? 
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Do representations regarding bail appear to be appropriate? 
 
     1 2 3 4 5 N/A X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
 
9. General standard of performance 
 
Was the general level of service/performance adequate? 
 
     1 2 3 4 5 X 
 
Comment? 
 
 
10. Outcome 
 
 
11. Was the result -  
 
A Better than expected  
 
B As expected    
 
C Worse than expected 
 
X Insufficient information to make judgement  
 
 
Comment? 
 
Guidance 
 
1. Quality of written records 
 
Adequacy of a standard form refers to whether the prompts are adequate, whether 
there is an appropriate mix between compliance and narrative prompts, layout, etc. 
Use of standard forms for police station work is not required under the criminal 
contract, but is recommended by the Law Society. Relevant factors in forming a 
judgement include: 
• the extent to which the form prompts the securing/recording of relevant 
information 
• the extent to which the form is designed to prompt the recording of relevant 
information as distinct from demonstrating compliance with contract requirements 
• the extent to which the form is of practical use. 
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Legibility is relevant both because of non-continuity of representation and because of 
the need to demonstrate contract compliance by evidence on the file. 
 
Layout refers to ease of use of the file bearing in mind the fact that information on the 
file may need to be readily accessible eg. in subsequent court proceedings, and 
discontinuity of representation. 
 
Level of information refers to information that should be recorded as a matter of good 
practice, having regard to contract requirements, transaction criteria, etc. It differs 
from adequacy of any standard form used because, inter alia, forms may not be fully 
completed. In Quality in Criminal Defence Services a distinction was made between 
information required to be recorded as a matter of good practice and information that 
it is necessary to record in order to advise/represent competently at the time. In 
outline, they were as follows (with slight amendment indicated by *): 
 
Information required for good practice 
• Client's name, address, date of birth* 
• Conflict of interests check noted 
• Where attendance at the police station is required under the contract, and no 
attendance, reasons for not attending. [Attendance requirements for duty 
solicitor cases are governed by para 8.2.6 of the Contract Specification, and 
for own solicitor cases, by paras 3.1 and 8.2.6 (part).] 
• The times of consultation with the client 
• The advice given as to what the police have to prove and as to the client's legal 
position 
• The advice given as to what to do in the police interview(s), especially as to 
whether to answer police questions 
• Advice/representations following police interview(s) 
 
Information that is necessary in order to advise/represent competently 
• The time of and reasons for arrest and detention, and the time of the client's 
arrival at the police station 
• The time and content of police interview(s) 
• A note of consultation with, and information obtained from, custody officer 
and officer in the case 
• Instructions from the client 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
Timeliness of first contact The contract requires that where a client has been arrested 
and requests advice and the contractor accepts the matter, first contact (in person or 
by telephone) must normally be within 45 minutes of the initial contact. [Para 5.1 
Contract Specification. If first contact is not made within 45 mins, the reason must be 
noted (para 5.1.3).] This is to be used for the purposes of peer review as a guideline 
only. 
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Indicate N/A where timeliness is not relevant, eg., where the first contact relates to a 
bail-back. 
 
Timeliness of first police station attendance The contract requires that where a 
decision to attend a client at the police station in person is made, attendance should 
normally be within 45 minutes of that decision. [Para 5.2 Contract Specifications. If 
attendance does not take place within 45 mins of decision to attend, the reason must 
be noted (para 5.2.4).] This is to be used for the purposes of peer review as a guideline 
only. 
 
Indicate N/A where timeliness is not relevant, eg., where the attendance relates to a 
bail-back, or solicitor and client attend the police station together. 
 
3. Decision to attend police station 
 
Generally, attendance at the police station would be expected where the client has 
been arrested for an arrestable offence, where the police are planning an ID procedure 
such as a parade, where the client complains of serious police maltreatment, or where 
the client is a person at risk or a youth. Seriousness of the allegation is also a relevant 
factor. [Para 8.2.6 Contract Specification (duty solicitor cases) and paras 3.1 and 8.2.6 
(part) (own solicitor cases).] 
 
 
4. Decision to attend police interview(s) 
 
The contract requires duty solicitors to attend all police interviews where the client is 
arrested for an arrestable offence. [Para 8.2.6 Contract Specification (duty solicitor 
cases) and paras 3.1 and 8.2.6 (part) (own solicitor cases).] Normally, it would be 
expected that where a solicitor attends the police station s/he will also attend police 
interview(s). However, relevant factors include seriousness of the allegation, 
instructions from client, vulnerability of client. 
 
Indicate N/A where there was no police interview, or where telephone-only advice 
was given. 
 
5. Obtaining information/instructions 
 
Information from the police This includes information from the custody record, 
custody officer and officer(s) in the case, and is to be judged having regard to rights to 
information, the stage at which the information appears to have been obtained, 
attempts to secure information, seriousness of the case, etc. The lawyer is entitled to 
see the custody record on arrival at the police station (PACE Code C para 2.4), and 
this should be done prior to police interview. The lawyer has no legal entitlement to 
other information (except the first description given by eyewitnesses where the police 
intend to hold an ID procedure), but good practice dictates that the lawyer should seek 
disclosure from the police, and negotiate appropriately in the case of refusal. Note that 
the issue is not whether the lawyer has in fact obtained disclosure, but whether they 
acted appropriately in seeking to obtain the information.  
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Instructions from the client There is some professional disagreement as to whether it 
is always appropriate to obtain detailed instructions from a client in a police station. 
Some believe that reasonably detailed instructions should always be obtained and 
recorded - otherwise it will be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give adequate 
legal advice. However, others are of the view that instructions need not be obtained 
where it is likely that this would professionally embarrass the lawyer if the client then 
wanted to deny the offence in interview. Allowance must be made for this. Other 
relevant factors include the nature and seriousness of the allegation(s), the level of 
detail obtained and recorded, and the stage at which instructions were obtained. 
 
6. Giving advice 
 
Advice as to legal position includes advice as to the apparent strength of the police 
case, and whether, on the client's instructions, they are guilty, have a defence, etc. 
Difficulty may arise where the file simply indicates that the client says that they are 
guilty. It can be argued that this is inadequate since it is for the lawyer to advise the 
client whether, on the basis of their instructions, they are guilty and whether the 
prosecution are likely to be able to prove guilt. One relevant factor in making a 
judgement will be the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence(s). 
 
Advice as to strategy in police interview The principal advice will be whether the 
client should answer questions in interview, but there are variations eg. making no 
comment and handing in a prepared statement. Relevant factors include the apparent 
strength of the police case, the instructions from the client, the implications of the 
'right to silence' provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and the 
vulnerability of the client (including age, drug/alcohol dependency, mental handicap 
or disorder). 
 
Indicate N/A if there is no police interview. 
 
 
7. Police interview 
 
This should be judged having regard to best practice requirements such as making an 
opening statement, and whether the lawyer should intervene eg. to challenge improper 
questioning, to give client further advice, or if 'evidence' is introduced which has not 
previously been disclosed to the lawyer. 
 
Indicate N/A if there is no police interview or the lawyer does not attend the 
interview(s). 
 
 
8. Representations as to charge and bail 
 
Representations as to charge may be relevant if there is scope for negotiations as to 
the level or nature of the charge eg. ABH rather than GBH, or if there is scope for 
negotiation as to whether the client should be dealt with other than by charge eg. 
NFA, caution, reprimand or warning. 
 
Indicate N/A if, for example, the client is bailed without charge.  
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Representations as to bail may be relevant if there is scope to affect the custody 
officer's decision regarding whether to grant bail, or whether to impose conditions or 
what conditions are appropriate. 
 
Indicate N/A if it is clear that representations would have made no difference eg. 
client charged with a very serious offence or that unconditional bail would be granted. 
 
 
9. General standard of performance 
 
This requires the peer reviewer to give an overall score taking into account all 
relevant matters. 
 
 
10. Outcome 
 
Indicate the outcome (eg. NFA, bail without charge, caution, reprimand or final 
warning, charges) and the bail position. 
 
 
11. Assessment of the outcome 
 
The peer reviewer should give their judgement, on the information available, as to the 
outcome. However, the reviewer should indicate X if there is insufficient evidence to 
make a judgement. For example, judgement will be impossible if there is little 
indication of the strength of the police case and/or of the client's instructions. 
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Appendix 4.2    Criteria and Definitions for Second Stage Peer Review of Crime 
Files 
 
Assessment Form 
 
Client Name: 
UFN: 
Supplier/PDO name:     PDO Area: 
Fee Earner (Where Known)    
Case complexity/difficulty: Exceptional/Demanding/Routine/Minor 
Case Seriousness: Most Serious/Moderately Serious/Least Serious 
 
1 = excellent 
2 = competence plus/good 
3 = threshold competence 
4 = below competent/poor 
5 = non-performance/very poor 
X = insufficient information to make a judgement 
NA = not applicable 
 
Lead charge: 
 
Other Charge(s): 
 
 
A. The file 
1. How effective is the composition of the file?   1  2  3  4  5 
2. How appropriate is the level of information recorded?  
(a) At investigation stage      1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
(b) Post Charge       1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
3. How appropriate was the management of the case throughout? 1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
Comments:      
 
B. Communication 
1. How appropriate were the lawyer's communication and  
client-handling skills?       1  2  3  4  5  X 
2. How appropriately was the client informed of: 
(a) the merits (or not) of their defence/case?    1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
(b) all developments (including conclusion)    1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
3. How appropriate was the lawyer's communication 
with others, including the CPS, defence counsel etc.?  1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
4. How timely was all communication?    1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
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Comments: 
 
 
C. Information and fact-gathering 
1. How effective was the lawyer in seeking relevant 
information from the client?      1  2  3  4  5  X 
2. How effective was the lawyer in seeking relevant 
information from the police and/or prosecution: 
(a) At investigation stage      1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
(b) Post Charge       1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
3. How effective was the lawyer in seeking relevant 
information from others?      1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
Comments: 
 
 
D. Advice and assistance 
1. How good was the advice?      1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
2. (a) How appropriate was advice on plea?    1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
    (b) If (at any stage) the client was advised to plead guilty, was the timing of the 
advice: 
 (i) too early (ii) appropriate (iii) too late 
3. How appropriate was advice on appeal?    1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
Comments: 
 
 
E. The work/assistance 
1. Was all work done that should reasonably have been done? Y  N  X 
If No, specify: 
 
 
2. How effective was the work done in achieving 
the client's (reasonable) objectives?     1  2  3  4  5  X 
 
 
3. What was the impact of the lawyer on:  
(a) Bail: better than expected/as expected/worse than expected/X/NA 
(b) Mode/venue: better than expected/as expected/worse than expected/X/NA 
(c) The Process:  better than expected/as expected/worse than expected/X/NA 
(d) What convicted of/or not: better than expected /as expected/worse than 
expected/X/NA 
 (e) Sentence: better than expected/as expected/worse than expected/X/NA 
4. Was the client prejudiced in any way by the work 
done or not done?        Y  N   
(If yes, specify) 
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Comments: 
 
 
F. Efficiency 
1. How efficiently was the work carried out?    1  2  3  4  5  X 
2. Throughout the file, how effectively did the  
organisation use resources (including experts?   1  2  3  4  5  X  
NA 
3. Were any disbursements incurred appropriate?   Y  N N/A 
Comments: 
 
 
G. General 
1. Where ethical issues arise were they dealt with appropriately? Y  N N/A 
 
 
Please state the following: 
 
Claim Code: 
 
Offence code: 
 
Outcome code: 
 
 
Overall mark 
(a) At Investigation Stage     1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
(b) At Magistrates Court Stage     1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
(c) At Crown Court Stage     1  2  3  4  5  X 
N/A 
(d) Overall File Score      1  2  3  4  5   
 
 
 
Please write any further comments below or on the extra paper provided. 
 
 
Claim Codes 
 
• 1A - Free Standing advice and assistance 
• 1B - Police Station telephone advice only (including a&a where given) 
• 1C - Police station attendance (including a&a and telephone advice where 
given) 
• 1D - Police station attendance (including a&a and telephone advice where 
given) - Armed Forces Personnel only 
• 1E - Warrant of further detention (including Terrorism Act 2000) (including 
a&a and any other police station advice where given) 
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• 1F - Warrant of further detention (including a&a and any other police station 
advice where given) - Armed Forces Personnel only 
• 1G - Duty Solicitor Standby 
• 1H - Breach of bail conditions 
• 1I - Arrest on warrant following failure to appear at the magistrates' or Crown 
court 
• 1J - Post-charge identification paragraph/recharge following discontinuance or 
dismissal of the case 
• 1K - Administration of a reprimand, warning or caution 
• 1L - Immigration Matter 
• 2A - Free standing advice and assistance (this code was used before 
17/05/2004) 
• 2B - Early hearing (including a&a where given) (this code was used before 
17/05/2004) 
• 2C - Magistrates' court advocacy assistance (including a&a where given) 
• 2D - Court Duty Solicitor session 
• 2E - Representation order - LSF (including a&a and early hearing where 
given) 
• 2F - Representation order - HSF (including a&a and early hearing where 
given) 
• 2G - Representation order - NSF (including a&a and early hearing where 
given) 
• 2H - Crown Court advocacy assistance (including a&a where given) 
• 2I - High Court representation 
• 2J - Second claim for deferred sentence 
• 4A - Free standing advice and assistance 
• 4B - Advocacy assistance at prison discipline hearings (including a&a where 
given) 
• 4C - Advocacy assistance at parole board hearings (including a&a where 
given) 
 
Offence Codes 
 
• 1 -  Offences against the person 
• 2 -  Homicide and related grave offences 
• 3 -  Sexual offences and offences against children 
• 4 -  Robbery 
• 5 -  Burglary 
• 6 -  Criminal damage 
• 7 -  Theft 
• 8 -  Fraud and forgery and other offences of dishonesty 
• 9 -  Public order offences and offences against public justice 
• 10 - Offences in relation to supply, production and possession of drugs 
• 11 - Driving offences 
• 12 - Other offences 
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Outcome Codes  
 
• A1 - No further instructions received from client 
• B1 - Change of solicitor 
• C1 - Client not a suspect/defendant on a criminal charge 
• D1 -  No further action to be taken 
• E1 -  Client released following warning/reprimand/caution 
• F1 - Client charged with/summonsed for a criminal offence 
• A2 - Arrest warrant issued/adjourned indefinitely 
• B2 - Change of Solicitor 
• C2 -  Representation order withdrawn 
• D2 -  Acquitted at trial of all contested matters 
• E2 - Convicted at trial of some contested matters but acquitted of other contested 
matters 
• F2 -  Convicted at trial of all contested matters 
• G2 -  Proceedings discontinued where the matter has not been listed for trial 
• H2 -  Proceedings discontinued where the matter has been listed for trial 
• I2 -  Guilty plea to all matters put where the matter has not been listed for trial 
• J2 -  Guilty plea to all matters put where the matter has been listed for trial 
• K2 -  Mix of guilty plea(s) and discontinuance or not guilty plea accepted where 
the matter has not been listed for trial 
• L2 -  Mix of guilty plea(s) and discontinuance where the matter has been listed for 
trial 
• M2 -  Committal and transfers for trial to Crown Court (election by client) 
• N2 -  Committal and transfers for trial to Crown Court (direction of the court)  
• O2 -  Committal proceedings that are discharged 
• P2 -  Extradition 
• Z2 -  Matter concluded on or before 16 May 2004 and reported on or after 17 May 
2004 
 
Rating Definitions 
 
The ratings’ definitions describe the work of the supplier as reviewed by the peer 
reviewer over a number of files. Similar concepts are applicable to individual 
files, although the wording of the definitions aims more to describe a range of 
work. 
 
The criteria are marked on a sliding (in research terminology “Likert”) scale (1–
5), and, in some cases, with Yes/No. For each civil file peer reviewed, an overall 
assessment of quality is made with a 1–5 rating. For crime files, an overall rating 
of 1–5 is given for each stage of the case (Investigation Stage, Magistrates Court 
Stage and Crown Court Stage), followed by an overall assessment of quality for 
each file. 
 
Following the review of a sample of files for a supplier, an overall rating (using 
the 1-5 rating) is given for the quality of legal advice and work.  
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The ratings are as follows: 
 
• Excellence (1) 
• Competence Plus (2) 
• Threshold Competence (3) 
• Below Competence (4) 
• Failure in Performance (5) 
 
Where a supplier’s work is rated as Below Competence (4) or Failure in Performance 
(5), this indicates that the work falls below that required by Clause 3.2 of the General 
Contract240F178 Standard Terms, which states that: 
 
“You must perform all Contract Work and exercise your Devolved Powers in a 
timely manner and with all reasonable skill, care and diligence. You must 
perform your obligations to record and report data accurately. Your Claims 
must be true, accurate and reasonable.”  
 
The definitions of the ratings are as follows: 
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Excellence (1) 
Indicators of Excellence in the standard of work include: 
• Clients’ instructions are fully and appropriately recorded. 
• Communication, advice and other work are tailored to each individual client’s 
circumstances.  
• Clients are all advised correctly and in full.  
• All issues are progressed comprehensively, appropriately and efficiently.  
• There is a demonstration of in-depth knowledge and appreciation of the wider 
context. 
• There is excellent use of tactics and strategies, demonstrating skill and 
expertise, in an attempt to ensure the best outcomes for clients.  
• The supplier adds value to their cases, taking a fully proactive approach. 
• There are no areas for major improvement. 
 
Competence Plus (2) 
Indicators of Competence Plus in the standard of work include: 
• Clients’ instructions are appropriately recorded.  
• Advice and work is tailored to individual client’s circumstances.  
• Clients are advised correctly and in full. 
• Issues are progressed comprehensively, appropriately and efficiently.  
• Tactics and strategies are employed to achieve the best outcomes for clients. 
• The supplier adds value to cases and takes a proactive approach. 
 
Threshold Competence (3) 
 
Threshold Competence is the standard that meets that required by Clause 3.2 of the 
Contract Standard Terms.                                            
                                                                                               
Indicators of Threshold Competence in the standard of work include: 
• Clients’ instructions are appropriately recorded.  
• There is adequate but limited communication with the client. 
• The advice and work is adequate although it may not always be extensive and 
may not deal with other linked issues other than the presenting issue. 
• There may be areas that the supplier will need to address in order to progress 
towards Competence Plus (2) or Excellence (1). 
 
Below Competence (4) 
Peer review demonstrates that contract work has been conducted below the standard 
which clients are reasonably entitled to expect from a solicitor, and in breach of 
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Clause 3.2 of the Contract Standard Terms. 
 
Indicators of Below Competence in the standard of work include: 
• Information is not being recorded or reported accurately. 
• Communication with the client is sometimes of poor quality. 
• The advice and other work is inadequate.  
• Some cases are not being conducted with reasonable skill, care and diligence. 
• The timeliness of the communication, the advice or other work is sometimes 
inadequate. 
• There are lapses below the required standard. 
 
Failure in Performance (5) 
 
Peer review demonstrates that contract work has been conducted substantially below 
the standard which clients are reasonably entitled to expect from a solicitor and 
substantially below that required by Clause 3.2 of the Contract Standard Terms (a 
fundamental breach as described in the contract).  Additionally, there has been at least 
one major or complete failure to conduct work to this standard. 
 
Indicators of Failure in Performance in the standard of work include: 
• Information is not being recorded or reported accurately. 
• Communication with clients is often of poor quality. 
• Cases in general are not being conducted with reasonable skill, care and 
diligence. 
• The timeliness of the communication, the advice or work is often inadequate. 
• There is a detrimental service to clients, or there is no meaningful service at 
all, or there is a service that leads to potential prejudice for the client. 
 
Additional notes 
 
The matters set out in the ratings definitions above are examples of the standard of 
work they describe. Peer reviewers may take other causes of the failures in the work 
into account in order to determine the quality of advice and work evidenced by the 
peer review. For example supervision and file review (required as part of the 
Specialist Quality Mark (SQM)) are designed to prevent the provision of poor quality 
of advice and legal work, as evidenced by a rating of Below Competence (4) or 
Failure in Performance (5).  The award of a rating of Below Competence (4) and 
Failure in Performance (5) suggest that supervision processes are not in effective 
operation. 
 
The indicators outlined by the bullet points for each rating are indicative only.  Each 
file is unlikely to evidence all the indicators and the peer reviewer is not restricted in 
the way he/she assesses the file.  The indicators are provided to develop an 
understanding of each rating and how one rating differs from another.  Peer reviewers 
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are able to use the experience of running their own cases and supervising the cases of 
others to assess what is in a case file and what may be. 
 
Ratings of Excellence (1), Competence Plus (2) and Threshold Competence (3) 
indicate that a supplier is meeting or exceeding the requirements of Clause 3.2 of the 
Contract Standard Terms, whilst ratings of Below Competence (4) and Failure in 
Performance (5) breach this clause.  
 
Making a Judgement on Quality 
 
Following the assessment of 15 files in a category of law, the peer reviewer prepares a 
quality assessment report.  This report details all the key findings extracted from the 
individual files, with particular emphasis on trends and patterns identified across the 
sample.  The peer reviewer will consider all the findings and all pertinent information, 
as evidenced from all the files in the sample and will determine an overall supplier 
rating, which is recorded on the final report. 
 
The peer reviewer will not automatically arrive at the final rating simply by averaging 
the scores on the individual files, although in some instances the final rating is likely 
to be the equivalent of the average of the scores on those individual files.  The essence 
of the peer review process is that reviewers use their skill, experience and training to 
inform the overall rating of the supplier from the trends and patterns they see on the 
individual files. The entire process and the management by IALS of areas such as 
consistency and training, ensures that the rating given by the reviewer is essentially 
the shared view of the entire panel of reviewers. 
 
The peer reviewer does not employ any specific formula to arrive at the overall rating. 
The fundamental nature of peer review is that it is the judgement of an experienced 
practitioner. Again, it is important to emphasise that the rating given by the reviewer 
is essentially the shared view of the entire panel of reviewers.  The peer review 
methodology and framework enables peer reviewers to make a judgement on how 
they think the work of a supplier is managed, supervised and ultimately produced as a 
result of seeing the work in a category of law on the individual files. Their function is 
to assess the overall quality of work in the organisation from the sample of files. For 
example, no one would wish any client to receive advice or legal work, which is 
Below Competence (4) or a Failure in Performance (5).  Peer reviewers’ overall 
ratings may be influenced by the extent and the causes of poorer work.   
 

 Appendix 5.1  Multivariate Analysis of  Estimated Costs in Police Stations and 
Magistrates’ Courts of PDS and Private Practice 
 
As before, in order to make the comparison of costs between PDO and PP suppliers 
statistically robust, we need to compare costs for like claims. In particular, we should 
be comparing claims of equal complexity and for similar localities. The data available 
from SPOCC and CMS allows us to estimate the differences in costs between PDO 
and PP supplier cases (where the former are estimated using CMS-derived estimates, 
and the latter are the actual bills claimed). In addition, it is possible to control for the 
type of offence, the number of defendants and the number of claims made by each 
supplier (a proxy for supplier size). Finally, it could be argued that the geographic 
variation in police station or court procedures means we should control for differences 
at the local level.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 below show the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the 
SPOCC/CMS data on the costs of investigation claims (using lower and upper rate 
assumptions respectively). In Tables 3 and 4, we present multiple regression analyses 
on the SPOCC/CMS data on the costs of magistrate claims cases (again, using lower 
and upper rate assumptions respectively).The independent variables in each case are 
the number of defendants, whether the claim is for a youth or duty solicitor case, 
supplier size (as measured by the number of claims made), and the type of offence (11 
indicator variables). In addition, the investigation claim cost regressions control for 
the location of the police station (704 indicator variables), and the magistrate court 
claim cost regressions control for the location of the court itself (297 indicator 
variables); the coefficients labelled Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, 
Swansea, Cheltenham and Pontypridd show the size of the cost differences (in £) for 
each of these PDOs compared with private suppliers, and the associated (robust) t-
statistics show the statistical significance of these differences. 
  
The results strongly support the existence of very significant differences in costs 
between PDOs and private suppliers, using the CMS-derived estimates of PD costs. It 
is immediately evident that, after controlling for case complexity and location, costs 
were found to be significantly higher in all PDOs by comparison with PP claims.  
This was true for both investigation claims and magistrate court claims. The costs per 
investigation claim were between £152 and £216 higher (depending on the particular 
PDO) than in private practice, even using the lower rate assumptions. The costs per 
magistrate court claim were between £74 and £349 higher (again depending on the 
particular PDO) than in private practice, even using the lower rate assumptions. 
 
On average, PDO investigations are predicted to cost between 71% and 93% more 
than the predicted PP average (£240.83). PDO proceedings are predicted to cost 
between 41% and 58% more than the predicted PP average (£450.42). The reasons for 
the higher cost per case in PDOs could in fact be: 
1. the PDOs have not done enough hours in total, so our calculation of the mean 
hourly cost is relatively high due to undercapacity by comparison with PPs 
2. the PDOs are doing too much work on each case relative to PPs, so their total costs 
are too high relative to PPs even when working at full capacity 
3. the PDOs are paying more for each hour, so their total costs are too high relative to 
PPs even when working at full capacity and with the same time/case 
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So, a higher cost per case could be due to low caseload (1) or high time per case (2) or 
high hourly costs (3) or a combination of these in varying proportions.  
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Table 1: Total costs and disbursements (lower rate) for investigation 
claims (retained clients only), controlling for police station 
identity 
 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=  132699 
                                                       F( 21,131942) 
=  364.48 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.1813 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.1766 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  163.42 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    totalowc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   .9207112   1.243163     0.74   0.459    -1.515865    
3.357288 
        you2 |  -4.100781   1.452557    -2.82   0.005    -6.947766   
-1.253795 
        dut2 |   48.98787   1.232415    39.75   0.000     46.57236    
51.40338 
      sumsup |  -.0013297   .0002485    -5.35   0.000    -.0018168   
-.0008426 
        off2 |   302.8586   14.18873    21.35   0.000     275.0489    
330.6682 
        off3 |   93.28766   3.398177    27.45   0.000      86.6273    
99.94803 
        off4 |   74.64233   2.681023    27.84   0.000     69.38758    
79.89709 
        off5 |   3.079934   1.616575     1.91   0.057    -.0885243    
6.248393 
        off6 |  -34.66192   1.770699   -19.58   0.000    -38.13246   
-31.19139 
        off7 |  -30.73491   1.190992   -25.81   0.000    -33.06923   
-28.40058 
        off8 |   38.58979   3.250703    11.87   0.000     32.21847    
44.96111 
        off9 |  -35.76304   1.788989   -19.99   0.000    -39.26942   
-32.25665 
       off10 |   8.329453    2.15935     3.86   0.000     4.097166    
12.56174 
       off11 |  -51.85667   1.677645   -30.91   0.000    -55.14483   
-48.56852 
       off12 |  -38.47812   2.005649   -19.18   0.000    -42.40916   
-34.54709 
        bham |   151.6485    16.5767     9.15   0.000     119.1585    
184.1385 
       lpool |   172.9698   16.11369    10.73   0.000     141.3872    
204.5523 
       mboro |   216.2505   11.73629    18.43   0.000     193.2476    
239.2534 
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      swnsea |   176.9116   23.40861     7.56   0.000     131.0312    
222.7921 
       chelt |   157.5261   12.56683    12.54   0.000     132.8953    
182.1568 
       ponty |   195.9017   19.05391    10.28   0.000     158.5564     
233.247 
       _cons |   236.3901   1.793164   131.83   0.000     232.8756    
239.9047 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        stat |   absorbed                                     (736 
categories) 
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Table 2: Total costs and disbursements (upper rate) for investigation 
claims (retained clients only), controlling for police station 
identity 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=  132699 
                                                       F( 21,131942) 
=  365.57 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.1889 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.1843 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  165.77 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    totalupp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   .9242834   1.254629     0.74   0.461    -1.534768    
3.383334 
        you2 |  -4.056824   1.457474    -2.78   0.005    -6.913447     
-1.2002 
        dut2 |   48.99408   1.256181    39.00   0.000     46.53199    
51.45617 
      sumsup |   -.001306   .0002492    -5.24   0.000    -.0017944   
-.0008176 
        off2 |   304.4928   14.55465    20.92   0.000     275.9659    
333.0196 
        off3 |    93.8329    3.44086    27.27   0.000     87.08888    
100.5769 
        off4 |   74.75294   2.693331    27.75   0.000     69.47406    
80.03182 
        off5 |   2.975625   1.638879     1.82   0.069    -.2365473    
6.187797 
        off6 |  -34.98075   1.796542   -19.47   0.000    -38.50194   
-31.45956 
        off7 |  -30.90627   1.210355   -25.53   0.000    -33.27854   
-28.53399 
        off8 |   38.79976   3.285031    11.81   0.000     32.36115    
45.23836 
        off9 |  -36.10261   1.809805   -19.95   0.000    -39.64979   
-32.55542 
       off10 |   8.259278   2.191926     3.77   0.000     3.963143    
12.55541 
       off11 |  -52.07917   1.706233   -30.52   0.000    -55.42335   
-48.73498 
       off12 |  -38.58584   2.035477   -18.96   0.000    -42.57534   
-34.59634 
        bham |   216.8382   19.00845    11.41   0.000      179.582    
254.0944 
       lpool |    215.932   17.85577    12.09   0.000      180.935    
250.9289 
       mboro |   277.4441   13.50429    20.54   0.000     250.9759    
303.9122 
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      swnsea |   226.9606   26.16549     8.67   0.000     175.6768    
278.2445 
       chelt |   204.6541   14.27697    14.33   0.000     176.6715    
232.6367 
       ponty |   241.4765   21.24418    11.37   0.000     199.8383    
283.1147 
       _cons |   236.3844   1.811315   130.50   0.000     232.8342    
239.9345 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        stat |   absorbed                                     (736 
categories) 
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Table 3: Total costs and disbursements (lower rate) for magistrate 
court claims (retained clients only), controlling for court identity 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=  153413 
                                                       F( 21,153095) 
=  207.68 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.0708 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.0689 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  491.29 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    lowallre |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   113.2037   20.14279     5.62   0.000     73.72427    
152.6832 
        you2 |   61.29849   4.248152    14.43   0.000      52.9722    
69.62478 
        dut2 |  -101.9016   4.043494   -25.20   0.000    -109.8268   
-93.97648 
      sumsup |  -.0062723   .0006445    -9.73   0.000    -.0075355   
-.0050091 
        off2 |   120.1696   52.63565     2.28   0.022     17.00478    
223.3344 
        off3 |   111.0444   19.26975     5.76   0.000     73.27609    
148.8127 
        off4 |   68.26209   13.62561     5.01   0.000     41.55617    
94.96801 
        off5 |  -86.03962   6.749211   -12.75   0.000    -99.26793    
-72.8113 
        off6 |  -131.1286   4.768229   -27.50   0.000    -140.4743    
-121.783 
        off7 |  -167.2688   3.564939   -46.92   0.000     -174.256   
-160.2816 
        off8 |  -76.99614   15.10705    -5.10   0.000    -106.6056   
-47.38664 
        off9 |  -98.06619    5.06282   -19.37   0.000    -107.9892   
-88.14316 
       off10 |  -153.3359   5.022874   -30.53   0.000    -163.1806   
-143.4912 
       off11 |  -144.3336   3.719583   -38.80   0.000    -151.6239   
-137.0433 
       off12 |  -189.7153   5.158989   -36.77   0.000    -199.8268   
-179.6037 
        bham |   348.9416   36.19048     9.64   0.000      278.009    
419.8742 
       lpool |   73.82933    18.3651     4.02   0.000     37.83411    
109.8245 
       mboro |   239.7524   27.56919     8.70   0.000     185.7173    
293.7874 
      swnsea |   201.9447   40.12684     5.03   0.000     123.2969    
280.5925 
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       chelt |   306.0081   33.27776     9.20   0.000     240.7844    
371.2318 
       ponty |   218.8503   37.64477     5.81   0.000     145.0674    
292.6333 
       _cons |   451.4592   21.16986    21.33   0.000     409.9667    
492.9517 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (297 
categories) 
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Table 4: Total costs and disbursements (upper rate) for magistrate 
court claims (retained clients only), controlling for court identity 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=  153413 
                                                       F( 21,153095) 
=  213.66 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.0730 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.0711 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  492.75 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    upperall |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   113.2117   20.14763     5.62   0.000     73.72274    
152.7006 
        you2 |   61.34204   4.257537    14.41   0.000     52.99735    
69.68672 
        dut2 |  -102.0492   4.080352   -25.01   0.000    -110.0466   
-94.05182 
      sumsup |   -.006254   .0006448    -9.70   0.000    -.0075178   
-.0049901 
        off2 |   120.1674   52.65473     2.28   0.022     16.96523    
223.3696 
        off3 |   110.9321    19.2938     5.75   0.000     73.11667    
148.7476 
        off4 |    68.2998   13.65963     5.00   0.000      41.5272     
95.0724 
        off5 |  -86.19824   6.763963   -12.74   0.000    -99.45547   
-72.94101 
        off6 |  -131.7641   4.790692   -27.50   0.000    -141.1537   
-122.3744 
        off7 |  -167.7527    3.57884   -46.87   0.000    -174.7671   
-160.7382 
        off8 |  -77.12711   15.12075    -5.10   0.000    -106.7635   
-47.49075 
        off9 |  -98.55665   5.081031   -19.40   0.000    -108.5154   
-88.59794 
       off10 |  -153.6148    5.05976   -30.36   0.000    -163.5318   
-143.6977 
       off11 |  -144.8202   3.733621   -38.79   0.000     -152.138   
-137.5024 
       off12 |  -190.2935   5.174004   -36.78   0.000    -200.4345   
-180.1526 
        bham |   476.4398   41.50731    11.48   0.000     395.0863    
557.7932 
       lpool |    123.149   20.10178     6.13   0.000     83.74996    
162.5481 
       mboro |   328.0105   30.87123    10.63   0.000     267.5035    
388.5175 
      swnsea |   270.6754   44.06034     6.14   0.000      184.318    
357.0327 
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       chelt |   390.6727   37.27985    10.48   0.000      317.605    
463.7405 
       ponty |   283.2761   41.10572     6.89   0.000     202.7097    
363.8424 
       _cons |   451.7592   21.17647    21.33   0.000     410.2537    
493.2647 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (297 
categories) 
 
  
 
Appendix 5.2 Multivariate Analysis of PDS Notional and Private Practice Costs 
as Recorded on SPOCC 
 
In Tables 1 and 2, we present multiple regression analyses of profit costs reported in 
SPOCC.  While these are notional profit costs in the case of the PDOs, it seems likely 
that they will be based on the PDO records of time spent on each case, and may 
therefore be interpreted as proxies for such.  
 
The regressions are estimated using data from all claims paid in the comparator 
regions. The independent variables in each case are the number of defendants, 
whether the claim is for a youth or duty solicitor case, supplier size (as measured by 
the number of claims made), and type of offence (11 indicator variables). In addition 
each regression controls for the location of the local police station (for investigation 
claims in Table 1) or the court (for proceedings claims in Table 2). The coefficients 
labelled Birmingham, Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Swansea, Cheltenham and 
Pontypridd show the size of the profit cost differences for each of these PDOs 
compared with private suppliers, and the associated (robust) t-statistics show the 
statistical significance of these differences241F179.  
 
The results can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. after controlling for case complexity and location, the reported profit costs at 
the investigation stage was significantly lower relative to private supplier cases in two 
of the PDOs [Birmingham and Liverpool], significantly higher relative to private 
supplier cases in one [Middlesborough], and no different in the remaining two [Table 
1]. 
2. after controlling for case complexity and location, the reported profit costs at 
the proceedings stage was significantly lower relative to private supplier cases in all 
but one of the PDOs, with Cheltenham being no different to private supplier cases 
[Table 2]. The lowest reported profit costs amongst PDOs were observed in 
Birmingham, Liverpool and Swansea. 
 
                                                 
179 t-statistics are calculated using standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Without this 
correction  estimates may be inefficient. 
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Table 1: Regression of reported profit costs in relation to PDO 
status controlling for offence type and police station (all 
investigation claims in comparator regions where solicitor was 
retained throughout) 
 
 
 Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs 
=  133513 
                                                       F( 21,132753) 
=  318.55 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.1400 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.1351 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  117.76 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    profitco |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   3.870471   .8348482     4.64   0.000     2.234184    
5.506758 
        you2 |  -4.597069    1.05208    -4.37   0.000    -6.659127   
-2.535012 
        dut2 |   19.75839   .8300294    23.80   0.000     18.13155    
21.38524 
      sumsup |   .0009574   .0001788     5.35   0.000     .0006069    
.0013079 
        off2 |   234.3347   10.15822    23.07   0.000     214.4247    
254.2446 
        off3 |   77.25845   2.536228    30.46   0.000     72.28749    
82.22941 
        off4 |   55.34865   1.977983    27.98   0.000     51.47184    
59.22546 
        off5 |   3.260904   1.160065     2.81   0.005     .9871969    
5.534611 
        off6 |  -26.90058   1.351157   -19.91   0.000    -29.54882   
-24.25234 
        off7 |  -24.65033   .8316433   -29.64   0.000    -26.28033   
-23.02032 
        off8 |    26.3235   2.349328    11.20   0.000     21.71886    
30.92814 
        off9 |  -25.49266   1.267874   -20.11   0.000    -27.97767   
-23.00765 
       off10 |   6.228633   1.549554     4.02   0.000     3.191535    
9.265731 
       off11 |  -39.95532   1.139905   -35.05   0.000    -42.18951   
-37.72112 
       off12 |  -28.81507   1.453382   -19.83   0.000    -31.66368   
-25.96647 
        bham |  -28.17609   3.899589    -7.23   0.000    -35.81922   
-20.53297 
       lpool |  -19.19755   4.806103    -3.99   0.000    -28.61742    
-9.77767 
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       mboro |   15.40758   3.724101     4.14   0.000     8.108413    
22.70675 
      swnsea |   6.838652   7.375295     0.93   0.354    -7.616792     
21.2941 
       chelt |  -.1230454    4.07878    -0.03   0.976    -8.117379    
7.871289 
       ponty |    8.08559   7.373948     1.10   0.273    -6.367215    
22.53839 
       _cons |   167.9729   1.224422   137.19   0.000      165.573    
170.3727 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        stat |   absorbed                                     (739 
categories) 
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Table 2: Regression of reported profit costs in relation to PDO 
status controlling for offence type and police station (all 
proceedings claims in comparator regions where solicitor was retained 
throughout) 
 
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs 
=  153413 
                                                       F( 21,153095) 
=  202.71 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.0559 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.0540 
                                                       Root MSE      
=   414.9 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    profitco |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    noofdefe |   100.7205   18.31201     5.50   0.000     64.82937    
136.6117 
        you2 |   56.60525   3.707992    15.27   0.000     49.33766    
63.87284 
        dut2 |  -74.77589   3.161414   -23.65   0.000     -80.9722   
-68.57958 
      sumsup |  -.0005884   .0005478    -1.07   0.283    -.0016622    
.0004853 
        off2 |   96.13103   47.77744     2.01   0.044      2.48823    
189.7738 
        off3 |   93.63549   16.87551     5.55   0.000     60.55983    
126.7111 
 
        off4 |   41.93081   11.69979     3.58   0.000     18.99947    
64.86215 
        off5 |  -94.19301   3.582418   -26.29   0.000    -101.2145   
-87.17154 
        off6 |  -106.9741   3.906215   -27.39   0.000    -114.6302   
-99.31795 
        off7 |  -145.0993   2.986503   -48.59   0.000    -150.9528   
-139.2458 
        off8 |  -57.29152   14.58742    -3.93   0.000    -85.88257   
-28.70047 
        off9 |  -76.51861   4.405098   -17.37   0.000    -85.15252   
-67.88471 
       off10 |  -131.0481    4.11656   -31.83   0.000    -139.1165   
-122.9797 
       off11 |  -126.1798   3.078592   -40.99   0.000    -132.2138   
-120.1458 
       off12 |  -150.1535   4.591963   -32.70   0.000    -159.1537   
-141.1534 
        bham |  -72.93727    11.5085    -6.34   0.000    -95.49369   
-50.38085 
       lpool |  -109.4245   6.695541   -16.34   0.000    -122.5476   
-96.30136 
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       mboro |  -38.49956   14.82681    -2.60   0.009    -67.55981   
-9.439311 
      swnsea |  -67.31873   15.09281    -4.46   0.000    -96.90034   
-37.73713 
       chelt |   8.872488    12.3741     0.72   0.473    -15.38049    
33.12547 
       ponty |   -58.4402   14.52338    -4.02   0.000    -86.90573   
-29.97467 
       _cons |   344.9621   19.19812    17.97   0.000     307.3342      
382.59 
 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                     (297 
categories) 
 
 

 Appendix 5.3 Regression Analysis of Estimated PDS and Private Practice Crown 
Court Costs 
 
Table 1: Crown court costs (lower) in relation to offence type and 
PDO indicator [costs capped at £200,000] 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=   35567 
                                                       F(  7, 35533) 
=  138.37 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.1170 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.1162 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  9582.1 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    lowercos |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    Homicide |   25656.07   1586.525    16.17   0.000     22546.43     
28765.7 
    Violence |  -1764.921    275.124    -6.41   0.000    -2304.172   
-1225.669 
      Sexual |   1030.443   342.4095     3.01   0.003     359.3099    
1701.576 
    Burglary |  -3185.616   275.4281   -11.57   0.000    -3725.464   
-2645.769 
        Misc |  -2087.973   286.4293    -7.29   0.000    -2649.384   
-1526.563 
 
 Pub justice |  -2547.805   337.8185    -7.54   0.000     -3209.94   
-1885.671 
         PDO |  -906.8524   235.9959    -3.84   0.000    -1369.412   
-444.2933 
       _cons |   4641.226   268.9332    17.26   0.000     4114.109    
5168.344 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                      (27 
categories) 
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Table 2: Crown court costs (upper) in relation to offence type and 
PDO indicator 
[costs capped at £200,000] 
 
 
Linear regression, absorbing indicators                Number of obs 
=   35567 
                                                       F(  7, 35533) 
=  138.66 
                                                       Prob > F      
=  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     
=  0.1173 
                                                       Adj R-squared 
=  0.1165 
                                                       Root MSE      
=  9584.7 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
             |               Robust 
    uppercos |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
    Homicide |   25693.71   1587.783    16.18   0.000      22581.6    
28805.81 
    Violence |  -1764.404   275.1336    -6.41   0.000    -2303.674   
-1225.133 
      Sexual |   1031.746    342.429     3.01   0.003     360.5749    
1702.918 
    Burglary |  -3186.463   275.4384   -11.57   0.000    -3726.331   
-2646.595 
        Misc |  -2087.856   286.4487    -7.29   0.000    -2649.305   
-1526.408 
 Pub justice |  -2548.323   337.8299    -7.54   0.000     -3210.48   
-1886.166 
         PDO |  -605.2227   258.6778    -2.34   0.019    -1112.239   
-98.20625 
       _cons |   4640.739   268.9427    17.26   0.000     4113.603    
5167.875 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------
--------- 
        cort |   absorbed                                      (27 
categories) 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
